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In this article the author examines the financial report released by the investment firm Goldman Sachs & Co. regarding its first-quarter earnings. He notes that the firm reported a better-than-expected profit amidst recession but offered investors with less information on how the profits have been made. He mentions that the firm excluded its $780 million loss in December 2008 in the report. He discusses the skepticism of investors towards the firm and the risk of potential trading loss at it.

The article discusses whether financier R. Allen Stanford has kept two sets of books at his controversial Stanford International Bank in Antigua. The judge, upon hearing the news about the two sets of bank records, asked representatives for the liquidator, Vantis Business Recovery Services, to come back to court with some evidence to bolster its claim. Investors are worried, in light of the latest disclosure, whether they'll ever get their money back.

The article presents the author's view regarding the return of the $10 billion federal bailout money by the investment firm, Goldman Sachs & Co. It opines that Lloyd Blankfein, chief executive officer of the firm, should offer to return some amount of the $13 billion which the firm got from the U.S. government in the bailout of American International Group Inc. (AIG). It comments that if AIG had filed for bankruptcy, the firm would have incurred a bigger fourth-quarter loss in 2008.

The article informs that the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission has been working with London police to track the British assets of financier R. Allen Stanford. A civil complaint has been filed by the SEC against Stanford, charging him with masterminding an $8 billion fraud at his offshore bank, which specialized in selling high-yielding certificates of deposit. Stanford denieds the civil fraud charges leveled against him by the SEC.

In this article, the author discusses the step taken by U.S. President Barack Obama for turnaround plan of banks in the country. The author says the action of Obama to the bankers was not as tough as it was with General Motors Corp. and Chrysler Corp. The author says that rather than simply urging the bankers to support his Administration's plan for reviving the financial system, Obama should have been far tougher with the chieftains of finance.

The article presents information on the alleged deal between financier R. Allen Stanford with the government of Libyan leader Muammar el-Qaddafi. In November 2009, Stanford may have met with a representative of the Libyan government to discuss Libya's interest in investing into Stanford's offshore bank in Antigua. Soon after the meeting Stanford boasted to a number of his top executives that the Libyans were sinking more than a $100 million into the bank's certificates of deposit.

The article reports that Dick DeGuerin, the celebrated Houston criminal defense lawyer representing alleged fraudster R. Allen Stanford, came out with verbal attacks at the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) on March 26, 2009. The SEC has civilly charged Stanford, the Texas financier with running a massive $8 billion Ponzi scheme. DeGuerin said that this is not a Ponzi scheme. He also said that the SEC is using Stanford as a distraction from its failures in Madoff scandal.

The article reports on the legal case against banker Allen Stanford who was accused of running an $8 billion fraud the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) in the U.S. According to observations, Stanford has snared depositors in his offshore bank, appearances long have been deceiving. Many people said that he has shown a knack for rewriting his past and mastering the illusion of being successful, beginning with his very first business venture.

The article discusses issues concerning R. Allen Stanford, the alleged mastermind of an $8 billion fraud that has captured depositors in his offshore bank. It notes that Stanford has filed for bankruptcy in 1984 just two years before he opened his bank in the Caribbean. Moreover, in 2008, Stanford has been considered as one of the richest men but securities regulators allege that much of his personal fortune may have come from treating the offshore bank that he created like his own personal ATM.

The article reports on the revised time frame set by the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) for their investigation on Stanford Financial Group compact disk fraud in the U.S. The regulators have offered this time frame to rebut the charges given to them by the critics and to show that they are already on trail on their investigation for the business practices of financier R. Allen Stanford and his firm. Stanford has been alleged of operating and releasing fraud certificates of deposit.

The article reports that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has revised time frame for its investigation of alleged certificate of deposit fraud at Stanford Financial Group Inc. This move is intended to rebut charges from critics that it had dropped the case regarding financier R. Allen Stanford. The pace of the investigation can be affected by the agency's ability to prosecute a matter and the jurisdiction in which the alleged offense takes place.

The article reports that the U.S. Supreme Court has been blamed for extending Allen Stanford Financial Group's $8 billion fraud case concerning doubtful certificates of certificates (CDs) exchanged by its's offshore bank. One primary reason of said extension raised by the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) is the 1982 Supreme Court's ruling on the Stanford investigation. John Nester, SEC spokesman explains that after the investigation, SEC files charges against Stanford.

The article reports on the issues surrounding the prolongation of the Supreme Court case of R. Allen Stanford's alleged $8 billion fraud of certificates of deposits (CD) in the U.S. The Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) reasoned that the slow progress on the case is due to a 1982 high court ruling, which differentiates a bank CD from a stock or a bond and not governed by federal securities laws.

