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This article presents some questions for the attention of medical sociologists. Some medical educators, admittedly few, still subscribe to the view that they alone are competent to provide role models for medical students and that, therefore, no matter what the subject, the proper training of the physician requires that a physician teach it. Others, adopting a less extreme standpoint, appear to be prepared to accept the behavioral sciences on trust as it were, even while retaining some of these reservations and often questioning the relevance of sociological theory and method to the practical problems of health and illness. While there are then a few medical educators with reservations, it appears that the vast majority nowadays consider that sociology, psychology and anthropology, and perhaps other allied disciplines, have an acknowledged place somewhere in the medical curriculum. It is not proposed in this paper to enter into the general debate on whether the behavioral sciences have anything to contribute to medicine and should be incorporated into medical training.

The article presents information about the relation between sociologist E. Durkheim's concepts of anomie and egoism. While the obscurity of Durkheim's distinction has frequently been commented upon, it is implicitly assumed to be irrelevant for contemporary theorization in social pathology. Against this view, two theses will be advanced. Firstly, if Durkheim had pursued and attempted to clarify his distinction between the two concepts, he would have been forced to re-examine the presuppositions upon which his sociology had been based. Secondly, despite difficulties in Durkheim's theory in which concepts of anomie and egoism play a crucial part, a distinction between them still has to be drawn which in fact retains some elements of their original meaning. All contemporary studies of anomie have neglected the distinction between anomie and egoism with the result that social conditions, psychological states and processes which are entirely different from one another have been assimilated.

Professions whose principal function is to bring about changes in the physical or psychological personality of the client are the personal service professions, whilst all other professions which are not charged with responsibilities of this sort or, at any rate, which do not set themselves such tasks as these, are the impersonal service professions. It is my contention that this distinction has a marked sociological significance and the author hopes to show that it is also strongly suggested by the facts and not merely by desire to engage in sociological speculations. No doubt the two classes of the professions have certain basic allegiances in common but these allegiances are elaborated, enriched and refined only in the personal service professions and this is at the very root of the distinctions the author is trying to make. To understand the ideological orientations of the personal service professions one must bear in mind that these professions are nowadays being trained in a socio psychological theory, and indoctrinated with moral principles, which inspite of all protestations by the more rigorous scientists of behaviour-are fundamentally Freudian in origin. Kindness, tolerance, acceptance, permissiveness, and a scepticism about strong loves and hates, have received a new lease of life in this psychoanalytical, social psychological, and sociological century. It is certainly easy to prove that in all these areas of personal service the counsellors basically psychoanalytical and social psychological ideology conquered and converted one may say that those in the personal service professions have been influenced by the counselling ideology even if they do no counselling themselves and even if they are unaware of this influence.

The two most important pieces of British research into effects of accommodation upon students come to opposite conclusions. Researcher Thoday's study of Birmingham University students in 1951-1952 found that those in a hail of residence "took on average a greater part in university life than others" as measured by their use of the union, their membership of student societies, outside interests, and range of friendships. These results, she argued, "support the general view that residence in hail adds much to these opportunities provided by the provincial university. Full residential places for all would therefore seem to be the ideal." In 1962 Marris compared hail and lodgings students at Cambridge, Leeds and Southampton in respect of their range of friendships, frequency with which they took part in informal discussions, contact with staff, reading outside their subject, participation in sport and societies, and university examination results. He found that halls did not "promote either general reading or academic performance," that they "did not influence the pattern of social life very profoundly," and that they "may not, after all, contribute significantly to education."

This article is not concerned so much with either functions or origins of incest taboos--subjects on which too many words have been wasted already, but rather with incest behaviour and the motivation underlying it. It is too easy to list either dire consequences of incestuous behaviour or beneficial effects of non-incestuous behaviour and not so easy to discover what motivates actors with respect to incest. To point out that the practice of incest would result in various calamities is not necessarily to state reasons for the non-performance of actors in this area, nor is to list beneficial effects of non-incestuous behaviour a sufficient explanation of the behaviour in question. Statements of dire results are not statements of why actors are motivated to the non-performance or punishment of the performance of incest, they are statements of what would happen if actors were not so motivated. Reasons why it should not or could not happen are not necessarily reasons why it does not happen. Too often we are told that there must be incest taboos and phobias. What this article suggests is that the 'sexless' brother-sister should be taken at its face value and merely repeats the experience of many other societies.

