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This study examines predictions derived from Foa and Kozak's theory of emotional processing. We hypothesized that the provision of heart-rate feedback would facilitate emotional processing through a fuller activation of the participant's fear structure, and by focusing participants' attention on information that is incompatible with the fear structure, i.e., the interoceptive pattern of habituation. Nonclinical students (N = 54) showing marked claustrophobic fear received 30 min of self-directed exposure to a claustrophobic chamber. Three exposure conditions (heart-rate feedback, paced-tone control, and exposure only control) were examined across six 5-min exposure trials. Participants receiving heart-rate feedback displayed greater between-trial habituation across treatment trials and lower levels of fear at post-treatment. Treatment process findings failed to support the fear activation hypothesis. Implications of the findings for theories of fear reduction are discussed.

We tested the hypothesis that the perceived availability of safety resources plays an influential role in fear prediction bias. Claustrophobic Ss (N = 37) completed a claustrophobic challenge under conditions of either low or high proximity to safety. Proximity to safety was operationalized as distance from the exit. We examined the effects of proximity to safety on Ss' predicted fear, actual fear, and discrepancy between predicted and actual fear (prediction bias). Consistent with prediction, the availability of safety resources had a more pronounced effect on Ss' actual fear than Ss' predicted fear. Moreover, subjects displayed a significant underprediction bias when proximity to safety was low and a slight (albeit nonsignificant) overprediction bias when proximity to safety was high. Our results lend further support for the hypothesis that anxious Ss underutilize safety information when confronting perceived threats. Possible mechanisms underlying this tendency are discussed.

The present study tested predictions derived from Rachman's match-mismatch theory of fear. Students (N = 117) displaying claustrophobic fear made predictions of fear, panic and performance prior to exposure to a claustrophobic chamber. Subjects were then classified into groups (i.e. matchers, overpredictors, underpredictors) based on the congruence between their anticipated phobic reactions and their actual reactions during exposure. The effects of match-mismatch status on predictions of fear, panic and performance on a subsequent exposure trial were examined. Results provided further evidence that phobic Ss are frequently inaccurate in predicting their phobic reactions during exposure. Consistent with previous findings, Ss who overpredicted fear, panic or performance tended to lower their predictions on a subsequent exposure trial, whereas Ss who underpredicted fear, panic or performance showed heightened predictions upon subsequent exposure. Contrary to previous findings, Ss were more likely to underpredict rather than overpredict their phobic reactions. Our findings are in accord with those of Rachman indicating that the magnitude of mismatch between predicted and actual fear/panic is more influential in determining subsequent predictions of fear/panic than it is in determining Ss' actual fear/panic. Moreover, this asymmetry was observed when the mismatch paradigm was applied to phobic behavior (i.e. tendency to escape).

The present study examined Reiss and McNally's expectancy model in the prediction of claustrophobic fear, measured across three domains. Non-clinical subjects (N = 117) reporting claustrophobic concerns were administered a behavioral approach test to a claustrophobic chamber. Consistent with the expectancy model, danger expectancy, anxiety expectancy and the interaction of anxiety sensitivity and anxiety expectancy accounted for unique portions of behavioral performance, with other variables partialled out. The expectancy model variable set, however, did not meaningfully relate to subjective fear or heart-rate reactivity. The formulation of anxiety sensitivity as a measure of the salience of anxiety is discussed. These findings lend support to the theory as a model for the behavioral dimension of pathological fear, but not the subjective or physiological facets.