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The article focuses on the author's comment on sociologists Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore's paper "Some Principles of Stratification." According to the author, the paper offers some important point but that the argument they advance is contradictory in certain of its implications and therefore defective. The source of the difficulty is to be found in one of the premises of their argument. To state it most simply, the premise asserts, "people desire rewards." This assertion is incontestable, but it is not adequately qualified in their argument. The author shows in the first part of this article how their argument, containing this premise, leads to contradictory implications. Then, in the second part of this article, the author attempts to provide qualifications which he believes will allow Davis and Moore's argument to avoid contradictions and thus give it greater force.

The article focuses on the sociology in and of China. In the general history of social sciences it is assumed that the marriage between sociology and anthropology comes late, having been preceded by a long courtship. China does not fit this pattern. Almost as soon as social sciences were established there anthropology and sociology were intertwined, to be disentangled in a strange way when Communists arrived. To avoid a tedious recitation of evidence just one witness is called upon, a scholar whose later career in the U.S. makes his testimony underline the Chinese paradox. Writing in China in 1944 Francis L.K. Hsu has said in this paper that the word sociology is used synonymously with the term social anthropology. It is customary to date the beginning of sociology in China by the publication of Yen Fu's translation of two chapters of "The Study of Sociology" in 1898. Later a few original works were produced in Chinese and courses of instruction were introduced in universities, it was not until about the 1920s that sociological investigations of any great weight began to be made.

The article traces the career of the concept scientific community through three discernible stages. The formative stages is presented by Ludwik Fleck's Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. It was learned that one of the early expositions of the theme that scientific knowledge is socially conditioned, Fleck's work revolves around the correlative concepts of thought collective and thought style. Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, was discussed. Stage three in the career of the concept scientific community is marked by criticism and the development of alternative models. During the 1960s and 70s, the view prevailed among metascientists that scientific knowledge is produced by communities of specialists. In the works of leading contemporary philosophers of science, as in many historical studies, the existence of scientific communities was assumed without question or argument. Kuhn's paper represents a watershed in the histories of both the concept itself and the entire discipline of sociology of science. Social integration in science was considered a result of a consensus about strategic norms or standards. Findings on the examination of the concept scientific community through the related works of Kuhn and Fleck, the Polish scientist and scientist knowledge, was presented.

The corpus of Alfred Schutz's methodological writings is directed at creating a scientific method which does not subjugate a meaning-endowing actor to objective, impersonal causal laws. Given the nature of this task, it is surprising that the list of Schutz's published writings is so small. It consists, in fact, of only one full-length book and numerous articles which have been compiled into a three-volume anthology. This relative paucity of published writings is partly due to the extreme care and meticulousness Schutz exhibits in writing and re-writing each work, and partly the result of a Jekyll-Hyde type of life in which days are spent pursuing money and success in the business world, leaving only nights to teach and write. In this paper I shall summarily describe Schutz's efforts and see if his phenomenologically defined notion of subjectivity is reasonably incorporated into a valid scientific method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the book "Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences," edited by May Brodbeck. The author gives attention to three topics discussed in this anthology. The first is the controversy over whether the account of explanation given by sociologist Hempel is applicable in the human as well as in the natural sciences. The second theme in the anthology obviously relevant to sociologist is that of methodological individualism versus holism. Many of the papers in this anthology characterize at one level the alternatives confronting a scientist whose theorizing confronts either empirical or conceptual difficulties. Just because actions are informed by intentions and purposes, and intentions and purposes presuppose beliefs, so a social role-which specifies and prescribes or permits certain courses of action for certain types of person presupposes certain beliefs. The matter of the philosophy of science may not only be regulative as regards the form of our theories and the lessons to be learnt here may well be one that the sociologist now feels have been conveyed to him almost too often-but suggestive as to their content.

The purpose of this short paper is to review the present the position of industrial sociology as an academic discipline as of September 1959. It will focus therefore on its approach, its field of inquiry, the selection of problems for study, methods used and the present provision for its pursuit. The treatment given to the article is analytical rather than descriptive, since it can be assumed that most sociologists will have some knowledge of particular developments and various researches in this field, and only passing reference will therefore be made to them. There is still a tendency to use the term industrial sociology compendiously, to refer to all developments in the study of social relations in industry, in a manner which is reminiscent of the way in which the role of sociology itself was seen at one time simply as synoptic. This tendency of course is indicative of the developmental stage of the subject, but is quite illegitimate and emphasizes the need for clarification of the special position of industrial sociology.

