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This paper provides a contribution to the institutionalist approach to money through ethnographic research carried out in two local currency systems in Argentina (known as trueque). It argues that Argentinian local currencies must be considered as monies in their own right even if they differ from state and bank issued currencies, because they can be understood as systems of evaluation and settlement of debts denominated in a specific unit of account (the crédito). Money is said to be an ambivalent social relation because in the two cases studied it mediates very different dynamics, exacerbating inequality in one context and promoting collective emancipation in another. This difference is due to the kind of political communities that the crédito tends to forge. In both Rosario and Poriajhu, the political community is defined by a set of values that legitimizes ongoing monetary practices and institutions rather than the State's coercion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The questions discussed in this paper are the following: how many activists are there and how are they organized? What are their distinctive values and ideologies? What are the main patterns of recruitment at the present time and why? What impact do young activists have on the policies and prospects of the parties they support? For answers to these questions, the information is drawn as provided by the parties and other political organizations themselves and on the results of the pilot inquiry of a large study of political activists now in progress. Three preliminary points may be noted. First, that the energies of young activists are concentrated in and around the three parliamentary parties. There is no important political action by the young outside this framework. Young people have participated in two major efforts to escape from or change the existing structure of political organization in the last decade-the New Left and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament-both have failed. Secondly, the parties have made serious efforts to appeal to the young only in periods of electoral adversity-the Liberals before 1905 and since 1955, the Conservatives after 1906 and again after 1946, the Labour Party in the 1930s and since 1959. One might infer from this that there is no substantial rapport between any of the parties and youth perceived as a distinct generation with peculiar values and interests. Thirdly, at the time of writing youth is withdrawing from political activity. The membership of each of the party youth organizations is declining.

The policing of protest at international events conflicts with the political and policing culture of the host nation. Previous research shows a trend toward softer, more tolerant styles of policing protest within various Western democracies. We present a case study of an exception: the repression of protest at an international event in which one Western democracy hosted rulers of less democratic regimes in a ritual celebration of economic globalization. We explore reasons why, in the face of protests about undemocratic regimes elsewhere, the Canadian government and police were willing to use blatantly undemocratic tactics popularly believed to be more characteristic of those other regimes. Implications are discussed concerning protest policing, economic globalization, the nation-state and social movements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some of the most solidly researched and validated findings in the social sciences relate to the differential participation of men and women in political activities of all kinds from voting and membership of parties, to interest in politics and political attitudes. Women have been found to vote less than men, to participate in political parties less than men, to know less about politics than men, to have less interest in politics than men and to be more conservative than men. A number of explanations of these findings have been suggested in this article. One type of explanation stresses the structural restraints militating against women's participation; the restraints, including the tasks of child-rearing and maintaining a home, are held to account for the lower political participation and knowledge since women, contrasted with men, are prevented from linking up with the wider network of social contacts which helps to maintain male political involvement. This explanation is obviously a powerful one and does account for the well-documented finding that women's rate of participation increases when such burdens cease and that mothers with young children are consistently less likely to vote than are fathers with young children across all levels of education within both the 21-34 and 35-54 age groups.

The article deals with the emergence and activities of a U.S. political phenomenon, the radical right. The conservative elements in U.S. society can be divided into two groups, the moderate conservatives and the radical right. These groups may be differentiated in terms of their attitudes towards the political era of New Dealism. The radical right refuses to accept the past, is radical in the sense that it rejects the status quo. It wants to turn the clock back all the way; it refuses to accept what has happened as something inevitable, or irreversible. Most, though not all the sections of the radical right are opposed to: the labor movement, preferring to see trade unions eliminated; the income tax, the movement for the repeal of the sixteenth amendment; the welfare state and government planning, it would like a return of limited government; the radical right sees the World War II as an avoidable mistake, and prefers in retrospect a policy of Russia and Germany fighting it out alone. The radical right views foreign policy from the recognition of Russia to Potsdam as appeasement, treachery and treason. It is opposed to membership in the United Nations, and to entangling foreign commitments. It tends to be Asia-oriented, rather than Europe-oriented; it is suspicious of Great Britain as a Machiavellian power which has manipulated people into wars, and refuses to back people in time of need.