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The article focuses on the author's comment on sociologists Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore's paper "Some Principles of Stratification." According to the author, the paper offers some important point but that the argument they advance is contradictory in certain of its implications and therefore defective. The source of the difficulty is to be found in one of the premises of their argument. To state it most simply, the premise asserts, "people desire rewards." This assertion is incontestable, but it is not adequately qualified in their argument. The author shows in the first part of this article how their argument, containing this premise, leads to contradictory implications. Then, in the second part of this article, the author attempts to provide qualifications which he believes will allow Davis and Moore's argument to avoid contradictions and thus give it greater force.

The article focuses on the sociology in and of China. In the general history of social sciences it is assumed that the marriage between sociology and anthropology comes late, having been preceded by a long courtship. China does not fit this pattern. Almost as soon as social sciences were established there anthropology and sociology were intertwined, to be disentangled in a strange way when Communists arrived. To avoid a tedious recitation of evidence just one witness is called upon, a scholar whose later career in the U.S. makes his testimony underline the Chinese paradox. Writing in China in 1944 Francis L.K. Hsu has said in this paper that the word sociology is used synonymously with the term social anthropology. It is customary to date the beginning of sociology in China by the publication of Yen Fu's translation of two chapters of "The Study of Sociology" in 1898. Later a few original works were produced in Chinese and courses of instruction were introduced in universities, it was not until about the 1920s that sociological investigations of any great weight began to be made.

In this article, the author responds to the sociologist Bryan S. Turner's comments on his article related to the inter generational conflicts. Turner's interpretation, and suggestion that he was drawing attention away from structural issues, is rooted in a paradigm which is inadequate to the task of properly describing how life course processes are integral to general social arrangements. In his paper, the author took issue with the assumptions and arguments of age stratification and generational conflict theorists. These writers see age and generation related self interest as underpinning a growth in age based conflict. The dimensions of such conflict are seen to cleave around people's current relations to work and welfare. In his response to the author's paper Turner re-asserts the salience of intra-generational cohesion and inter-generational difference in shaping consciousness and action in efforts to secure social advantage. Turner insists that age and generation are important components of social stratification and should be incorporated in theory accordingly.

Alan Fox is one of the most prolific and original British sociologists of industry and employment. Fox's largely derivative writings on macro-sociology have received considerable attention in the literature. In comparison his original micro-sociological theory of the role played by trust in organizational integration has been neglected. This paper presents a critical evaluation of Fox's microsociological theory of 'trust dynamics' in organizations. The paper identifies conceptual, theoretical and methodological weaknesses in Fox's complex argument and concludes that Fox's theory is invalid. The paper also suggests that trust in organizational life is probably more significant as an aspect of 'social integration' than, as Fox contends, as an aspect of' 'system integration'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article traces the career of the concept scientific community through three discernible stages. The formative stages is presented by Ludwik Fleck's Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. It was learned that one of the early expositions of the theme that scientific knowledge is socially conditioned, Fleck's work revolves around the correlative concepts of thought collective and thought style. Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, was discussed. Stage three in the career of the concept scientific community is marked by criticism and the development of alternative models. During the 1960s and 70s, the view prevailed among metascientists that scientific knowledge is produced by communities of specialists. In the works of leading contemporary philosophers of science, as in many historical studies, the existence of scientific communities was assumed without question or argument. Kuhn's paper represents a watershed in the histories of both the concept itself and the entire discipline of sociology of science. Social integration in science was considered a result of a consensus about strategic norms or standards. Findings on the examination of the concept scientific community through the related works of Kuhn and Fleck, the Polish scientist and scientist knowledge, was presented.

This article discusses the theory on suicide advanced by sociologist Emile Durkheim. Durkheim attempted to derive a sociological explanation of variations in social suicide rates. He postulated identical relations between each of two independent variables -- integration and regulation -- and suicide. When either is high or low, the suicide rate is high; when either is moderate, the rate is low. Changes in rates are proportional to changes in the strength of these two variables. The low and high points of each are named -- egoism and altruism (integration), anomie and fatalism (regulation) -- and identified as the cases of suicide. The author of this article argues that Durkheim's attampt to establish a viable sociological distinction between integration and regulation are unsuccessful; indeed his book "Suicide" contains numerous indications that no such distinction exists. The paper then analyzes the theory of regulation as it fits into his book's explanatory structure and concludes by stating a theory of suicide devoid of any integration-regulation direction. Durkheim's initial attempts to distinguish between integration and regulation do little more than refer to societal attachment and attraction as integration, and societal control as regulation.