Dorfman is eulogized as the creator and curator of the definitive account of Veblen's life and work. He argued that Veblen was the archetypal marginal man and that this explains his dissenting contribution. Dissemination of Dorfman's pathography of Veblen led to its hegemony - until now. Andrew Veblen was the first to challenge Dorfman's portrait of his younger brother's life in the mid 1920s. He asserted that his family were not linguistically, socially or economically deprived. However, it was not until Dorfman's private papers became publicly available in the 1990s, that his flawed view of Veblen became more widely and comprehensively contested. An alternative appreciation of Veblen is advanced with reference to his experiences in general and the works of Bellamy, Morris and Ibsen in particular. Data sources include Dorfman's original tome, Andrew Veblen's extensive correspondence with Dorfman, and Veblen's own writings. It is concluded that Veblen's radical views are entirely congruent with his life experiences during an era of capitalist transformation. The moral of this saga is that a dose of Veblenian scepticism is essential to intellectual health. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is an attempt to evaluate the contribution of the late Erving Goffman to the field of Sociology. In doing so I have attempted to document some of the main commentaries upon Coffman's work — especially those of A. Dawe and A.W. Gouldner — and to evaluate their validity. This paper is presented within the framework of a general overview of Goffman's work and an elaboration of some of the salient themes within it. The intention of the author is to free Goffman from some of the crude overgeneralizations that his colleagues have used in evaluating his writings. In particular, I have attempted to show, in general terms, how Goffman's work is sensitive to ‘structural’ as well as ‘situational’ concerns and also to class, hierarchy and power. It is argued that Goffman's importance has been underestimated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Upon his death in 1920, at the age of 56, sociologist Max Weber left behind a huge and untidy mass of personal papers and scholarly manuscripts, some of the latter in the process of being edited for publication by Weber himself, others intended for intensive reworking, others yet superseded drafts. The intended characteristics of the book "Max Weber Gesamtausgabe," in the first of the publications listed below: they are those of a critical-historical edition, intended not to replace the several collections of Weber's writings currently available for the use of students, but rather to serve the needs of scholars, including the editors of such future collections. The edition is to include three sections: Writings and Speeches; Manuscripts of and notes from lecture courses. In the first section, the arrangement of material will embody a compromise between chronological and thematic grouping; that is, the numbering of volumes will reflect the shifts in the prevailing concerns of Weber's scholarly and publicistic activity, but each volume may contain again, in chronological sequence writings and speeches. From a number of years in so far as they bear on its chief theme. Each volume will contain editorial material which elucidates the circumstances of each piece of writing or speech, indicates the state of the relative sources and eventual discrepancies among them, and clarifies or corrects such parts or points in the text as might baffle or mislead even a relatively informed contemporary reader.

Recent discussions in the philosophy of the social sciences exhibit a remarkable agreement about what has become one of the most urgent problems for sociological methodology. The situation may be summarized thus: ethnomethodological developments in interpretative sociology have shown that there can be no firm and certain basis on which to ground truth claims for our propositions. The conclusion drawn from this is that the traditional aspirations of conventional sociology — to be objective and scientific — cannot be attained. However, the programme of work promised by those who have developed ethnomethodology as a critique of ‘conventional sociology’ itself contains certain difficulties. Thus, the problem addressed by those writing in the philosophy of social science is this: given the contradictions in sociology as traditionally practiced, and given the problems in the programme offered by those largely responsible for discrediting it, whither sociology now? The purpose of my paper is to show that the question may be unnecessary. This is not so much because interpretative sociologists are mistaken in their understanding of the conditions in which research is undertaken, but rather because the positivist epistemological assumptions taken to be necessary for an objective scientific sociology, are not required for this and indeed are erroneous. I shall argue specifically that a Popperian account of (objective) science is wholly compatible with the understanding contemporary interpretative sociologists have of the research context, and indeed that there are striking similarities between this and Popper's ideas, most especially those developed in recent years. Thus, I shall go on to suggest that, by adopting a Popperian epistemology we may thereby recognize the validity of the fundamentals of the ethnomethodological position without being forced to abandon the effort to be objective and scientific; we may also sidestep the particular dif... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper compares one aspect of Max Weber's explicit conception of ‘interpretive sociology’ with his actual practices in his substantive investigations. It shows that Weber's overt emphasis on the importance of meanings and motives in causal explanation of social action does not correspond adequately with the true mode of explanation involved in his comparative-historical studies of the world religions. Rather, the ultimate level of causal explanation in Weber's substantive writings is that of the social-structural conditions under which certain forms of meaning and motivation can achieve historical efficacy. A model is developed to represent the actual nature of ‘Weberian sociology’. It is proposed that this internal comparative analysis and interpretation can have useful implications for contemporary sociological debates and approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article attempts to understand the relationship between sociology and history by examining of material relating to the position and development of sociology in Yugoslavia with the hope the distinctive nature of the position of sociology in society will be thrown into comparative relief. It must be made clear that in discussions of the relationship between history and sociology, one is dealing with highly organized professional groups, with a high level of articulate self-awareness. These groups tend to be relatively self-sufficient intellectually, and there is little cross-recruitment between them. One makes a career, in other words, as either a historian or as a sociologist. Under these circumstances the discussion about the relationship between sociology and history reads like a kind of academic diplomacy. But, like all diplomacy, it is dependent upon a highly specific set of political circumstances. One does not negotiate treaties to cover all circumstances, but only certain foreseen circumstances. A brief consideration of the position of sociology in Yugoslavia will serve to highlight just how specific and peculiar are the circumstances which govern our current understanding of the relationship between sociology and history.

