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The paper ethnographically explores the cultural embedding of atomistic indifference in online, global financial markets: arenas that have been digitally designed according to economic ideals and that demand an extreme form of relational and social dissociation from the partners to exchange and from those affected by the transactions. Its case‐study is lay financial‐trading in Israel, a country undergoing extensive neoliberalization. The study shows that dissociation is embedded in an economic culture marked by constant, multi‐sited declarations that economic‐Others are cold, uncaring and manipulative. It takes shape as traders convert the distrust towards Others into distrust towards portions of the Self that represent links to these Others, namely their own social‐psychology and social concern. Acting atomistically and selfishly in the market thus entails considerable reflexive work. The paper contributes to an ongoing debate on the moral and cultural embeddedness of markets in general and of the expanding financial markets in particular. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ulrich Beck states in the Risk Society (1992) that the rise of the social production of risks in the risk society signals that class ceases to be of relevance; instead the hierarchical logic of class will be supplanted by the egalitarian logic of the distribution of risks. Several trenchant critiques of Beck's claim have justified the continued relevance of class to contemporary society. While these accounts have emphasized continuity, they have not attempted to chart, as this paper will, how the growing social production of risk increases the importance of class. This paper argues that it is Beck's undifferentiated, catastrophic account of risk that undergirds his rejection of class, and that by inserting an account of risk involving gradations in both damages and calculability into Beck's framework, his theory of risk society may be used to develop a critical theory of class. Such a theory can be used to reveal how wealth differentials associated with class relations actually increase in importance to individuals' life-chances in the risk society. With the growing production and distribution of bads, class inequalities gain added significance, since it will be relative wealth differentials that both enables the advantaged to minimize their risk exposure and imposes on others the necessity of facing the intensified risks of the risk society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a contribution to the institutionalist approach to money through ethnographic research carried out in two local currency systems in Argentina (known as trueque). It argues that Argentinian local currencies must be considered as monies in their own right even if they differ from state and bank issued currencies, because they can be understood as systems of evaluation and settlement of debts denominated in a specific unit of account (the crédito). Money is said to be an ambivalent social relation because in the two cases studied it mediates very different dynamics, exacerbating inequality in one context and promoting collective emancipation in another. This difference is due to the kind of political communities that the crédito tends to forge. In both Rosario and Poriajhu, the political community is defined by a set of values that legitimizes ongoing monetary practices and institutions rather than the State's coercion., (© London School of Economics and Political Science 2018.)

Monetary financing - the funding of state expenditure via the creation of new money rather than through taxation or borrowing - has become a taboo policy instrument in advanced economies. It is generally associated with dangerously high inflation and/or war. Relatedly, a key institutional feature of modern independent central banks is that they are not obligated to support government expenditure via money creation. Since the financial crisis of 2007-2008, however, unorthodox monetary policies, in particular quantitative easing, coupled with stagnant growth and high levels of public and private debt have led to questions over the monetary financing taboo. Debates on the topic have so far been mainly theoretical with little attention to the social and political dynamics of historical instances of monetary financing. This paper analyses one of the most significant twentieth-century cases: Canada from the period after the Great Depression up until the monetarist revolution of the 1970s. The period was a successful one for the Canadian economy, with high growth and employment and manageable inflation. It offers some interesting insights into the relationship between states and central banks and present-day discussions around the governance of money creation., (© London School of Economics and Political Science 2017.)

This paper explores the factors that have recently increased support for candidates and causes of the populist right across the developed democracies, especially among a core group of working-class men. In the context of debates about whether the key causal factors are economic or cultural, we contend that an effective analysis must rest on understanding how economic and cultural developments interact to generate support for populism. We suggest that one way to do so is to see status anxiety as a proximate factor inducing support for populism, and economic and cultural developments as factors that combine to precipitate such anxiety. Using cross-national survey data from 20 developed democracies, we assess the viability of this approach. We show that lower levels of subjective social status are associated with support for right populist parties, identify a set of economic and cultural developments likely to have depressed the social status of men without a college education, and show that the relative social status of those men has declined since 1987 in many of the developed democracies. We conclude that status effects provide one pathway through which economic and cultural developments may combine to increase support for the populist right., (© London School of Economics and Political Science 2017.)