The paper argues that sociologists have constructed their accounts exclusive of nature. This pre-ecological sociology is critically examined and explained. It has resulted from disciplinary specialization and revulsion at biological determinism, with the trend away from systems sociology to human-agency sociology being an aggravating factor. Sociology as if nature did not matter has also been influenced by the assumption prevailing in modern societies of the plasticity of the relationship of humans to their natural environment. This sociology has been the sociological expression of modern societies careless of nature. The growing awareness that social constructions unleash dynamic processes of nature - processes beyond human control that bear on social action - has the potential of radically transforming such sociology. The paper proposes the reconstruction of sociology in which nature matters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents John Goldthorpe's response to several comments about his paper which analyzed the uses of history in sociology. According to Goldthorpe, his main concern was to show that history and sociology necessarily differed in the nature of the evidence that they used or, more precisely, in the ways in which this evidence came into being. He claims that in his paper, he emphasizes that historians cannot hope to produce descriptions that are free of general ideas about social action, process and structure. His argument concerning the differences in evidence available to historians and sociologists is that the latter have the possibility of engaging in research that itself generates evidence, over and above, not as distinct from, that of exploiting relics. Goldthorpe clarifies the argument with which his paper began was that (i) pace Abrams and Giddens, history and sociology are not the same thing; (ii) that one important way in which they differ is the nature of the evidence on which historians and sociologists draw; and (iii) that sociologists, in being able to generate their own data in the present, rather than being restricted to the relics of the past, are in a position of advantage that should be recognized and not given up without good reason.

This paper discusses the reasons why Edward Westermarck's reputation as a sociologist began to decline in the 1920s. It begins with some personal recollections of Westermarck, who was the author's great-uncle. Then follows an account of how Westermarck in both The History of Human Marriage and The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas made original contributions to the discussion concerning several issues, which were at that time regarded as central in the sociological debate. Although Westermarck and Durkheim held very similar ideas concerning some of these problems, they disagreed on other important points. Of particular consequence for the subsequent development of sociology was Durkheim's utter rejection of Westermarck's and the other comparativists' method of quoting examples from various societies which were detached from their context as support for their theories. During the inter-war decades Durkheim's ideas were taken up and championed by Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski, with the effect that Westermarck's comparative method was definitely regarded as passé when he died in 1939. Also other factors, which are discussed in some detail in sections V and VI of the paper contributed to this development. The paper ends with the conclusion that Westermarck's magna opera are today mainly of historical interest, whereas his Moroccan monographs and his Ethical Relativity will retain their value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The corpus of Alfred Schutz's methodological writings is directed at creating a scientific method which does not subjugate a meaning-endowing actor to objective, impersonal causal laws. Given the nature of this task, it is surprising that the list of Schutz's published writings is so small. It consists, in fact, of only one full-length book and numerous articles which have been compiled into a three-volume anthology. This relative paucity of published writings is partly due to the extreme care and meticulousness Schutz exhibits in writing and re-writing each work, and partly the result of a Jekyll-Hyde type of life in which days are spent pursuing money and success in the business world, leaving only nights to teach and write. In this paper I shall summarily describe Schutz's efforts and see if his phenomenologically defined notion of subjectivity is reasonably incorporated into a valid scientific method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over recent years, sociologists have devoted considerable attention to the comparative analysis of industrialized societies. Perhaps the major impetus for such interest has been the discussion the so-called "thesis of convergence" has generated. Although this thesis tends to focus upon "structural" features of societies, there have been other arguments which have suggested that such developments are related to changes of a more "cultural" kind. Researcher A. Inkeles has put forward the view that industrial modes of production particularly of the large-scale bureaucratic kind, generate structural environments and institutional features which lead to relatively consistent patterns of attitudinal responses. This paper is an attempt to re-examine Inkeles' thesis in the light of empirical data for two industrial societies, namely England and Sweden. More particularly, the emphasis is upon the perceptions of various aspects of social stratification. In order to test Inkeles' thesis, the findings of a number of empirical studies have been synthesized. But it is important to stress the problems of comparability. The studies have been conducted at various points of time; different research designs have been utilized; and the objectives of the studies have often been quite different.

This article discusses the book "Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences," edited by May Brodbeck. The author gives attention to three topics discussed in this anthology. The first is the controversy over whether the account of explanation given by sociologist Hempel is applicable in the human as well as in the natural sciences. The second theme in the anthology obviously relevant to sociologist is that of methodological individualism versus holism. Many of the papers in this anthology characterize at one level the alternatives confronting a scientist whose theorizing confronts either empirical or conceptual difficulties. Just because actions are informed by intentions and purposes, and intentions and purposes presuppose beliefs, so a social role-which specifies and prescribes or permits certain courses of action for certain types of person presupposes certain beliefs. The matter of the philosophy of science may not only be regulative as regards the form of our theories and the lessons to be learnt here may well be one that the sociologist now feels have been conveyed to him almost too often-but suggestive as to their content.

