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Recent scholarly work on sustainability transitions has highlighted the importance of the development of norms against fossil fuels, or Anti-Fossil Fuel Norms (AFFNs), for climate mitigation. However, further research is needed to understand the mechanisms and conditions by which such norms are developed and secured for successful sustainability transitions. This paper contributes to addressing this, through analysing the case of the Republic of Ireland, probing the emergence of norms against fossil fuels and notably against natural gas (also referred to here as 'fossil gas'). Whilst Ireland is considered an overall laggard on climate action, in recent years the country has witnessed several ground-breaking supply-side moves against fossil fuels. Drawing on in-depth original research interviews and analysis of key political sources, including parliamentary debates and policy documents, the paper finds evidence of norms against fossil gas emerging in the Irish case. The analysis contributes insights into the iterative development of AFFNs at the domestic level, the role of environmental movements, and broader lessons for the development of a just transition away from fossil gas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Paris Agreement's nationally driven structure puts the spotlight on financing strategies at the national level. The role of national funding vehicles in mobilizing climate finance, however, has not received extensive attention. This paper remedies this gap by introducing a novel dataset of national climate funds established in developing countries. The database creates an inventory of national financing vehicles and tracks their major attributes, including scope, legal form, and the host, among others. We show that 39 countries have established national climate funds. These funds seek to access and mobilize finance from various sources, domestic and international. Most of these funds have broad mandates to tackle climate change, while a smaller share has a more targeted, sectoral focus. Funding sources vary from taxes to international aid. The funds offer a limited range of financial instruments, primarily awarding grants. The funds also differ in how integrated they are with overarching climate plans and strategies. We also find that most developing countries use existing budget lines to target finance towards climate change objectives. Only five countries track public expenditure on the basis of dedicated budget codes. This paper contributes to the literature by providing an empirical basis to pursue questions regarding the role and effectiveness of national climate funds. For policymakers, the limited range of instruments at the disposal of many of these national climate funds also suggests a need to ensure that the national climate funds have the design features they need to support the implementation of national policy goals. Key policy insights Systematic data on public climate finance are scarce. Most governments do not use climate change codes to track their expenditures related to climate change. Policymakers should adopt practices that will help instil transparency in public expenditure on climate change. Policymakers have to revisit the design features of national climate funds such as legal form and areas of operation as the wider operating context changes. Funds accredited with multilateral climate funds are underutilized by fund contributors. The Green Climate Fund's direct access modality offers one major avenue to foster synergies between national climate funds and multilateral climate funds. Policymakers have the opportunity to harvest lessons from existing funds and calibrate climate policies accordingly, especially as countries contemplate setting revenue-generating carbon prices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The German Federal Climate Change Act includes binding annual greenhouse gas (GHG) emission targets for the economic sectors energy, industry, buildings, transport, agriculture and waste. For sectors that fail to meet their targets, climate policy measures have to be implemented immediately. However, some sectors may only have achieved their targets thanks to the COVID-19 pandemic, while others may have missed their targets because of COVID-19. For policy making, it is therefore important to disentangle the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic from the effects of policy and other drivers on emissions. In this paper, the effects of the pandemic on GHG emissions in Germany in 2020 are estimated at the national level and at the levels of the economic sectors. Counterfactual emissions are estimated here based on autoregressive econometric models, thereby distinguishing between different factors of emissions based on decomposition analysis. The findings at the national level suggest that the COVID-19 pandemic lowered GHG emissions in 2020 in Germany by about 41 Mt CO2-eq (5.15%) compared to counterfactual emissions. Accordingly, about 58% of the reduction in emissions between 2019 and 2020 in Germany may be attributed to the pandemic. The findings at the sectoral level imply that without the COVID-19 pandemic, all sectors with the exception of the transport sector, would have met their emissions target in 2020 as set in the Federal Climate Change Act. The transport sector would have missed its emission target in 2020 without COVID-19, suggesting that existing policies were not strong enough to bend the curve of emissions trends sufficiently down. In contrast, the buildings sector failed to meet its target in 2020 because of COVID-19, prompting immediate climate policy measures