Search

To purchase or authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-7976.2008.00124.x Byline: Matthew C. Rousu (1), Robert H. Beach (2), Jay R. Corrigan (3) Abstract: Basic economic theory predicts that a consumer's willingness to pay for a good is affected by the availability of complements and substitutes. In an auction setting, this theory implies that the presence of complements would increase bid prices for a good, while the presence of substitutes would decrease bid prices for a good. We designed an experiment that allows the calculation of inverse elasticities, the inverse-demand equivalent of conventional price elasticities. Our results show that the availability of complements and substitutes affects bids in the expected directions. This finding has important implications for researchers who design experimental auctions. Selon la theorie economique de base, la volonte de payer d'un consommateur pour obtenir un bien est influencee par la disponibilite de complements et de substituts. Dans un scenario de vente aux encheres, cette theorie implique que la presence de complements ferait augmenter le prix offert pour un bien, tandis que la presence de substituts ferait diminuer le prix offert. Nous avons concu une experience qui a permis de calculer les elasticites inverses, l'equivalent de la demande inverse des elasticites-prix classiques. Nos resultats ont montre que la disponibilite de complements et de substituts influence les offres d'achat dans les directions prevues. Cette observation a d'importantes repercussions pour les chercheurs qui concoivent des ventes aux encheres experimentales. Author Affiliation: (1)Assistant Professor, Susquehanna University, 314 Steele Hall, Selinsgrove, PA 17870 (corresponding author: phone: 570-372-4186; fax: 570-372-2870; e-mail:rousu@susqu.edu). (2)Research Economist, RTI International, Research Triangle Park, NC 27709 (phone: 919-485-5579; fax: 919-541-6683; e-mail:rbeach@rti.org). (3)Assistant Professor, Kenyon College, Gambier, OH 43022 (phone: 740-427-5281; fax: 740-427-5276; e-mail:Corrigan@kenyon.edu).

To purchase or authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-7976.2007.00103.x Byline: Robert H. Beach (1), Christine Poulos (2), Subhrendu K. Pattanayak (3) Abstract: Outbreaks of infectious animal diseases represent a major threat to agriculture and can impose significant social and economic costs. The potential for devastating epidemics, such as the recent outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in Asia, Europe, and Africa, has prompted major global investments in animal disease prevention and control, both public and private. However, there has been little research into the effects of alternative public policies on farm-level actions to prevent and control HPAI and the implications for disease impacts. Animal disease management involves both ex ante investments to reduce the probability of infection and ex post actions to contain the spread of disease once introduced. The public sector can play an important part in disease mitigation through provision of public disease prevention and control. Another vital role for government in mitigating the potential impacts of HPAI is in the development of well-designed policies to induce socially optimal ex ante private investment while providing incentives for truthful disclosure of disease status. This study employs an economic epidemiology framework to examine the effects of farmer behavior on disease introduction and transmission and to analyze the effects of public policy decisions under alternative scenarios. Les eclosions de maladies animales infectieuses representent une menace importante pour l'agriculture et peuvent entrainer des couts socio-economiques considerables. L'eventualite d'epidemies devastatrices, telles que les recentes flambees d'influenza aviaire hautement pathogene (IAHP) en Asie, en Europe et en Afrique, a suscite d'importants investissements publics et prives a l'echelle mondiale pour prevenir et lutter contre ces maladies. Cependant, peu de recherches se sont penchees sur les effets des politiques publiques de rechange sur les mesures prises a la ferme pour prevenir et lutter contre l'IAHP et les repercussions des maladies. La gestion des maladies animales necessite des investissements ex ante pour diminuer la probabilite d'infection et des mesures ex poste pour contenir la propagation d'une maladie une fois introduite. Le secteur public peut jouer un role important dans l'attenuation d'une maladie en instaurant des programmes publics de prevention et de lutte. Pour attenuer les consequences potentielles de l'IAHP, le gouvernement peut elaborer des politiques efficaces pour inciter des investissements prives ex ante socialement optimaux tout en offrant des stimulants pour encourager la divulgation veridique de la situation zoosanitaire. Dans la presente etude, nous avons utilise un cadre epidemiologique et economique pour examiner les consequences du comportement de l'exploitant agricole sur l'introduction et la transmission des maladies et pour analyser les consequences des decisions de politique publique selon divers scenarios. Author Affiliation: (1)Senior Economist, Food and Agricultural Policy Research Program, RTI International, 3040 Cornwallis Road, Research Triangle Park, NC 27709-2194 (phone: +1-919-485-5579; fax: +1-919-541-6683; e-mail:rbeach@rti.org). (2)Senior Economist, Environmental and Natural Resource Economics Program, RTI International, Research Triangle Park, NC 27709-2194. (3)Fellow and Senior Economist, Public Health and Environment Division, RTI International, Research Triangle Park, NC 27709-2194.