The argument of this paper is firstly, that public opinion is a complex process that cannot properly be measured by an arbitrary cross-section of opinions. Secondly, that pollsters adopt a different definition of public opinion that makes certain value assumptions and thirdly, that-even on the pollsters own definition, measures of opinion on controversial issues offered by commercial polls cannot readily be validated and are as practical guides to public opinion of doubtful value. The practice of public opinion polling implicitly treats public opinion as opinions of all members of a defined universe, such as the electorate, as measured by means of standard questions presented to an appropriate sample. It is a sign of the influence of the polls that current discussion of public opinion tends to take this definition for granted. Criticism there certainly is, on both technical and constitutional grounds. But few people challenge the implied definition of public opinion. Political scientists and sociologists have given systematic expression to the view that public opinion derives from activities of restricted numbers of people, typically organized in groups.

The purpose of this short paper is to review the present the position of industrial sociology as an academic discipline as of September 1959. It will focus therefore on its approach, its field of inquiry, the selection of problems for study, methods used and the present provision for its pursuit. The treatment given to the article is analytical rather than descriptive, since it can be assumed that most sociologists will have some knowledge of particular developments and various researches in this field, and only passing reference will therefore be made to them. There is still a tendency to use the term industrial sociology compendiously, to refer to all developments in the study of social relations in industry, in a manner which is reminiscent of the way in which the role of sociology itself was seen at one time simply as synoptic. This tendency of course is indicative of the developmental stage of the subject, but is quite illegitimate and emphasizes the need for clarification of the special position of industrial sociology.

This article is an attempt to evaluate the contribution of the late Erving Goffman to the field of Sociology. In doing so I have attempted to document some of the main commentaries upon Coffman's work — especially those of A. Dawe and A.W. Gouldner — and to evaluate their validity. This paper is presented within the framework of a general overview of Goffman's work and an elaboration of some of the salient themes within it. The intention of the author is to free Goffman from some of the crude overgeneralizations that his colleagues have used in evaluating his writings. In particular, I have attempted to show, in general terms, how Goffman's work is sensitive to ‘structural’ as well as ‘situational’ concerns and also to class, hierarchy and power. It is argued that Goffman's importance has been underestimated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Upon his death in 1920, at the age of 56, sociologist Max Weber left behind a huge and untidy mass of personal papers and scholarly manuscripts, some of the latter in the process of being edited for publication by Weber himself, others intended for intensive reworking, others yet superseded drafts. The intended characteristics of the book "Max Weber Gesamtausgabe," in the first of the publications listed below: they are those of a critical-historical edition, intended not to replace the several collections of Weber's writings currently available for the use of students, but rather to serve the needs of scholars, including the editors of such future collections. The edition is to include three sections: Writings and Speeches; Manuscripts of and notes from lecture courses. In the first section, the arrangement of material will embody a compromise between chronological and thematic grouping; that is, the numbering of volumes will reflect the shifts in the prevailing concerns of Weber's scholarly and publicistic activity, but each volume may contain again, in chronological sequence writings and speeches. From a number of years in so far as they bear on its chief theme. Each volume will contain editorial material which elucidates the circumstances of each piece of writing or speech, indicates the state of the relative sources and eventual discrepancies among them, and clarifies or corrects such parts or points in the text as might baffle or mislead even a relatively informed contemporary reader.

