Search

This article comments on several articles about the phenomena of war and peace in relation to sociology. Several authors recognize the threat posed to Marxism by the phenomenon of war. Weaker sociologists will take refuge in useful phrases, such as relative autonomy, uneven development and determination in the last instance. One of the legacies of Marxism is the division between base and superstructure, and its idea that political decisions are the effects, but not the causes of economic change. Class analysis comes to the fore only in two papers, one by John Mattausch, the other by Graham Day. Mattauch's unconcealed nostalgia for mass working class support sits unhappily with the fact that the majority of activists are state class radicals. Other papers are more interested in peace movements than in peace. They make no reference to the actual effect of such movements, for example, in contributing to the pre-war strategy of Adolph Hitler. Only one paper offers a definition of war. This occurs as a prelude to David Riches' discussion of the peaceful Eskimos. War, according to Riches, is the authorized employment of physical force against other persons, as means by which groups competing for control of public resources and benefits attempt to influence the outcome of the competition in their favor.

Any collection of papers purporting to set out new directions for a discipline, like sociology, whose fundamental orientations are humanist, might reasonably be expected to contain within it items that may themselves be collected into one of two principal categories. The first is of work that brings radically into question existing ontological and, hence, epistemological bases of the discipline; the second, of work that, developing from a fundamental, though not an unquestioning, acceptance of those bases, seeks to modify them in the light of its experiential practice in their terms. Work of both kinds requires the courage and rigour of a strong and serious commitment to sustain sociology as a discipline through questioning thoughtfully its basic tenets in relation to the lived, social experience both of those who conduct it and of those whose conduct is its topic. Work in the second category can be too easily confused, however, with that of a third—the scholarship of the disciplinary cartographer, whose work is the recording and reporting upon the work of others in his field. Such work informs those in search of the new of the names and appearances of the epistemological territories that they are leaving behind, and of the conceptual topography of some of the issues they may expect to have to negotiate during their journey. As such, and if it is thorough, it can be valuable. But it is too often an indication of unreflective neophilia amongst sociologists than of new directions in sociology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]