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Nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are traditionally believed to provide assured second-strike capability and stabilize deterrence. This paper contests this classical assumption in South Asia's context and argues that SSBN capability to become secure and credible deterrent depends upon doctrinal issues, command and communication systems, and operational readiness of SSBN force. In a dyad, if both countries have invulnerable second strike capability, there is less incentive to strike first. Whereas invulnerability of one country incentivizes first strike. In South Asian strategic situation, an assured sea-based second-strike capability may contribute to India's aggressive nuclear posture. This paper evaluates New Delhi's induction of SSBNs in light of its stated notion of minimalism, as declared in its nuclear doctrine, and discusses in the context of traditional stability theory associated with the development of SSBN force. This paper primarily considers deterrence stability and crisis stability as two dependent variables to study how India's sea-based nuclear capability affects strategic stability in South Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]