This paper is inspired by Thomas Piketty's book Capital in the Twenty- First Century. Piketty does a wonderful job of tracing income and wealth over time, and relating changes to trends of economic and population growth, and drawing out the implications for inequality, inheritance and even democracy. But, he says relatively little about where capital is located, how capital accumulation in one place relies on activities elsewhere, how capital is urbanized with advanced capitalism and what life is like in spaces without capital. This paper asks 'where is the geography in Capital' or 'where is the geography of capital in Capital'? Following Piketty's lead, the paper develops its analysis through a number of important novels. It examines, first, the debate that Jane Austen ignored colonialism and slavery in her treatment of nineteenth century Britain, second, how Balzac and then Zola provide insight to the urban political economy of capital later in the century, and third, how Katherine Boo attends to inequality as the everyday suffering of the poor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is about the struggle for value by those who live intensified devaluation in the new conditions of legitimation and self-formation, by which the self is required to repeatedly reveal its value through its accrual and investment in economic, symbolic, social and cultural capitals. It explores how this value struggle is experienced: felt affectively, known and spoken through discourses of injustice. Drawing on a small research project, which uses the British New Labour government's Respect Agenda as an evocative device to provoke discussion, the paper details how those positioned as already marginal to the dominant symbolic, presented as 'useless' subjects rather than 'subjects of value' of the nation, generate alternative ways for making value. It examines how the experience of injustice generates affective responses expressed as 'ugly-feelings'. The conversion of these 'ugly feelings' into articulations of 'just-talk' reveals how different understandings of value, of what matters and what counts, come into effect and circulate alongside the dominant symbolic. The issue that most angered working-class respondents is how they are positioned, judged, blamed and held responsible for an inheritance over which they have no control, 'an accident of birth'. They were acutely aware of how they were constantly judged and de-legitimated and how practices such as selfishness and greed were legitimate for others. Showing how they refuse to authorize those they consider lacking in value but with authority and in a position to judge, the paper demonstrates how class relations are lived through a struggle, not only against economic limitation but a struggle against unjustifiable judgment and authority and for dignified relationality. The paper reveals a struggle at the very core of ontology, demonstrating how the denigrated defend and make their lives liveable; an issue at the heart of current austerity politics which may have increased significance for the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the ways in which the work–life balance choices made by heterosexual couples differ in different generations, how such choices are gendered, and the extent to which ‘individualization’ provides an adequate conceptualization of the effects of social change on heterosexual couples. It argues that processes of individualization need to be seen in the context of changing social institutions, and that it is the de-institutionalization of ‘the family’ and the life course that is leading to a de-gendering of work–life balance choices. The paper draws on findings from a restudy of the family and social change and a study of the gender dimensions of job insecurity both of which were carried out in the same geographical location. The studies provide evidence of generational change in work–life balance choices and increasing occupational differentiation between heterosexual partners. This leads to a situation where increasingly choices are made which blur gendered boundaries and which has been made possible by a process of de-institutionalization of the male breadwinner family. Our findings support the contention that processes of individualization are more apparent amongst younger than older generations and that, because of changes external to the family, there is more negotiation and pragmatism amongst younger generations about work–life choices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship between interpersonal trust and membership in voluntary associations is a persistent research finding in sociology. What is more, the notion of trust has become a central issue in current social science theorizing covering such diverse approaches as transaction costs economics or cognitive sociology. In different ways and for different purposes, these approaches address the role of voluntary organizations, although, as this paper argues, much of this thinking remains sketchy and underdeveloped. Against an empirical portrait of this relationship, the purpose of this paper is to assess such theorizing. We first set out to explicate major approaches to trust in economics, sociology and political science, using the non-profit or voluntary organization as a focal point. We then examine the various approaches in terms of their strengths and weaknesses, and, finally, identify key areas for theoretical development. In particular, we point to the social movement literature, the social psychology of trust, and recent thinking about civil society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much attention has been focused on Singapore's attempt to use information technology to build a knowledge-based economy. This paper examines the implications of the unintended consequences of the Internet in the restructuring of state and society relations in Singapore. We use the data on Singapore-based and Singapore-related websites to show (a) the diversity of positions expressed by civil society organizations, fringe groups and even mainstream segments of society; (b) the negotiation process between the state and civil society over various rights and how developments in cyber-space have implications for 'reality'; (c) how censorship and content regulation itself is a more complex multi-dimensional process such that while local politics is regulated, the multi-ethnic character of the resident population has led to greater religious tolerance such that religious groups banned in some countries have found a safe haven in Singapore and have used the city-state as a strategic Internet node. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper notes the contemporary emergence of 'morality' in both sociological argument and political rhetoric, and analyses its significance in relation to ongoing UK welfare reforms. It revisits the idea of 'moral economy' and identifies two strands in its contemporary application; that all economies depend on an internal moral schema, and that some external moral evaluation is desirable. UK welfare reform is analysed as an example of the former, with reference to three distinct orientations advanced in the work of Freeden (1996), Laclau (2014), and Lockwood (1996). In this light, the paper then considers challenges to the reform agenda, drawn from third sector and other public sources. It outlines the forms of argument present in these challenges, based respectively on rationality, legality, and morality, which together provide a basis for evaluation of the welfare reforms and for an alternative 'moral economy'., (© London School of Economics and Political Science 2016.)

