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Unless the military is under civilian control, the risk of military intervention and control in politics will continue to linger even after democratization, especially in states with a history of military rule. Indonesia, Myanmar, and Thailand make up the past and present military-led regimes in Southeast Asia, in which the military has played a vital part in shaping the trajectory of each state's democratization process. Yet why are some militaries able to maintain significant military control despite transitions from military to democratic rule? What explains the Myanmar military's divergence from its Southeast Asian counterparts? The paper positions the military and the continuation of military control as the center of analysis in understanding civilian control and democratization. It proposes the reconceptualization of the military as an inherently political institution affected by path-dependency, relationalism, and rent-seeking. This framework focuses upon the military's legitimation of its role in politics, repression/co-optation of competing forces, and establishment of an independent economic base. The paper argues that the form and extent of military control in Myanmar is not only hegemonic, but has also transformed, in the decades of military rule, to become the state itself—a level of military influence unparalleled by its regional counterparts in Indonesia and Thailand. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Tatmadaw (the Myanmar armed forces) and the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF) are two of the most resilient and enduring politically active militaries in the world, engaging in a decades long process of the institutionalization of a system of military tutelage. There are, however, significant differences in the strategies pursued and the degree of success achieved in each. These variations are due to the combination of three factors creating the environmental context within which they have pursued these projects: (1) the existence of political allies and cohesiveness of the military; (2) degree of unification of domestic opposition elements against them; and (3) international pressures and influences. Based on a Historical Institutionalist perspective, this paper will map the interplay of these factors over time within each case to explain the different pathways these projects have proceeded. With a lack of allies, a fragmented opposition, and various degrees of international pressure the Tatmadaw has been unsuccessful in creating a durable system of tutelage, resulting in lengthy periods of direct rule while attempting wholesale recreations of the state. In Thailand, the RTAF's alliance with the Monarchy combined with a fragmented but at times united opposition and weak international pressure has resulted in frequent coups to remove elected governments, but usually for short durations resulting in their limited institutionalization into the political system. The current democracy projects in both states, in part due to domestic and international pressures, are not about replacing but rather embedding the military's involvement in the political system, though their freedom of action has been constrained to a certain extent. Myanmar and Thailand are best characterized as perpetual transitions as an intentional project to maintain a defective-democratic, tutelary system. Defective in that the military maintains the prerogative to involve itself in electoral politics and tutelary in that the military has cordoned off reserve domains of policy which ensure the system, regardless of who is in charge, supports their interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines Rohingya living in Malaysia. Myanmar's discriminatory citizenship laws have stripped nearly all Rohingya of their citizenship, making them the largest stateless ethnic group in the world. Malaysia is one of the most popular destinations for the displaced Rohingya from Myanmar. As Malaysia is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the Rohingya are not entitled to any legal protection under the existing law in their host country. This study aims to identify the challenges faced by displaced Rohingya regarding their right to work, and the response from the Malaysian government. The methodology used for this research is a multi-site case study with the case study sites being Kuala Lumpur, Selangor, Terengganu, and Pahang. After intensive fieldwork and meetings with different stakeholders, this research revealed that Malaysian people are sympathetic to the Rohingya and wish to assist them within their limited capacities. Overall, this study argues that there is no consistent government policy and a lack of coordination between the Malaysian government and international agencies working to improve the welfare of the Rohingya. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past 18 months, the U.S. Government has nearly normalized relations with the government of Burma1/Myanmar. The United States has recognized Myanmar government's recent reforms through reduced economic sanctions, placing an ambassador in Yangon, and encouraging continued progress through a recent (and first ever) visit by a President of the United States. As the United States considers additional enhancements to the relationship, the military relationship must be considered. The Myanmar military (otherwise known as the Tatmadaw) has either directly or de facto governed Myanmar for 53 of the 65 years since the country gained independence from Great Britain. The Tatmadaw is fully ingrained into the government's institutions and will arguably have a profound role in any progress (or backsliding) the country makes in economic and political reform. The question for the United States, then, is how best to positively influence the Tatmadaw officer corps. One part of the solution is to provide Tatmadaw officers with military educational opportunities in the United States. In fact, from 1980 to 1988, the United States funded 175 Tatmadaw officers' attendance at U.S. military schools. Reviewing the history of that 1980s program provides some perspective for restarting this program, especially in light of the recent changes occurring in Myanmar. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2011, after more than 20 years of direct rule, the Tatmadaw transferred formal authority to a nominally civilian government following Myanmar's first multi-party election since 1990 as part of a transformation of the political system to a presidential republic. Within this new arena, though, electoral manipulations and constitutional stipulations have brought to power a government consisting mostly of former military officers who are closely aligned to the Tatmadaw. These reforms, therefore, have changed the nature and organization of the ruling regime from that of a military one to an Electoral Authoritarian form. Elections now have become the main conduit to accessing power. Despite the maintenance of authoritarian rule (and the unclear motivations promoting such system change) the opening of the political realm and civil society creates avenues for new actors, identities, interests, and relationships to be constructed. A number of developments over the past few years are tentatively positive signs that Myanmar is undergoing a fundamental political change distinct from the years of military rule. In particular, the interactions of actors within and across civil-military, central-regional, and foreign relations will come to define the future trajectory of these reforms. Ultimately, the willingness of the Tatmadaw to abandon its praetorian ethos of directing the political process, specifically over security policy areas, will determine whether the system remains primarily in the service of regime maintenance or becomes an arena of increasingly diverse, free, and fair political discord with the possibility of power being assumed by those that are non-military. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Thai-Myanmar and Thai-ASEAN relations have undergone significant changes recently. Whereas ASEAN was generally keen in the late 1980s and 1990s not to isolate Burma/Myanmar diplomatically, there has been an increasing chorus of voices in ASEAN opposing a continuation of the political status quo there. In particular, there have been calls for the release of NLD detainees, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and the start of a meaningful attempt at domestic political reconciliation. Notwithstanding such criticisms from within ASEAN and beyond, the SPDC government is unlikely to acquiesce and change its ways as a result of such criticisms. There are simply no incentives for it to do so. If anything, external criticism is likely to lead to a more xenophobic foreign policy. To stave off criticism, the compromise solution between ASEAN and Myanmar has been for the latter to turn over the chairmanship of ASEAN to the Philippines in 2006. This face-saving gesture has allowed all parties concerned to uphold the ASEAN principle of noninterference in members' domestic affairs while responding to international criticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the anti-democracy campaign of the Burmese military government. Defeat of pro-democracy demonstrations through the use of force; Military government's defiance of the 1990 election results; Details of the emergence of the anti-government sentiments.