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Bangladesh continues to face a threat from Islamic terrorism. However, the drivers of this phenomenon remain under-studied. Research has traced terrorism in Bangladesh to wider processes of Islamization; a political context marked by conflict between the country’s two main political parties and by authoritarian governance; the institutional weakness of the Bangladeshi security and justice system; and international factors, such as the Afghanistan War, influences from the Gulf, and more recently the Rohingya refugee crisis, as well as the increased interest of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in South Asia. Based on an analysis of the literature and interviews, I argue that while the growth of terrorism in Bangladesh has been a complex process in which all of these factors have interacted, different constellations of them have been decisive at different historical stages.

2007 appeared to be a year of political and economic continuity in Malaysia. The government won three by-elections. The economy grew at 5.6%. Tensions over ethnic relations and Islamization simmered, though with probably no greater intensity than in past years. And foreign relations were smoothly conducted. But in an extraordinary scandal, a prominent political advisor went on trial for abetting the murder of his former mistress.

In 1995 Brunei's national leader, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah, had experimented with small doses of political and economic openness. In 1996, however, the sultan halted his liberalization of politics, while his subjects remained unenticed by new incentives for entrepreneurship. Accordingly, the contours of Brunei's politics and economy returned to more familiar patterns of grand royal pageantry, visiting dignitaries, deepening Islamization, luxury hotel purchases, and naval procurements.

Islamization and Government After taking over the government in July 1977 in a bloodless military coup, General Zia-ul-Haq named himself President and Chief Military Law Administrator, established military rule, dissolved the National Assembly, and suspended the Constitution of 1973. His was, then, literally one-man rule until 1981 when he inaugurated the Majlis-iShoora, the appointed advisory body that replaced the dissolved elected National Assembly. The discussion that follows is roughly divided between the period preceding December 19, 1984, when President Zia held a national referendum to determine whether the electorate supported his program of Islamization, and the period following that date. When President Zia announced the formation of the Shoora, the original plan called for 350 members, although 286 were finally appointed. When the new session opened on March 31, 1984, 39 new members were appointed to replace seven who had resigned, 11 who had died, one who had been appointed a minister, and one who had not taken the oath. Those appointed were selected to represent various interest groups: professionals, businessmen, landowners, etc. The rationale for the selection process is not easy to determine, but President Zia claimed it was the "first

During the past six years, the government of Pakistan has been pursuing an Islamization program unparalleled in the modern history of Islam in South Asia. The government proposals, if all are enacted, would systematically reduce women's power and participation through established social institutions (e.g., legal, educational, political). This article addresses the many implications of the new Islamic laws (both decreed and proposed) for women in Pakistan, discusses the variety of responses to these actions, and analyzes the effects of these laws on the social environment they are attempting to shape, focusing on the conflicting social forces at play. Female literacy rates rose sharply in Pakistan in the mid1970s, and women were just beginning to participate in both general elections and labor politics in larger numbers.' The 1977 military coup d'etat led by General Zia ul-Haq overthrew the government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and effectively silenced political opposition. Protesting women in Lahore and Karachi during February 1983 broke through the veil of si

From reading the Pakistani newspapers, watching television, and listening to the pronouncements of government officials, one gets the impression that Islamization is a major goal of Pakistani society and that there is a broad consensus concerning its relevance and desirability. Islamization is a popular topic in Pakistan-the subject of speeches, books, articles, conversations, and even programs at the U.S. Information Service American Centers. Where it is found, critical analysis of the present government-sponsored "Islamization" program is focused on three central questions. First, how relevant is "Islamization" to various segments of Pakistani society beyond those of officialdom and such organizations as the Jamaat-i-Islam? Second, what does "Islamization" mean and how is the issue of varying interpretations and modes of interpretation to be resolved? And finally, how is "Islamization" to apply to specific issues and policies, such as national development, women's rights, and scientific education? To be sure, there is considerable debate in each of these areas. Polar positions are easily characterized. For some there is agreement and enthusiastic support by everyone for Islamization, while for others Islamization is a fraud, a tool used by a dictatorial regime. For some Islamization is self-evident and has a single meaning held by everyone in the Muslim community, while for others Islamization is a vague concept with different communities and sects holding different and often contradictory interpretations of what it entails. For some Islamization means putting all women inpurdah (i.e., formally separating them from the world of men), promul

MALAYSIA IS AMONG SEVERAL Muslim countries affected by the current wave of Islamic resurgence. Revivalist organizations that sprang up some years ago now have nationwide appeal among the Malays, and their impact is being felt throughout the country, particularly at the socio-political level. It is highly probable that the trend towards Islamic orthodoxy could steer this multi-racial country' on to a new political course. Several factors account for this latest upsurge in religious feeling. Essentially this phenomenon results from the re-education in Islam amongst an increasing number of Muslim Malays. Other factors such as the "back to the Koran" movement in vogue in certain Muslim countries have only aided the Islamization process. Similarly, the secularization of Malay society is only a contributory factor responsible for the crystallization of Islamic orthodoxy among these Muslims.

der martial law administration. The once self-described interim government, committed to early elections and a return to constitutional rule, had long since settled into an entrenched military-bureaucratic regime, convinced of its indispensability for the country's domestic peace and national security. The government headed by President Zia ul-Haq could boast of little popular support. Even so, public feelings were less the bitter hatred that one finds toward tyrannical rule, which it was not, than a sadness and frustration that still another authoritarian regime had failed to forge a national consensus or provide a viable constitutional framework. The uncharismatic General Zia had by most judgments skillfully coopted, outmaneuvered, and suppressed opponents to his rule. An Islamization program, not part of the original mission in seizing power, assured the regime a claim to moral high ground and tempered criticism among a broad segment of the society. In a Pakistan still experiencing relative economic prosperity, opposition middle class groups previously successful in toppling governments failed to coalesce or arouse the masses in protest. Large landowners and business interests clearly preferred the Zia rule to any prospect of a return to civil disorder and economic stagnation. President Zia's standing in the conservative Arab world as a sincere Muslim leader figured critically in Pakistan's economic planning. He played his American card well, cashing in for military and economic assistance on his country's apparent strategic position, while winning praise for his determination to have Pakistan retain an independent, nonaligned foreign policy. Negotiations with Mrs. Gandhi's government in India for a no-war treaty and the normalization of relations demonstrated a diplo