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This paper addresses the optimal decisions and channel coordination issues in a green supply chain composed of a socially responsible manufacturer and a fair-mined retailer, where the manufacturer invests in advanced facilities/technologies to improve green quality of products, and the retailer exerts marketing effort to enhance market demand. We develop supply chain models under three scenarios: centralized system, wholesale price (WP) contract without fairness concerns, and WP contract with fairness concerns. Our results show that the retailer’s fairness behavior further causes a benefit for herself, while the manufacturer and the total supply chain to suffer. Moreover, a revenue-cost-sharing (RCS) contract is introduced to coordinate supply chain . We prove that a win-win outcome is reachable, and the RCS contract is applicable in practice.

This paper considers the supply chain composed of altruistic retailers and selfish manufacturers under risk aversion. We use the mean variance (MV) method to construct two types of behavior models. One is a two-stage supply chain model with a single manufacturer and a single retailer, and the other is a competitive supply chain model with two retailers and two manufacturers. We discuss the decision-making problems under manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) game and retailer Stackelberg (RS) game, respectively. We analyze the role of risk aversion and power structure. Results show that the more risk aversion manufacturers are, the lower the emission reduction levels are. It also find that the prices increase with power shift from retailers to manufacturers. Finally, we point out that the competing can help the firms earn more benefits via numerical studies.

This paper considers a low carbon supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer under the condition that the demand is uncertain. We first establish three games, including manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), retailer Stackelberg (RS) and Nash according to the different power structure of the firms. We then determine that the equilibrium stocking factors, emission reduction levels, wholesale prices and retail prices for the three models, respectively. After that, we demonstrate the effects of power structure. Results show that when the power shifts from the retailer to the manufacturer, the stocking factor decreases, whereas the wholesale price increases. Finally, we discuss the impacts of the random demand. We find that the expected profits of the firms, the emission reduction levels and the retail prices are increasing with respect to the market potential and low-carbon sensitivity coefficient, respectively. Meanwhile, they decrease with respect to the price sensitivity coefficient.