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This article maps the behaviours of two middle powers, Australia and Indonesia, as a response to the emergence and evolution of the Indo-Pacific concept. The background for this analysis is the emergence and development of the 'Indo-Pacific' concept as a response to crises of legitimacy enveloping the region and how countries in the region, including middle powers, respond to it. Using a minimalist definition which I have developed of a middle power as a country with a middle level of power capabilities and a penchant for cooperation, this article develops a framework based on two dimensions of outcome (ranging from status-quoist to reformist outlooks) and process (ranging from Lockean to Kantian strategies) to facilitate a more open-ended approach towards looking at middle-power behaviours beyond the common categorisation of traditional/emerging, and Western/non-Western. Using Australia's 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper and 2023 National Defence: Defence Strategic Review, and Indonesia's 2015 Defence White Paper and 2019 ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, this article concludes that while Australia is exhibiting a status-quoist/Lockean approach, Indonesia is demonstrating a reformist/Kantian approach towards the Indo-Pacific. The outcome-process dimension framework developed in this article is useful as a tool to map other middle power behaviours in various contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the Bali Process in the context of Australia's securitised approach to migrant smuggling, and the consequences this has for both the Australia-Indonesia diplomatic relationship and the Bali Process overall. The Bali Process is the premier regional forum for combating migrant smuggling and is well placed to discuss and develop regional cooperation policies on irregular migration within the region. In particular, the Bali Process remains a key domain where Australia and Indonesia can contest and amend the norms and practices around the human rights of refugees and asylum-seekers. This article traces and analyses the emergence of Australia's bilateral agreements for offshore processing and resettlement between 2011 and 2014, which Australian political elites aligned rhetorically to the Bali Process, but which the authors argue remain in tension with stated Bali Process objectives in terms of rights and protections for asylum-seekers and refugees. This article identifies that Australia's security-driven policies and regional disagreements over humanitarian responsibility remain an ongoing tension within Bali Process states, and provides commentary on the implications of this for future Australian policy relating to regional cooperation on irregular migration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the modes by which Australian scholars construct knowledge of Indonesia with particular reference to the debates on West Papua in the post-Suharto period. It examines their perceptions, beliefs and attitudes towards human rights issues with a view to analysing the underlying forces, motivations and implications of activism. This article casts doubt on a common, yet often unacknowledged, perception in Indonesia about Australian Indonesia-specialists who are categorised as: intellectuals who always see Indonesian government policies as 'negative'.2 I demonstrate that the theorisation of Indonesian society has been diverse in Australia as exemplified by the West Papua debates. Australian scholars' social positions and mobility, not government policy, shape their beliefs, attitudes and knowledge construction of Indonesia. Thus, considering Australian scholars from a monolithic perspective misses the reality that contemporary intellectual culture in Australia is no longer based on a traditional class.3 I argue there are two major opposing groups in West Papua studies which I label as the 'affirmative revisionist' scholars who tend to be more optimistic towards resolution of conflicts in West Papua and the 'sceptical reformist' scholars who are dubious about any major changes in West Papua. This latter group believes the people of West Papua should be given the opportunity to remain integrated with Indonesia or to opt for selfdetermination. They tend to use the perceived failure of Indonesia in the protection of human rights in West Papua to attack the Indonesian government and Australian governmental agencies dealing with Indonesia. This article argues that this criticism may adversely impact on future Australia-Indonesia relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given the scale of destruction, and the international responses to the disaster, it has been clear from the outset that the tsunami in Aceh would also have far-reaching internal and external political consequences for Indonesia. Within Indonesia's domestic context, the disaster has forced the government to deal with the problems of xenophobia, the resolution of the Aceh conflict, and the imperative of good governance. The tsunami has also presented an opportunity for much closer bilateral relations between Indonesia and some key aid-providing nations, especially Australia, and the US. Despite some encouraging improvements in the aftermath of the disaster, the long-term effects of tsunami aid on Indonesia's relations with Australia and the US should not be taken for granted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In late 1999, former Australian Prime Minister, Paul Keating, attacked the Howard government's handling of the East Timor crisis, arguing that John Howard had neglected the most important priority in the management of Australia's relationship with Indonesia. Citing the enormous population imbalance between the two countries, Keating argued that Howard had failed to 'square away' the potential threat arising from Indonesia's population of more than two hundred million people. Keating's invocation of this reason to be fearful seems distinctly at odds with his confidence and pride in Australia's relationship with Indonesia and his own personal closeness to former President Suharto during his period as Prime Minister. But the use of fear to win a political point in debates about Australia-Asia relations or to discipline Australian voters is far from unusual. Indeed, fear has been perhaps the dominant factor in shaping Australia's relations and policies towards Asia and the perceptions of a sceptical community. This article argues that fear is an integral and inescapable element of Australia's relations with Indonesia. However, rather than presenting fear as evidence of flawed diplomacy or as being necessarily irrational, I argue that fear is a constitutive element of relations with Indonesia in much the same way that trust has been an enduring feature of Australian relations with the United States. There have been, of course, many critics of unquestioning Australian alignment with United States' foreign policy and, equally, there have been critics of the various manifestations of Australian policy towards Indonesia over the years. It is not my intention to suggest that Australian attitudes to Indonesia have been without contradictions or that they remained unaffected by changes in Australia, Indonesia and the region more generally. Among politicians on both sides of parliament and among journalists and academics there have been many who have sought to improve what has been a troubled relationship. But despite these efforts, Australian attitudes towards Indonesia are partly constructed in immutable discourses of fear and anxiety. The images and metaphors used to describe Indonesian society and assumptions about 'our' and 'their' national character reflect an enduringly negative view of Indonesia. Moreover, politicians, journalists and academics alike are caught up in this historical web of anxieties and fears. Seemingly routine and benign descriptions of Indonesia's 200 million plus population, its low levels of political and economic development and its status as the world's largest Muslim nation, all play deeply on white Australian fears of Asia even if the authorial intention is to alleviate concerns about Indonesia among Australians. This article explicitly discusses the politics of fear in modern Western societies and explains how domestic anxiety about the policies of multiculturalism and immigration overlap with other concerns about events and peoples external to the Australian nation. Later, I analyse particular images that have been used to describe Indonesia and argue that not only do they have antecedents in colonial depictions of Indonesia but also tend to imply that Australian values and attitudes are superior. Finally, I argue that the key to establishing better relations with Indonesia is not a clearer understanding of 'them', but an ongoing and thoughtful unpacking of the values and fears that constitute 'us'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the relations between Australia and Indonesia. Origins of the East Timor problem; Dispute about Australian policy over East Timor; History of East Timor from 1974 to 1976; Australia's failure to prevent Indonesia's resort to the use of force in its efforts to achieve the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesian territory in late 1975; Implications to the Australian policy-making.

Analyzes the dynamics of policy debate and implementation with focus on Australia's policy towards East Timor. Evaluation of the contents of the published document, 'Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor 1974-1976.' Central figures in the making of Australian policy; Australia's preference to the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia; Profile of the Australian policy concerning East Timor.

Examines the flaws in the foreign policy of Australia that led to the crisis in East Timor. Need to reappraise the foreign policy of the country; Errors which marked the evolution of Australia's policy action in the months before the deployment of forces in East Timor; Analysis on the arguments advanced by the government in defense of its policy actions.

Discusses the foreign policy and `security agreement' between Indonesia and Australia. Status of agreement; Significance of policy; Suggestions from the agreement as it relates to Indonesia.