Search

This paper considers the application of Foucauldian perspectives within sociology. While Foucault's epistemology has generated novel historical and philosophical interpretations, when transposed to sociology, problems arise. The first of these concerns the association of knowledge and power, and the concept of 'discourse'. Foucault suggested that there are 'rules' of discursive formation which are extraneous to the 'non-discursive' realm of 'reality'. This formulation is consequently both deterministic and incapable of supplying explanations of why some practices become discursive which others do not. This determinism is reflected in some sociological analyses of embodiment, offering a model of the 'body' which is passive, and incapable of resisting power/knowledge. Secondly, Foucault's notion of the 'self' moves to the other extreme, inadequately addressing the constraints which affect the fabrication of subjectivity. Sociological accounts do not always recognize the ambiguities which consequently result from efforts to use Foucauldian positions. It is argued that post-structuralists other than Foucault may offer more to sociology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to breathe a little life into one of the most moribund corners of the methodological literature, namely the 'debate' on interview strategy and the supposed opposition between 'structured' and 'unstructured' approaches. From the very beginning, we tend to learn about interviewing as an issue concerning the pros and cons of each respective strategy. The choke of interviewing style is thus presented as a matter of inclination towards standardization versus sensitivity, enumeration versus emancipation, anonymity versus ardour, and so forth. All such distinctions are essentially method-driven and have resulted in extensive technical literatures on how to achieve the chosen ends. Forgotten, therefore, in most of the literature is the very purpose of the interview - namely to advance data in order to inspire/validate/falsify/modify sociological explanation. This paper proposes a theory-driven approach to the construction of the interview. It takes on board two contemporary approaches to sociological understanding, namely a realist theory of explanation and a structurationist theory of social being, and attempts to incorporate their principles into the basic structure of the interview. The paper is illustrated with examples from the author's research with prisoners, and so hopes to inspire a dons and cons approach to the interview. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper sets out an approach to the analysis of political power in terms of problematics of government. It argues against an overvaluation of the 'problem of the State' in political debate and social theory. A number of conceptual tools are suggested for the analysis of the many and varied alliances between political and other authorities that seek to govern economic activity, social life and individual conduct. Modern political rationalities and governmental technologies are shown to be intrinsically linked to developments in knowledge and to the powers of expertise. The characteristics of liberal problematics of government are investigated, and it is argued that they are dependent upon technologies for 'governing at a distance', seeking to create locales, entities and persons able to operate a regulated autonomy. The analysis is exemplified through an investigation of welfarism as a mode of 'social' government. The paper concludes with a brief consideration of neo-liberalism which demonstrates that the analytical language structured by the philosophical opposition of state and civil society is unable to comprehend contemporary transformations in modes of exercise of political power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, it is argued that the feminist critique does not seriously undermine those 'class theories' which seek, in the most general way, to argue that classes are social forces having an impact upon societal development. However, that version of 'class analysis' -- exemplified by researchers such as Wright and Goldthorpe -- which seeks to theoretically identity an empirical ensemble of 'class places' is seriously affected. This approach, which rests upon an analysis of the occupational structure, cannot separate out systematically the impact of 'class' from that of 'gender' (or indeed, of other factors) in this structuring. Although, therefore, such theoretical 'class' schemes retain their sociological utility as descriptive concepts, they do not, as has been claimed, provide uncontaminated measures of 'social class'. An alternative approach to the occupational structure, which stresses its fluid and socially constructed nature, is developed. In the light of this discussion, attempts to establish the theoretical basis of a 'system' of patriarchy are examined. It is argued that although gender relations are universal, they are not necessarily patriarchal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sociologists have recently debated the general manner in which respondents' accounts should be treated. Should they be regarded as evidence of underlying intentions, objectives and beliefs or should analytical attention focus on the structure of the accounts themselves? This paper reviews this debate from the point of view of the philosophy of social science. While, as critics have noted, the 'accountist' position is subject to major epistemological problems, the 'actionist' view also faces considerable difficulties. These are elaborated through examples from the history of science and artificial intelligence research. Having established the vulnerabilities of both accountist and actionist positions, a pragmatic and mutually supportive rapprochement is proposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The way in which many social analyists conceptualize knowledge and order has been changed by postmodernism. Because sociologists have generally ignored this theoretical development, the purpose of this paper is to introduce the central ideas associated with postmodernism. The author proposes the conception of knowledge advanced by postmodern theorists requires that traditional methodologies and social imagery be abandoned. It is argued that society should be viewed as embodied, or to originate from language games, and, within this context, the exercise of praxis and social control are not contradictory ideas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the limitations of holding to a strict fact-value dichotomy, given some of structural difficulties students of social problems encounter. Authors also attempted to extend and clarify the above analysis via a critical discussion of two papers concerned with the value problem in the sociology of deviance-by the well-known American sociologists, Howard S. Becker and Alvin Gouldner. In this article, authors are involved not only with theoretical implications and omissions of this debate but also more generally with its implications for social theory at large. Authors have argued throughout that the social structure will determine that what is truth for one group will not be truth for another. Authors further suggest that there is a clear rationale for close examination of the extent to which deviant values are inextricably linked with social structure, and that, with this as a major concern, one can elucidate one's conception of the way in which men define the world and the way the world actually is.

