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Tensions in the EU-China relationship have hampered cooperation in various sectors, including a set of transnational security issues where engagement with China is unavoidable but nevertheless profoundly challenging. The EU maintains a "tripartite" strategy, originally outlined in its 2019 Strategic Outlook, seeing China as a "partner", but also as an economic "competitor" and a "systemic rival". China's former State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi has described the European approach as suffering from "cognitive dissonance". As a result, and as demonstrated by the failure of the 2022 EU-China Summit, the two parties are now operating within two different frameworks, and constructive cooperation has become increasingly difficult. By working with Qin Yaqing's concept of "relationality", this article aims to contribute to a better conceptualisation of the ways in which the EU and China can work with each other to tackle global issues. Challenging the literature that tries to explain the shift in EU-China relations by focusing on individual actors, this research's approach focuses on the relations between actors. Adopting this ontology of relations, this research paper analyses how, in the EU-China relationship, relations between the two parties contribute to creating their own identities and motivate their actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article takes a critical look at the sovereignty claims surrounding the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands. The dispute has long plagued Sino-Japanese relations and is considered one of the key regional security hotspots, with the People's Republic of China mounting an active challenge to Japanese administrative control. This article reviews the case for sovereignty under both the discovery and the prescription principles. However, the article concludes that one cannot find a compelling case for sovereignty under either principle in favour of either claimants. The paper argues that this is due to the traditional insignificance of the islands prior to UNCLOS establishing exclusive economic zones. Rather, the article suggests that to facilitate a resolution to the disputes, the islands should not be classified as islands under UNCLOS as they do not meet the legal threshold for such a classification, either today or historically. If anything, the weakness of claims that contributes to the intractability of the dispute today shows that traditionally neither China nor Japan has considered these territories as islands in a manner that would be in the spirit of UNCLOS. While such a reclassification would not immediately resolve the dispute, it would be a significant step to remove incentives for the further pursuit of conflicting sovereignty over the islands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to explore the political implications of China's economic relationship with Africa using the case study of Sino-Nigerian economic relations. China – perhaps the most prominent rising economy of the contemporary era – and Nigeria – one of the Africa's largest economies with a fast-growing consumer population – provide an ideal context to study the economic significance of bilateral ties for the 'Global South.' Nigeria's prospects of sustained economic growth, through Sino diplomatic relations, could appear relatively bleak considering issues involving its growing debt burden, unequal trade composition and deteriorating governance standards, some of which are attributable to China. This paper explores both sides of the argument before concluding that certain political aspects of Sino-Nigerian bilateral relations do indeed undermine sustainable economic development in the long run. It is argued that unequal economic practices, lack of transparency, disregard for environmental concerns, exclusion of civil society and absence of serious engagement with wider social actors and other checks and balances could indeed nurture elements of rentierism across Africa – particularly in resource-rich countries like Nigeria leaving significant detrimental effects that could well outweigh short-term gains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the incipient tensions over the Brahmaputra between India and China has become a considerable threat and cause for concern to the downstream dwellers of India's North East Region (NER), especially Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. It enlarges the term 'Brahma-hypothesis' and considers Chinese 'hydro-hegemony' over the Brahmaputra as a 'national security' threat to India. It also argues that apart from having the occasional Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with China, India should seek to develop with China and other countries a multilateral diplomatic agreement regarding the management of the Brahmaputra River to secure India's vital interests at national and regional levels. This is also necessary to minimise the sense of insecurity continuously growing in the minds of the people of the NER. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of China in recent decades has forged closer naval bilateral relationships in the Indo-Pacific region. Amongst these the Indo-Australian maritime ties have been a noteworthy development. Beijing's expanding maritime capabilities in the Indian Ocean Region and growing influence in the South China Sea have become a core convergence in Indo-Australian cooperation. China's approach of asserting its rise as friendly while simultaneously becoming more aggressive in boundary claims has increased security concerns for Australia and India, thereby prompting maritime security convergences through the AUSINDEX exercises, increased trilateral engagements and establishing a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD). However, the maritime convergence is not only based on hedging, as there are common views of maintaining an inclusive security framework with China to address non-traditional maritime security threats affecting the region. In examining the China factor, this article also draws in other players such as USA, Japan and the ASEAN states with stakes involved in the region as also influencing Indo-Australian relations in their considerations of China. This article will explore China as a strong point of interest in India-Australia maritime cooperation; the roots of which can be traced from 1991 and have culminated into synergies of collaboration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, reports have emerged that China operates "political re-education" camps of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang. China justified them as a sort of vocational training program to assist Uyghurs in participating in the Chinese economy. In actuality, they are brutal incarceration camps; these forms of 'education' can qualify as torture that perhaps 1.5 million adults have been subjected to, and have led to detaining children of people incarcerated in state-run boarding schools. It is necessary to interrogate the underlying factors that have enabled the Chinese government to open and operate these camps under the guise of education. This paper first examines the impact of the current geopolitical interests of China's Belt & Road Initiative and the historical backgrounds of Xinjiang and the Re-Education through Labour program. It then explains the methods of 'education' taking place within the camps and interrogates China's justifications for building them. This education issue is more about inhibiting Uyghur power than China's claim that the camps are meant to empower Uyghurs to participate in the Chinese labour force. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Umbrella Movement is the culmination of Hong Kong's protracted democratization process. This paper uses a historical perspective to explain the present situation. Students, which had been at the forefront of political activism in the 1970s, have yet again taken a leading role in the current movement. This has occurred as the democracy movement, which was buoyed by modest democratic reforms since the 1980s, has become deeply divided in recent years. Political parties of the pan-democratic camp, which played an important role in the 1990s, have been eclipsed by more assertive protest movements. The very slow progress of democratic reforms in Hong Kong is, however, due to the ruling elite. On the one hand, there is the authoritarian government in China which is worried about greater autonomy in its Special Administrative Region as well as potential spillover effects that could threaten one-party rule. At the same time, the powerful business elite in Hong Kong, Beijing's key ally, is worried that greater representative politics could lead to more substantial social redistribution. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Presents information on a visit by Thubten Gyatso, the thirteenth Dalai Lama of Tibet, to Peking, China from September 30 to December 1908. Why the Dalai Lama visited Peking; Reference to relations between Tibet and Britain; Refusal by the Chinese to ratify a 1904 treaty between the British and the Tibetan government.

This article contends that increasing centralisation of decision-making in China will undermine the country's future economic growth. It highlights the declining role of private enterprises and the increasing role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the economy, and the extension of Communist Party influence in both SOEs and the private sector through the Party's Organization Department and United Front Work Department. It argues that the increasing role of the state in the economy over the past decade has stifled growth through a decline in 'total factor productivity' because of increasing misallocation of resources. Centralisation, with associated losses in efficiency, objectivity, agility, speed and finesse regarding allocations of risks and investment, has debilitated decentralised decision-making and reduced the incentives for undertaking risks and innovation. The article argues that increasing Party control over the SOEs and the private sector will negatively impact the corporate structure and management decisions, exacerbate the fundamental problems of corporate governance and limit or hamper innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