The article focuses on areas which reflect changes in race relations among Afro-Americans. The article illustrates five areas of change. These are armed forces, public school desegregation, public and private housing, professional baseball and college teaching. The speed of changes in race relations displayed in these areas have been uneven. It has been suggested that changes have been most rapid in areas where economic values are supported, as in the case of baseball. The change has been slowest where economic values are threatened as in the case of private housing. The speed of change appeared to be most positively influenced, where attitudes previously held by Afro-Americans as well as whites were favorable toward the change and where there existed a strong commitment to the change by those in a power position to effect the change. While edicts and laws appear to be related to the speed and efficiency of change in areas involving large numbers of people, extra-legal means can, do and have served as initiating and accelerating forces for change.

The article discusses biases in psychology as those caused by the social circumstances. Method-ideology lays great stress on the use of the experimental method as the source of data in psychology and emphasizes the desirability of quantifying. Most psychologists know what it is to have observed a certain phenomenon and to have found it too difficult to reproduce experimentally. It is a natural consequence that experiments tend to be limited to effects that can be easily produced. The tendency is perhaps most marked in the field of personality assessment. Another example of crude theorizing in animal psychology lies in the experiments on imitation. Experimenters have had little success in bringing this about experimentally. But the special circumstances in which one might have expected it most likely to occur, when an animal is young and dependent and the model is a parent, do not seem to have been examined. Another influence might come from the way research in psychology is organized. As with any other subject, where the research has been tied to the teaching and not many students have taken the subject, psychologists have been distributed over a large number of small groups.

This article discusses the contribution of psychoanalysis to ethics. The contribution of psychoanalysis may be considered from three points of view. In the first place, what light analytic theory throws on the natural history of morals, that is the ways in which moral rules and moral sentiments are formed and developed in the individual and the group. There is also a question whether psychoanalysis can, from its own resources, provide the basis for an ethical theory or a set of standards or principles in the light of which existing moral codes can be criticized or evaluated. Finally, there is the question how far the insight into human nature acquired through the exploration of the unconscious elements in the human mind can help us in releasing the energies of man and removing the obstacles that hinder the realization of his ideals, whatever may be their ultimate source. The problems raised in the first two questions are not always clearly distinguished by psychoanalytic writers and some would deny that there is such a thing as ethical theory other than the psychology of morals. Sigmund Freud himself tells us that it is not the object of his investigations to provide an ethic, still less a Weltanschauung. Such activities, he says, may be left to philosophers who avowedly find it impossible to make their journey through life without a Baedeker of that kind to tell them about everything.

The article focuses on the historical pattern of psycho-analysis. Some twenty years ago psycho-analysis, Freudianism in particular, seemed to have been assimilated and consequently given its own place within Western civilization. Psycho-analysis was regarded as one among many hypotheses about the structure and evolution of the human mind. The first important fact about the present psycho-analytical revival is that it comes from the U.S. where psycho-analysis has been adopted mainly as a clinical practice. The lead taken by U.S. literature in making use of psycho-analytical ideas is a characteristic aspect of this phenomenon. The second factor in the popularity of psycho-analysis derives from the psychological repercussions of the Second World War. Due to the high frequency of mental disorders during the post-war period, psycho-analysis as a psycho-therapeutic method is more useful now than at any other time. The late war had a second even more important effect. It has in many aspects brought Western society nearer to the socio-cultural pattern characteristic of the Austro-Hungarian Empire during the last decades of its existence. It would be more accurate to say that it has brought London and Paris closer to the Vienna of 1900. All these circumstances have contributed greatly to the weakening of the critical resistance which was present twenty years ago. This study is a short account of the historical conditions of some fundamental psycho-analytical ideas, such as the discovery of the unconscious, as the principal layer of the mental energy; the bivalence of this energy as the life and death instincts; the stratification of mental life and the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious.