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Jurors are often asked to evaluate statements provided by young victims, witnesses, and suspects. When, over time, youths' statements contain inconsistent information or recantations of prior statements, jurors face a difficult task in evaluating the validity of the initial claim. The underlying reasons for inconsistencies and recantation of young people's statements, particularly in cases of child sexual abuse, have been debated. Of primary interest here is whether inconsistencies (e.g., recantation) are evaluated differently by fact finders depending on the youth's age and role in a legal case. The current study examined effects of consistency of juvenile statements, legal role, and age on perceptions of testimony in a child sexual abuse investigation. Participants (N = 693) read vignettes describing child sexual abuse in which consistency of a follow-up statement (consistent, inconsistent, recanted), legal role (victim, witness, suspect), and age (10 years, 16 years) of the juvenile providing testimony were manipulated. The results revealed that judgments of initial statement quality, blameworthiness, and guilt were dependent on the consistency of follow-up statements and on the interactive effects of a juvenile's legal role and age. The current study has theoretical implications for understanding juror decision-making and practical implications for legal professionals and fact finders evaluating youths' statements. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Amid growing psychological controversy and legal interest surrounding the uses of PCL-R and biological evidence in the legal system, this mock jury study assessed the effects of PCL-R and biological evidence on outcomes in an insanity defense case. A sample of 428 undergraduates read a trial transcript of an insanity defense murder case. Three variables of interest were manipulated: rebuttal illness (no mental illness, personality disorder, or psychopathy), evidentiary basis (biological or psychological), and evidentiary strength (moderately strong or moderately weak). Consistent with the hypotheses, biological evidence was more persuasive than psychological evidence, and the rebuttal was slightly more successful when the prosecution labeled the defendant as a “psychopath” than when they described him simply as “not mentally ill.” Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During interrogations, police may use false-evidence ploys or fabricated claims to convince suspects to confess. Mock jurors read trial materials containing interrogation transcripts with or without a false-evidence ploy and one of two expert witness conditions (present or absent). We examined jurors' verdicts, recommended sentences, and perceptions of the interrogation. Although factual evidence and the defendant's confession remained constant across conditions, false-evidence ploys led to fewer convictions and shorter sentences. Jurors also perceived interrogations with ploys as more deceptive and coercive. Expert testimony reduced convictions and increased interrogation deception and coercion ratings. Across ploy types, participants rated demeanor ploys as less deceptive and recommended longer sentences for confessors. Outcomes reveal important, previously unrecognized consequences of false-evidence ploys. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Past research examining the effects of expert testimony on the future dangerousness of a defendant in death penalty sentencing found that jurors are more influenced by less scientific clinical expert testimony and tend to devalue scientific actuarial testimony. This study was designed to determine whether these findings extend to civil commitment trials for sexual offenders and to test a theoretical rationale for this effect. In addition, we investigated the influence of a recently developed innovation in risk assessment procedures, Guided Professional Judgment (GPJ) instruments. Consistent with a cognitive–experiential self-theory based explanation, mock jurors motivated to process information in an experiential condition were more influenced by clinical testimony, while mock jurors in a rational mode were more influenced by actuarial testimony. Participants responded to clinical and GPJ testimony in a similar manner. However, participants' gender exerted important interactive effects on dangerousness decisions, with male jurors showing the predicted effect while females did not. The policy implications of these findings are discussed. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Past research examining the effects of actuarial and clinical expert testimony on defendants' dangerousness in Texas death penalty sentencing has found that jurors are more influenced by less scientific pure clinical expert testimony and less influenced by more scientific actuarial expert testimony (Krauss & Lee, 2003; Krauss & Sales, 2001). By applying cognitive–experiential self-theory (CEST) to juror decision-making, the present study was undertaken in an attempt to offer a theoretical rationale for these findings. Based on past CEST research, 163 mock jurors were either directed into a rational mode or experiential mode of processing. Consistent with CEST and inconsistent with previous research using the same stimulus materials, results demonstrate that jurors in a rational mode of processing more heavily weighted actuarial expert testimony in their dangerousness assessments, while those jurors in the experiential condition were more influenced by clinical expert testimony. The policy implications of these findings are discussed. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite widespread use of mental health testimony in cases where violence risk is at issue, relatively little is known about the impact of such information on juror decision-making. This study addressed the effects of testimony based on three types of risk assessment instrument or method (clinical opinion, actuarial assessment, and ratings of psychopathy) to examine whether they would have differential impact on jurors' perceptions of the defendant. In a mock sexually violent predator civil commitment trial, 172 undergraduates were presented a case summary that included prosecution and defense expert testimony related to violence risk based on one of the three methods noted above. Consistent with earlier research, the hypothesis that a defendant described as a “high risk psychopath” by the prosecution would be judged more severely than a defendant judged as “high risk” based on other evaluation procedures was supported, but only among female jurors. Unlike prior studies, little support was found for the hypothesis that clinical opinion testimony would be more influential than actuarially based testimony for either gender. Mechanisms that may underlie the observed gender differences are discussed, as are the potential implications of these findings for civil commitment proceedings. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines influences on mock juror and jury decision making regarding damages in an employment discrimination case. We examined the effects of expert economic testimony, suggested awards, and conflicting economic testimony on decisions regarding lost wages and benefits and pain and suffering. Participants heard excerpts of an age discrimination lawsuit in which liability had previously been determined in the plaintiff's favor. We varied whether suggested awards were included and if so, whether they were presented by attorneys, a plaintiff's expert economist, or both a plaintiff's and defendant's expert economist. Results tentatively showed that attorney's suggestions were not persuasive and that the effects of expert testimony depend on its nature and on the particular decision task at hand. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews the basic rules of evidence and procedure that provide the basis for the introduction of expert testimony into court. Second, it reviews some of the findings of social psychology regarding expert testimony, primarily the ways in which the structure of society affects what information will reach the court and what is the readiness of the fact-finder to deal with that information. Finally, it reports original data on jurors' assessments of a variety of witnesses, (viz. physicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, chemists, document examiners, polygraph examiners, police, eyewitnesses, firearms experts, and accountants and appraisers). Jurors' differential assessments of the different experts and differences among juror subgroups are reported and some explanations for a few of those differences are tested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]