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This paper examines the role of new developmentalist agenda for actions in the economic area of Dilma Rousseff's government. The paper aims to contribute to the research area that examines the relevance of schools of economic thought to economic policy in Brazil. The central conclusion is that - despite the increase in the state intervention in the economy - we cannot argue that the new developmentalist agenda played an important role in Dilma Rousseff's government. The absence of a "national development strategy" and essential elements of the new developmentalist macroeconomic policy support this conclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Brazilian government has over the past years promulgated a mix of orthodox and heterodox policies for Brazil's economic development. This paper seeks to test whether the existing economic ideas have been prescriptive in formulating the policies, or whether they have been the outcome of the "infusion of private interests" (Katzenstein, 1978) in the policy making process. To this end, the paper charts the origins of the unilateral opening for trade in the agribusiness and contrasts them with the policy process in the car industry, where trade barriers have been erected. The article will identify the channels through which private actors informed the government's interventions and show that the industry bodies have largely prodded the government. The resulting policy maze has left both the representatives of the orthodox as well those of the heterodox approach unsatisfied and has failed to halt Brazil's dwindling manufacturing capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brazil attracted relatively little innovation-intensive and export-oriented foreign investment during the liberalization period of 1990 to 2010, especially compared with competitors such as China and India. Adopting an institutionalist perspective, I argue that multinational firm investment profiles can be partly explained by the characteristics of investment promotion policies and bureaucracies charged with their implementation. Brazil's FDI policies were passive and non-discriminating in the second half of the 1990s, but became more selective under Lula. Investment promotion efforts have often been undercut by weakly coordinated and inconsistent institutions. The paper highlights the need for active, discriminating investment promotion policies if benefits from non-traditional FDI are to be realized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]