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This paper explores the cascading influence of revolutionary moments on democracy and inequality, not at home, but across borders. We use data on revolutions and other social upheavals over the past 120 years and examine their cross‐national impact on a range of variables in neighboring countries. Engaging with debates on whether substantial democracy and equality increases require extraordinary circumstances, our research investigates whether revolutionary activities induce consequential spillovers, such as policy concessions from elites in neighboring contexts. In exploring spillover effects, the paper examines how significant events in one nation influence social life in adjacent ones. It encompasses an analysis of 171 countries over two centuries, connecting data on revolution with democracy and equality metrics, and hypothesizing that elite fear of revolutionary contagion may necessitate democracy and equality concessions to mitigate potential uprisings. Findings suggest neighboring revolutions positively impact domestic democracy and equality levels. We observe significant increases in an index of democracy and two indices of economic egalitarianism, although one of the egalitarianism measures is robust to all model specifications. Additionally, we find that isolated “protest‐led ousters” can moderately increase suffrage and one of our indices of egalitarianism, while coups do not seem to impact democracy or inequality variables. By examining various upheaval types and outcomes across time and space, the study illuminates the causal relationship between global mobilizations and local changes, providing insights into how global events inform domestic outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A long tradition in stratification research argues students with higher cultural capital are likely to be treated by their teachers as possessing the "right culture," which positively affects their academic performance. Nevertheless, the literature has paid little attention to the role of students' perception in this process. Using two waves of the China Educational Panel Survey, we investigate how students' cultural capital affects their own understanding of teacher‐student interactions, including its gender difference. Fixed effects regressions show a substantially positive effect of cultural capital on the perceived frequency of teachers praising and calling on students to answer questions across subjects. Nonetheless, we also find the lack of cultural capital is not punished and that the cultural capital's effect varies across its specific components and gender. These findings pave the way for elucidating the entire causal chain of intergenerational social inequality via cultural capital, teacher bias, students' perception, and their educational outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the social structuring of social capital, understood as resources embedded in social networks. The analysis integrates key theoretical–methodological insights from two distinct approaches concerned with social capital and inequality: the position‐generator approach associated with Nan Lin and the spatial approach associated with Pierre Bourdieu. Empirically, we exploit the possibilities of survey data containing detailed information about the social ties of a representative sample of the Norwegian adult population (N = 4007). By means of Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA), we construct a space of social ties, a spatial representation of systematic similarities and differences between individuals' social ties to a set of 33 occupational positions. In this space, social capital is structured according to two primary dimensions: (i) the level of social ties, in terms of individuals' number of contacts; and (ii), the quality of social ties, in terms of a division between being connected to others in high‐status positions and others in low‐status positions. By means of Ascending Hierarchical Cluster analysis, five clusters are identified within the space of social ties: a homogenous working‐class cluster, a well‐connected working‐class cluster, a cluster of high‐status ties, a homogenous high‐status cluster and a low‐volume cluster. Moreover, the analysis clearly indicates that the structure of social capital is connected to respondents' class positions, their volumes of cultural and economic capital and their class origin. The analysis thus draws attention to the role of social capital in processes of social closure, regarding both resource monopolization and class formation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A puzzle has emerged amidst rising inequality: why do people profess high levels of belief in meritocracy even as income gains are increasingly concentrated at the top? In light of contradictory theories and evidence, we undertake the first assessment of the relationship between local income inequality and meritocratic beliefs outside the United States, using data from the UK Household Longitudinal Study. We find that the positive relationship between country‐level income inequality and meritocratic beliefs identified in the recent literature does not translate straightforwardly below country level: there is no robust relationship between local income inequality and meritocratic beliefs in England. However, there is a robust—and somewhat paradoxical—positive association between high local income inequality and meritocratic beliefs among those with the lowest incomes. On average, respondents with annual household incomes of £10,000 are five points more likely (on a 100‐point scale) to believe their hard work will pay off if they live in the most rather than the least unequal places in England. We also show that this applies beyond the specific case of meritocratic beliefs: low‐income respondents in unequal places are also notably more satisfied with their own (low) income than similar respondents in more equal localities. In line with system justification theory, we argue that belief in meritocracy serves as an important tool of psychological resilience for low‐income individuals who regularly come into contact with others more economically fortunate than themselves: though it legitimates their current position at the bottom of the status hierarchy, this belief also offers the promise of future advancement. While this reduces concern about the psychological effects of growing local income inequality on the most economically vulnerable, it also suggests that there is little prospect of demand for systemic economic change emerging from what might have been considered the most likely places. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely accepted that support for government intervention is highest among people in lower socioeconomic positions, during economic recessions and in less prosperous countries. However, the relationship between income inequality and attitudes toward government intervention is less clear. We contribute new insights to both questions by exploring how subjective household income, economic prosperity, and income inequality interact to influence attitudes. Using mixed‐effects and country fixed‐effects models fitted to data from 66 countries, we demonstrate that income inequality has a strong positive impact on attitudes toward government intervention in rich countries but no discernable effect in poor countries. Concomitantly, the impact of economic prosperity differs by level of inequality. It has little effect when income inequality is relatively low, a weakening effect as inequality rises, and no apparent effect when inequality is high. Consistent with these findings, the effect of subjective household income on attitudes toward government intervention is strongest in countries that are simultaneously very prosperous and highly unequal. Taken together, these findings suggest that if inequality continues to rise, especially in rich countries, public demand for social spending will eventually increase as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we propose a model to analyze the class structure of hybrid post‐socialist societies in South‐East Europe (SEE), using the case of Serbia. We argue that, in such hybrid societies, social inequalities are generated by several mechanisms of similar strength: exploitative market mechanisms (based on economic capital) and different types of social closure mechanisms (based on political and social capital). Their influences are intertwined and cannot be analytically isolated or reduced to a common foundation. Therefore, occupational class analysis in these societies can have only limited explanatory power. In an attempt to overcome these challenges, we were forced to modify the instruments of several established approaches to class analysis. These modifications included (1) a reconceptualization of Bourdieusian notions of political, social, and cultural capital, (2) a different operationalization of social space, (3) identification of specific mechanisms of generating social inequalities, (4) paying attention to both practical and discursive classifications of lifestyles in the establishment of symbolic boundaries, and (5) relying on differential association analysis for identifying class boundaries. Our analysis's final result is a model that enables studying general social inequality, that is, generalized social advantage/disadvantage, in SEE post‐socialist societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]