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Since 1984, every Australian federal election campaign except 1987 has featured at least one televised debate between the leaders of the major parties. These debates have been the subject of considerable speculation, particularly in the popular press. However, initial enthusiasm and optimism has been replaced, in part, by skepticism and indifference about their impact. Although viewing audiences for the early debates were large, audiences have steadily declined in more recent campaigns. Although televised debates are ostensibly an established part of federal elections, their influence on individual vote choice and aggregate impact on the vote has received little academic attention. This paper considers each campaign since 1990 and, using data from The Australian Election Study series, it assesses the impact of leaders' debates on individual vote choice. It investigates whether the impact varies for different groups of the electorate, considering the role of partisan identification, as well as whether any influence of the debates extends beyond the actual viewing audience. Finally, it estimates the aggregate impact on the vote attributable to the debates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the patterns of television news coverage of the political parties, their leaders and the issues they raised during the 2001 Australian federal election campaign. By focusing on some issues, parties and leaders, television has long been argued to constrain voters' evaluations. We find that television news coverage in the 2001 Australian election campaign focused primarily on international issues, especially terrorism and asylum seekers, and on the two major parties - virtually to the exclusion of coverage of the minor parties and their leaders. Within the major party 'two-horse race', television gave substantially more coverage to the leaders than to the parties themselves, thereby sustaining what some have called a 'presidential'-style political contest. John Howard emerged as the winner in the leaders' stakes, garnering more coverage than Labor's Kim Beazley. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A growing number of lower-house seats at Australian State and federal elections rely on a distribution of preferences from Independent and small-party candidates before seats can be awarded. Actors have attempted to gain political capital from this situation by claiming that the preferences of particular small parties have affected election outcomes. This paper uses the events of the Western Australian State election held in 2001 to explore the validity of such claims. More specifically, it investigates the widely propagated contention that the One Nation Party' s anti-sitting-member preference strategy was a key determinant of the Coalition's electoral defeat. It concludes that the increased number of candidates contesting elections makes it difficult to assess whether the second and subsequent preferences of any particular small party were critical to the outcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the impact of the Internet, specifically the World Wide Web (WWW) and e-mail on Australian parties in two key areas: (1) party communication: what exactly are parties using their Websites for? and (2) party competition: does the Internet lower the threshold for smaller parties to communicate their message compared with the traditional media? We examine these questions with two types of data—a questionnaire of party communication staff and content analysis of a representative sample of party Websites. Our findings show, first, that Australian parties have taken a fairly cautious approach to the new medium, using it primarily as an information storehouse rather than putting it to more innovative use. Second, while almost all Australian parties have a Web presence, there is a divide between those parties with parliamentary representation and those without in terms of their site quality and visibility on the Web. The study concludes by interpreting the findings in the context of research on parties' use of the Internet worldwide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most federations, including Australia, have systems of fiscal equalisation which transfer income between States. Economists have long studied the economic efficiency and equity arguments for and against such transfers. This paper concentrates instead on the political aspect; namely, it asks whether federal political parties wishing to maximise their expected votes at election time would ever support a system of equalisation, particularly one which mandates efficient transfers of the type studied by economists. The answer, found using a two-State model of a federation in which voters are mobile, is in the affirmative: the political process delivers an efficient and equitable system of equalisation. However, the result depends on certain assumptions. The implications of these assumptions are explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]