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Singapore's electoral autocracy is well known for its innovative use of political institutions such as Parliament and elections to enhance its durability, but relatively little attention has been paid to decentralised subnational institutions such as Town Councils, which require elected Members of Parliament to manage public housing estates in their constituencies. This paper focuses on Town Councils by examining the motives behind their formation and exploring how they serve as institutions to support authoritarianism. Based on analysis of a range of primary and secondary sources such as parliamentary Hansard, government documents and newspaper articles, this paper argues that the formation of Town Councils was politically motivated and specifically designed to thwart opposition growth. It also argues that Town Councils support authoritarianism in three ways. First, they create extra hurdles and disadvantages for the opposition. Second, they give the ruling party an additional election issue on which to attack the weaknesses of the opposition and allow it to shift the focus of elections in its favour. Lastly, they facilitate more effective and targeted material distribution and create more opportunities for elite co-optation. The implications of the study for Singapore politics and the role of decentralisation in electoral autocracies are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to reconstruct widely accepted concepts of the top-down authoritarian nature of Central Asian politics in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan through a comparative study of the pro-democratic movements that emerged in the late 1980s. By analysing data from interviews with the cultural elites of the late Soviet perestroika period and data on the indigenous nationalist movements such as Erk, Zheltoksan, Birlik and others, we question why such nationalist movements did not “survive” or emerge as a significant political platform as promised in post-independence Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and why they failed to change the political outlook of one party rule or the dominance of one nationalising regime. Furthermore, we analyse how such nationalist movements had an opportunity to turn into semi-democratic movements but failed to transform after their agenda (arguably, independence) was achieved, leaving “communists-turned-nationalists” to continue their policies in newly formed countries. Thus, the paper also looks at how these cultural elites eventually contributed to the local “authoritarianism” and lack of plurality in views and identifications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is hardly surprising that liberalism has been neglected in studies of Indonesian political thought, with most scholars focusing on nationalism, communism, conservatism, populism, and Islamism. The term 'liberal' has long been a byword for the kind of naked individualism and dog-eat-dog capitalism against which mainstream Indonesian nationalism has contrasted itself. This article argues that liberalism has, nevertheless, been present as a counter-narrative throughout Indonesia's modern history and should be considered as a distinct political tradition. Liberal ideas inform Indonesia's legal, economic, and political structures and have thrived in sections of the media, the professions, academia, and civil society organisations, reaching their apogee in the unique circumstances of the immediate post-Soeharto period. Repeated efforts to establish overtly liberal political vehicles, though, have gained little traction in a political environment dominated by nationalist and Islamist parties. This article argues that despite the rapid growth of the economy, Indonesia's middle classes are still relatively weak and dependent, and have repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to ally with authoritarian statism when their interests are threatened by populist movements from the left or the right. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In response to "indigenous" justifications of illiberalism (e.g., "Asian values") and the cronyism of electoral authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia, some pro-democracy activists constructed a "vernacularised" liberal discourse that framed demands for human rights and "good governance" in religious-communalist terms. This countered charges that activists were overly Westernised and supported their calls for ethical rule. Yet, after authoritarian rule gave way to democratic transition, liberals often turned against elected governments or were reluctant to challenge extremists who targeted ethno-religious minorities. In analysing these paradoxes, this article uses a contextualist rather than a stipulative, benchmarking approach that ignores contradictions in Western liberalism. Anti-majoritarianism in the Philippines and Thailand was driven by the fear that corrupt populists threatened religious-communalist values, with liberals ultimately turning against democracy. Another paradox is that in Indonesia, Malaysia and Myanmar liberals first used culturalist arguments to justify upholding civil liberties, but later became reluctant to criticise exclusivist forms of ethno-nationalism that endangered human rights. In the face of democratic backsliding in Southeast Asia, liberalism is being reconfigured, for instance through resistance by a middle-class youth movement against military-monarchical rule in Thailand, through multi-ethnic resistance to the 2021 coup in Myanmar, and by traditionalist Islamic groups in Indonesia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For much of the 2000s, scholars and activists lauded Indonesia's surprisingly successful transition to democracy. Recent years, however, have made imperfections visible to the point where the breakdown of Indonesian democracy is imaginable if not yet under way. This article investigates the conditions under which moderate Islamic organisations support non-democratic values and actors, and by doing so contribute to Indonesia's democratic decline. Drawing on original survey data and interviews, as well as case studies in which the preferences of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah leaders have become visible, this article argues that these organisations' values are compatible with both democracy and authoritarianism. While NU and Muhammadiyah exemplify the civic associational ties and democratic culture that are necessary for making democracy work, civic pluralism is not their only value. NU and Muhammadiyah have a hierarchy of values that they promote and defend, and are willing to forgo civic pluralism in order to combat blasphemy against Islam, ensure Muslim control over overwhelmingly Muslim regions, and limit political expression concerning heterodox approaches to Islam or non-Muslim involvement in matters of aqidah (faith). NU and Muhammadiyah also operate within the country's political patronage system, and their material interests can lead them away from supporting democratic values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The literature on field research methods has focused almost exclusively on the strategies available to scholars working in democracies. By comparison, there has been scant guidance for those working in authoritarian regimes. This is despite the distinct set of challenges that arise where civil liberties and political rights are not consistently or well protected. The purpose of this article is to address this deficit. Drawing on the region of Southeast Asia as a natural laboratory for comparative analysis, it offers guidance on how to successfully conduct archival research, carry out interviews and undertake participant observation under authoritarianism. The resulting conclusions are applicable to the pursuit of primary research by scholars at all career levels and in other regions of the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Vietnamese party-state has been seeking to develop the concept of a socialist law-based state in an effort to provide a legal-rational justification for its rule. One of the key pillars in the construction of a socialist law-based state has been electoral governance. Unlike the popular understanding proliferated by the Western media about the meaning of elections in authoritarian countries, I argue that elections are of significance to the political life of the Vietnamese party-state even without pressure from any political opposition. This is because there is a growing need for the party-state to make the elections work more effectively to bolster its legitimacy. Along with the process of promoting the concept of a Vietnamese socialist law-based state, continuous reforms of the electoral integrity system have been considered and cautiously implemented. An important aspect of the reform is to ensure the values, purposes and duties for which power is entrusted to or held by electoral institutions are honoured. It is argued that the process of building a more integrated national system of rules and values has been set in motion but many setbacks have occurred from time to time, making it a dynamic process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]