NATO has promised to address China as "an alliance" but struggles to define underpinning principles. This article explores NATO's policy options and prospects. It traces the evolution of NATO China policy from 2017 on; assesses NATO's ability to pull China under its resiliency policy regime; and evaluates NATO's capacity to address wider issues of global order. The article concludes that NATO is not able to develop a politico-military strategy in line with classical alliance policy. Instead, NATO has pursued an incremental alignment policy to nourish its internal consensus and stave off the dire prospect of leadership abdication. Pushed by China's implicit support for the war in Ukraine, NATO must now become more politically explicit about China, global order, and NATO's approach to it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since Deng Xiaoping's opening-up policy and drive for economic modernisation and reform in the late 1970s, and especially since China's foreign energy requirements skyrocketed in 1993, Beijing's interests in the Persian Gulf have grown immensely. A staple of its regional policy has been an insistence on cultivating relations with all states, something that has necessitated a careful balancing act between regional rivals, especially Saudi Arabia and Iran. This article examines China's strategy to balance relations with these two states, especially during periods of tension, such as following the 2019 drone attacks on Saudi oil facilities, something that Riyadh accused Iran of masterminding. Following an examination of this strategy, the article explores Saudi attempts to coax Beijing away from Tehran and Saudi perceptions of Sino-Iranian relations through the lens of the 2021 25-year agreement between China and Iran, questioning whether Sino-Iranian relations are a bone of contention in Sino-Saudi relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The China-Iran comprehensive strategic partnership (CSP) has been described as a potentially disruptive alignment. This article analyses the impact of the CSP in two regional security complexes (RSCs): the Persian Gulf and South Asia. It finds that of the two RSCs, the China-Iran CSP has a greater likelihood of affecting the strategic landscape of the South Asian RSC as China seeks to contain India's power and influence. In the Persian Gulf, China's economically-motivated regional presence is supported by the maintenance of the status quo, and as a result the CSP is not likely to adversely affect that RSC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines several under-explored aspects of Sino-Iranian relations in the 1970s, the process of Sino-Iranian rapprochement, and China's reaction to the 1979 revolution. By relying on sources in both Chinese and Persian and pushing back the timeline to 1965, it analyses the role of China's unofficial support for Iranian Maoism on official relations, the personal role of the Shah and the women of the royal family, China's internal view of the Islamic Republic shortly after 1979, and the role of propaganda and performativity in Sino-Iranian diplomacy. In doing so, it sheds new light on old topics and expands on previous studies that focus primarily on the official politics of rapprochement and the post-1971 era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article aims to understand how China has dealt with the puzzle of Iran's sanctions. Beijing's approach and reaction to the question of sanctioning Tehran and abiding by the sanctions imposed by the United States and the UNSC are a response to a complex matrix formed by three distinct but co-existing dimensions: the bilateral relationship with Iran, that with Washington, and its own positioning within the international community. Each dimension is associated with the performance of a specific international role. What emerges from the analysis of three case studies – the introduction of the 1996 Iran and Libya Sanction Act, the UNSC resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran (2006-10), and the response to Washington's Maximum Pressure campaign – is that, for China, Iran's sanctions are an inherent source of conflicts between its roles. Ultimately, Beijing's responses to the emerging conflicts between its roles have been cautious and aimed at tempering their possible escalations, even though the case studies show that a quite visible hierarchy of roles exists. China's role vis-à-vis Iran occupies a lower position than those performed vis-à-vis the United States and the international community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Russian factor in Sino-Iranian relations has been an outgrowth of Moscow's relations with Beijing and Tehran which each occupy distinct, though at times overlapping, roles in Russian foreign policy. Whereas the economic ties between Beijing and Tehran have been crucial in the evolution of Sino-Iranian relations, Russia-Iran relations have been driven by converging security concerns with an emphasis on regional issues ranging from the Caspian Sea to Afghanistan. This article begins with an overview of the convergences in Russia, China, and Iran's view of international order, which has materialised in the nascent collective efforts to contest the basis of ostensibly 'liberal' norms and practices. It proceeds to examine the Russian and Chinese role in the evolution of the Iranian nuclear programme and joint Sino-Russian collaboration during P5+1 negotiations. Next, it shifts its focus to regional and domestic security through Iran's engagement with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and through Beijing and Moscow's transmission of sovereignty-boosting practices to strengthen regime stability. Finally, it concludes with Iran's role in Russian efforts to link the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) with China's Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) as well as the wider efforts at supporting de-dollarisation. Yet, despite ideational convergences and coordination on salient issues, it would be erroneous to suggest the existence of a formidable Russia-China-Iran axis. Rather, the tripartite relationship between Russia, China, and Iran remains