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Sweden has been considered both pioneer and pariah in regard to its approach to the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 and its pandemic disease, COVID-19. While much of Europe went into economic hibernation and rigid lockdown in the first wave of novel coronavirus infections in the spring of 2020, Sweden kept its borders, bars, restaurants, schools, gyms etc. open. Organised children’s sporting arrangements were also encouraged, on the basis that socialising and physical activity outweighed the risks posed by COVID-19 to children. Public transportation could still be freely used. Masks were not worn. This paper examines the often controversial tenets of the Swedish public health response to COVID-19, and how widely it has appealed to public health experts and officials in Europe and beyond. Debates within the country are also discussed. What it shows is that, despite rising levels of infection in a second wave in Europe and concessions that it might have even failed, the Swedish model is being adopted by stealth and admired from afar. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The manoeuvring and the strategies that state actors and their delegates employ when discussing and negotiating practices at the European Union (EU) level clearly respond to their aim of attaining outcomes at that very level. Within that landscape, what makes a country more powerful and persuasive than others, why some states punch above their weight, and how the threads of European diplomacy are concretely moved are unclear processes that the practice approach promises to explain. This investigation employs the practice approach to distinguish 'power in practice'. It considers power as a development connected to social relations. In fact, it views micro-level diplomatic dynamics as the site from which to observe power. It fills a gap in the field of adopting the practice approach in EU studies by contributing to theory through showing the approach's policy performance. It asks the central question of'whether power resources emerge out of constant work and negotiation'. It applies the practice approach to the early 2020 negotiations in the EU arena on burden sharing linked to the Covid-19 pandemic. It argues that what is at stake in the course of the negotiations is a complex social game, in which manoeuvring for diplomatic competence becomes an end in itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The unprecedented economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic might also have a negative impact on banks. Banks in the euro area play an important role as the main source of external financing for the private sector. Hence, the negative impact of COVID-19 could translate into both deeper economic contraction and hinder banks' ability to finance the post-pandemic economic recovery. Therefore, this study provides a review of the bank lending and banking sector situation in the first year of the pandemic. It presents changes in bank lending and conducts a descriptive analysis on the following main potential determinants of bank lending growth during the pandemic: bank lending supply and demand, public sector lending guarantee schemes and monetary policy easing. It also describes how the overall situation of the banking sector was influenced and the perspectives for the medium term. The descriptive analysis is complemented with a simple econometric analysis on the determinants of bank lending across the euro area countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article investigates EU-China trade and investment relations, highlighting the importance of their partnership for the global economy. The article argues that Covid-19 is an accelerating factor of existing trends, analysing EU-China relations as empirical evidence. It will address the institutional and legal framework of EU-China trade and investment relations. The article will use primary and secondary sources to inform the research. It will benefit from an interdisciplinary approach, combining both legal and political literatures. The analysis is based on EU-China trade and investment relations, as reported by EU's official documents and is divided into three main sections. The first section gives an overview of economic interactions between EU-China. The second section provides an analysis of the main documents between the EU and China before the pandemic. The third section is dedicated to showing how the relations between the two actors continued during Covid-19 pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The unprecedented global health crisis caused by COVID-19 has unleashed individual, self-centred responses in most states, including Asian and European countries. Multilateralism may be more imperative than ever, but the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) does not seem to epitomise a feasible international platform to guide cooperation. This article attempts to assess whether the ASEM still constitutes a relevant instrument of intercontinentalism, as there seem to be indications suggesting that EU-Asia relations will not abandon their apparent multilateral stalemate. In fact, ASEM could rather deepen asymmetries between a highly institutionalised EU and an institutionally devoid Asia. Notwithstanding, the current pandemic offers ASEM an unprecedented opportunity to recover some salience as a relevant multilateral EU-Asia platform, namely, the centrality of economics. Given the irremediable necessity to strengthen economic cooperation to alleviate the impact of COVID-19, this is a unique opportunity to strengthen connectivity as well as a multilateral cooperation and governance that would otherwise blur. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers how the European Union and Member States' responses to the COVID-19 crisis in the first half of 2020 could inform climate action in Europe, and particularly the resumption of actions on the EGD. It first outlines the EU's public health and economic responses to COVID-19 and Europe's role in the global response to the pandemic. We find that, based on the challenges and successes of all these responses, a strong argument can be made for 'more Europe' - greater integration, and stronger EU-level institutions - to lead and govern the COVID-19 response. This has direct lessons for the governance and scope of future climate action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]