This article discusses the book "Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences," edited by May Brodbeck. The author gives attention to three topics discussed in this anthology. The first is the controversy over whether the account of explanation given by sociologist Hempel is applicable in the human as well as in the natural sciences. The second theme in the anthology obviously relevant to sociologist is that of methodological individualism versus holism. Many of the papers in this anthology characterize at one level the alternatives confronting a scientist whose theorizing confronts either empirical or conceptual difficulties. Just because actions are informed by intentions and purposes, and intentions and purposes presuppose beliefs, so a social role-which specifies and prescribes or permits certain courses of action for certain types of person presupposes certain beliefs. The matter of the philosophy of science may not only be regulative as regards the form of our theories and the lessons to be learnt here may well be one that the sociologist now feels have been conveyed to him almost too often-but suggestive as to their content.

This paper examines the generally neglected place of Lorenz yon Stein in the paradigmatic bifurcation of social theory during the nineteenth century. As a student of Hegel who rejected the idealist approach of his teacher, von Stein anticipated the major arguments of historical materialism; but, unlike Marx, he did not postulate an inexorable proletarian revolution which would ultimately resolve societal contradictions. Instead, he proposed a fundamentally reformist political strategy in which the state guides the distribution of economic resources in a form that would prevent the class polarization envisioned by Marx. While yon Stein is little known by contemporary social scientists in the English literature, he has been recognized in Europe beyond his time as a theorist and as a governmental consultant whose ideas became materialized in social reforms, offering a ‘political realism’ that was designed to prevent the consequences seen by Marx in the development of capitalism, as well as to avoid the fallacies of the liberal belief in free and unregulated pursuit of individual self-interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some form of communicative understanding is central to all cross-cultural ethnographic research. A Verstehende approach typifies most English- language interpretive social science. At best this involves understanding-in- context, but at worst amounts to little more than an attempt to 'put oneself in the other's shoes'. Charges that this approach discards the informants' discourse in favour of the researcher's narrative are surveyed along with theoretical attempts within sociology to refute these critiques by modifying Verstehen. It is argued that Verstehende methods are unethical by contemporary standards of research ethics. Rather than privileging the understanding of one or another person, whereby one agent (an informant) possesses the truth and other (the researcher) does not, a focus on the interaction between researcher and informant is proposed. This 'dialogical' model, drawn from the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, provides a theoretical basis for research on the social and shared nature of understanding. The 'truth' is between the interacting agents. Poetic though this may seem, this view is strongly theorized by ethicists and grounded in both the work of German neo-Kantianism and Hegel, where 'truth' is always aporetic and liminal. Untranslated work by Bakhtin is presented, including his commentaries on the problem of cross-cultural understanding. This paper argues that a 'dialogical verstehen' provides an equitable foundation for field research in the social sciences which avoids the problem of a research 'speaking as' and 'speaking for' discarded and potentially silenced respondents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The `Willis thesis' has two component claims. The first is that class inequalities in educational outcomes occur in part through working-class misbehaviour in schools, and that underachievement is associated with male and female forms of gender traditionalism. The second claim is that this misbehaviour constitutes a working- class cultural resistance. In this paper the first component is operationalized and tested in a statistical model of student plans in Ontario, Canada. Results show that misbehaviour is a weak conduit for differential class outcomes, though expected gender patterns emerge. While noting that findings may reflect British/Canadian differences and that recent de-industrialization may mute traditional class-related student responses, I argue that Resistance theorists have over-extended their claims, and that gender, rather than class background, is a more durable source of cultural reproduction through school underachievement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is concerned with the adequacy of economic and sociological theories of the enterprise as a basis for analysing industrial democracy. An outline of the major strands in these disciplines' theories in this area is given. It is argued that despite their different starting points, there are considerable similarities in the theoretical approaches of the two disciplines, especially their deployment of concepts of profit-making, interest and certain notions of organization. Griticisms of the use of these concepts are followed by an attempt to suggest more helpful approaches to understand firms and hence to understanding the possible meaning and implications of industrial democracy in firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The focus of the closure theories of Weber, Collins, and Parkin on the power relations contained in exclusionary codes which regulate society provides a promising framework for integrating the analysis of property, credentials, lineage, communal divisions between racial, ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups, the relations between the sexes, Communist Party domination, and resulting counterstruggle. This paper demonstrates, however, that the neglect of structural relationships among different sets of closure rules is a central weakness of their theories. It proposes a conceptual and methodological framework for strengthening closure theory by bringing such relationships, which constitute the deep structure of domination, into focus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contests the view of historical method, and especially of the relation between history and social theory, advanced by E. P. Thompson in his essay ‘The Poverty of Theory’. It is maintained that he recurs to a methodological position similar in important respects to that of Max Weber. Thompson's proposed methodology, founded on a sharp separation of science and politics, is inconsistent with both his political commitment and his own historical work. The inconsistencies are explored with a view to affirming the interrelatedness of history, theory and practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper gives a systematic introduction to the major themes of Jürgen Habermas' formulation of critical social theory. A discussion of his views on knowledge, cognitive interests, and scientific method is followed by an account of his social theory and his attempt to combine Marxism with mainstream sociology. In criticism it is argued that Habermas has not yet solved all the problems of a ‘realist’ approach to sociology and that his synthesis is incomplete. It is argued that sociology can progress through a critical dialogue with Habermas' work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper compares one aspect of Max Weber's explicit conception of ‘interpretive sociology’ with his actual practices in his substantive investigations. It shows that Weber's overt emphasis on the importance of meanings and motives in causal explanation of social action does not correspond adequately with the true mode of explanation involved in his comparative-historical studies of the world religions. Rather, the ultimate level of causal explanation in Weber's substantive writings is that of the social-structural conditions under which certain forms of meaning and motivation can achieve historical efficacy. A model is developed to represent the actual nature of ‘Weberian sociology’. It is proposed that this internal comparative analysis and interpretation can have useful implications for contemporary sociological debates and approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many social theorists have pointed to problematic aspects of viewing the 1960s youth culture as an enduring form of social movement;[2] however these analyses spring largely from the traditional sociological frame that sees the frustration and deprivation of a population leading (more or less) directly to the rise of social movements.[3] McCarthy and Zald, in their recent and cogent discussion of resource mobilization and social movement organizations,[4] have pointed to the fact that this focus upon frustrations and deprivations is in opposition to the focus of practical theorists (such as Lenin, Mao Tse-Tung and Saul Alinsky), who have emphasized the ways in which particular social structures make the tasks of resource mobilization more or less difficult.
This theoretical analysis, viewing the relation of social movements to their beneficiaries of grievance base not as given, but as fully problematic and contingent, offers an opportunity for the examination of specific social movements within a new, and possibly more fruitful, frame. I wish in this paper to address the question of whether there is an enduring base for contra-cultural social movements[6] across generations of the young. Can a social movement persist beyond the life span of one generation when it recruits from what is claimed to be a short-term and transitional category? and if there is persistence, to what extent and upon what is this persistence contingent? Focusing more specifically, I shall examine the head shop as a social movement industry,[7] and its relationship to resource base and movement mobilization within and without the youth contra-culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Roots of the increasingly close collaboration between sociology and medical care are to be found partly in a common interest in certain aspects of disease and therapy and partly in their similarity of approach to research problems. This article reports a study in the sociology of medical care that is characterized not only by the multiplicity of disciplines represented in it, but also by the cross-cultural comparisons which it introduces. It is concerned with the contribution that the study makes to the refinement and development of social theory, and especially to the theory of illness and sick-role behaviour given by sociologist T. Parson. The article presents data from three small-scale populations surveys, in different cultures to examine some of the components of Parsons' analysis of illness and sick-role behaviour. Central issues concern the criteria that define entry into and performance in the sick role, and they are both conceptual and methodological issues. The underlying objective is to examine sociology of illness and illness behaviour.