The article reports that R. Allen Stanford, the billionaire financier has been charged by the Securities Exchange Commission for running an $8 billion scam in the U.S. As stated, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) served him with a copy of the SEC's civil complaint at a location in Virginia. Thus, the Stanford Internation Bank, which was owned by R. Allen Stanford, is the heart of Stanford's empire and aims to have more than $8 billion in assets.

The article offers information on the reaction of R. Allen Stanford, through a letter regarding the charges filed by the government agencies in the U.S. A letters states that from the moment Stanford went into the offshore banking business, he was on the radar screen of investigators from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). However, the SEC alleges it cannot account for the roughly $8 billion that Stanford International Bank in Antigua has taken in from CD sales.

The article focuses on the pressures being faced by Stanford Financial Group Co. as it feels investigations from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and others. In the beginning of February 2009, the firm controlled by Texas-born billionaire R. Allen Stanford has laid off about two-dozen people at its Houston headquarters. Sources say there's confusion about whether Stanford Financial is honoring early redemptions.

The article reports that billionaire R. Allen Stanford's worst enemies may be some of the former employees who once worked for his $50 billion Stanford Financial Group Inc. One former employee, Lawrence J. De Maria, even went so far as to file a private whistleblower lawsuit alleging a myriad of wrongdoing at Stanford Financial and its Antigua-based bank. Securities regulators have interviewed dozens of former employees to get to the bottom of its banking affiliate in Antigua.

In this article, the author opines that Bank of America Corp. be forced to eliminate the hefty dividend it's still paying to its shareholders before seeking a bailout. He says that if workers across the country are being asked to take unpaid vacations to save their jobs, why shouldn't bank bondholders take some sacrifices to help save these institutions. He points out that the Big Three auto manufacturers were too forced to make concessions before receiving government aid.

The article reports on issues surrounding the Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. It has been contended by the Bank of America that Lehman has wrongfully refused to return the collateral and is violating its agreement as a trading partner. In addition, a hearing in the case has been scheduled for October 6, 2008 in Manhattan, New York. Moreover, similar suits over collateral on derivatives trades have also been filed in the same court by Nomura Global Financial Products and Aeterno Master Fund.

The article examines the business condition of Lehman Brothers Inc. in the U.S. It states that the company is seeking for an acquirer at any price to avoid collapse and may not be able to rely on the federal government for any help. It mentions that Bank of America, Barclays and several private equity firms are interested to buy Lehman. The company's trading partners started to demand cash settlement for trades while other hedge funds and banks are still trading with Lehman.

The article informs that Richard Zinman, one of the U.S. top brokers in terms of customer assets under management and servicing high-networth investors, officially left Citigroup Inc. on May 30, 2008. As reported, Zinman left the company because his clients had lost millions from investing in a series of Citigroup-managed hedge funds. Zinman has now moved to Credit Suisse.

The article focuses on a civil lawsuit filed by the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) against Robert J. Sucarato of New Jersey, accusing him of fraud in raising at least $1.5 million from investors. A state federal judge has frozen all the assets of Sucarato and ordered him not to destroy any documents pending a court hearing on May 8, 2008. The regulators claim that Sucarato distributed false financial statements, misrepresented his background and accomplishments, and concealed large losses from trading commodity futures and options.

The article reports on a lawsuit filed by investor Joseph Umbach at a federal court in Connecticut against Carrington Investment Partners and its manager Bruce Rose which seeks a declaration that the action taken by Carrington and Rose was an illegal or unenforceable ex post facto. Umbach claimed that Carrington has tied up his investments and improperly imposed a redemption freeze. Prior to the suit, it said that Rose had persuaded some of his investors to amend Carrington's partnership agreement to bar any investor redemption for at least a year.

The article reports that negotiations about a takeover of troubled Bear Stearns by JPMorgan Chase continued until March 16, 2008. Executives of both banks wanted a deal locked up before investors could weigh in when Asian stock markets open for business. Bear executives reportedly were likely to file for bankruptcy court protection if a deal could not be reached by then.

The article reports that Bear Stearns hit an 11-year low on March 14, 2008 following the news that JPMorgan Chase and the New York Federal Reserve had stepped in with an emergency cash bailout for the investment firm. The bailout was engineered after days of denials by Bear executives that the firm was facing a liquidity crisis and lacked sufficient funds to continue operating.

