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In the last decade, a heated public debate broke out in the Netherlands about the extreme violence that Dutch security forces perpetrated in Indonesia between 1945 and 1949. Similar discussions cropped up in France and the United Kingdom. Exhaustive comparative research into excessive violence in Indonesia, Algeria, Indochina, Malaysia, Kenya and other places during the decolonisation wars has nevertheless only been sporadic. This forum is based on the initial findings of a recent research project and a conference that explored the options for more targeted comparative research. The provisional results that we share here demonstrate that although the armed conflicts strongly differed from each other, there were more similarities than differences in the ways in which extreme violence was used in them and the explanation for it. We conclude that all cases involved some form of institutionalised impunity, which enabled the type of situation in which the forces in the service of the colonial rulers were able to use extreme violence. Het afgelopen decennium is in Nederland een verhit debat ontstaan over het extreme geweld dat militairen in Nederlandse dienst hebben gepleegd in Indonesië tussen 1945 en 1949. In Frankrijk en het Verenigd Koninkrijk zijn soortgelijke discussies ontstaan. Grondig vergelijkend onderzoek naar buitensporig geweld in Indonesië, Algerije, Indochina, Maleisië, Kenia en andere plaatsen tijdens dekolonisatieoorlogen is echter zelden verricht. Dit forum is gebaseerd op de eerste uitkomsten van een recent onderzoeksproject en een congres waarin de mogelijkheden voor gerichter vergelijkend onderzoek zijn verkend. De voorlopige resultaten die wij hier delen laten zien dat de gewapende conflicten weliswaar sterk van elkaar verschilden, maar dat er meer overeenkomsten dan verschillen zijn in de manieren waarop extreem geweld daarin werd toegepast en kan worden verklaard. We concluderen onder meer dat in alle gevallen sprake was van een vorm van geïnstitutionaliseerde straffeloosheid, die het soort situaties mogelijk maakte waarin troepen in dienst van de koloniale machthebbers extreem geweld gebruikten. Filmpje

In the last decade, a heated public debate broke out in the Netherlands about the extreme violence that Dutch security forces perpetrated in Indonesia between 1945 and 1949. Similar discussions cropped up in France and the United Kingdom. Exhaustive comparative research into excessive violence in Indonesia, Algeria, Indochina, Malaysia, Kenya and other places during the decolonisation wars has nevertheless only been sporadic. This forum is based on the initial findings of a recent research project and a conference that explored the options for more targeted comparative research. The provisional results that we share here demonstrate that although the armed conflicts strongly differed from each other, there were more similarities than differences in the ways in which extreme violence was used in them and the explanation for it. We conclude that all cases involved some form of institutionalised impunity, which enabled the type of situation in which the forces in the service of the colonial rulers were able to use extreme violence. Het afgelopen decennium is in Nederland een verhit debat ontstaan over het extreme geweld dat militairen in Nederlandse dienst hebben gepleegd in Indonesië tussen 1945 en 1949. In Frankrijk en het Verenigd Koninkrijk zijn soortgelijke discussies ontstaan. Grondig vergelijkend onderzoek naar buitensporig geweld in Indonesië, Algerije, Indochina, Maleisië, Kenia en andere plaatsen tijdens dekolonisatieoorlogen is echter zelden verricht. Dit forum is gebaseerd op de eerste uitkomsten van een recent onderzoeksproject en een congres waarin de mogelijkheden voor gerichter vergelijkend onderzoek zijn verkend. De voorlopige resultaten die wij hier delen laten zien dat de gewapende conflicten weliswaar sterk van elkaar verschilden, maar dat er meer overeenkomsten dan verschillen zijn in de manieren waarop extreem geweld daarin werd toegepast en kan worden verklaard. We concluderen onder meer dat in alle gevallen sprake was van een vorm van geïnstitutionaliseerde straffeloosheid, die het soort situaties mogelijk maakte waarin troepen in dienst van de koloniale machthebbers extreem geweld gebruikten. Filmpje

Klep, Christ, Somalië, Rwanda, Srebrenica. De nasleep van drie ontspoorde vredesmissies (Dissertatie Utrecht 2008; Amsterdam: Boom, 2008, 385 blz., ISBN 978 90 8506 668 2)The Aftermath of Somalia, Rwanda and Srebrenica: Parallels and DifferencesChrist Klep has written an impressive and highly accessible thesis on the aftermath of three unsuccessful peace operations. By using a bold comparative approach and an ambitious tone of enquiry he places the traumatic Dutch Srebrenica experience in the context of two broadly similar processes of finger-pointing and evading responsibility in Canada and Belgium following their respective interventions in Somalia and Rwanda. He thus exposes many fascinating parallels, yet the historian Klep pays little attention to the differences between his case studies. This is regrettable, as this would have strengthened rather than weakened his otherwise compelling argument. The Somali case in particular differs from ‘Srebrenica’ and ‘Rwanda’, since the murders perpetrated by Canadian soldiers – horrific as they may have been – and the subsequent cover-up in no way constituted a defining moment in the collapsing international mission as a whole. Unlike the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica the death of the two Somalis was the result of a purely national Canadian failure, which helps explain why the Somalia Inquiry could identify guilty compatriots far more decisively than, for example, the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD) in its Srebrenica report. This review is part of the discussion forum 'Somalië, Rwanda, Srebrenica' (Christ Klep).