in this sector. The COVID-19 pandemic lowered greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in Germany in 2020 by 5.5% compared to counterfactual emissions and accounted for about 58% of total estimated reductions between 2019 and 2020. Without COVID-19, all sectors but the transport sector would have met their emissions targets. Climate policy response should take into account the effects of extraordinary events like COVID-19 suppressing GHG emissions based on counterfactual emissions because failure to implement measures early on may turn out to be costly in the medium term once the transitory emissions reductions no longer occur. Counterfactual emissions should be considered prior to crediting emissions surplus or deficit to subsequent years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate politics and governance across the globe involve an increasing number of interest groups such as from business and civil society. Against this backdrop, it matters a great deal whether interest group mobilization is able to influence climate policy-making. First, there is an increasing number of climate policy supporters like nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and green businesses lobbying in favour of additional climate policies. Second, there is also strong mobilization of groups from energy-intensive and fossil fuel industries lobbying against potentially costly climate policies. In this paper, we investigate the potential effects of these mobilization patterns. More precisely, we ask whether there is any systematic effect of competing interest group mobilization on national climate policy production. To this end, we harness arguments from literatures on interest group mobilization and climate policy-making. Empirically, we exploit a comprehensive global dataset on the adoption of national climate laws and interest group mobilization (over 4,000 organizations) between 1997 and 2016. The results show that the increasing mobilization of climate policy supporters is positively related to national climate policy production. Climate policy opponents are able to weaken this effect, but are hardly able to block new climate laws. The results add to our understanding of climate politics focusing on the role of business organizations and NGOs. This is highly policy relevant for both analysts and practitioners given that the Paris Agreement relies heavily on national policy efforts. The growing mobilization of climate policy supporters is positively related to the adoption of additional climate laws. The positive effect of climate policy supporters is weakened but rarely blocked by climate policy opponents, such as those from the fossil fuel industry. The effect of lobbying over climate policy needs to be assessed in its competitive context, that is by considering how political support and opposition on climate policy interact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Enhancing the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) is an important exercise to achieve the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. The Paris Agreement also recognizes that support to developing countries in this regard will help them to aim for higher climate ambition. The role of international support programmes in the NDC enhancement process is crucial but is not often covered in scientific research. Consequently, the factors driving a country's decision to apply for NDC-related assistance have also not yet been fully explored. Acknowledging the research gap, this paper framed and tested multiple hypotheses to evaluate the impact of potential factors on the likelihood of a country applying for assistance to enhance its NDCs. For this, a logistic regression method was employed. Data from the two initiatives coordinating the technical and financial assistance worldwide, namely the Climate Action Enhancement Package (CAEP) and Climate Promise, were reviewed for this purpose. The CAEP program is financially supported by Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK. This study identifies the level of socio-economic development and the population's exposure to air pollution as key factors which influence the likelihood of applying for assistance under CAEP and Climate Promise in developing countries. Further, the presence of democratic aspects in the form of governance may also influence this choice. Finally, this study discusses the results and associated policy implications for countries receiving assistance to enhance their NDCs. Developing countries with relatively low socio-economic development are more likely to apply for assistance to enhance their NDCs. The assistance is designed to help them to build capacities to develop and implement future climate policies. Air pollution and climate change issues are interconnected. Exposure to air pollution is a potential indicator that can influence the NDC enhancement process in developing countries. The assistance for enhancing NDCs will lead to NDC targets that are well-informed and are aligned with national and sub-national development priorities with realistic prospects of implementation. Climate vulnerability and net trade do not influence the decision-making process to apply for NDC enhancement assistance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political traction for nature-based solutions is rapidly growing as governments recognize their role in addressing the simultaneous climate and biodiversity crises. While there has been recognition of the role of Indigenous Peoples in nature-based solutions, there has also been limited academic review on their relationship. This paper explores how the Government of Canada's