This article focuses on the theory of sociology given by sociologist Talcott Parsons. The fate of the functional requisites in Parsonian sociology can be regarded as happy or sad according to one's theoretical predilections. It has been shown that in many respects the development and changes that have taken place in and around the concept have reflected the development and changes in Parson's theory of society. The caveat on theory-building expressed in the book "The Structure of Social Action," has held good over the years as of March 1970. This is especially the case with respect to the universal imperatives. They are not subject to change for they are not empirical realities; they are, however, real in their consequences for social systems and for the structure of social organization in terms of all human societies. Parsons has made and elaborated the important distinction between social and personality systems in such a fashion that old notions of the individual versus the society have been seen to be inadequate. This is particularly relevant here as it paves the way to an understanding of individual and social requisites of human society, though Parsons himself has not taken full advantage of the possibilities in this context.

Coinciding with the popularity of postmodern theory, the fall of communism appeared to offer further evidence of the exhaustion of modernity. Such analysis is grounded in a view that the Soviet system was the epitome of modernity. An alternative approach regards post-communism as opening new terrains of struggle for modernity. Thus Habermas and others suggest that post-communist societies are rejoining the trajectory of western modernity whose problems they now recapitulate. This alternative view implies that Soviet systems were something other than `modern', although their nature is not always clearly defined. However, even if post-communist societies do encounter problems of modernity, they do so in new circumstances where modernist notions of social development have become problematic. This article argues that, contrary to those who regard modernization or postmodernization as irresistible trends, core post-communist societies are likely to develop along an alternative path to that of western modernity. This is tentatively described as `neo-mercantilist'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Piaget's sociological theory is not widely discussed among sociologists, partly because much of it is contained in untranslated French works. In this article I summarize several aspects of Piaget's sociological views, especially his social exchange theory, and briefly indicate its relevance to several current theories in sociology and social psychology. Rejecting both Durkheim's sociological holism and Tarde's individualism, Piaget advances a sociological relativism (relationalism) in which all social facts are reducible to social relations and these, in turn, are reducible to rules, values, and signs. Piaget's theory of social values takes the form of a social exchange theory characterized first in an abstract, logical way -- its structural aspect -- and second its developmental aspects. Piaget claims social exchange requires normative principles of reciprocity and that individual social development results in such an equilibrium because rationality itself is social in nature and based upon social co-operation. These views, in turn, derive from his orthogenetic view concerning the course of evolution: development can be characterized as an increase in equilibrium manifested both in individual action and in social interaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay I criticize one of Wittgenstein's new sociological commentators, David Bloor, for wrongly conflating Wittgenstein's sociologism with that of Durkheim. Wittgenstein's sociologism is a species of 'methodological individualism' and is radically at odds with Durkheim's sociologism, which is a form of social realism and holism. Although some empiricist philosophers have dismissed the holist/individualist debate as uninteresting or peripheral to the central concerns of philosophy, when it is construed as a debate about the foundations of knowledge it becomes a focal point where epistemology and ontology, and the philosophy of philosophy, all come together. Wittgenstein's sociologism spells the end of philosophy by regarding epistemology as just another language-game or professional social practice with no independently-existing subject matter, whereas Durkheim's sociologism forms the basis of a new transcendental turn in philosophy, one that locates 'transcendence' and the foundations of knowledge in society itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An examination of the rhetoric surrounding three interdenominational mergers -- in Scotland, Canada and Australia -- reveals that advocates of union typically used organismic images of the Church whereas opponents of union typically used contractual images. The use of these forms of imagery is analysed and explained with reference not only to broader streams of social and political theory but also to the specific cultural inheritances and social situations of the parties involved. Contractual !imagery had special significance in Presbyterianism and it was given a conservative emphasis by opponents of union, in much the same way as Edmund Burke had done with the contractual view of society. Notions contained in organicism provided not only a more Catholic view of the Church but also a putative solution to particular problems which the Churches were facing. Although organizational imagery typically draws on some familiar object or field of experience, the use to which that imagery is put may not be simply a reflection of existing social relationships or cultural inheritances; it may also be part of an attempt to evoke a desired state of affairs, perhaps one which it is believed once existed or one which is considered an appropriate step forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most accounts of sociology's origins ignore the role of Schopenhauer's philosophy and fin de siècle German philosophy in general in favor of a Kantian, positivistic scenario. Thus contemporary sociological theory remains trapped in Kant's dismissal of the noumenon, or the thing-in-itself, as unknowable. Evidence is presented to suggest that Schopenhauer's philosophy in particular influenced many of sociology's precursors, among them Durkheim, Simmel, Freud, Weber and Tönnies. Schopenhauer attempted to recover Kant's noumenon by renaming it the will, thereby informing a vocabulary that included 'the other side' of the phenomenon, including the unconscious, habit, perception, intuition, and judgment. The implications of recovering Schopenhauer's achievement for contemporary sociological theory as well as understanding its origins are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lon Fuller's principles of 'procedural legality' bring specificity to Habermas' idealized standard of procedural reason, and this brings into view possibilities for broadening the applications of the concept of 'communicative action.' At the same time, Habermas' communication theory provides Fuller's principles with a theoretical grounding against relativism. The interrelationship between the grounding provided by Habermas' idealized procedural standard of reasoned consensus and the much more practicable threshold provided by Fuller's standard of the procedural integrity of law contributes principles to a non-Marxist critical theory called societal constitutionalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the concept of optimum development path expounded by sociologist Herbert Spencer in his theory of social evolution. It can be said that Spencer's theory of social evolution cannot be understood without comprehension and use of his concept of an optimum development path along which a society may or may not advance. Progress along it involves a shift in welfare goals and movement from militant to industrial society. Of all Spencer's social doctrines, his welfare theory and its corollary, the optimum development path, are the most consistently presented throughout his works. Yet, out of the supposed concern for sociology as a science, some sociologists divest Spencer's theory of social development of his welfare theory and not very surprising result is the allegation that Spencer left adapting man to wander through history without a goal and thereby invited displacement of sociology by one frankly discussing the roles and ends and values dodged by evolution in its attempt to establish values without moral argument by showing how a particular set would inevitably come about. Social evolution , according to Spencer, results from man's efforts to adapt, and in a competitive world of individual or society achieving the best adaptation is more likely to survive.