This paper is an analysis of the role of language in historical class formation in light of the recent developments in postmodern social theory and historiography. Revisionists from within this perspective have questioned if not abandoned E. P. Thompson's class struggle analysis, arguing that he fails to account for the constitutive character of language in the construction of collective identities. They oppose his account of the making of the English working class with alternative histories emphasizing populist and other non-class identities. Drawing on the Bakhtin Circle of literary studies, and returning to Thompson's own writings, I argue that we can incorporate language into class struggle analysis as a critical mediating force. I maintain that class struggle occurs largely within a hegemonic discursive formation, and that class consciousness and identity thus in part are formed through counter-hegemonic strategies of resistance to ideological domination. To illustrate this theory I analyse the role of language in the class struggles of the silk weavers of the Spitalfields district in London in the 1820s. I analyse how the silk weavers articulated a class consciousness through their counter-hegemonic struggles with the large capitalists and the language of political economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dorfman is eulogized as the creator and curator of the definitive account of Veblen's life and work. He argued that Veblen was the archetypal marginal man and that this explains his dissenting contribution. Dissemination of Dorfman's pathography of Veblen led to its hegemony - until now. Andrew Veblen was the first to challenge Dorfman's portrait of his younger brother's life in the mid 1920s. He asserted that his family were not linguistically, socially or economically deprived. However, it was not until Dorfman's private papers became publicly available in the 1990s, that his flawed view of Veblen became more widely and comprehensively contested. An alternative appreciation of Veblen is advanced with reference to his experiences in general and the works of Bellamy, Morris and Ibsen in particular. Data sources include Dorfman's original tome, Andrew Veblen's extensive correspondence with Dorfman, and Veblen's own writings. It is concluded that Veblen's radical views are entirely congruent with his life experiences during an era of capitalist transformation. The moral of this saga is that a dose of Veblenian scepticism is essential to intellectual health. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to reassess Norbert Elias's central theme of the `civilizing process' with reference to the Holocaust in Nazi Germany. My argument is that the process of `civilization' must be seen as thoroughly ambivalent, following Zygmunt Bauman's use of the latter term to denote the possibility of assigning an object or event to more than one category. The practice of naming and classifying social behaviours or processes as `civilized' or `barbarous' is am- bivalent, because they can never be placed so unequivocably in one or the other category - certainly not in a social scientific way. I then trace out ambivalences in the three central features of the `civilizing' process as Elias conceives it - the monopolization of means of violence, the removal of physical violence `behind the scenes', and the lengthening chains of interdependence between people. I shall argue that these ambivalent features are as much potential forces of destruction as they are of internal pacification and `civilization'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a critique of the increasingly fashionable view that what actors say about their motives and intentions cannot be used by sociologists to explain that behaviour. The Millsian 'vocabularies of motives' position and the more recent attempts of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis to produce a sociology that does not make inferences about actors' intentions are examined. We argue that Mills adds little or nothing to the conventional view, of motives and that, while claiming to do otherwise, ethnomethodology and conversation analysis do, in fact, make considerable use of intuited inferences about actors' intentions. We intend, with these criticisms, to rescue and rehabilitate the conventional uses of actors' talk as a key to their motivation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent discussions in the philosophy of the social sciences exhibit a remarkable agreement about what has become one of the most urgent problems for sociological methodology. The situation may be summarized thus: ethnomethodological developments in interpretative sociology have shown that there can be no firm and certain basis on which to ground truth claims for our propositions. The conclusion drawn from this is that the traditional aspirations of conventional sociology — to be objective and scientific — cannot be attained. However, the programme of work promised by those who have developed ethnomethodology as a critique of ‘conventional sociology’ itself contains certain difficulties. Thus, the problem addressed by those writing in the philosophy of social science is this: given the contradictions in sociology as traditionally practiced, and given the problems in the programme offered by those largely responsible for discrediting it, whither sociology now? The purpose of my paper is to show that the question may be unnecessary. This is not so much because interpretative sociologists are mistaken in their understanding of the conditions in which research is undertaken, but rather because the positivist epistemological assumptions taken to be necessary for an objective scientific sociology, are not required for this and indeed are erroneous. I shall argue specifically that a Popperian account of (objective) science is wholly compatible with the understanding contemporary interpretative sociologists have of the research context, and indeed that there are striking similarities between this and Popper's ideas, most especially those developed in recent years. Thus, I shall go on to suggest that, by adopting a Popperian epistemology we may thereby recognize the validity of the fundamentals of the ethnomethodological position without being forced to abandon the effort to be objective and scientific; we may also sidestep the particular dif... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper compares one aspect of Max Weber's explicit conception of ‘interpretive sociology’ with his actual practices in his substantive investigations. It shows that Weber's overt emphasis on the importance of meanings and motives in causal explanation of social action does not correspond adequately with the true mode of explanation involved in his comparative-historical studies of the world religions. Rather, the ultimate level of causal explanation in Weber's substantive writings is that of the social-structural conditions under which certain forms of meaning and motivation can achieve historical efficacy. A model is developed to represent the actual nature of ‘Weberian sociology’. It is proposed that this internal comparative analysis and interpretation can have useful implications for contemporary sociological debates and approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a comment on a previous article that appeared in the September 1996 issue of the British Journal of Sociology. According to the author, the more interesting issues raised by sociologist Andre Beteille's paper have less to do with the mismatch between class and status than with the question of how two conceptions of status, the one focusing on unequal social esteem and the other on the equal rights of citizenship should be related to each other in a general theory of social stratification since it is not unreasonable to anticipate some difficulty when the same general concept is used to describe a major aspect of inequality and also an antidote to it. The common feature of status relations in all societies is that they are exhibited fundamentally through acts of defense, acceptance and derogation. But such interactions vary according to how they are sanctioned and maintained, and the kinds of privileges and disabilities with which they are associated. No one would wish to deny that within the limits set by the rights of citizenship, inequalities of esteem, and more particularly the social networks in which they are grounded, continue to exert their influence for the reasons Beteille so well adduces.

This section presents updates on the British Sociological Association in 1955. It was decided at the Annual General Meeting in March 1955 that the office of the president should be created so that it might be possible to invite an eminent sociologist to become associated in this way with the association. The president would hold office for one year and would be eligible for re-election. This decision was endorsed by the majority of the members voting by postal ballot and the constitution has been amended accordingly. Professor Morris Ginsberg has been invited to be the first holder of the office for the remainder of the current year and has been pleased to accept. On October 14, 1955 the association will hold a meeting on problems of social change and causation at the University of London in England. Meanwhile, the Urban Sociology Study Group and the Industrial Sociology Study Group will resume their monthly meetings in October 1955. The possibility is being investigated of forming a third study group for examining the territory on which the interests of psychiatrists, psychologists and sociologists meet. Furthermore, the association welcomes applications for membership from younger sociologists and others whose disciplines are related to sociology. It offers student membership for those occupied in full-time study at an institution of higher learning. Student members have all the advantages of full membership except the power to vote and make nominations. Subscriptions for 1955 will be waived for all members whose applications are accepted between now and the end of the year. Particulars will be sent on application to all those interested.

The issue of morality has lost its position of importance within the discipline, yet a growing number of sociologists interested in the ambivalent character of (post)modernity have returned to this subject in recent years. This article examines the revival of interest in morality and suggests it would benefit by engaging creatively with Durkheim's writings on homo duplex, collective effervescence, and the social construction of moral orders. After examining this relatively neglected part of Durkheim's work, developed most fully in his (1995 [1912]) The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, we focus on two of the most influential contemporary commentators on morality, Bauman and Giddens. Having evaluated the limitations of their respective approaches (which associate the sources of morality respectively with a methodologically individualistic bodily impulse of `being for the other', and with an increasingly global cognitive reflexivity), we analyse recent writings which have attempted to transcend such difficulties by engaging with some of the tensions in Durkheim's account of sacred moral. orders. These high- light those features of Durkheim's work which continue to offer a productive basis on which to develop further a thoroughly sociological appreciation of morality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Piaget's sociological theory is not widely discussed among sociologists, partly because much of it is contained in untranslated French works. In this article I summarize several aspects of Piaget's sociological views, especially his social exchange theory, and briefly indicate its relevance to several current theories in sociology and social psychology. Rejecting both Durkheim's sociological holism and Tarde's individualism, Piaget advances a sociological relativism (relationalism) in which all social facts are reducible to social relations and these, in turn, are reducible to rules, values, and signs. Piaget's theory of social values takes the form of a social exchange theory characterized first in an abstract, logical way -- its structural aspect -- and second its developmental aspects. Piaget claims social exchange requires normative principles of reciprocity and that individual social development results in such an equilibrium because rationality itself is social in nature and based upon social co-operation. These views, in turn, derive from his orthogenetic view concerning the course of evolution: development can be characterized as an increase in equilibrium manifested both in individual action and in social interaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article attempts to understand the relationship between sociology and history by examining of material relating to the position and development of sociology in Yugoslavia with the hope the distinctive nature of the position of sociology in society will be thrown into comparative relief. It must be made clear that in discussions of the relationship between history and sociology, one is dealing with highly organized professional groups, with a high level of articulate self-awareness. These groups tend to be relatively self-sufficient intellectually, and there is little cross-recruitment between them. One makes a career, in other words, as either a historian or as a sociologist. Under these circumstances the discussion about the relationship between sociology and history reads like a kind of academic diplomacy. But, like all diplomacy, it is dependent upon a highly specific set of political circumstances. One does not negotiate treaties to cover all circumstances, but only certain foreseen circumstances. A brief consideration of the position of sociology in Yugoslavia will serve to highlight just how specific and peculiar are the circumstances which govern our current understanding of the relationship between sociology and history.

The article presents information on the factors related to the urban sociology in an urban society. Some of the factors are the intellectual crisis that confronts urban sociologists, the direction taken by British urban sociology, and the statement of metropolitan dominance. All these factors led to the uneven development of metropolitan centre and provincial satellites. Factors like residence, occupation, religion, politics, legal and military obligation can be considered for the total social experience and for the social structure that extends beyond the urban area. There has been a growing public concern with the changes in cities.

This article reflects on the social philosophy of Karl Popper. Karl Popper is a widely influential writer on the methodology of the social sciences. To many sociologists, scientific method means Popper's account of scientific method. Yet Popper does not believe that sociology should be value-free. He believes that a commitment to scientific sociology, far from clearing us from making value-judgments about utopian thought, requires us to denounce it. Thus Poppers, supports the orthodox view that utopian thought is objectionable, but it is unusual in deriving this value-judgment from his conception of scientific method. Popper developed his views on the methodology of the social sciences and his social philosophy in the course of his critique of something he calls historicism. Popper defines historicism as an approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction is their principal aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the rhythms or the patterns, the laws or the trends that underlie the evolution of history. With characteristic vigor, Popper denounces historicism as logically defective, false, sterile and murderous. Poppers critique of historicism is linked with his analysis of utopianism. The connection is mainly made by a third villain: holism. Holism is the doctrine that events must be understood in the context of the social whole of which they form a part.

