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Most literature on ideology in the late Soviet period notes the progressive de-ideologization of Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) politics under Mikhail Gorbachev. Looking specifically at the legitimating functions of ideology, the article contests this generalization. In doing so, it proposes the concept of ideological interpellation to clarify the relationship between doctrine and regime legitimation. The author argues that interpellation – the construction of the ideal Soviet subject, in a way that sustained therelations of domination and production– was a consistent goal throughout the last decade of communist rule. However, while the party approached interpellation in different ways, it was unable to resolve official ideology’s rigidity and narrowness of appeal. These conclusions are supported by a discourse analysis of the 26th, 27th, and 28th CPSU congress proceedings. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article seeks to provide a nuanced understanding of why some Russian citizens look upon Josef Stalin respectfully today. Based upon the results of an original nationwide survey conducted by the Levada Analytical Center and supplemented by seventy field interviews, this article posits that a considerable number of Russians view Stalin respectfully on account of three factors. First, Stalin remains a somewhat revered historical figure in part because most Russians harbour no feelings of shame about the Soviet past. Additionally, the tendency of some to rationalize Stalin's main policies of the 1930s, by claiming that there was no other way for the USSR to industrialize than according to the course adhered to by Stalin, helps to safeguard the former General Secretary's reputation. That said, the primary reason why some Russians view Stalin respectfully is due to the pervasiveness of nostalgia for the Soviet period, a widespread phenomenon which serves to bolster Stalin's image as a leader whose contributions led to the realization of great achievements. This article contends that feelings of respect for Stalin are mainly grounded in how Russians evaluate the present ordering of society in comparison to the Soviet past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Factors that have made it difficult for post-communist East European societies to integrate the Holocaust into their historical cultures include the communist heritage, which downplayed the specifically Jewish Holocaust; sensitivity to charges that a nation was complicit in the murder of the Jews; the framing of East European histories as national narratives into which it is difficult to incorporate the experience of other nations; the feeling that Jewish suffering is recognized, while that of other East Europeans is not; the positive re-evaluation of the interwar and wartime politics and culture after the collapse of communism; the survival and revival of anti-Semitism, with new inputs from the Middle East and from Western Holocaust deniers; the construction in the West of the Holocaust as a centrepiece of twentieth-century history; the influence of East European diasporas; the embedment of the discourse on the Holocaust in the political divide between nativists and Westernizers; the deployment of accusations of Holocaust collaboration as an instrument of foreign policy; and debate over the restitution of confiscated Jewish property. Often these factors come together into a reinforcing discursive structure. The essay's conclusion suggests how to overcome these obstacles to the integration of the Holocaust into East European histories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]