This article reflects on the social philosophy of Karl Popper. Karl Popper is a widely influential writer on the methodology of the social sciences. To many sociologists, scientific method means Popper's account of scientific method. Yet Popper does not believe that sociology should be value-free. He believes that a commitment to scientific sociology, far from clearing us from making value-judgments about utopian thought, requires us to denounce it. Thus Poppers, supports the orthodox view that utopian thought is objectionable, but it is unusual in deriving this value-judgment from his conception of scientific method. Popper developed his views on the methodology of the social sciences and his social philosophy in the course of his critique of something he calls historicism. Popper defines historicism as an approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction is their principal aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the rhythms or the patterns, the laws or the trends that underlie the evolution of history. With characteristic vigor, Popper denounces historicism as logically defective, false, sterile and murderous. Poppers critique of historicism is linked with his analysis of utopianism. The connection is mainly made by a third villain: holism. Holism is the doctrine that events must be understood in the context of the social whole of which they form a part.

The problem of order and the age-old debate over conflict and consensus continues to animate modern social theory. The article critically appraises sociologist Edward Shils' relatively uncelebrated contribution in the rescue of the classical consensual view of society from its current state of disrepute by fusing it with tenets derived from conflict framework. Shils' theory of society builds upon the premise that 'Every society, seen macro-sociologically, may be interpreted as a centre and a periphery.' These 'zones' have both a structural and a cultural aspect. Defined in terms of structure, the centre consists of those institutions and roles which exercise authority, while the periphery consists of those strata or sectors of society which are recipients of commands and of beliefs which they do not themselves create or cause to be diffused. Alongside the institutional structure of authority relations, Shils suggests that every society also acquires a central cultural system. Unlike 'orthodox' consensus theorists who see consensus deriving from a natural identity of interest served by a common stake in cooperative activity, Shils explicitly rejects the notion that a fundamental harmony of interest undergirds social order.

The article focuses on the relationship between epistemology and sociology, for it is here that the general relationship between philosophy and science appears most obvious and direct. Although there is no necessary or logical connection between an epistemological doctrine and a sociological orientation, sociologists often use epistemology to support their sociological orientation. Using works of sociologists Emile Durkheim, William James, Charles H. Cooley and W.I. Thomas, this article will show how these men employed an epistemology to justify their conceptions of sociology. The author finds that understanding past theories and orientations can be made easier by examining philosophical issues. Being aware of philosophical assumptions should place endeavours in a wider context, perhaps alerting to unthought of implications and thereby helping to understand where the society have been, what the society is doing and where the society is going. Philosophical awareness may help us to see that existing controversies over the nature, scope and subject matter of sociology are fundamentally philosophical controversies that cannot be settled on empirical grounds.