One of the on-going consequences of recent financial crises seems to be that the conventional 'anchor' measures of global finance (such as the US dollar, treasury bonds and AAA rated securities) are no longer playing the anchoring role once believed of them. LIBOR now needs to be added to this list and not just because it has been tarnished by illegal practices, but because it is looking increasingly surpassed by financial market practices. LIBOR was believed to provide a risk-free rate of interest, but has been revealed to be risk-laden. Moreover, LIBOR is a measure of the costs of borrowing, whilst market concern is increasingly with measures of interest rate volatility. This paper looks at why, in the context of crisis, financial market focus on interest rates is turning towards other benchmarks, notably the overnight indexed swap (OIS) market, and what this shift might be telling us about the anchoring requirements of global financial markets., (© London School of Economics and Political Science 2016.)

We are living in a time when it is frequently assumed that the logic of capital has subsumed every single aspect of our lives, intervening in the organization of our intimate relations as well as the control of our time, including investments in the future (e.g. via debt). The theories that document the incursion of this logic (often through the terms of neoliberalism and/or governmentality) assume that this logic is internalized, works and organizes everything including our subjectivity. These theories performatively reproduce the very conditions they describe, shrinking the domain of values and making it subject to capital's logic. All values are reduced to value. Yet values and value are always dialogic, dependent and co-constituting. In this paper I chart the history by which value eclipses values and how this shrinks our sociological imagination. By outlining the historical processes that institutionalized different organizations of the population through political economy and the social contract, producing ideas of proper personhood premised on propriety, I detail how forms of raced, gendered and classed personhood was formed. The gaps between the proper and improper generate significant contradictions that offer both opportunities to and limits on capitals' lines of flight. It is the lacks, the residues, and the excess that cannot be captured by capital's mechanisms of valuation that will be explored in order to think beyond the logic of capital and show how values will always haunt value., (© London School of Economics and Political Science 2014.)

In this paper, I take Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty as the starting point for a set of twelve policy proposals that could bring about a genuine shift in the distribution of income towards less inequality. In designing the set of proposals, I draw on the experience of reducing inequality in postwar Europe and on an analysis as to how the economic circumstances are now different in the twenty-first century, highlighting the role of technical change and the rise in capital emphasized by Piketty. The proposed measures span many fields of policy, and are not confined to fiscal redistribution, encompassing science policy, competition policy, public employment, a guaranteed return on small savings, a capital endowment, as well as more progressive taxation of income and wealth transfers, and a participation income. Inequality is embedded in our social structure, and the search for a significant reduction requires us to examine all aspects of our society. I focus on inequality within countries, and what can be achieved by national governments, with the UK specifically in mind. The primary audience is those concerned with policy-making in national governments, but implementation should not be seen purely in these terms. There are different levels of government, and certain proposals, particularly those concerned with taxation, may only be feasible if pursued by a group of countries in collaboration. The last of the twelve proposals - for a basic income for children - is specifically directed at the European Union. Finally, actions by individuals as consumers, as workers, or as employers, can all contribute to reducing inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last 20 years, the drive for evidence‐based policymaking has been coupled with a concurrent push for the use of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) as the "gold‐standard" for generating rigorous evidence on whether or not development interventions work. Drawing on content analysis of 63 development RCTs and 4 years of participant observation, I provide a rich description of the diverse set of actors and the transnational organizational effort required to implement development RCTs and maintain their "scientific status." Particularly, I investigate the boundary work that proponents of RCTs—also known as randomistas—do to differentiate the purposes and merits of testing development projects from doing them, as a way to bypass the political and ethical problems presented by adopting the experimental method with foreign aid beneficiaries in poor countries. Although randomistas have been mostly successful in differentiating RCTs from the projects evaluated, I also examine cases where they were not able to do so, as a means to highlight the controversies associated with implementing RCTs in international development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article re-reads Marx's account of the commodity as a socio-natural entity. In doing so, it re-evaluates the status of the political (as opposed to questions of political economy) in Marx's analysis and also reads his argument in light of Actor-Network-Theory's call for the thingness of things to be taken seriously. The paper argues that there is a complex duality to the commodity as it is always comprised of both use-value and exchange-value and hence as both 'natural' and 'social'. It is pointed out that the usual translation of words with the root 'gesellschaft-' as 'social' is unhelpful and that a better term would be 'societal', as this enables Marx, and us, to re-approach the very distinction between the natural, the societal and the social. Marx's notion of 'value as equivalence' is then outlined and it is argued that this crucial stage in his account is often passed over. Value as equivalence is not a mere social production but relies upon the expression of the use-value of one thing in another. This leads to the third move which is an outline of the importance of value-form and social form. It is argued that it is this formation of a commodity (comprising both the natural and the social) which is the key both to understanding it as a specific historical entity as well as offering a powerful, non-reductive, account of the natural, social, material and historical character of things. Overall, the article attempts to develop a novel conception of natural-social commodities which does not premise either side of this dyad and so might help social theorists to talk of real things whilst avoiding charges of essentialism and reductionism as well as possible Latourian critiques of over-generalization., (© London School of Economics and Political Science 2012.)