conceptualization of nature-based solutions either support or prevent Indigenous sustainable self-determination. Drawing on past policy frameworks, we construct a novel four-dimensional sustainable self-determination policy lens focused on: Indigenous knowledge systems; Indigenous jurisdiction over land; the full and effective participation of Indigenous Peoples; and Indigenous Peoples as rights-holders to review a total of nine federal climate policy, planning, and science documents. Our analysis shows that while there is growing recognition of Indigenous rights, inclusion of Indigenous knowledge, and commitments to include the participation of Indigenous Peoples in the implementation of certain climate activities, there is a clear unwillingness to recognize Indigenous jurisdiction and Indigenous understandings of land as systems of reciprocal relations. Reframing nature-based solutions in the context of Canadian and international climate policy is essential not only to advance the self-determination of Indigenous Peoples, but also to create the ceremonial ground for Indigenous visions of nature-based solutions in order to address these joint crises. Key policy insights Despite a growing recognition of the role of nature-based solutions in climate policy, there is limited discussion of how current framings support or prevent Indigenous self-determination. Without such consideration, and the appropriate protection and recognition of Indigenous rights and jurisdiction, nature-based solutions risk perpetuating a form of climate colonialism that facilitates further violence and land dispossession against Indigenous Peoples. Framings of nature-based solutions could benefit from Indigenous ontologies to reframe discussions on the reciprocal connection between humans and nature, advancing a relational framework of nature-based solutions. A novel sustainable self-determination policy lens may assist Parties consider how, and in what capacity, they are considering the rights of Indigenous Peoples, as required by the Paris Agreement and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Populism and its rhetoric are on the rise. Political actors across different ideological camps and parties are employing dispositional blame attribution, emphasizing the non-responsiveness of 'corrupt elites' to the needs of 'good and honest' people. In this paper, we focus on one specific and common area of blame attribution; climate change. In particular, in the United States, a central player in global climate governance, climate change is a very contested issue. The successes of populist candidates in both major US parties suggest that populism could affect citizen support for climate mitigation policies. The often abstract, elite-driven, and technical nature of climate change makes this issue an ideal target for populist critique. Our paper offers an empirical assessment of this claim. First, we test whether populism truly has an independent effect on people's climate attitudes. Second, we assess to what extent frames about elite responsiveness are important heuristics for individuals in their formation of preferences concerning climate policies. To accomplish this goal, we fielded representative US surveys (N = 3000) and collected both observational and experimental data. Results suggest that populist attitudes enhance the effects of partisanship, rather than creating an independent, orthogonal dimension. Populist Democrats support climate policies more than non-populist Democrats do, whereas populist Republicans oppose such policies more than non-populist Republicans do. Additionally, while our experimental results indicate that populist treatments blaming elites for being non-responsive to citizens' preferences do not affect policy support, we also find that reassuring individuals that political elites care about citizens' needs and preferences in relation to climate policy increases support for the latter. Key policy insights Citizens' support is central for implementing ambitious climate policies. Populist attitudes amplify partisanship effects on public opinion about climate policy. Populist discourse per se is not an obstacle to adopting ambitious climate policy in the US. Political entrepreneurs can foster support for climate policies by emphasizing elite responsiveness to citizens' needs and preferences. Populist attacks on established elites are unlikely to derail support for climate policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper employs a computable general equilibrium model (CGE) to analyse how a carbon tax and/or a national Emissions Trading System (ETS) would affect macroeconomic parameters in Turkey. The modelling work is based on three main policy options for the government by 2030, in the context of Turkey's mitigation target under its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC), that is, reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by up to 21% from its Business as Usual (BAU) scenario in 2030: (i) improving the productivity of renewable energy by 1% per annum, a target already included in the INDC, (ii) introducing a new flat rate tax of 15% per ton of CO2 (of a reference carbon price in world markets) imposed on emissions originating from carbon-intensive sectors, and (iii) introducing a new ETS with caps on emission permits. Our base path scenario projects that GHG emissions in 2030 will be much lower than Turkey's BAU trajectory of growth from 430 Mt CO2-eq in 2013 to 1.175 Mt CO2-eq by 2030, implying that the government's commitment is largely redundant. On the other hand, if the official target is assumed to be only a simple reduction percentage in 2030 (by 21%), but