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This paper argues that a lonely death is, by definition, a bad death and that society as a whole, as well as individuals in society are obligated to assure a certain degree of well‐being, flourishing, or care among and for fellow individuals. Individuals can then be said to have a right against dying a lonely death. Such a right has corresponding duties. The paper further specifies what such duties may entail based on what individuals may need on their deathbed, specifically focusing on the need for human touch. Assuming that human touch might indeed be needed by some individuals in order to avoid a lonely death, the paper explores potential implications from a public health perspective, particularly during infectious disease outbreaks such as COVID. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Loneliness is a major public health concern, particularly during pandemics such as Covid. It is extremely common, and it poses a major risk to human health. Technological solutions including social media, robots, and virtual reality have been advocated and implemented to relieve loneliness, and their use will undoubtedly increase in the near future. This paper explores the use of technological solutions from a normative perspective, asking whether and to what extent such measures should indeed be relied upon. The conclusion is that technological solutions are unquestionably part of the solution to loneliness, but that they cannot and should not constitute the whole solution. It is important to note that this is not a straw‐man argument, as several organizations and scholars have strictly focused on such technological solutions for loneliness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Responses to the COVID‐19 pandemic have been widely criticized for being too delayed and indecisive. As a result, the precautionary principle has been endorsed, applauded, and proposed to guide future responses to global public health emergencies. Drawing from controversial issues in response to COVID‐19, especially in Vietnam, this paper critically discusses some key ethical and legal issues of employing the precautionary principle in public health emergencies. Engaging with discussions concerning this principle, especially in environmental law where the precautionary principle first appeared as a guiding principle with objective content(s), this paper formulates the precautionary principle as 'in dubio pro salus', which is about advising, justifying and demanding states to proactively prepare for scenarios arising out of any public health emergency. It distinguishes the precautionary principle into moderate and hard versions. A moderate version largely takes a holistic approach and fulfils a series of criteria specified in this paper, while a hard version either permits restrictive measures to be deployed primarily on a hypothetic basis or expresses an instrumental mentality. The hard version should be rejected because of the ethical and legal problems it raises, including risk‐risk tradeoffs, internal paradoxes, unjustified causing of fear and unreasonable presupposition. Ultimately, this paper defends the moderate version. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past decade, numerous ethical frameworks have been developed to support public health decision‐making in challenging areas. Before the COVID‐19 pandemic began, members of the authorship team were involved in research programmes, in which the development of ethical frameworks was planned, to guide (a) the use of new technologies for emerging infectious disease surveillance; and (b) the allocation of scarce supplies of pandemic influenza vaccine. However, as the pandemic evolved, significant practical challenges emerged that led to our questioning the value of these frameworks. We now believe that a normative instrument, such as a framework, cannot adequately or reliably provide the ethical guidance that needs to be incorporated into public health decision‐making during natural disasters or infectious disease emergencies. Recently it has been suggested that there are potentially more dynamic, flexible, and effective ways to navigate decisions involving complex considerations entailed in policies and practices during a public health emergency. In this paper, we first outline the key functions of a public health ethics framework, before describing why we believe it would not be fit for purpose during a crisis. We end by considering whether proposed alternative methods to promote ethical public health decision‐making goals have the potential to meet these objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Successful public health interventions have, in recent decades, improved the health of the working classes in significant ways across much of the western world. Nevertheless, here, I argue that populist electoral breakthroughs over the last decade may be considered side‐effects of 'successful' public health policies: crucially, the claim is that those political side‐effects resulted because of—rather than despite—the health‐measured success of those public health interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is ongoing debate on how to fairly allocate scarce critical care resources to patients with COVID‐19. The debate revolves around two views: those who believe that priority for scarce resources should primarily aim at saving the most lives (SML) or at saving the most life‐years, and those who believe that public health should focus on health equity to address health disparities and social determinants of health. I argue that maximizing medical outcomes by saving the greatest number of patients is not a plausible strategy for combating COVID‐19. There are reasons of fairness to give each patient who can meet general eligibility requirements a chance of being saved. Rather than focusing on outcome maximization, a better solution would be the individualist lottery that takes account of probability of survival and duration of treatment. Although the individualist lottery allocates scarce resources in a fair way that is responsive to health equity concerns, it still gives considerable weight to the concern of SML. Thus, this procedure can be reasonably accepted by all key stakeholders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Assume a pandemic in which, despite all efforts of vaccine persuasion, too many people are hesitant toward vaccination for a laissez‐faire regime to reach herd immunity on a strictly voluntary basis. Then, basically four policy options are available—(a) moral appeals, (b) legal obligation, (c) monetary fines, and (d) monetary rewards. In this article, we demonstrate that the prevalent vaccination debate chooses the wrong starting point in discussing these options. Rather than asking how vaccine hesitancy can be overcome as a (bothersome) hindrance toward reaching herd immunity, we ask how one can reach herd immunity in due time while minimizing the (subjectively perceived) offense to the dignity of vaccine‐hesitant citizens. This change in perspective favors paying people for getting vaccinated instead of sanctioning them for not doing so. With respect to the COVID‐19 crisis, we show that a payment strategy is both feasible and advisable. This may be an important insight not only in the short term, but also with respect to future pandemics that are likely to come. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]