This paper examines the consequences of the recent economic downturn and UK government spending cuts, as exacerbations of prevailing trends in neoliberal employment policy, on temporal perception, specifically as it relates to the adaptation of subjective anticipations of and projections into the future to objective prospects of unemployment by class. Grounded in a phenomenologically-minded Bourdieusian conceptualization of class and time and contextualized by statistics on chances of job loss, it draws on qualitative research with 57 individuals from across the class structure to chart differing dispositions toward the future. In particular, it distinguishes three orientations - the future as controllable, the future as uncontrollable and the future as reasonably controllable - which appear to correspond with resources possessed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on British data from two annual sweeps of the ISSP eight years apart in 1994 and 2002, for modules focusing on 'Family and Changing Gender Roles', this paper examines the extent to which changes in women's labour market participation, changing ideologies/discourses of gender and changing forms of intimate relationships are affecting the ways in which couples organize household money, and the implications of such changes for recent theories of intimate relationships. The analysis indicates that by 2002, the type of relationship respondents had established, together with their social class position, were both independently related to the ways in which they managed money, after controlling for socio-economic and cultural or discursive factors. Our findings also provide a degree of support for the thesis of a partial decline in the male breadwinner model of gender, as indicated by small declines in the use of the relatively inegalitarian female whole wage and housekeeping allowance systems which were most likely to be used by married couples and cohabiting fathers, expressing relatively traditional ideologies/discourses of breadwinning - and a slight increase in the use of the partial pool, which was most likely to be used by childless cohabiting couples in which male partners expressed less traditional ideologies of breadwinning and women were in middle-class jobs with incomes high enough to facilitate partially separate finances. We also suggest, however, that in so far as cohabiting couples earning different amounts define equality as contributing equally to household expenditure, it is possible that rather than being associated with shifts to greater equality in access to money for personal spending and saving, the partial pool may be associated with marked inequalities, because it may enable gender inequalities generated in the labour market to be more directly transposed into inequalities within households, despite the decline of traditional discourses of male breadwinning and the increasing importance of egalitarian ideologies of co-provisioning.

This paper argues that although classical sociology has largely overlooked the importance of social relations with the material world in shaping the form of society, Braudel's concept of 'material civilization' is a useful way to begin to understand the sociological significance of this relationship. The limitations of Braudel's historical and general concept can be partially overcome with Elias's analysis of the connection between 'technization' and 'civilization' that allows for both a civilizing and a de-civilizing impact of emergent forms of material relation that both lengthen and shorten the chains of interdependence between the members of a society. It is suggested that the concept of the 'morality of things' employed by a number of commentators is useful in summarizing the civilizing effects of material objects and addressing their sociological significance. From the sociology of consumption the idea of materiality as a sign of social relationships can be drawn, and from the sociology of technology the idea of socio-technical systems and actor-networks can contribute to the understanding of material civilization. It is argued that the concept of 'material capital' can usefully summarize the variable social value of objects but to understand the complexity of material civilization as it unfolds in everyday life, an analysis of 'material interaction' is needed. Finally the paper suggests some initial themes and issues apparent in contemporary society that the sociological study of material civilization might address; the increased volume, functional complexity and material specificity of objects and the increased social complexity, autonomy and substitutability that is entailed. A theory of 'material civilization' is the first step in establishing a sociology of objects.

Sociological understanding of generations can be enhanced by avoiding defining them rigidly as chronological cohorts but rather linking people's accounts of their generational experience with an historically informed political economy. It then becomes possible, for example, to understand the complexity of generational politics. This paper uses data on the 'War Generation' taken from the Exeter Politics of Old Age project to link an empirically based political economy of generational inequality with a cultural sociology of generations. The 'War Generation' recognizes itself and is referred to by others in terms of a common identity. It is also an historical generation; its values, attitudes and, above all, sense of national solidarity and mutual obligation were forged in the direct experience of war. But it is also divided by divergent economic interests in property and pension rights based on the historical experience of the life course by successive groups and this segmentation can be observed in political action. The political culture of the War Generation manifests both continuity and change. Understanding these dynamics requires listening to people constructing their worlds, understanding their full range of historical experiences, and analysing the conditions for their conflicts and their cohesion.

