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On October 7, 2001, 3 weeks after 9/11, U.S. forces attacked Afghanistan; bombers struck Taliban headquarters and Al Qaeda training sites. By early December, the Taliban and Al Qaeda have been defeated and had fled. However, a war that began so successfully in 2001, eventually ended ignominiously on August 30, 2021, almost exactly 20 years later, with a U.S. withdrawal and a total Taliban victory. The speed of the Taliban's triumph shocked everyone. The entire campaign, costing US$2.3 trillion and 2,488 U.S. lives, had failed—utterly. The United States had lost its longest-ever war. How is it possible to explain a defeat of that magnitude? This article seeks to address this question. Although numerous factors played a role, this article identifies three principal factors: the environment, the local politics, and the Taliban. Afghanistan is a very difficult place to conduct large-scale military operations. The West never came to terms with the local politics and consequently undermined their own efforts. Finally, although they were not militarily sophisticated, the Taliban were politically astute and very resilient. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examined whether satisfaction with the Air Force (AF) as way of life increased post-9/11 and whether it has sustained. Using data from 179,309 personnel collected across a period of eight years (2000–2008) in four waves of cross-sectional data collection, we found that satisfaction with the AF as a way of life increased dramatically following 9/11 and since then has declined from the height, but has not returned to pre-9/11 levels. After controlling for time as well as demographics, the best predictors of satisfaction were (1) feeling that the AF is a good environment for bringing up children, (2) a strong a sense of community, and (3) perceived strong unit leader support for members and their families. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a qualitative analysis of nation-state population “resiliency” to several spectacular and/or highly symbolic terrorist assaults that were watershed events. It draws heavily from qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) frameworks to isolate and identify the presence of what Goertz calls the “secondary dimensions” of a “primary concept” such as resiliency to terrorist assaults. In turn, the presence of those secondary dimensions and their strength presuppose and derive from “tertiary indicators” that are the basic metrics and concrete manifestations of those secondary dimensions. The nation-states under consideration include the London bombings of 2005, the United States for 9/11, the Madrid bombings of 2004, the first suicide bombings within pre-1967 boundaries of Israel, and the Russian Federation in the case of the 2002 terrorist assault against the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow. The results serve as the basis for the development of a “resiliency continuum” of nation-states where placement of those countries on the continuum reflect “nonresilient,” “semiresilient,” and “resilient” conditions, themselves defined by the number of secondary dimensions found in each case study. In the process, the analysis illuminates possible interconnections between “context specific” factors, such as a country’s historical experience with terrorism and population characteristics (e.g., education levels, degree of heterogeneity) to the resiliency or nonresiliency condition, and describes possible links between exogenous “systems factors” such as war and power ranking to the resiliency condition. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Previous research on public opinion regarding military expenditures in the United States was conducted predominantly in the cold war context. This analysis of public opinion in thirty major U.S. cities over the period 1999 through 2002 revisits this earlier literature in light of changing sociopolitical conditions during a period bracketing the onset of the war on terrorism. The study offers support for much of the earlier research with respect to sources of support for robust military expenditures, in the process illustrating the value of archival data in replicating key research findings in extant literature conducted in a cold war context. The results of the multivariate analysis offer important insights into the sources of public support for military expenditure in the post-9/11 setting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the extent to which the professional orientation of Australian military personnel has shifted since September 2001. Four dimensions of professional orientation are identified, through analysis of ratings of reasons for serving in surveys conducted across the period 1996 through 2006. Duty/Professionalism represented Moskos's institutional orientation and Pay/Conditions, Development/Enhancement, and Adventure/Variety represented occupational orientation. The professional orientation of Other Ranks is now more pragmatic and more professional, in the sense that Pay/ Conditions and Duty/Professionalism motives are now more important as reasons for serving. Officers, on the other hand, have become less pragmatic and more professional, with Duty/Professionalism motives now dominant in professional orientation and Pay/ Conditions motives now much less important. Development/Enhancement and Adventure/ Variety are now less important for all categories. The article argues that these shifts are due to recent changes to Australia's strategic, social, and economic circumstances and notes the practical and scholarly implications of the results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States armed-forces-and-society intersection is explored comparing attitudes toward the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan among West Point, Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC), and civilian undergraduates. A survey was administered in January and February 2003 to determine if military affiliation is associated with attitudes toward sending troops into Afghanistan after the war started and Iraq before sending troops. Majorities of all students supported both war efforts, though United States Military Academy at West Point and ROTC cadets are somewhat more supportive of both wars compared to civilian students. However, most differences are explained by students' gender and political affiliation, suggesting that differences between groups result from selection effects rather than cultural differences. The authors contend a fourth wave in civil-military affairs potentially has emerged in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 through a civil-military attitude fusion complicated by a gender-politics gap. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the military reorganization process in Russia. Every major military organization in the world has started the new century faced with a challenge of adjusting capabilities with the new risks of terrorism. In the United States, the process had already begun with the terrorist attack on September 11, 2006. But Russia entered into this phase on August 21, 1991, when the defeat of the military rebellion in Moscow signaled the demise of the Soviet Union. From then onwards there were numerous blueprints and several starts of comprehensive reform of the military organization in Russia but the final result was a total failure.