an illusory entente – bereft of regularised, institutionalised relations outside of their respective bilateral ties which tend to allow only modest trilateral coordination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are many shared historical experiences and similarities between Iran and China. Both are legacies of the long-lasting empires and civilisations in West and East Asia, respectively. Like other great Asian empires, Iran and China were confronted with the expansion of the European imperial powers in the early-nineteenth century which ultimately led to the dislocation of these ancient empires. Both countries had resisted pressures towards peripheralization in the global economy by the creation of nationalist popular revolutions and by building modern nation states and identities in the first half of the twentieth century, despite different political systems, cultures, and external relations. Both Iran and China have been trying to escape from the external pressures and internal socio-economic backwardness by the modernization of their states, societies, and economies via a state-led catch-up development strategy. These efforts led to the rise of China in the late-20th century and the emergence of post-Islamic revolutionary Iran 1978/79 as a 'contender state' to the hegemony of the United States (US) in West Asia. This development raises two key questions: why did China succeed in rising as an industrialised regional and global power, and has Iran's development strategy failed so far? I argue that the main reason for post-revolutionary Iran failure to become the regional hegemon comes from two interconnected issues: (i) the failure of its economic development strategy, which was mainly caused by (ii) the 'offensive' external involvement in its own region before a successful catch-up process. Iran's catch-up development strategy, which is the main material basis for the country's rise, was hampered after the revolution by its 'offensive, revolutionary and military oriented foreign policy'. This strategy blocked Iran from access to capital, information and technology concentrated in the core area of the global economy dominated by the US. Unlike Iran, China's successful catch-up industrialisation was driven, in part, through rapprochement and consensus between Chinese leaders and the US and its allies in 1970s. This strategy led China to distance itself from Mao's revolutionary offensive foreign relations and replace it with 'defensive' and peaceful foreign relations in the era of its catch-up industrialisation (1980-2000s). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Systemic shift, in which the weight of the global economy has shifted away from the Euro-Atlantic eastwards, is increasingly underlined by what is referred to here as the 'Asianisation of Asia'. Asianisation is a process in which Asia's diverse regions steadily converge around shared economic agendas. Japan, followed by the so-called 'Asian Tigers', were the pioneers of the Asian process, which began in earnest in the mid-1960s. China and India, drivers of the pre-modern world economy, are emulating the strategies of the early Asianisers this century and are building parallel pan-Asian relations of their own. Nowhere is this more evident, and indeed significant, than in relation to China and Iran, the Asianisers par excellence. Their relations are arguably critical to the process, a process which is infused with the legacy and their collective memories of the ancient Silk Road which had shaped pan-Asian relations for centuries before the rise of European power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years the Iranian government has emphasised its Look East approach. As a diplomatic choice, the Look East approach has also aroused different understandings among Iranian scholars and in this context, China has received more attention from Iran. For different reasons, many countries have tracked and observed Iran's Look East approach and China-Iran relations. At present, there are many negative perceptions about the Look East approach and Sino-Iranian relations in Iran and the international community. So far, China has made very few official comments on Iran's Look East approach, and this is essentially the case with Chinese scholars and media. China is very concerned about whether Iran's Look East approach is an act of political expediency or a strategy. Some of Iran's actions in the past few years have partially proved the necessity for China to be so suspicious. Although there are some negative views of China in Iran, Beijing should still pay more attention to deepening relations with Tehran. Even if Iran's Look East approach is not a long-term strategy, it is no longer just an expedient measure to deal with Western sanctions. China must be an important goal of Iran's multilateral diplomacy. China and Iran, which need each other, urgently need to increase political mutual trust. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the political and diplomatic response from Kazakh and Kyrgyz governments towards China regarding its post-2014 Xinjiang security strategy. The policy, which includes repressive measures against Xinjiang Muslim minorities, has led to the detention of a significant number of ethnic Kazakh and Kyrgyz, thus calling for a reaction from their kin states. In order to explain the complexity of the problem, the article looks via a neorealist lens at the role of Kazakh and Kyrgyz human rights advocacy groups in urging local authorities to securely release ethnic Kazakh and Kyrgyz detained in Xinjiang's "vocational camps". It further explores official responses from Kazakh and Kyrgyz governments, identifying their considerations and foreign policy choices. This article concludes that Kazakh and Kyrgyz governments neither possess economic and political leverage to press on China over the Xinjiang issue nor are they willing to do so as this may jeopardize their cooperation with China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is aimed at better understanding China's Overseas Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) choices through a post-War Japanese historical perspective. It will focus in the main on OFDI as a marker of an advanced stage of the East Asian 'developmental state' formula, wherein the 'China Brand' takes shape. The transition process from heavy-industry and low-value added goods to frontier-technology manufacturing with global brand recognition will be placed under scrutiny. A Japanese perspective is called for, as much of the theory in the field of international business to do with OFDI and the growth of multinational corporations (MNCs) is currently primarily derived from a Western developed-economy setting, and hence does not seek to offer much in the way of predictive insight about all-important yet middle-income China, as it proceeds towards becoming the largest economy on the planet. The article surveys the historical trajectory of Chinese OFDI, underling its correlation with inbound foreign investment into China; it then offers a comparative view of Japanese OFDI in the pre- and post-War era. It then assesses Chinese brand strength in the electrical appliance, automobile, and IT areas. Finally, it offers a prognosis as to the future direction of Chinese OFDI, and how it might affect the contours of globalization as well as Sino-American rivalries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discerns the shifts in China's engagement with its Western neighbour, Afghanistan. Beijing's approach has gradually shifted from dis-interest to a careful re-calibration of strategy indicating Afghanistan's growing eminence in its strategic calculus. This transposition – dating back to the 1980's – it is argued has been accentuated as the 'West' weans itself away from the Afghan theatre. This article demonstrates that Beijing's chequered history of engagement with Kabul has been historically underpinned by its engagement with a plethora of actors identified with 'political Islam' who in turn are patronized by its allies in Rawalpindi. Its deepening footprint in contemporary Afghanistan while continuing to be coloured by the prism of Rawalpindi, is informed by a growing sense of unease regarding the perceived adverse imprint that developments across China's Western borders are likely to leave on its domestic security and growing economic interests in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a big gap on the study of Indo-Myanmar relations between India and China, in which the Indian experts are mainly concerned about the serious consequences of the China factor, while few Chinese scholars focus on Indo-Myanmar relations. This article, therefore, looks into the post-Cold War Indo-Myanmar relations from a Chinese perspective, so as to fill the research gap. It argues that India's influence upon Sino-Myanmar relations is actually marginal, though it has established a budding relationship with Myanmar through deepening political engagement, naval cooperation and physical connectivity with the country. The main reason is that India lacks full capability to develop the bilateral relations with Myanmar and thus compete fully with China. Additionally, the suspicion and resistance from the Burmese elite and local communities constitutes another major obstacle to the further engagement between India and Myanmar. Naypyidaw, notwithstanding its efforts to advance Indo-Myanmar relations, would prefer to gain benefits from both China and India. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the security and economic implications of the proposed China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), one of the projects under China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Topics discussed are industrial, economic and trade cooperation between Pakistan and China, role of Pakistan in China's Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road, and development plan for the Gwadar Port in Baluchistan, Pakistan.

The article looks into the risk assessment and adaptation processes being done by the Chinese government in response to domestic and international resistance to its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Topics discussed are China's lack of experience and knowledge of the sociopolitical complexities of countries traversed by BRI, strategic planning mission of the BRI task forces and efforts to promote BRI to improve global development and governance and fight against unilateralism and protectionism.

The article analyzes the potential advantages and pitfalls of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Topics discussed include the national security strategy released by the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump in response to BRI, the envisioned trade routes of BRI, unsustainability of BRI routes such as Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan due to war, conflict or terrorism, water insecurity in South Asia and the Middle East that pose risk for BRI, as well as the financial risk for BRI.