In education, as in other respects, Ghana's position has been a lodestar from which other emerging nations chart their course. This pioneer status has attracted many eminent scholars to scrutinize the system at close quarters, and to examine the origins of Ghanaian students. Thus, within three years of the University of Ghana's inception Gustav Jahoda found that 66 per cent of its students came from the top 7 per cent of the working population, while farmers and manual workers were poorly represented. Subsequent scholars have reached similar results, although some have preferred to emphasize long-term trend toward a student body more representative of the population as a whole. Unfortunately, such optimism proves to have been somewhat premature. The debate has also illuminated the variety of interpretations of social stratification. Sociologists take the observed, inequality of life chances as axiomatic evidence of the existence of class differences. They replied that class has a psychological as well as a structural connotation, and he suggests that relative consensus over the value of education itself indicates the classlessness of Ghanaian society.

This article presents a note stating that the Max Weber Centennial Commission has been established in order to mark the year 1964 as the one-hundredth anniversary of the birth of the German social scientist Max Weber by focusing attention on Weber's impact on the social sciences. The Commission is designed to co-ordinate the efforts of co-operating institutions of higher learning and academic organizations by arranging visiting professorships, exchange lectureships, seminars, and institutes. The activities of the commission will culminate into a symposium to be held in April 1964 in Kansas City.

The article focuses on various sociologists. There were a number of sociologists who were rather bemused and puzzled seeing Sorokin being idolized by the radical students and young faculty members. It seemed to them that Sorokin, who had condemned violence and revolutionary activity ever since the Revolution, was being worshipped by the wrong people. Some of the famous scholars are Pitirim A. Sorokin, Nicholas S. Timasheff and Georges Gurvitch. Timasheff, Sorokin and Gurvitch have succeeded, each in his own way, in becoming internationally famous scholars. The paths they each chose to follow seem to have been determined to a significant degree by their respective family backgrounds, as well as by the Revolution. Timasheff's approach in his sociological writings was historical and analytical. Sorokin's work and style represent a marked contrast to Timasheff's. While Timasheff used historical data as empirical facts, Sorokin used the data as means for conforming his personal apocalyptic vision. Gurvitch's ideas were also formed under the direct impact of the Revolution.

This article discusses the problem of social control among sociologists which raises fundamental questions about the nature and organization of human societies. One important tradition of sociological thought, influenced by sociologist E. Durkheim has exa

This article discusses sociologist Harold Garfinkel's view on ethnomethodology. According to Garfinkel, it refers to the investigation of rational properties of indexical expressions and other practical actions as contingent, ongoing accomplishments of or

In his work, sociologist Karl Marx appears as a thorough going humanist and it is from this point onwards that a whole Marx industry developed. Sociologist David McLellan's intention is to convince his readers that any interpretation of Marx which does not take his work "Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie," seriously into account must by virtue of omission be radically mistaken. The work given by McLellan is not Marx's Grundrisse but McLelIan's Grundrisse. There is no proper explanation presented by McLellan of why from one thousand pages, a selection of one hundred and fifty two was done. The last chapter of "Marx Before Marxism," and the introduction to the Grundrisse are taken up with the crucial but rather easy task of textually refuting the break in Marx thesis. In the preface to his extremely useful selection from the early texts McLellan indicates the importance of the manuscripts and other works. McLellan's presentation of Marx is cautious, erudite and clever, but he rarely commits himself completely. McLellan demonstrates "Capital," which is only the elaboration of the first of the six sections outlined in the Grundrisse. In a sense, none of Marx's works is complete, but the completest of them is the Grundrisse.

The relationship between social class structure and political institutions and behaviour has been one of the dominant interests of social scientists since the time of sociologist Karl Marx. More specifically social class structure has been the main source of theory for the explanation of voting behaviour and it is probably the most frequently investigated area empirically. The connection between some indicator of social class and voting behaviour has been amply demonstrated in many studies in many societies. However, the way in which occupation, education or income has its effect on voting has rarely been considered. The purpose of this article is to consider this large array of indicators of status and conditions of living and working, of intervening variables of social involvement, personality characteristics and attitudes. The article will demonstrate which variables should be pursued for further theoretical development and research, and which should be abandoned. The data are drawn from a larger study of voting behaviour, collected at the time of the 1968 Canadian federal election, in the province of Ontario.

The article comments on the concept of power. Power is one of the most central and yet problematic concepts in sociological theory. Power, like love, is a word used continually in ordinary speech, understood intuitively, and defined rarely, people know what the power game is. In many instances sociologists have been no more precise than this. Yet it is possible to define power precisely without losing the core of its common-sense meaning. This section discusses critically current definitions of power, and concludes by suggesting a refinement of current definitions which maintains their essence while avoiding some of their misleading assumptions. Most sociological theorists have defined power in more restricted terms, as a specific type of relation between objects, persons and groups. The most influential definition remains that of the sociologist Max Weber: power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless the basis on which this probability rests.