This article reflects on the social philosophy of Karl Popper. Karl Popper is a widely influential writer on the methodology of the social sciences. To many sociologists, scientific method means Popper's account of scientific method. Yet Popper does not believe that sociology should be value-free. He believes that a commitment to scientific sociology, far from clearing us from making value-judgments about utopian thought, requires us to denounce it. Thus Poppers, supports the orthodox view that utopian thought is objectionable, but it is unusual in deriving this value-judgment from his conception of scientific method. Popper developed his views on the methodology of the social sciences and his social philosophy in the course of his critique of something he calls historicism. Popper defines historicism as an approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction is their principal aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the rhythms or the patterns, the laws or the trends that underlie the evolution of history. With characteristic vigor, Popper denounces historicism as logically defective, false, sterile and murderous. Poppers critique of historicism is linked with his analysis of utopianism. The connection is mainly made by a third villain: holism. Holism is the doctrine that events must be understood in the context of the social whole of which they form a part.

This article presents a note stating that the Max Weber Centennial Commission has been established in order to mark the year 1964 as the one-hundredth anniversary of the birth of the German social scientist Max Weber by focusing attention on Weber's impact on the social sciences. The Commission is designed to co-ordinate the efforts of co-operating institutions of higher learning and academic organizations by arranging visiting professorships, exchange lectureships, seminars, and institutes. The activities of the commission will culminate into a symposium to be held in April 1964 in Kansas City.

The article focuses on various sociologists. There were a number of sociologists who were rather bemused and puzzled seeing Sorokin being idolized by the radical students and young faculty members. It seemed to them that Sorokin, who had condemned violence and revolutionary activity ever since the Revolution, was being worshipped by the wrong people. Some of the famous scholars are Pitirim A. Sorokin, Nicholas S. Timasheff and Georges Gurvitch. Timasheff, Sorokin and Gurvitch have succeeded, each in his own way, in becoming internationally famous scholars. The paths they each chose to follow seem to have been determined to a significant degree by their respective family backgrounds, as well as by the Revolution. Timasheff's approach in his sociological writings was historical and analytical. Sorokin's work and style represent a marked contrast to Timasheff's. While Timasheff used historical data as empirical facts, Sorokin used the data as means for conforming his personal apocalyptic vision. Gurvitch's ideas were also formed under the direct impact of the Revolution.

The article comments on the concept of power. Power is one of the most central and yet problematic concepts in sociological theory. Power, like love, is a word used continually in ordinary speech, understood intuitively, and defined rarely, people know what the power game is. In many instances sociologists have been no more precise than this. Yet it is possible to define power precisely without losing the core of its common-sense meaning. This section discusses critically current definitions of power, and concludes by suggesting a refinement of current definitions which maintains their essence while avoiding some of their misleading assumptions. Most sociological theorists have defined power in more restricted terms, as a specific type of relation between objects, persons and groups. The most influential definition remains that of the sociologist Max Weber: power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless the basis on which this probability rests.

The article discusses sociologist Christopher Bryant's defence of scientific sociology. Bryant rejects the idea that sociology must be exclusively humanistic and he proposed three categories of social reality. Humanistic explanations vary in a number of ways, in directness, in simplicity and according to the persistence of the action referred to. Within humanistic explanation there are levels, continua rather than dichotomies. Most famed sociology is humanistic explanation. That this has not been recognized and is frequently denied is profoundly damaging to the defence of the subject. It leads sociologists to fail to push humanistic explanations to their limits of logical and empirical rigour, it leads them to self condemnation, and provides ammunition to sociology's opponents. Bryant, in keeping with his acceptance of a rather rigid dichotomy, is inclined to accept much of the philosophical case against comparison and generalization. Bryant's argument tends to miss the strongest of the philosophical cases. This involves recourse to a fundamental relativism.

