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The so-called Bulldozer, Rose, Orange, and Tulip Revolutions have reminded us that as repressive as a regime may be, the real power ultimately belongs to the masses, especially when its forces are supported and channelled into non-violent action in pursuit of clear and concrete objectives. This article shows how the first of these events, the "Bulldozer Revolution," unfolded in Serbia resulting in the ouster of the dictator Milošević. The lessons were then absorbed by Georgian activists who were similarly successful in replacing Shevardnadze with Saakashvili. In Ukraine, the election of Kuchma's protégé, Yanukovych, was foiled when the "Orange Revolution" installed Yushchenko instead. The author also chronicles the "Tulip Revolution" of Kyrgyzstan. A notable feature of this paper is that, in addition to analyzing these "successful" revolutions, it also looks at some clearly unsuccessful ones, namely those attempted in Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Belarus. But the current global economic crisis could lead to more political changes in the former Soviet Union, whether in Belarus, the Caucasus, Central Asia, or even Russia itself. The article argues that the "colour revolutions" of 2000-2005 present a real danger to the authoritarian regime of Medvedev-Putin in Russia, and that their fear of them is hence thoroughly justified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the Russian Federation's foreign policy vis-à-vis Belarus and Ukraine during the presidencies of Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. It addresses the question: Which specific factors influenced Russian foreign policy towards the aforementioned European states? The goals of the study are to illuminate these factors and to compare Russian foreign policy at the time of Yeltsin's administration with that during Putin's presidency. Russo-Ukrainian and Russo-Belarusian relations are analyzed using the method of structured focused comparison. The research examines presidential speeches, decision-makers' memoirs, decisions or the absence thereof, and official declarations of the Russian government towards Ukraine and Belarus, as well as official agreements and empirical reality that exemplify the implementation of Russia's foreign policy. The empirical analysis reveals that geopolitical considerations, threat perception, interest groups, and decision-makers' perception of the past influenced the formation of Russia's foreign policy. Perception of the past, however, is fundamental to the understanding of this process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]