The article discusses sociologist Christopher Bryant's defence of scientific sociology. Bryant rejects the idea that sociology must be exclusively humanistic and he proposed three categories of social reality. Humanistic explanations vary in a number of ways, in directness, in simplicity and according to the persistence of the action referred to. Within humanistic explanation there are levels, continua rather than dichotomies. Most famed sociology is humanistic explanation. That this has not been recognized and is frequently denied is profoundly damaging to the defence of the subject. It leads sociologists to fail to push humanistic explanations to their limits of logical and empirical rigour, it leads them to self condemnation, and provides ammunition to sociology's opponents. Bryant, in keeping with his acceptance of a rather rigid dichotomy, is inclined to accept much of the philosophical case against comparison and generalization. Bryant's argument tends to miss the strongest of the philosophical cases. This involves recourse to a fundamental relativism.

This article is concerned with an analysis of some meanings that can be given the word 'group'. By an analysis of this concept, the author hopes to outline the form of association that can be expected to lead to sociologist Karl Marxist-type formulations. The problem raised by living in groups is that of having to put up with the proximity of other individuals in the group. The fear of being observed keeps them apart. The article is mainly concerned with the manner by which individuals cope with shame. The author argues that there are three ways in which group relationships can be attained and categorically names them as Fascism and the Acceptance of Authority, Communism and the Rejection of Authority, and finally Science and the Irrelevance of Authority. The author further states that Marxists have not yet awoken to the existence of another possible third party. He says that if Marxists stress social origins of beliefs, they must acknowledge social origins of their own.

The article compares influentials in contemporary American and British sociology for a time span for 11 years, between 1958-68. Authors of the article have compared names of the men most cited in journals "American Sociological Review" and "British Journal of Sociology" for two time periods and have found that lists for the second time period contained a larger number of names in common than the list for the first period. This finding was interpreted as support for the thesis that sociology is becoming more international. A comparison of the two American lists revealed no essential differences in the national origin of the most important influentials for the two periods. A similar examination of the two British lists revealed that contemporary sociologists from the U.S. are becoming increasingly influential in British sociology. It was therefore suggested that the internationalization of sociology may, for the immediate future, be equivalent or almost equivalent to the Americanization of sociology.

Defending sociologist's right to exist is as old as sociology itself. So it is hardly surprising that it is possible to cite the work of classical figures in its development when rejecting the stringent criticisms of three contemporary British philosophers. Their criticisms are modern variants of the old case against social science. The three philosophers are Peter Winch, A. R. Louch, and Alasdair Maclntyre. Taken together they present three arguments which would, if acceptable, invalidate the basis of sociology. The first contends that sociologists fail to recognize quite how social reality differs from nature. The second, in its extreme form, states that the concept cause is only applicable to the natural world, so that causal accounts of social phenomena are, by definition, the product of conceptual confusion. The third holds that cross-cultural analysis is impossible. The philosopher's most profound mistake is to equate all sociology with accounting for human action qua action, i.e. explaining why actors act as they do. Correspondingly their most serious omission is their failure to consider the meaning of social structure.

This article explores aspects of the social organization of migrant farm labor crews. These crews constitute a distinctive type of socio-cultural organization. However, many characteristics of migrant labor crews have developed, not as a reflection of internal cultural values, but as an adaptive response to their marginal position in the U.S. society. The marginality of the migrant worker is not adequately reflected in the classic definition of the marginal man who through migration, education, marriage, or some other influence leaves one social group or culture without making a satisfactory adjustment to another and finds himself on the margin of each but a member of neither. This definition stresses the personal ambivalence of the individual poised between two distinct cultures, who experiences problems to the extent that these cultures conflict. Some of qualifications and redefinitions stimulated by sociologists seem somewhat more relevant. Sociologists included in their definition of a marginal situation, examples where some members of one group for one reason or another come under the influence of another group and where cultural and racial barriers serve to block full and legitimate membership within another group.

According to sociologist R.H. Tawney, the triumph of capitalism was the failure of Protestantism. Capitalism was, in his view, a reaction to the social revolution begun by Reformation but which it was unable to control or complete. Capitalism succeeded, according to Tawney, in spite of the protestant ethic, not because of it. Unlike sociologist Max Weber, who contrasted modern capitalism with earlier and pre-rational forms, Tawney juxtaposed capitalism with feudalism. Sociology texts on collective behavior have viewed Reformation as a social movement. But they are apt to neglect the interpretation of a specific social change, i.e., they abstract the movement from its historical context. Accordingly, they do not deal with the problems raised by Tawney, Weber and their critics concerning the relationship of the Protestant ethic to capitalism. The approach outlined in the article aids the examination of many modernizing countries today and consideration of the empirical question of whether capitalism is, as Tawney assumed, a less stable social system than socialism.

