Search

In Canada, it is estimated that only about 5 percent of sexual assaults are reported to police and fewer than 1 percent of assaults result in convictions. The reasons for this are discussed in this commentary using results from a formal model in economic theory. In the model, if police overestimate the probability that women's reports of assault are false, as the evidence clearly documents, they under-investigate. This in turn reduces the reporting of actual assaults and reduces the conviction rate. The attrition rate of active files (as women drop out as a result of the challenges within and outside the system) may further reinforce the incentive effects of police disbelief. These effects are compounded by the fact that, in common law, the Crown prosecutor represents not the victim but rather the society at large. Policy recommendations that stem from the model include an emphasis on victim advocates, who can increase police belief and hence spur police efforts and reduce attrition rates, leading to more reports and convictions and fewer assaults. In considering punishments for false reports, it is argued that due consideration must also be given to the effect such a punishment may have in reducing truthful reports and hence in increasing the number of assaults. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]