This article looks at the problems facing China in regard of its water supply and usage. It considers China's available water resources and their uses, the growing water pollution, and the water management system adopted by China to secure the country's future. This includes small and large-scale projects, dams, the South-to-North Water Diversion Project/South-North Water Transfer Project (SNWDP/SNWTP) or Nanshuibeidiao, and the Sponge Cities Initiative. It also looks at some of the policy issues and relevant legislative frameworks developed to respond to the problem. This article argues that despite the measures taken by the Chinese government, water remains an area of concern for China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay reviews the history of Uighur related terrorism in Xinjiang as well as elsewhere in China and discusses the political motivations and effectiveness of the Chinese government in suppressing terrorism. The essay assesses both the motivations of the Uighurs engaged in terrorism, as well as the motivations for counter terrorist by the Chinese authorities. A key objective of the essay is to determine what are the political and other reasons that drive the Chinese government’s counter terrorism strategy and tactics and whether these have been effective or counter-productive. The essay assesses the counter terrorism strategy of the Chinese government in Xinjiang Province and across China, the political motivations for the strategy, the impact and success or otherwise. The essay discusses if the government is combatting terrorism, or separatism, or extremism, the confusion of these terms, and whether this has had any impact on the effectiveness of counter terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article looks at the South China Sea dispute and its impact in international relations. It analyses why the Southeast Asian states are highly sovereignty sensitive, and how such sensitivity has made non-intervention the bedrock of managing their foreign policies. China has long viewed the near seas as regions of geostrategic interest, and thus the SCS is not an exception. On the one hand it brings hope and prosperity, and on the other uncertainty and threat. At the end, the article argues whether China’s assertive position regarding other countries’ sovereignty claims in the Arctic might undermine its own position in contested areas like the SCS, and suggests that China will at least have to learn how toshare and bear(term coined by the author) as a member of the international community. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article juxtaposes two of the most influential yet under-studied America watchers within the top echelon of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Wang Huning and Zheng Bijian. To be sure, the two have indelibly shaped CCP attitudes, yet surprisingly enough, although Zheng has been written about extensively in the English language, Wang has hitherto largely remained outside academics’ purview. This article also aims, in passing, to explore linkages between Wang and Zheng ideas and those of other well- known America watchers like Liu Mingfu and Yan Xuetong. The comparison offers clues as to the extent to which the current advisory shaping CCP thinking on the US differs from the previous generation, and as to whether CCP thinking is un-American or anti-American in essence. The conclusions ties the study together by arguing, based on Wang and Zheng's views, that New Confucianism may shape Chinese society in the future [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Since becoming head of the Communist Party in China in late 2012, Xi Jinping has accrued an impressive raft of titles. He has been compared to the founder of the regime, Mao Zedong, and is seen by some as sitting at the centre of a network of different power sources. But is power as personalised as this model makes out in contemporary China, with all its complexity and diversity? And can one person really rule the continental sized country in this paternalistic way? This article argues that Xi's powers are intrinsically linked with the organisation that he leads and which his power is sourced in – the Party itself. Far from him being the emperor of modern China, it is the Communist Party which acts as the all-seeing, all-powerful ruler. In this model, Xi is its servant, not its master. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Mainstream media have reported on ‘China in Uncle Sam's Backyard’ - Latin America - with considerable alarm in recent years. But is such alarm justified? This article aspires to lift the fog on China's engagement with Latin America. The article finds that mutual concerns over economic development, not military advantage, are the driving force behind closer Sino-Latin American relations. Nonetheless, it is indisputable that China's presence in the Southern Hemisphere impacts the region's geopolitical dynamics, with possible consequences for the US security position. That said, China's arrival in Latin America also harbours a positive strategic opportunity for Washington to re-engage, on a more equal footing, with a continent whose relations with the US have been historically troubled, and more recently, have suffered from a certain neglect. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Though the build-up of China's blue-water fleet is causing consternation in foreign-policy circles, the country's on-going expansion into Russia and the former Soviet Union has scarcely garnered comment. For the past decade, China has used its foreign reserves to acquire strategic assets (principally infrastructure and natural resources) and tracts of sovereign territory along its existing borders and increasingly further afield. The impact on targeted countries (and, in turn, their own foreign policy) is extreme, with serious implications for security and economics far beyond their borders. This article provides an overview of China's acquisitions and investments in Eurasia, followed by more detailed discussion of recent developments and responses in Central Asia, Ukraine and Mongolia, and Siberia. It then looks at the impact of China's actions on Sino-Russian relations, discusses the importance of Russia and Central Asia as a resource corridor and buffer zone between Europe and China, and suggests how these manoeuvrings might result in long-term benefits for China. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The East China Sea (ECS) is gaining an increasingly central role in Sino-Japanese relations as it is crucial to the economic development and political affirmation of both countries, for whom the main sea routes crossing the ECS offer vital arteries for trade and energy imports. For the past year and a half, the ECS has attracted considerable international attention because of the flare-up of tensions over the sovereignty of the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands. This small group of islands is also claimed by the authorities in Beijing and known in Chinese as Diaoyu. Is war looming? Are we seeing an escalation spiral that will ultimately set the two countries on a collision course? The article argues that the current tensions should be seen in the wider context of the increased strategic significance of the ECS. For there are two different types of disputes here. One concerns sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; the other concerns the demarcation of the Chinese and Japanese maritime borders and exclusive economic zones (EEZ) as defined by the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This distinction is important because sovereignty on land is different from sovereignty at sea. The former is connected to a vital national interest and historically, represented a primary reason for war. The latter focuses on functional rights over bodies of water included in the EEZ, not on the actual ‘ownership’ of the maritime realm. Accordingly, the article argues that seapower is going to play a crucial role in the projection of Japanese and Chinese power and status in the ECS and in the evolution of Sino-Japanese relations more generally. Significantly, Naval Defence doctrines in both countries have evolved greatly over recent years. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Gordon Harmon was born in China in 1900 and after the First World War served in the Salt Revenue Guards for a number of years. After the outbreak of WWII he was posted in a liaison role to the centre of Chinese government in Chungking. There he worked with Chiang Kai Shek's Nationalist Intelligence Service. But he also had quite close links with Chou En-Lai, who was also in Chungking at that time. The extent of his more general relationship with the Communists is unclear, but he seems to have reported fairly extensively on their plans and intentions. Harmon has left a very detailed record of a conversation with Mao Tse-tung in 1946 which seems to suggest that he had met Mao a few times before.. It was Mao who apparently said to Harmon “I am not interested in Hongkong and I will certainly not allow it to become a bone of contention between your country and mine” [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The recently installed leadership in Beijing has to carry forward the legacy of Deng Tsiaoping. He was a life-long communist and Chinese nationalist who espoused market economics, not for its own sake but to help the Party and China. China has strengths, like the power of the economy, the lack of a political opposition and a middle class that has been bought off. But wealth disparities, corruption and the environment will all need careful handling. Only Xi Jinping and Li Kegiang remain from the old Politburo. They and their colleagues must maintain control while meeting rising expectations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Taiwan-China relations have experienced a remarkable détente since KMT candidate and cross-strait moderate Ma Ying-Jiu was elected president on Formosa in 2008. Yet despite the rapprochement and its concomitant reduction of military tensions across the Taiwan Strait, the island's security position vis-à-vis China has been in steady decline since the early 2000s. Ma's expectation that closer economic and diplomatic ties with Beijing will result in greater international space for Taiwan have so far not yet been realised. On the contrary, deeper connections with the mainland seem to but accelerate the growth of Taiwan's security vulnerability. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article seeks to evaluate the impact of India and China on world energy markets by setting their future energy demands, principally for coal and oil, in the context of their domestic supply potential. After examining their approach to energy efficiency, the author concentrates on their energy diplomacy and the way in which they have sought to enhance their security of supply by targeting exporting countries, often those with a somewhat fraught relationship with the west. He concludes that it is in their interest to further strengthen their co-operation and avoid competition which simply drives up the price they pay for oil. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An account of archaeological finds in two great Chinese deserts, the Gobi and the Lop. They now seem utterly inhospitable, yet they were once inhabited, witness the abandoned city of Lou Lan in the Lop, discovered by Sven Hedin in 1893 and subsequently further excavated by Aurel Stein. The graves and mummies discovered there and in the Gobi have given rise to one of the great mysteries of Asia. Who are these people, who lived in the area and seemingly predated the arrival of Chinese settlers by some 2,000 years? Incredibly there is significant evidence to suggest they could be Celtic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A survey of a number of books about how the overall international system will need to be modified so as to cope with the rise of China. Clearly the single most important relationship will be that between the US and China. The present structure of that bilateral relationship is inadequate for future needs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the politics of crime and the state in Taiwan and Hong Kong and Macao, China. It mentions that the transformation of Taiwan from a symbiotic state to a development state is problematic. Macao is in the transition stage towards a developmental model although the presence of triad forces are still possible. On the other hand, Hong Kong has already been a developmental state due to its assertive role against the penetration of the political institutions by criminal groups.

Lord Wilson of Tillyorn was Governor of Hong Kong from 1987 to 1992, editor of the China Quarterly from 1968 to 1972 and a member of the British Diplomatic Service for many years. He is currently Master of Peterhouse, Cambridge and Chancellor of Aberdeen University. This article is slightly adapted from the Anniversary Lecture which he gave to the Society on 13 June 2007. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the cultural revolution (CR) in inner Mongolia in 1967-1969 as it looks into the purge of the heirs of Genghis Khan. The author believed that the CR was to have a devastating and profound effect on the development of the People's Republic of China. He also pointed out that the CR was a hugely complicated movement and that it was only in 2006 that the first relatively comprehensive history appeared.

Looks at the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in China and examines how well the Communist regime there addressed the crises. Reactions of China from the initial discovery of SARS up through the second winter of the disease; Reason China controlled access to information on SARS; Political implications of SARS.

Discusses the physical and cultural diversity of people in the Yunnan Province in China. Main problems with the preservation of minority languages; Establishment of Christian communities by missionaries from Europe and the U.S.; Role of tourism as the main source of revenue of the province.

Discusses the history of the British educational system in Tibet, China. Origins of the English School at Gyantse in southern Tibet; Background of Frank Ludlow of the Indian Educational Service; Information on how Ludlow motivated the students to practice cleanliness; Progress made by students in English and arithmetic.

Focuses on the travel of missionaries Cecil Polhill-Turner and brother Arthur Twistleton in Tibet, China. Study on the language and customs of the people; Culture of the people; Goals of Cecil in her mission.

Presents an article about visiting China to research on the Taklamakan mummies. Difference of the Taklamakan mummies with the Egyptian mummies; Features of the Taklamakan desert; Examples of the archaeological items viewed during the trip to China.

Presents information on a study which focused on the link between education and citizenship in China. Traditional way of teaching students in China; Rules for pupils to become thoroughly acquainted with socialist morality; Obligations of the Communist Youth League; History of formal education in China; Chinese political education and its bearing on British education for citizenship.

Examines the relations between China and the West. Motives of strategy, self-interest and sentiment in China's relations with the West; Details on the Boxer Rebellion; Sentiment and strategy in the era of Chang Kai-shek.

Details a journey and exploration to Lop Nur in China's Xinjiang Autonomous Region all the way to the ancient city of Loulan. Exploration of Sven Hedin at Lop Nur; Description of the site of Lop Nur; Features of Loulan.