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This article addresses scholarly deficiencies in identifying the conditions under which the desecularization of militaries takes place. To theorize this process, two militaries are studied, the United States and Israel. Arguably, six drivers sequentially generate the desecularization of the militaries: (1) Militaries largely mirror the growing influence of religion in the broader society. However, intramilitary drivers play their role in promoting/mitigating the extra-military mechanisms of desecularization. Thus, (2) organizational interests along with external constraints drive militaries to promote religious diversity, which may (3) lead to the empowerment of religious actors, and thereby to further desecularization through religious intolerance, and to (4) reliance on the spiritual and religious services provided by military chaplains, and jointly stimulate (5) the use of religion to motivate military sacrifice. By religiously increasing the symbolic value of military sacrifice, (6) religiosity becomes more naturally associated with good soldiering, thereby reshaping intramilitary hierarchies and, hence, further triggering desecularization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The abundant writing on conscientious objection (CO) had kept one significant actor rather neglected—the state. Relatively unexplored is the question of how democracies shape their policies toward CO. This article wishes to address this gap, focusing in particular on states that maintain conscription, and examining what accounts for their different responses to CO. Based on the Israeli case study, while drawing on comparative insights from The Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland during the Cold War, I argue that states’ treatment of CO depends primarily on the military’s status and the type of roles assigned to conscription. States in which these roles are mainly functional, and the military does not enjoy, accordingly, a high symbolic status will be more inclined to formally recognize CO than states in which the military fulfills civilian–social roles and enjoys a high symbolic status. Lack of recognition, however, does not necessarily imply harshness; states of the latter sort might nonetheless accommodate CO through unofficial means. Thus, when discussing the policy towards CO a distinction is ought to be made between accommodation and recognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article portrays the theocratization of the Israeli military. At the center of this process stands the national-religious sector, which has significantly upgraded its presence in the ranks since the late 1970s. It is argued that four integrated and cumulative processes gradually generated this shift toward the theocratization of the Israeli military: (1) the crafting of institutional arrangements that enable the service of religious soldiers, thereby (2) creating a critical mass of religious soldiers in many combat units, consequently (3) restricting the military command’s intraorganizational autonomy vis-à-vis the religious sector, and paving the road to (4) restricting the Israel Defense Forces autonomy in deploying forces in politically disputable missions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Israeli reservists played a major role in the protest movements that developed after the 1973 War and the First Lebanon War (1982–85). In other cases, debates about moral and political issues within the Israeli political system included petitions and rallies conducted by groups of reservists. How can scholars explain the special standing of the Israeli reservists within Israeli society? Why, during the 1970s and the 1980s, did the protests of the reservists lead to significant changes in the Israeli political and social arena, while this was not the case in the aftermath of the Second Lebanon War? The article explores these dilemmas by presenting different facets of the Israeli reserve army and its role in civil–military relations in Israel. The rationale for the establishment of the reserve army in Israel is discussed and is followed by an analysis of the changes the reserve forces have gone through since the establishment of the state. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This study examines conditions of peace and war to find whether the "rally 'round the flag" effect is indeed attributed to rising levels of social collectivism. Reserve service motivation in peacetime and wartime was compared among 1,004 Israeli reservists. Levels of motivation and the factors that affect them were examined during the optimism of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process (February 2000) and about a year and a half into the second Intifada (October 2000). Findings suggest that motivation to serve in wartime is indeed higher than in peacetime. However, they also suggest that similar factors predict motivation in both times, although their relative impact is altered by the situation. Reservists were more likely to be motivated by individual rather than collective incentives (in both peacetime and wartime situations), thus suggesting that "rally 'round the flag" occurrences are not necessarily reflective of the social cohesion and collective reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a common desire to seek a proper equilibrium that will assure civilian superiority over the military and prevent the military's intervention in domestic affairs. This article addresses the unique situation in Israel during the Oslo process, in which the military was deeply involved in the political process and influenced the political echelon by its knowledge and persuasive argumentation, mostly in private intellectual encounters between the echelons. We show how the military led the civilian arm to make choices that eventually determined strategy. The military with its knowledge infrastructure was hegemonic in this encounter, its influence was significant, and civil control was weak or inefficient. The Discourse Space model used in this article provides complementary tools for describing and analyzing the encounter between the echelons. The model provides an appropriate examination of how this encounter was conducted and what outcomes it produced, at least for the Israeli case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Israel, where over one million immigrants