The author replies to a critique of his work by scholar Ulrich Beck on the concept of risk society, particularly the importance of the use of social class in the development of a critical theory of risk society. The article responds to distinctions made by Beck concerning risk society including risk and catastrophe, individual and systemic risks, and the concept of conflict logic of social classes and global risks. The article also examines economic inequality, wealth distribution, and political and economic power.

This paper takes issue with Stehr and Grundmann's argument in this journal that sociology's poor record of contribution to practical knowledge results from sociologists' misguided attachment to the idea that social phenomena are peculiarly complex, and so peculiarly resistant to efforts at practical knowledge formation. Stehr and Grundmann develop their thesis by contrasting sociology to economics, claiming the latter's superior methods and disciplinary cultures enable it to contribute more successfully to solving practical problems. We argue that Stehr and Grundmann's comparison of the relative success of economics and sociology as policy sciences underestimates the extent to which the complexity argument has been destructive of economics' capacity to contribute practical knowledge, and overestimates the importance of disciplinary methods and cultures in explaining the use of economics in policy making. Further, we argue that the 'complexity argument' can contribute to better policy making, by virtue of its capacity to highlight the dangers of simplistic or fundamentalist solutions to social problems with complex causes.

Several disciplines have contributed to the understanding of the relationship between science, technology, and economic change. Weber's perspective on this relationship, however, has not been properly explored. In the first part of this paper, we give an account of Weber's perspective. In the second part, we critically assess Weber's ideas, indicating those that are useful and those that deserve to be abandoned. We also confront a revised Weberian perspective with those of the main contemporary competitors, the key ideas of economists and economic historians on one side and social constructivists on the other. We conclude that a Weberian comparative-historical approach compares favourably with these competitors, and suggest where his approach still requires further work.

Analyses of global financial markets are dominated by atomized models of decision-making and behavioural psychology ('exuberance' or 'panic'). In contrast, this paper argues that overwhelmingly, finance organizations rather than 'individuals' make decisions, and routinely use emotions in formulating expectations. Keynes introduced emotion (business confidence and animal spirits) but in economics, emotion remains individualistic and irrational. Luhmann's system theory lies at the other extreme, where emotions like trust and confidence are central variables, functional in the reduction of complexity in sub-systems like the economy. The gap between irrational emotions aggregated to 'herd' behaviour in economics, and 'system trust' applied to finance and money as a 'medium of communication' in sociology, remains largely unfilled. This paper argues that while organizations cannot be said to 'think' or 'feel', they are rational and emotional, because impersonal trust, confidence and their contrary emotions are unavoidable in decision-making due to fundamental uncertainty. These future-oriented emotions are prevalent within and between organizations in the financial sector, primarily in generating expectations. The dynamic of corporate activities of tense and ruthless struggle is a more plausible level of analysis than either financial 'manias' in aggregate or 'system trust'.

This paper focuses upon the emergence of the night-time economy both materially and culturally as a powerful manifestation of post-industrial society. This emergence features two key processes: firstly a shift in economic development from the industrial to the post-industrial; secondly a significant orientation of urban governance involving a move away from the traditional managerial functions of local service provision, towards an entrepreneurial stance primarily focused on the facilitation of economic growth. Central to this new economic era is the identification and promotion of liminality. The State's apparent inability to control these new leisure zones constitutes the creation of an urban frontier that is governed by commercial imperatives.

A joint concern with multidimensionality and dynamics is a defining feature of the pervasive use of the terminology of social exclusion in the European Union. The notion of social exclusion focuses attention on economic vulnerability in the sense of exposure to risk and uncertainty. Sociological concern with these issues has been associated with the thesis that risk and uncertainty have become more pervasive and extend substantially beyond the working class. This paper combines features of recent approaches to statistical modelling of poverty dynamics and multidimensional deprivation in order to develop our understanding of the dynamics of economic vulnerability. An analysis involving nine countries and covering the first five waves of the European Community Household Panel shows that, across nations and time, it is possible to identify an economically vulnerable class. This class is characterized by heightened risk of falling below a critical resource level, exposure to material deprivation and experience of subjective economic stress. Cross-national differentials in persistence of vulnerability are wider than in the case of income poverty and less affected by measurement error. Economic vulnerability profiles vary across welfare regimes in a manner broadly consistent with our expectations. Variation in the impact of social class within and across countries provides no support for the argument that its role in structuring such risk has become much less important. Our findings suggest that it is possible to accept the importance of the emergence of new forms of social risk and acknowledge the significance of efforts to develop welfare states policies involving a shift of opportunities and decision making on to individuals without accepting the ‘death of social class’ thesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Max Weber's The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, studied in isolation, shows mainly an elective affinity or an adequacy on the level of meaning between the Protestant ethic and the 'spirit' of capitalism. Here it is suggested that Weber's subsequent essays on 'The Economic Ethics of World Religions' are the result of his opinion that adequacy on the level of meaning needs and can be verified by causal adequacy. After some introductory remarks, particularly on elective affinity, the paper tries to develop the concept of adequate causation and the related concept of objective possibility on the basis of the work of v. Kries on whom Weber heavily relied. In the second part, this concept is used to show how the study of the economic ethics of India, China, Rome and orthodox Russia can support the thesis that the 'spirit' of capitalism, although it may not have been caused by the Protestant ethic, was perhaps adequately caused by it.

