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The article presents a response to a commentary by Peter Burnham about an article on depoliticisation in Great Britain. Burnham's commentary contains a number of perceptive observations that serve to advance further the debate on depoliticisation. He suggests that rather than conceptualising the post-war development of British governance as a simple transition from politicised to depoliticised methods, it is more productive to analyse statecraft in terms of the relationship between the two in any given period. One area of disagreement between Burnham and the authors of the article relates to the theoretical utility of the term dual polity.

This article seeks to build on Peter Burnham's analysis of New Labour's depoliticisation statecraft as set out in an earlier volume of this journal. While Burnham provides a convincing account of how this new governing strategy differed from earlier ‘politicised’ methods of governance, we know less about why such change took place. Burnham makes a start by suggesting that developments in the international financial system go some way to explaining this shift. The main argument of this article is that this account of change needs to be supplemented by a focus on domestic factors. It is asserted below that politicised strategies failed in part because state managers governed within a strategically selective context which penalised the deployment of more activist and discretionary policy instruments in industrial affairs. Instead, this context was more favourable to the depoliticisation techniques which have emerged in the 1980s and the 1990s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1 May 1997 the Labour government in the United Kingdom has implemented a number of public–private partnerships (PPPs) as a central tool of governance within their wider modernisation agenda. To date, the introduction of PPPs has largely been evaluated through conceptual lenses that emphasise either the administrative, managerial, financial or technical dimensions of this reform strategy. This article seeks to complement this wider literature by arguing that PPPs raise a host of political issues and tensions that have largely been overlooked. Five specific themes are set out in order to provide a framework or organising perspective. These are: efficiency; risk; complexity; accountability; and governance and the future of state projects. The main conclusion of the article is that PPPs represent a Faustian bargain in that forms of PPP may deliver efficiency gains and service improvements in some policy areas but these benefits may involve substantial political and democratic costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]