from the former Soviet Union (FSU) arrived during the past decade, compulsory military service provides young immigrants with an opportunity for acculturation. These youth are regarded as a population at risk, as they both face the trials of adjustment to a new society and are in the midst of their identity formation, at decision-making crossroads regarding future life goals. The purpose of this phenomenological study was to examine how a group of young immigrants from the FSU use their military conscription in the context of their acculturation, investigating its actual effect on their coping in the host society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Military leaders and social scientists often regard unit cohesion as the key element in combat motivation and fighting resilience. However, a close look at today's battlefield calls for rethinking this assumption. This study is based on observations of combat units during the current Arab-Israeli conflict (the "AI-Aqsa lntifada"). In contrast to the usual depiction found in the scholarly literature, these units were characterized by some rather unique features. Instead of socially cohesive structures (based upon mutual, continuous. and common experiences), the action of these combat units during operations is based upon temporary frameworks based on short-term, ad hoc, and diverse components. In general, the components comprising these ad hoc frameworks do not have a common background and do not belong to the same organizational arms of the Israeli military. Nevertheless, the fighting power of the emergent amalgamations has not been diminished or damaged. Our study depicts several possible explanations for the social dynamics of such "instant units" and focuses on the importance of "swift trust" to their functioning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines patterns of continuity and change in Israeli military thinking over time, as reflected in Ma'arachot articles. The main questions addressed are: First, do Ma'arachot pieces reflect an intellectual focus, that is, a theoretically and historically based thinking? Second, given the fact that in modern times war has receded from the actual battlefield, do Ma'arachot pieces reflect a modern focus? In other words, do they address war in a comprehensive, multilevel, and multidimensional manner? The findings of the survey refute the claim that the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) is ignorant or anti-intellectual. However, the results portray an army which puts application before study, and which has a lot of catching up to do where a deep understanding of central aspects of modern war is concerned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents information on a study which examines the level of motivation of Israeli men to serve in the reserve army, using a quantitative method to evaluate and identify the relative strength of the factors affecting that motivation. The study findings suggest that individual level as well as institutional and organizational variables are the best predictors of motivation to serve in the compulsory reserve Israeli army. The study shows that Israeli reserve army is virtually unique in its individual participation and the heavy demands made upon its soldiers.

The article reports about the Intifada ("surge" in Arabic), which suddenly broke out in December 1987. It was a civilian resistance by the Palestinians against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (the Occupied Territories) since 1967. It was expressed in agitation, symbolic displays, labor, commercial, and general strikes, road blocks and mass demonstrations, acts of violence that included mainly hurling stones but also petrol bombs, and occasional use of explosives and firearms against Israeli soldiers, policemen, and civilians. Such activities were accompanied by frequent acts of terror against Arabs who were suspected of collaboration with Israel. The Intifada inflamed the political controversy within the Jewish population about the future of the occupied territories. The Israel Defense Force had conducted six wars with regular or mostly regular armies, with a national consensus regarding goals, ways and means of combat. Now it was engaged in a quasi-war against a rebellious population, while the Israeli public was divided about its objectives, ways of dealing with the uprising, and the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The perception of a war that is not really a war and the ideological-political clash of attitudes blurred the definition of military service during the Intifada.

Western nations including Israel are modernizing their militaries. They are turning to advanced technologies and information warfare as alternatives to nuclear weapons and as solutions to manpower and budget constraints. For the same reasons, technological modernization of the Israeli Defense Force's ground organization has become a political and strategic necessity. The modernization process, however, is precipitating a wrenching and non-obvious reorganization of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) as managers' expectations of the technology are imposed on organizational realities. The Israeli ground forces are developing into a smaller, more professional, standing army that requires more coordination and precise behavior. Achieving greater precision in operations will prove difficult for the reserve oriented IDF. This article investigates the case of the IDF as an example of a general phenomenon in which complexity in machines drives the directions of organizational adaptation, making the capabilities of military organizations less clear-cut. As a result, actors throughout the military organization are less able to accurately foresee the organizational consequences of decisions involving these machines, especially during crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents information about the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Established in 1984, the IDF has been conventionally associated with people's army. Apart from demonstrating a heightened sense of occupational consciousness and being selective in its recruitment policy, the IDF has started including attributes of modern military professionalism. Although the IDF still retains many of the features of a militia force, it does not receive the automatic budgetary priority that it enjoyed lately.