based on our more realistic base path, the government's current renewable energy plans will not be sufficient to reach it. Turkey's official INDC is based on over-optimistic assumptions of GDP growth and a highly carbon-intensive development pathway; A carbon tax and/or an ETS would be required to reach the 21% reduction target over a realistic base path scenario for 2030; The policy options considered in this paper have some effects on major sectors' shares in total value-added. Yet the reduction in the shares of agriculture, industry, and transportation does not go beyond 1%, while the service sector seems to benefit from most of the policy options; Overall employment would be affected positively by the renewable energy target, carbon tax, and ETS through the creation of new jobs; Unemployment rates are lower, economic growth is stronger, and households become better off to a larger extent under an ETS than carbon taxation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Energy and climate policies may have significant economy-wide impacts, which are regularly assessed based on quantitative energy-environment-economy models. These tend to vary in their conclusions on the scale and direction of the likely macroeconomic impacts of a low-carbon transition. This paper traces the characteristic discrepancies in models' outcomes to their origins in different macro-economic theories, most importantly their treatment of technological innovation and finance. We comprehensively analyse the relevant branches of macro-innovation theory and group them into two classes: 'Equilibrium' and 'Non-equilibrium'. While both approaches are rigorous and self-consistent, they frequently yield opposite conclusions for the economic impacts of low-carbon policies. We show that model outcomes are mainly determined by their representations of monetary and finance dimensions, and their interactions with investment, innovation and technological change. Improving these in all modelling approaches is crucial for strengthening the evidence base for policy making and gaining a more consistent picture of the macroeconomic impacts of achieving emissions reductions objectives. The paper contributes towards the ongoing effort of enhancing the transparency and understanding of sophisticated model mechanisms applied to energy and climate policy analysis. It helps tackle the overall 'black box' critique, much-cited in policy circles and elsewhere. Key policy insights Quantitative models commissioned by policy-makers to assess the macroeconomic impacts of climate policy generate contradictory outcomes and interpretations. The source of the differences in model outcomes originates primarily from assumptions on the workings of the financial sector and the nature of money, and of how these interact with processes of low-carbon energy innovation and technological change. Representations of innovation and technological change are incomplete in energy-economy-environment models, leading to limitations in the assessment of the impacts of climate-related policies. All modelling studies should state clearly their underpinning theoretical school and their treatment of finance and innovation. A strong recommendation is given for modellers of energy-economy systems to improve their representations of money and finance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global climate change governance has changed substantially in the last decade, with a shift in focus from negotiating globally agreed greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction targets to nationally determined contributions, as enshrined in the 2015 Paris Agreement. This paper analyses trends in adoption of national climate legislation and strategies, GHG targets, and renewable and energy efficiency targets in almost all UNFCCC Parties, focusing on the period from 2007 to 2017. The uniqueness and added value of this paper reside in its broad sweep of countries, the more than decade-long coverage and the use of objective metrics rather than normative judgements. Key results show that national climate legislation and strategies witnessed a strong increase in the first half of the assessed decade, likely due to the political lead up to the Copenhagen Climate Conference in 2009, but have somewhat stagnated in recent years, currently covering 70% of global GHG emissions (almost 50% of countries). In comparison, the coverage of GHG targets increased considerably in the run up to adoption of the Paris Agreement and 89% of global GHG emissions are currently covered by such targets. Renewable energy targets saw a steady spread, with 79% of the global GHG emissions covered in 2017 compared to 45% in 2007, with a steep increase in developing countries. Key policy insights The number of countries that have national legislation and strategies in place increased strongly up to 2012, but the increase has levelled off in recent years, now covering 70% of global emissions by 2017 (48% of countries and 76% of global population). Economy-wide GHG reduction targets witnessed a strong increase in the build up to 2015 and are adopted by countries covering 89% of global GHG emissions (76% not counting USA) and 90% of global population (86% not counting USA) in 2017. Renewable energy targets saw a steady increase throughout the last decade with coverage of countries in 2017 comparable to that of GHG targets. Key shifts in national measures coincide with landmark international events - an increase in legislation and strategy in the build-up to the Copenhagen Climate Conference and an increase in targets around the Paris Agreement - emphasizing the importance of the international process to