The assertion about the unique 'complexity' or the peculiarly intricate character of social phenomena has, at least within sociology, a long, venerable and virtually uncontested tradition. At the turn of the last century, classical social theorists, for example, Georg Simmel and Emile Durkheim, made prominent and repeated reference to this attribute of the subject matter of sociology and the degree to which it complicates, even inhibits the development and application of social scientific knowledge. Our paper explores the origins, the basis and the consequences of this assertion and asks in particular whether the classic complexity assertion still deserves to be invoked in analyses that ask about the production and the utilization of social scientific knowledge in modern society. We present John Maynard Keynes' economic theory and its practical applications as an illustration. We conclude that the practical value of social scientific knowledge is not dependent on a faithful, in the sense of complete, representation of social reality. Instead, social scientific knowledge that wants to optimize its practicality has to attend and attach itself to elements of social situations that can be altered or are actionable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper sets out an approach to the analysis of political power in terms of problematics of government. It argues against an overvaluation of the 'problem of the State' in political debate and social theory. A number of conceptual tools are suggested for the analysis of the many and varied alliances between political and other authorities that seek to govern economic activity, social life and individual conduct. Modern political rationalities and governmental technologies are shown to be intrinsically linked to developments in knowledge and to the powers of expertise. The characteristics of liberal problematics of government are investigated, and it is argued that they are dependent upon technologies for 'governing at a distance', seeking to create locales, entities and persons able to operate a regulated autonomy. The analysis is exemplified through an investigation of welfarism as a mode of 'social' government. The paper concludes with a brief consideration of neo-liberalism which demonstrates that the analytical language structured by the philosophical opposition of state and civil society is unable to comprehend contemporary transformations in modes of exercise of political power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The nations of the industrialized capitalist world are characterized by a tendency to reduce the length of time employees normally spend at work. Through capitalism's long history mercantilists, classicalists, Marxists and marginalists have devoted a great deal of effort to attempting to explain why it is that standard times should tend to change. This paper overviews the major contributions to the debate. Various theories are examined and their emergence and fates placed in an historical context. Marginalism's preference argument which presently dominates the debate is challenged by showing that within Marxism there exists an alternative explanation for this phenomenon which is not based on income but on the innate limitations of human beings. Until the 1950s, it is argued, the human limits approach dominated the whole issue of worktime and the essence of this contribution has never been refuted but has been simply deleted from the discussion. Consequently the whole contemporary debate is being conducted on the basis of unjustified assumptions and this is rendering discussion increasingly sterile. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A considerable amount has been written recently on the concept of exploitation, which has extended its meaning beyond Marx's original usage. While the concept has lost its association with the theory of surplus value and ideas about the right of workers to their product, there is still no agreement on how exploitation should be conceptualized. It is in the context of such conceptual debate that this paper brings a historical perspective by focusing on how Adam Ferguson, two and a half centuries ago, anticipated much of the modern reformulation of the concept. Methodologically, this anticipation is not shown by finding vaguely matching quotations from modern and classic works, but follows Foucault and examines the similarity in the meaning of the vocabulary in the context of the different problematics within which they occur. In this regard Ferguson's work has three characteristics which are also to be found in many modern works: exploitation is understood as economic exploitation; it is approached through the notion of human agency; and the discussion of exploitation is integrally linked to an ethical concern about its injustice. Such a historical interest is useful for a number of reasons. First, it augments the conceptual analysis which has so far dominated the debate about the term. Second, it demonstrates part of the origins of some of the modern reformulations of exploitation. Ferguson's work anticipates those writers who perceive exploitation to involve inequality of power and control in the labour process, and to involve situations where skills are not the determinant of economic reward and where workers are denuded, diminished and impoverished. In this respect Ferguson follows those modern writers who tend to merge exploitation with alienation. Finally, a discussion of these particular antecedents of the concept is useful to illustrate the distinctiveness of Ferguson's social thought and to define his major contribution to the development of sociology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The economic achievements of medieval monasticism have evoked the paradoxical connection between religious asceticism and capitalism central to Weber's famous analysis of the 'Protestant ethic'. It will be argued, however, that focusing on the resemblances to the 'Protestant Ethic' and/or capitalism makes for a partial and distorted picture of the monastic economy and does not render the full impact of monasticism upon the economic sphere of activity in the medieval West. The first section of this paper examines Weber's own perception of the monastic economy: recognizing its achievements and relative rationality, yet also refusing to see in these any real similitude to the 'Protestant ethic' or the announcement of the capitalistic breakthrough. The second section partly confirms Weber's perception by expanding upon ideological and institutional foundations of the monastic economy which further invalidate the analogy to either capitalism and/or the 'Protestant Ethic', albeit for reasons very different from those advanced by Weber. Shifting away from the overriding concern with economic rationality characteristic of previous discussions -- and incidentally offering an altered perspective on the 'Protestant Ethic' itself -- the third section focuses on monasticism's unintended and indirect contribution to the nascent autonomization of the economic sphere of activity, through the analysis of two ideological processes essentially: depersonification on the one hand, symbolic intensification on the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims at analysing a case of state/economy relationships in a Western capitalist country, with reference to the particular problem of the public enterprise, and at pointing out some of the characteristics of the Italian situation. The analysis, through an examination of the Fascist period and of the events of the 1950s, tries to identify different patterns of direct state intervention in the productive sphere and to relate them to some significant changes in the class structure and in the political system of the country. The casestudy is intended as a contribution to the debate concerning the construction of a ‘theory of the state’, for which it provides some empirical material about an example of state intervention in economic life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Capital and Ideology represents a significant further statement from Thomas Piketty. The arguments made by the "New Piketty" are largely compatible with those of his previous Capital in the Twenty‐First Century, but reflect broadening of scope and deepening of causal analysis, most markedly through the adoption of a world historical perspective. The result is a fuller offering for understanding inequality's pattern in the world, why it exists and how we can best respond to it. The book presents a wide range of arguments, which do not on first glance appear unified. This review essay distills these into six propositions, describes and evaluates each in turn, and identifies some threads that link them. In the process, it provides a critical assessment of Capital and Ideology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we address the classical debate about the relationship between the economic and cultural aspects of social stratification, typically cast in terms of Weber's distinction between class and status. We discuss in particular Chan and Goldthorpe's influential, yet largely unchallenged, attempt to reinstate a strict version of the class‐status distinction, mounted as an attack on 'Bourdieusian' accounts. We argue that this is unconvincing in two respects: There are fundamental problems with their conceptualization of status, producing a peculiar account where one expression of status honour explains the other; in addition, their portrayal of the Bourdieusian approach as one‐dimensional is highly questionable. In contradiction of a reading of Bourdieu as discarding the class‐status distinction, we develop an alternative, neo‐Bourdieusian account that recognizes class and status as distinct aspects of stratification, thereby allowing for a subtle analysis of their empirical entwinement. The fruitfulness of this approach is demonstrated by analysing the homology between the space of lifestyles and the social space through Multiple Correspondence Analysis of unusually rich data about lifestyles. Importantly, we highlight the relative autonomy of these spaces: Although they exhibit a similar structure, they do not overlap completely. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I examine the idea of 'the long run' in Piketty (2014) and related works. In contrast to simplistic interpretations of long-run models of income- and wealth-distribution Piketty (2014) draws on a rich economic analysis that models the intra- and inter-generational processes that underly the development of the wealth distribution. These processes inevitably involve both market and non-market mechanisms. To understand this approach, and to isolate the impact of different social and economic factors on inequality in the long run, we use the concept of an equilibrium distribution. However the long-run analysis of policy should not presume that there is an inherent tendency for the wealth distribution to approach equilibrium. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that gambling is a paradigmatic form of consumption that captures the intensified logic at the heart of late modern capitalist societies. As well as a site of intensified consumption, it claims that gambling has also become the location of what has been described as a new form of 'social pathology' related to excess play. Drawing on Castells' (1996) notion of techno-economic systems, it explores the ways that intersections between technology, capital and states have generated the conditions for this situation, and critiques the unequal distribution of gambling environments that result. It argues that, while the products of these systems are consumed on a global scale, the risks associated with them tend to be articulated in bio-psychological discourses of 'pathology' which are typical of certain types of knowledge that have salience in neo-liberal societies, and which work to conceal wider structural relationships. We argue that a deeper understanding of the political and cultural economy of gambling environments is necessary, and provide a synoptic overview of the conditions upon which gambling expansion is based. This perspective highlights parallels with the wider global economy of finance capital, as well as the significance of intensified consumption, of which gambling is an exemplary instance. It also reveals the existence of a geo-political dispersal of 'harms', conceived as deteriorations of financial, temporal and social relationships, which disproportionately affect vulnerable social groups. From this, we urge an understanding of commercial gambling based on a critique of the wider social body of gambling environments within techno economic systems, rather than the (flawed) individual bodies within them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We can distinguish four positions on the continuing, or maybe even increasing, relevance of the category of