The article reports that JPMorgan Chase is paying just $2 a share to take over Bear Stearns, which a little over a year ago was trading for as high as $170 a share. The deal to buy Bear will avert a looming bankruptcy filing by the investment firm and potentially stave off a new crisis in the financial markets. The purchase price is an indication of just how far things have fallen at Bear, which a year ago helped spark the subprime meltdown with the collapse of its two big hedge funds.

The article deals with the investigation being conducted by U.S. securities regulators and federal prosecutors into the collapse of two Bear Stearns (BSC) hedge funds that invested in risky securities backed by subprime mortgage. The Securities & Exchange Commission and the U.S. Attorney's office are looking into an allegation that some Bear Stearns insiders associated with the funds may have been pulling their personal money out of the investment vehicles in spring of 2007 when the market was in turmoil.

The article announces that John Thain was appointed chief executive officer (CEO) at Merrill Lynch.

The article features John Thain, chief executive officer (CEO) of NYSE Euronext (NYX) and a former Goldman executive, as the new CEO of Merrill Lynch. Thain, 52, also spent time on Goldman's mortgage bond desk, experience that should help as he tries to fix Merrill's subprime problems. Having no experience in retail brokerage, he will have to soothe Merrill's in-house brokers.

The article considers the challenges faced by Bear Stearns CEO James E. Cayne. He has come under fire for his distant management style while two Bear hedge funds imploded in the summer of 2007. His biggest challenge may come in December 2007 when the company reports its fourth quarter earnings. The company's main problem may be its so-called Level 3 assets, which includes securities such as mortgage-related debt and assorted corporate loans.

The article focuses on the vulnerability of James E. Cayne, chief executive officer of Bears Stearns, to lose his position after being scrutinized for his distant management style while two Bear hedge funds imploded in the summer of 2007. Analysts predicted that the firm's Level 3 assets, including mortgage-related debt and assorted corporate loans, will become susceptible to subprime exposure.

The article reports on bond insurers' exposure to collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). As CDOs grew into a trillion-dollar business, bond policies became a lucrative source of revenue for companies such as American International Group, MBIA and Ambac Financial Group. ACA Capital claims it has $1 billion in capital it could use for potential payouts if the CDOs it insures go bad. MBIA blamed markdowns on CDOs and similar securities, which forced it to cut the value of policies it wrote on those products.

The article predicts that Citigroup may face an exposure because of financial obligations tied to the commercial paper market which is a critical source for short-term financing. At issue are those collateralized debt obligations (CDO), entities that issue securities often backed by subprime mortgages pooled in tranches and sold to investors based on their risk tolerance. However, the critical issue here is Citigroup's exposure through financing commitments to about a dozen CDO, including three managed by executives of the Bear Stearns hedge funds.

The article explores the possible impact of collateralized debt obligations (CDO), a type of asset-backed security, on bond insurance firms. Bond insurers sell insurance to banks and other major investors for bonds backed by mortgages and the complicated investments that hold CDO. The policies are designed to protect investors in case the securities default. But a flurry of downgrades on mortgage-backed securities and CDO has started to affect insurers' earnings. Anxiety has focused on ACA Capital, a small player with big exposure to CDO.

The article investigates the factors that affected the financial performance of Merrill Lynch in the 2007 subprime market crisis in the U.S. The bank's $7.9 billion third-quarter writedown, the result of a sharp drop in the value of securities backed by risky home loans, is the biggest loss taken by a Wall Street bank during the subprime housing crisis. Merrill took a leadership role in underwriting collateralized debt obligation (CDO) in 2006 and 2007, when subprime mortgage lenders lowered lending standards.

The article reports that the leadership role of Merrill Lynch in underwriting risky collateralized debt obligations (CDO) brought in millions in fees but put it in the subprime bull's-eye. The company's $7.9 billion third-quarter writedown is the most painful hit taken by a Wall Street bank during the subprime housing blowout. Merrill prospered while the revelry lasted, raking in $800 million in CDO underwriting fees since the beginning of 2006.

The article examines the cause of the collapse of two Bear, Stearns & Co. hedge funds in July 2007. Investors lost $1.6 billion all told. Now some are claiming that Bear marketed the funds which bought risky mortgage-backed securities largely with borrowed money as conservative investments. The Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Fund was described as very low volatility, very conservative, and very low risk, according to one investor who asked not to be named.

The article reports that hedge fund firm D.E. Shaw was granted permission to increase its stake in the trading technology outfit Technology Group. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) allowed the company to increase its stake by 15%. Damien Park of Hedge Fund Solutions states that such move offers stakeholders the freedom to increase their ownership of the company. It presents the proposals made by the company in boosting the stock of Technology Group such as a stock buyback program.