maintaining national momentum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emissions trading is a cost-effective climate policy for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. It could also be useful for addressing road transport emissions, especially given that this sector is the largest CO2 emitter in the transportation sector and its emissions continue to increase. However, emissions trading for road transport (ETS-RT) has rarely been implemented due to its complexity. This paper designs a novel and practical policy framework for an ETS-RT based on advanced blockchain technology, including all related entities upstream, midstream and downstream of the road transport sector. First, the government determines the cap and allocates the initial permits. Then, fuel producers, vehicle manufacturers, and vehicle users are involved as regulated entities with tradable emission permits. They are responsible for the three determinants of CO2 emissions in the road transport sector: fuel emission factors, vehicle fuel economy, and vehicle miles travelled, respectively. With all the regulated entities collaborating on compliance, the three determinants can be synergistically optimized so that the efficiency of the emissions abatement can be maximized. In addition, all trading, monitoring, reporting, and verification of the emission permits are automatically executed and recorded via a smart contract deployed on a decentralized blockchain. This approach can dramatically reduce administrative costs, improve transparency and traceability, and eliminate double counting and fraud. Finally, the proposed policy was evaluated using a multicriteria analysis method compared with other possible ETS-RT approaches. Key policy insights Fuel producers, vehicle manufacturers, and vehicle users – who are respectively responsible for fuel emission factors, vehicle fuel economy and vehicle miles travelled – should be synergistically regulated in an ETS-RT to maximize the efficiency of emissions abatement. This can be enabled by advanced blockchain technology, which can eliminate the need for a central authority, while enhancing transparency, traceability and cost-effectiveness. Blockchain technology could also be useful for monitoring, reporting and verification under the Paris Agreement. A blockchain-based ETS-RT is found to outperform other forms of ETS on criteria of acceptability, feasibility and environmental performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Swiss climate policy consists of three regulatory instruments for greenhouse gas emissions reduction: A CO 2 levy, the Swiss Emissions Trading System (CH EHS) and an additional program for medium-sized plants that is labeled 'nonEHS' and consists of command-and-control elements plus a sizeable abatement subsidy. Our paper informs about this tripartite climate policy, which is unique in the international context. Second, we estimate the differential impact of the CH EHS and the nonEHS program on plants' emissions. Our empirical strategy exploits a policy change in 2013 that instituted a mandatory emissions trading system for a subset of previously regulated plants. We find that the nonEHS outperforms the CH EHS for a minority of plants, but that on average, the two programs result in similar abatement efforts despite very different financial incentives. Plants that previously engaged in abatement efforts continue to do so even after the financial incentives were reduced by an order of magnitude. Key policy insights We find similar pollution abatement for plants regulated by an emissions trading system relative to plants receiving an abatement subsidy in Switzerland This is surprising given that the allowance price in the CH EHS is an order of magnitude lower than the abatement subsidy Emissions reductions in the ETS are especially pronounced for large plants, and for plants that had engaged in significant abatement in the past [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ocean acidification is most frequently framed by the scientific community as a concurrent threat to climate change, rather than an effect of it. This separation of the two phenomena has long been deemed as a way of garnering heightened policy attention for ocean acidification rather than having it bound up in the often contested politics of climate change. This effort, however, appears to have resulted in the inadvertent placing of ocean acidification outside of the mandate of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This has created a significant gap in the global governance of this issue with no multilateral agreement understood as having jurisdiction over the mitigation of rising ocean acidity. For these reasons this paper argues that an alternative framing of ocean acidification as an effect of climate change is warranted. This would include ocean acidification in the core obligations of the Convention, thereby filling the mitigation governance gap and avoiding perverse implementation outcomes. It is contended that interpreting the UNFCCC in this way is more consistent with its objective and purpose than the existing interpretations that place ocean acidification beyond the remit of the Convention. Key policy insights Ocean acidification is best understood as an effect of climate change in the context of the UNFCCC, and therefore is included in its obligations to combat climate change and its adverse effects. An obligation to address ocean acidification has implications for the way that the provisions of the Convention, particularly on mitigation, are implemented. Mitigation activities that exacerbate ocean acidification or lead to emission reduction pathways that do