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How should one appraise the security situation in East Asia since the end of the Cold War? Which set of standards should the analyst use? How should “security” be understood? What is the appropriate criterion for regional security: stable security relationships among all countries or the satisfaction of the security interests of a select few? Depending on considerations such as these, it is possible to present East Asia’s security in either highly optimistic or pessimistic terms. Few observers today doubt that by any standard, East Asia is more politically stable and economically better off than was ever the case during the Cold War. But there the consensus ends, with analysts divided over the security implications of China’s ambitions, Japan’s “hedging bets,” American primacy, the viability of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (and of the “ASEAN way”), regionwide economic and environmental stresses, and, of course, the Korea deadlock. This article explores the Korean situation—in particular, policies toward North Korea—from the standpoint of common security rather than power politics. The central concept behind common, or cooperative, security is preventing threats from arising rather than, as in collective security, assembling force to counter threats. Though collective security may serve as a backstop to common-security policies, the accent is on preventive steps such

As President Chiang Kai-shek celebrates his eightieth birthday (by the Western calendar), the Republic of China (ROC) has considerable cause for optimism. Official Taipei, viewing the mainland's "great cultural revolution" with remarkable restraint, apparently sees the possibility of a dramatic change in leadership in Peking that could evolve into a breakup of centralized power and provide appropriate conditions for the long-awaited return of the Nationalists. New government structures have been set up to deal with that potentiality. At the same time, Taiwan, as the "base" for any recovery operation, continues its forward economic thrust characterized by impressive achievements in national growth, external trade and other areas. President Chiang set the tone of caution in a 1967 New Year's message in which he placed an armed counterattack second to political measures evidently intended to smooth the transition from Communist to Nationalist rule. "The question of the recovery of the mainland today is how to tidy up the calamitous situation which Mao has left behind; when to counterattack the mainland and how to bury Mao have become secondary questions," the generalissimo said. "Political means," he explained, are "even more important" than military preparations, although the latter should not for a moment be relaxed.' Chiang gave the strong impression that it is no longer necessary for the ROC to launch a lightning strike against the mainland inasmuch as Mao's extremist measures to save his regime are bound to produce similar effects, and at less cost. The meaning of Chiang's reference to "political means" became clear in February with the announcement of the establishment of a National Security Council under Vice-Premier Huang Shao-ku. Besides enhancing the President's personal powers in this, the so-called "period of rebellion," the NSC itself has been given broad functions embracing national reconstruction planning, strategy and defense, post-recovery political administration, and mobilization.2 Thus, the Council, dominated by members of the Kuomintang Central Committee and the military, could be used as easily to promote internal political change as to engineer the military and political logistics of supplanting the Communist mainland regime.

ship to Taiwan's development into a modern, progressive state. Politically, Taiwan remained a tight little island as it went through a fourth general election. The special "Temporary Provisions" of the constitution enabled President Chiang to gain pro forma approval from the National Assembly for a fourth six-year term (March 21). To the surprise of many observers, Chiang chose as his running mate the comparatively young (62) Yen Chia-kan, the premier (as president of the Executive Yuan) and former minister for economic affairs and finance. Although a good choice from the standpoints of age and ability, Yen lacks an independent power base, thus making Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo still the logical heir to his father's power. Moreover, Yen's continuation as premier was a blow to those reform-minded individuals who had hoped to see a reduction of presidential control over the Executive Yuan through the selection of a new man to the premiership. The impact of Yen's election was further offset by the selection of a cabinet little different in freshness or quality from previous ones. Chiang's post-election call for new talent in the Party seems, in retrospect, to have been intended more for domestic consumption than for actual implementation. Taiwan is guided in its international relations by the overpowering goal of reconquering the mainland. In 1966 that goal was no closer to achievement, and Chiang was moved to remark that unless the Communists were unseated by 1968, only the U.S. would be in a position to effect the recovery because of Peking's anticipated nuclear delivery capability. This admission of the KMT's growing inability to achieve its paramount national goal is founded also upon the knowledge that the U.S. will not assist