The article focuses on legal norms and social order with reference to sociologists Leon Petrazcycki, Vilfredo Pareto and Émile Durkheim. Petrazcycki's contribution to the philosophy of law has hardly permeated this field to which not only its subject matter, but also its methodology are relevant. His primary interest in the source of legal norms, reinforced by his practical concern for the problems of legal reform, resulted in an appraisal of the connections between law and social order. Prolonged and widespread political unrest increased the premium placed upon social stability, while emphasizing the latent contradiction between freedom and order. The simultaneous acceleration of economic development led to an awareness of the advantages inherent in industrialization and a desire for their planned extension. Unlike the Utilitarians, Petrazcycki did not represent law as the arbitrator of conflict. A similar rejection of the emphasis on external constraint distinguished both Durkheim and Pareto.

The term attitude, both in colloquial as well as in scientific usage, refers to dispositions of men to view things in certain ways and to act accordingly. Attitudes are complexes of ideas and sentiments. Sociologists, one assumes, are never interested in attitudes as a final object of enquiry but always as part of an ultimate aim of studying the structure of social conduct; for them, an enquiry into attitudes must be justified by assumptions that attitudes are predictive of conduct. Sociologists who defend attitude studies must assume that social attitudes are not perfectly malleable or flexible. If attitudes were perfectly malleable then they would simply be governed by structural factors, which would also govern conduct, in any social situation, in that case, the existence of such attitudes could be inferred either from the governing factors, the independent variables, or from the conduct itself; the dependent variable, and this would give them little or no explanatory value. It is, of course, arguable, that even if attitudes were perfectly malleable.

The history of sociology is not or should not be analogous to archaeology. It is or it should be an indispensable element in the present practice of sociology and where it is not, the reason is rarely that it is genuinely superfluous. One peculiar feature of sociology, distinguishing it both from the natural sciences and interestingly from economics, is that it is rarely possible to say of it that theory has genuinely moved on, including what was valid in the past as special cases or partial truths in what is acceptable to the present. This feature is only a weakness so long as it goes unrecognized. Two primitive but prevalent, errors are then possible. Either the sociologist uses the theories of the past unconsciously, thereby accepting current and necessarily distorted, interpretations of their methods, concepts and insights or else he consciously rejects them as in principle defunct which unless he is a genius, leaves him impoverished and ill-equipped. Sociologists today still have much to learn in a substantive way, from the works of their ancestors.

The purpose of this article is to abstract and synthesize sociologist James Baldwin's views and wherever possible to extrapolate their relevance to sociology. He seeks desperately to define his identity as an American Negro writer and spokesman for his people. In order to know who he is, Baldwin must examine his cultural heritage for the past is all that makes the present coherent. And it is advisable to understand the present before looking forward to the future. It is this goal that has both guided and driven Baldwin as a Negro and as an American. Despite his distinct antipathy for sociology, Baldwin's writings are highly relevant to that discipline, perhaps even more than many works by professional sociologists. Though obviously prejudiced on the subject of Negro-white relations, Baldwin's personal experience and literary freedom yield an insight and comprehensiveness that social scientists lack. His definition of the problem and its causes provide a viewpoint that white writers and academics are simply not in a position to contribute. Equally useful is his knowledge of Negro people and their society. Baldwin's combined writings imply a new system for classifying Negro responses to discrimination. They also furnish a fruitful picture of the Negro social structure.

The term model is nowadays used almost indiscriminately by sociologists and anthropologists to dignify any form of analysis or explanation. In a way this is justifiable: for almost all sociological analysis does involve the implicit use of models. But it is also unfortunate for there is then no way to distinguish model-building from other activities; the term becomes over-burdened and its use innecessary. Even when most usages are discarded, at least two acceptable ones remain. According to the first, a model is a set of assumptions which attributes to some relatively unknown or unobservable process a form which is similar to that which is known to operate elsewhere. One of the best known examples of this in physics is Bohr's model of the atom which attributed to it a structure similar to that of the relationship between planet and satellite. A less quoted, but equally significant example is the model of the chemical process of genetic transmission which attributes to it a structure similar to that of linguistic communication-a code.

This article is amongst one of the three articles read at the Annual Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science in the year 1962. A limited number of terms which are associated with major themes of anthropological discourse, or which have been found to be necessary for concise communication between people engaged in social anthropology are considered in this article. In discussing the vocabulary of social anthropology one must begin with two key words which indicate different aspects of the subject-matter and also different approaches to it. First of such words is culture, which is the whole complex of learned behavior, the traditions and techniques and the material possessions, the language and other symbolism, of some body of people. Anthropologist Radicalize-Brown defined the structure of a society as the sum total of those interpersonal relations to which social norms apply.