The article begins with a discussion of the influence of a follower upon a leader. It shows how the leader may become entrammelled in the very source of his legitimacy. It also discusses implications of this approach for an understanding of that most exacting and non-ritualistic form of leadership, sometimes known as democratic leadership. Success in leadership does not merely depend on having certain abilities, nor does it depend only on having any very specific personality characteristics, but also on a third requirement, leaders attitude to his own position. This is not unrelated to personality characteristics but differs in that an individual can perform well in a position that he feels he has a right to, and yet badly in one he feels he has no right to. The difference between these last two is brought out by what may well be considered a cautionary tale. The leader must adjudicate amongst his jealous followers, for it is he who must uphold the authority, which is the basis of his legitimacy.

This article analyzes social philosophy in relation to the vocabulary of sociology. While social science describes things as they are social philosophy prescribes or recommends how they ought to be ideally. The main task of social philosophy is the critical evaluation of ideas and beliefs about society. Its job is to ask whether these ideas and beliefs can be rationally justified and if they cannot, whether they can be replaced by others which are rationally justifiable. The author does not recommend any one concept of causation for sociology. Social philosophy is not competent to say what concept of causal explanation is apt for a particular purpose. What social philosophy can do is to point out that there is more than one concept of cause and that an unreflective imitation of a previously established field of science can involve unjustified assumptions.

Novelty may lose its terrors even for the academic mind in periods of rapid social change, and perhaps because of this sociology seems to have had little difficulty in gaining respectability in nineteenth-century Japan. Confucian scholars, especially latter-day Japanese Confucian scholars, had been very much concerned with the study of social institutions as artificial means of keeping men in good order and at a time when the whole legal framework of Japanese society was being reshaped there was a general welcome for evolutionary studies of the way societies should and must progress. The early concern of Japanese sociologists was with applying principles of western social theory and social philosophy to contemporary Japanese society, but this approach became less marked as sociology developed as an academic profession. As the tempo of institutional change diminished sociologists became more exclusively concerned with the exegetical task of translating, interpreting and comparing writings of foreign scholars, though in the liberal 1920s they did once again begin to show a new interest in contemporary society. More departments of sociology were established and a new sociological journal was founded as a monthly in 1924.

This article was originally given as a lecture in the Webb Centenary Series at the London School of Economics in London, England. The title elicited the comment that sociologist Beatrice and Sidney Webbs were not social theorists at all. They substituted for social theory, a series of varying generalizations which they supposedly derived from their various researches and produced the enormous book, "Soviet Communism," which derived primarily from emotional conviction. Webbs, apparently, never discussed social theory at all. The suggestion that Beatrice and Sidney Webb had no social theory is not acceptable, they could not have done the work they did, or influenced contemporary society in the way they did, if they would not had a pretty fair idea of what society was and where it was, or ought to be going. At the same time, their experience or imagination was not deep enough or wide enough to build a whole new society, they left too many things out. But, allowing for that, their contribution to social thinking, social investigation, and to the development of social institutions within their own country over half a century is pretty nearly without parallel.

At the beginning of the twentieth century criminology was at a crossroads. In so far as it was an accepted scientific discipline it owed much to criminologist Cesare Lombroso and his followers, who starting as anthropometrists, had begun to elaborate sociological and psychological theories of causation which took them far from measurement of bodily characteristics and comparisons with other races or animals. Of great importance to the social sciences were the development by Karl Pearson in the 1890's of the techniques of correlation. They were, of course, invented primarily to further the cause of eugenics, and this has particular relevance to the nascent science of criminology, since the period was much dominated by discussion about the inheritance of various traits. Amongst these was criminality, or, to be more precise, "the criminal diathesis' or tendency to criminality; and closely associated with it, feeblemindedness. In sum, therefore, an historical perspective demonstrates an increasing tendency towards particularization, towards the study of specific problems of importance as against the large exploratory study.

This article presents the text of the opening address given by sociologist Gunnar Myrdal at the 1953 conference of the British Sociological Association, which deals with the relation between social theory and social policy. Social sciences have received their impetus from the urge to improve society than from simple curiosity about its working. Social policy has been primary, social theory secondary. For their subsequent development it was of importance that the social sciences were imbued with very radical policy premises. If the social sciences were thus from the outset endowed with a radical urge towards social policy, this momentum was continuously fed by new impulses.