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Through a critique of Margaret Archer's theory of reflexivity, this paper explores the theoretical contribution of a Bourdieusian sociology of the subject for understanding social change. Archer's theory of reflexivity holds that conscious 'internal conversations' are the motor of society, central both to human subjectivity and to the 'reflexive imperative' of late modernity. This is established through critiques of Bourdieu, who is held to erase creativity and meaningful personal investments from subjectivity, and late modernity is depicted as a time when a 'situational logic of opportunity' renders embodied dispositions and the reproduction of symbolic advantages obsolete. Maintaining Archer's focus on'ultimate concerns' in a context of social change, this paper argues that her theory of reflexivity is established through a narrow misreading and rejection of Bourdieu's work, which ultimately creates problems for her own approach. Archer's rejection of any pre-reflexive dimensions to subjectivity and social action leaves her unable to sociologically explain the genesis of 'ultimate concerns',and creates an empirically dubious narrative of the consequences of social change.Through a focus on Archer's concept of 'fractured reflexivity', the paper explores the theoretical necessity of habitus and illusio for understanding the social changes that Archer is grappling with.In late modernity, reflexivity is valorized just as the conditions for its successful operation are increasingly foreclosed, creating 'fractured reflexivity' emblematic of the complex contemporary interaction between habitus, illusio, and accelerating social change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a critique of the concept of reflexivity in social theory today and argues against the tendency to define agency exclusively in terms of reflexivity. Margaret Archer, in particular, is highlighted as a key proponent of this thesis. Archer argues that late modernity is characterized by reflexivity but, in our view, this position neglects the impact of more enduring aspects of agency, such as the routinization of social life and the role of the taken-for-granted. These concepts were pivotal to Bourdieu and Giddens' theorization of everyday life and action and to Foucault's understanding of technologies of the self.We offer Bourdieu's habitus as a more nuanced approach to theorizing agency, and provide an alternative account of reflexivity. Whilst accepting that reflexivity is a core aspect of agency, we argue that it operates to a backdrop of the routinization of social life and operates from within and not outside of habitus. We highlight the role of the breach in reflexivity, suggesting that it opens up a critical window for agents to initiate change. The article suggests caution in over-ascribing reflexivity to agency, instead arguing that achieving reflexivity and change is a difficult and fraught process, which has emotional and moral consequences. The effect of this is that people often prefer the status quo, rather than to risk change and uncertainty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]