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Demand-side energy storage is an important foundation for enhancing load flexibility to accommodate renewable energy. With the widespread adoption of renewable energy, demand-side energy storage planning, and its incentive mechanism have also attracted the attention of a large number of scholars. However, there are still few studies on incentives from a carbon perspective. To fill the gap, a dynamic carbon incentive mechanism is proposed in this study. In addition, a hierarchical two-stage robust planning model for demand-side energy storage that incorporates the proposed carbon incentive mechanism is developed. At the first level, the economic dispatch is performed, and bus carbon intensities are calculated based on the carbon emission flow theory. The second level is a two-stage robust planning model to obtain the optimal capacities of demand-side energy storage, which is solved based on the nested column and constraint generation algorithm. The proposed model is implemented and evaluated on the MATLAB/YALMIP platform using IEEE 24-bus power systems. The results validate the efficacy of the model in promoting carbon-oriented demand-side energy storage planning, leading to a substantial reduction of carbon emissions by 8.44%. Notably, when compared to existing incentive mechanisms, the proposed carbon incentive mechanism exhibits distinct advantages in achieving carbon reduction with less both subsidy costs and fixed investments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the trend of power system decarbonization, wind power and energy storage planning studies are in full swing. Incentives for wind power and energy storage development are important research topics. However, most studies have proposed incentives from an energy perspective, and few focus directly on incentives from a carbon perspective. To this end, this paper proposes a novel unified bus carbon intensity incentive mechanism from the carbon perspective. A two-stage Stackelberg game wind storage planning model that considers the proposed carbon incentive mechanism is constructed. In the first stage, the carbon flow of the entire system is obtained following economic dispatch based on the carbon emission flow theory. In the second stage, a Stackelberg game wind-storage planning model is constructed to model the game between the power generation company and the power grid company. Through simulation analyses of these cases, the proposed incentive mechanism can effectively guide the construction of wind turbines and energy storage at the best buses. Additionally, by comparing the proposed incentive with the existing incentive mechanisms, this paper finds that the proposed incentive mechanism can achieve a higher carbon reduction effect with a similar total investment in wind turbines and energy storage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]