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Neo-Weberian closure theory developed principally by Parkin appears at first glance to suffer from two opposing weaknesses — that its central concept of exclusion is either too broad or too narrow. This paper demonstrates that these objections are spurious. It then uncovers several real problems which have not yet been examined by the critics of closure theory. These problems have to do with Parkin's conceptions of usurpation, of the withdrawal of services, and of property, as well as with the ambiguity in the politics of Parkin's closure theory. The paper corrects these weaknesses and clarifies this ambiguity and concludes that closure theory so-corrected provides a promising framework for going beyond analyses focused narrowly on one particular means of domination and one particular set of monopolization and exclusion rules to a focus on monopolization and exclusion per se. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents information about the relation between sociologist E. Durkheim's concepts of anomie and egoism. While the obscurity of Durkheim's distinction has frequently been commented upon, it is implicitly assumed to be irrelevant for contemporary theorization in social pathology. Against this view, two theses will be advanced. Firstly, if Durkheim had pursued and attempted to clarify his distinction between the two concepts, he would have been forced to re-examine the presuppositions upon which his sociology had been based. Secondly, despite difficulties in Durkheim's theory in which concepts of anomie and egoism play a crucial part, a distinction between them still has to be drawn which in fact retains some elements of their original meaning. All contemporary studies of anomie have neglected the distinction between anomie and egoism with the result that social conditions, psychological states and processes which are entirely different from one another have been assimilated.