not prevent dangerous acidification should be deemed inconsistent with the Convention. Protection, conservation and restoration of coastal and marine ecosystems should become a priority area for action within the UNFCCC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate policy across the world is proceeding at a highly variable pace, with some places very committed to decarbonizing their economies and others just beginning. Emerging nations are generally just starting along this journey. However, among the few nation states that have pledged to achieve carbon neutrality, is Bhutan, a least developed country. Carbon neutrality is an ambitious climate policy that is increasingly being recognized as necessary in order to stabilize global temperature rise at 1.5°C. However, Bhutan is likely to face significant challenges in maintaining this status as the country balances its desire to grow in economic opportunities (GDP) and in human happiness (GNH). Little research has been conducted inside the policy processes to better understand how Bhutan will maintain carbon neutrality. Through open-ended, semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders, this study provides an inside view on the current situation and future challenges that Bhutan may face, along with the complexities associated with implementing and maintaining an ambitious carbon neutral policy. The paper highlights Bhutan's story and how it could be useful for policy learning and knowledge sharing, especially in the context of emerging nations' climate governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) submitted under the Paris Agreement propose a country's contribution to global mitigation efforts and domestic adaptation initiatives. This paper provides a systematic analysis of NDCs submitted by South Asian nations, in order to assess how far their commitments might deliver meaningful contributions to the global 2°C target and to sustainable broad-based adaptation benefits. Though agriculture-related emissions are prominent in emission profiles of South Asian countries, their emission reduction commitments are less likely to include agriculture, partly because of a concern over food security. We find that income-enhancing mitigation technologies that do not jeopardize food security may significantly augment the region's mitigation potential. In the case of adaptation, analysis shows that the greatest effort will be directed towards protecting the cornerstones of the 'green revolution' for ensuring food security. Development of efficient and climate-resilient agricultural value chains and integrated farming bodies will be important to ensuring adaptation investment. Potentially useful models of landscape level climate resilience actions and ecosystem-based adaptation are also presented, along with estimates of the aggregate costs of agricultural adaptation. Countries in the region propose different mixes of domestic and foreign, and public and private, adaptation finance to meet the substantial gaps. Key policy insights Though substantial potential for mitigation of agricultural emissions exists in South Asia, governments in the region do not commit to agricultural emissions reductions in their NDCs. Large-scale adoption of income-enhancing technologies is the key to realizing agricultural mitigation potential in South Asia, whilst maintaining food security. Increasing resilience and profitability through structural changes, value chain interventions, and landscape-level actions may provide strong options to build adaptive capacity and enhance food security. Both private finance (autonomous adaptation) and international financial transfers will be required to close the substantial adaptation finance gap [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article gives a detailed account of part of the modelling that was carried out for the assessment of the EU's proposed energy and climate targets for 2030. Using the macro-econometric simulation model, E3ME, and drawing on results from the PRIMES energy systems model, it shows that a 40% reduction in GHG emissions (compared to 1990 levels) could lead to an increase in employment of up to 0.7 million jobs in Europe. Furthermore, if the same GHG reduction target was combined with targets for renewables and energy efficiency, the net increase in jobs could be as high as 1.2 million. Both results are in contrast to the standard findings from computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, reflecting the different underlying assumptions (e.g. labour supply) to the modelling approach. Additional sensitivity testing shows that the ways in which the energy efficiency and renewable measures are funded are important factors in determining overall economic impact. Policy relevance In recent years there has been much debate as to whether the European Union should have a single GHG reduction target or a set of targets that also cover renewables and energy efficiency. This paper elaborates on part of the modelling that was carried out for the official assessment of the European Union's proposed energy and climate targets for 2030. Using an empirical, model-based approach, it compares a scenario where there is a single 40% GHG reduction target to a scenario that also includes a 30% renewables target and stricter energy efficiency standards. The model results show that the large investment stimulus needed to meet the combined targets leads to higher levels of GDP and employment. This suggests that there could be medium-term economic and social benefits to including all three targets in the future energy and climate package. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]