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Examines the relationship between militarization and politicalization in Afghanistan by comparing the social and political presuppositions of traditional and tribal forms of warfare, particularly the Islamic jihad, with those of the modern total war. A brief study of the Massoud front from 1979 to 1985 illustrates how traditional concepts and tactics have been adapted for modern war.

The modern Islamist movement entered Afghanistan through individuals who had been educated at the University of Al-Azhar in Cairo and who taught at the Kabul Faculty of Theology. Divergences between these Muslims and General Mohammad Daud, in 1958 led to the movement becoming clandestine and forming itself into the 'Jamiat-e Islami' or Islamic Society. The movement functioned within two circles, that of the Muslim Youth which acted in the open and the more secret group that surrounded the "professors" led by the intellectual Gholam Mohammad Niazi. Mohammad Daud's coup d'etat in 1973 resulted in the armed suppression of the Muslims and the exile of Islamic leaders to Pakistan in the late 1970's.

At the time of the Communist takeover of Afghanistan in 1978 Sufism was well established, principally in the Naqshbandiya, Qadiriya, and Cheshtiya orders. The Soviets had learned from their experience in the USSR that clandestine Sufi brotherhoods were far more threatening than the relatively cooperative official clergy. After the takeover Sufi brotherhoods were subjected to violent and widespread repression. However, such measures have only stiffened resistance. Brotherhoods of the "spiritualist" type are deeply involved in the Afghan resistance, providing fighting cadres that are both militarily efficient and almost impossible to penetrate.