Klep, Christ, Somalië, Rwanda, Srebrenica. De nasleep van drie ontspoorde vredesmissies (Dissertatie Utrecht 2008; Amsterdam: Boom, 2008, 385 blz., ISBN 978 90 8506 668 2) The Aftermath of Somalia, Rwanda and Srebrenica: Parallels and Differences Christ Klep has written an impressive and highly accessible thesis on the aftermath of three unsuccessful peace operations. By using a bold comparative approach and an ambitious tone of enquiry he places the traumatic Dutch Srebrenica experience in the context of two broadly similar processes of finger-pointing and evading responsibility in Canada and Belgium following their respective interventions in Somalia and Rwanda. He thus exposes many fascinating parallels, yet the historian Klep pays little attention to the differences between his case studies. This is regrettable, as this would have strengthened rather than weakened his otherwise compelling argument. The Somali case in particular differs from ‘Srebrenica’ and ‘Rwanda’, since the murders perpetrated by Canadian soldiers – horrific as they may have been – and the subsequent cover-up in no way constituted a defining moment in the collapsing international mission as a whole. Unlike the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica the death of the two Somalis was the result of a purely national Canadian failure, which helps explain why the Somalia Inquiry could identify guilty compatriots far more decisively than, for example, the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD) in its Srebrenica report. This review is part of the discussion forum 'Somalië, Rwanda, Srebrenica' (Christ Klep).

Klep, Christ, Somalië, Rwanda, Srebrenica. De nasleep van drie ontspoorde vredesmissies (Dissertatie Utrecht 2008; Amsterdam: Boom, 2008, 385 blz., ISBN 978 90 8506 668 2) The Aftermath of Somalia, Rwanda and Srebrenica: Parallels and Differences Christ Klep has written an impressive and highly accessible thesis on the aftermath of three unsuccessful peace operations. By using a bold comparative approach and an ambitious tone of enquiry he places the traumatic Dutch Srebrenica experience in the context of two broadly similar processes of finger-pointing and evading responsibility in Canada and Belgium following their respective interventions in Somalia and Rwanda. He thus exposes many fascinating parallels, yet the historian Klep pays little attention to the differences between his case studies. This is regrettable, as this would have strengthened rather than weakened his otherwise compelling argument. The Somali case in particular differs from ‘Srebrenica’ and ‘Rwanda’, since the murders perpetrated by Canadian soldiers – horrific as they may have been – and the subsequent cover-up in no way constituted a defining moment in the collapsing international mission as a whole. Unlike the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica the death of the two Somalis was the result of a purely national Canadian failure, which helps explain why the Somalia Inquiry could identify guilty compatriots far more decisively than, for example, the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD) in its Srebrenica report. This review is part of the discussion forum 'Somalië, Rwanda, Srebrenica' (Christ Klep).

Klep, Christ, Somalië, Rwanda, Srebrenica. De nasleep van drie ontspoorde vredesmissies (Dissertatie Utrecht 2008; Amsterdam: Boom, 2008, 385 blz., ISBN 978 90 8506 668 2) The Aftermath of Somalia, Rwanda and Srebrenica: Parallels and Differences Christ Klep has written an impressive and highly accessible thesis on the aftermath of three unsuccessful peace operations. By using a bold comparative approach and an ambitious tone of enquiry he places the traumatic Dutch Srebrenica experience in the context of two broadly similar processes of finger-pointing and evading responsibility in Canada and Belgium following their respective interventions in Somalia and Rwanda. He thus exposes many fascinating parallels, yet the historian Klep pays little attention to the differences between his case studies. This is regrettable, as this would have strengthened rather than weakened his otherwise compelling argument. The Somali case in particular differs from ‘Srebrenica’ and ‘Rwanda’, since the murders perpetrated by Canadian soldiers – horrific as they may have been – and the subsequent cover-up in no way constituted a defining moment in the collapsing international mission as a whole. Unlike the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica the death of the two Somalis was the result of a purely national Canadian failure, which helps explain why the Somalia Inquiry could identify guilty compatriots far more decisively than, for example, the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD) in its Srebrenica report. This review is part of the discussion forum 'Somalië, Rwanda, Srebrenica' (Christ Klep).