The article reports on the plan of private equity firm Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR) to use the credit market woes to make money for investors. It notes that KKR executives are raising at least $1 billion from investors for an existing KKR-managed hedge fund. It mentions KKR Financial Advisors, a credit investment affiliate created by KKR in 2004. KKR claims that its hedge fund, which had posted a 10 percent gain in the six months through the end of June 2007, has a competitive advantage investing in junk bonds and high-yield loans.

The article offers information on the plan of private equity firm Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR) to profit from the credit market crisis. KKR executives are raising at least $1 billion from investors for an existing KKR-managed hedge fund. KKR expects to gain profit from $300 billion in junk bonds and high-yield loans that have promised financing for major LBO deals.

The article focuses on trouble and debts in the U.S. buyout markets. The authors report that the flu in the financial sector has sapped the stock market of more than $200 billion since the start of 2007. The market resumed a downdraft and once again bad news from a financial company triggered the sell-off. Shares of American Home Mortgage Investment decreased by 88% after the lender to homeowners with decent credit histories warned that it is experiencing liquidity issues and may be forced to close.

The article analyzes the impact of the declining U.S. stock market on the subprime loan sector in 2007. According to the authors, a slump in the markets for corporate loans and junk bonds will deepen. They warn that if debt investors remain wary, banks may have no choice but to reprice loans and junk bonds at higher interest rates. In addition, the authors believe that a decrease in the credit markets is likely to continue to the hedge fund sector.

The article reports on the decline of the Dow Jones industrial average on July 24, 2007, after mortgage lender Countrywide Financial Corp. warned of more rough times to come in the housing market. On the next day, banks pulled an offering for $12 billion in loans to fund private equity firm Cerberus Capital Management's buyout of Chrysler Group. This is just one of the signs of trouble in the credit market. Several other loans to finance buyouts have also been delayed or renegotiated.

The article reports on the role of the due diligence done by Thomas H. Lee Partners in the bankruptcy of the public brokerage firm Refco. Refco's stock crashed, filed for bankruptcy, and CEO Phillip Bennett was charged with multiple counts of securities fraud. Bennett was being charged by federal prosecutors with orchestrating a multi-year scheme to use a series of circular loans to hide millions in noncollectible customer-trading losses.

The article focuses on the warning of credit-rating agencies Moody's Investors Service and Standard & Poor's (S&P) on July 10, 2007, of greater-than-expected losses for bonds backed by subprime loans. S&P has placed just 2.1% of the total issued from late 2005 to late 2006, on watch for downgrades, while Moody's cut its ratings on just $5.2 billion worth. S&P cites that mortgage fraud is a bigger problem than it had foreseen and that it is tightening its rating practices.

The article discusses the troubles facing money manager Jeffrey Epstein, BNP Paribas and others who invested in Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage fund, a hedge fund of Bear Stearns with big stakes in subprime mortgages. An overview of the allegations against Epstein is presented. The fund that Epstein and BNP invested in has used billions in borrowed money to buy bonds backed by subprime mortgages. The fund was down 23% at the end of April 2007.

The article focuses on greater-than-expected losses for bonds in the U.S. backed by subprime loans, according to credit rating agencies Moody's Investors Service and Standard & Poor's. In 2006 about 12% of subprime borrowers grappling with interest rate hikes went delinquent or lost their homes. It describes the reaction of investors to the outlook of Moody's and Standard & Poor's.

This article deals with the impending collapse of a Bear Stearns hedge fund which invested on risky bonds backed by subprime mortgages. One of the bigger investors in the troubled Bear Stearns fund is Jeffrey Epstein, a former Bear Stearns trader turned money manager for the super-rich, according to regulatory filings. Another beneficial owner of the troubled hedge fund is a so-called hedge fund-of-funds managed by BNP Paribas. The fund was down 23% for the year as of the end of April 2007.

The article focuses on the issues surrounding the near-collapse of investment firm Bear Stearns' High-Grade Structure Credit Strategies Enhanced Leveraged Fund. On May 15, 2007, Bear Stearns reported that Enhanced Leveraged fund posted a 6.5 percent loss in April. However, the investment firm restated its earnings on June 7 and revealed that the actual loss was 18.97 percent. The U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission launched a preliminary inquiry into fund's near-collapse.

The article reports on the decision of Bear Stearns to introduce additional investments to its High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Fund, a four-year-old fund that raised $916 million from investors, than to help its two hedge funds facing financial problems. It was the big declines at the enhanced leverage fund that prompted Bear Stearns to suspend investor redemptions, forced it to sell off $4 billion in high-quality mortgage-backed bonds, and caused a crisis of confidence on Wall Street.