class at the beginning of the twenty-first century depending on the extent to which they accord central importance to (1) the reproduction or (2) the transformation of social classes with regard to (3) the distribution of goods without bads or (4) the distribution of goods and bads. One could say that Dean Curran introduces the concept of 'risk-class' to radicalize the class distribution of risk and charts who will able to occupy areas less exposed to risk and who will have little choice but to occupy areas that are exposed to the brunt of the fact of the risk society. As he mentioned it is important to note that this social structuring of the distribution of bads will be affected not only by class, but also by other forms of social structuration of disadvantage, such as gender and race. In order to demonstrate that the distribution of bads is currently exacerbating class differences in life chances, however, Curran concentrates exclusively on phenomena of individual risks. In the process, he overlooks the problem of systemic risks in relation of the state, science, new corporate roles, management the mass media, law, mobile capital and social movements; at the same time, his conceptual frame of reference does not really thematize the interdependence between individual and systemic risks. Those who reduce the problematic of risk to that of the life chances of individuals are unable to grasp the conflicting social and political logics of risk and class conflicts. Or, to put it pointedly: 'class' is too soft a category to capture the explosiveness of social inequality in world risk society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study uses data from the UK Millennium Cohort Study to examine the extent to which economic circumstances in infancy and mother's mental well-being are associated with children's cognitive development and behaviour problems at age 3 years, and what part parenting behaviours and attitudes play in mediating these factors. The analyses derived from Structural Equation Modelling show that economic deprivation and maternal depression separately and collectively diminish the cognitive and emotional well-being of children, and part of this diminution emanates from less nurturing and engaged parenting by those with less economic and emotional resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past decades an authoritarian–libertarian value dimension has become increasingly important to electoral behaviour across western countries. Previous analyses have shown that education is the most important social antecedent of individuals’ positions on this value dimension; high education groups tend towards the libertarian pole and low education groups tend towards the authoritarian pole. It remains an open question, however, what aspects of education cause this relationship. The article examines a range of explanatory models: a psychodynamic, a cognitive, a socialization, and an allocation effects model. The results strongly favour the socialization model in which the relationship between education and authoritarian–libertarian values is explained as a result of differences in the value sets transferred to students in different educational milieus. The value differences between the educational groups should thus not be seen as reflecting economic differences between the groups but rather as the result of a more fundamental value conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A conception of money as a 'neutral veil' masking a 'real' economy was adopted by orthodox economic theory after the Methodenstreit, and is also to be found, in a different form, in Marxian political economy. Both derive from an erroneous functionalist and anachronistic 'commodity' theory of money which, as Post-Keynesian economists argue, cannot explain the distinctive form of capitalist credit-money. Orthodox economic theory and classic Marxism have tacitly informed and flawed historical sociology's understanding of money's role in capitalist development. Mann and Runciman, for example, consider the 'economy' exclusively in terms of the social relations of production and imply that money is epiphenomenal and is to be explained as a response to the needs of the 'real' economy. They do not recognize the structural specificity of capitalist money and banking nor its importance. An alternative account of the autonomous historical conditions of existence of the specifically capitalist form of bank and state credit-money and its role in capitalist development is outlined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The trademark that Weber imprints on Calvinism -- specifically a crisis of proof in the creed and the pastoral peculiarity of this-worldly -- now corrected, I here examined his fruitless attempts to sustain them. His dilapidated efforts in this direction are marked by the misunderstanding of theological terminology; the unenlightened use of this terminology to subvert his own cause; inconsistency and contradiction in the argument arising from these defects; and, less excusably, the use of legerdemain when countervailing evidence is encountered. Calculated evasion is unmistakable in Weber's defence of the seventeenth-century hegemony of Calvin's sola fide. Scattered across several footnotes, Weber admits that Baxter is non-predestinarian and at one point even correctly records him as an 'opponent' of sheer grace. Yet in the text Weber adroitly conveys the impression that Baxter is a disciple of the double decree, thereby cloaking information whose greater visibility would challenge the foundation of his thesis. No less convincing are Weber's attempts to maintain his workaday conception of works which he does so against all considerations of their dubious fallout. Notwithstanding their avowed deference to Aristotelian rigour, Weber none the less imputes to Calvinist and Catholic theologians contradictions so blatant and glaring that a precipitous leap of faith is demanded from the reader. Scarcely credible under these circumstances, are Reformed and Catholic scholars of the period so readily succumbing to the myopia that Weber directs their way. Irrespective of this improbability, and unlike his equivocation on sola fide, Weber remains convinced to the end that works are temporally framed. By contrast I show that the temporal calling and thus earthly toil -- like Catholic and Lutheran accounts -- are cast as religiously... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]