The article compares influentials in contemporary American and British sociology for a time span for 11 years, between 1958-68. Authors of the article have compared names of the men most cited in journals "American Sociological Review" and "British Journal of Sociology" for two time periods and have found that lists for the second time period contained a larger number of names in common than the list for the first period. This finding was interpreted as support for the thesis that sociology is becoming more international. A comparison of the two American lists revealed no essential differences in the national origin of the most important influentials for the two periods. A similar examination of the two British lists revealed that contemporary sociologists from the U.S. are becoming increasingly influential in British sociology. It was therefore suggested that the internationalization of sociology may, for the immediate future, be equivalent or almost equivalent to the Americanization of sociology.

Defending sociologist's right to exist is as old as sociology itself. So it is hardly surprising that it is possible to cite the work of classical figures in its development when rejecting the stringent criticisms of three contemporary British philosophers. Their criticisms are modern variants of the old case against social science. The three philosophers are Peter Winch, A. R. Louch, and Alasdair Maclntyre. Taken together they present three arguments which would, if acceptable, invalidate the basis of sociology. The first contends that sociologists fail to recognize quite how social reality differs from nature. The second, in its extreme form, states that the concept cause is only applicable to the natural world, so that causal accounts of social phenomena are, by definition, the product of conceptual confusion. The third holds that cross-cultural analysis is impossible. The philosopher's most profound mistake is to equate all sociology with accounting for human action qua action, i.e. explaining why actors act as they do. Correspondingly their most serious omission is their failure to consider the meaning of social structure.

The term attitude, both in colloquial as well as in scientific usage, refers to dispositions of men to view things in certain ways and to act accordingly. Attitudes are complexes of ideas and sentiments. Sociologists, one assumes, are never interested in attitudes as a final object of enquiry but always as part of an ultimate aim of studying the structure of social conduct; for them, an enquiry into attitudes must be justified by assumptions that attitudes are predictive of conduct. Sociologists who defend attitude studies must assume that social attitudes are not perfectly malleable or flexible. If attitudes were perfectly malleable then they would simply be governed by structural factors, which would also govern conduct, in any social situation, in that case, the existence of such attitudes could be inferred either from the governing factors, the independent variables, or from the conduct itself; the dependent variable, and this would give them little or no explanatory value. It is, of course, arguable, that even if attitudes were perfectly malleable.

The history of sociology is not or should not be analogous to archaeology. It is or it should be an indispensable element in the present practice of sociology and where it is not, the reason is rarely that it is genuinely superfluous. One peculiar feature of sociology, distinguishing it both from the natural sciences and interestingly from economics, is that it is rarely possible to say of it that theory has genuinely moved on, including what was valid in the past as special cases or partial truths in what is acceptable to the present. This feature is only a weakness so long as it goes unrecognized. Two primitive but prevalent, errors are then possible. Either the sociologist uses the theories of the past unconsciously, thereby accepting current and necessarily distorted, interpretations of their methods, concepts and insights or else he consciously rejects them as in principle defunct which unless he is a genius, leaves him impoverished and ill-equipped. Sociologists today still have much to learn in a substantive way, from the works of their ancestors.

The purpose of this article is to abstract and synthesize sociologist James Baldwin's views and wherever possible to extrapolate their relevance to sociology. He seeks desperately to define his identity as an American Negro writer and spokesman for his people. In order to know who he is, Baldwin must examine his cultural heritage for the past is all that makes the present coherent. And it is advisable to understand the present before looking forward to the future. It is this goal that has both guided and driven Baldwin as a Negro and as an American. Despite his distinct antipathy for sociology, Baldwin's writings are highly relevant to that discipline, perhaps even more than many works by professional sociologists. Though obviously prejudiced on the subject of Negro-white relations, Baldwin's personal experience and literary freedom yield an insight and comprehensiveness that social scientists lack. His definition of the problem and its causes provide a viewpoint that white writers and academics are simply not in a position to contribute. Equally useful is his knowledge of Negro people and their society. Baldwin's combined writings imply a new system for classifying Negro responses to discrimination. They also furnish a fruitful picture of the Negro social structure.

The article focuses on the contribution of sociologists in the study of industrial problems. Sociology is no stranger to the curriculum of the American schools of business and management, a state of affairs which clearly reflects the high standing of sociology in that country. Indeed, the position of sociology in business and management education in the United States now seems to be such that it has passed beyond the point at which separate reference needs to be made to it in the curriculum. At the highest reaches of all, in institutions like the School of Industrial Management of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, sociology may lose its separate identity in the interdisciplinary examination of "executive behavior"; but the relevance of things social and psychological to management processes is taken for granted. The overall picture of management studies in Great Britain gives little satisfaction to the sociologist who believes that his subject has something to offer to anyone preparing for a career in practical affairs.