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Global climate change governance has changed substantially in the last decade, with a shift in focus from negotiating globally agreed greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction targets to nationally determined contributions, as enshrined in the 2015 Paris Agreement. This paper analyses trends in adoption of national climate legislation and strategies, GHG targets, and renewable and energy efficiency targets in almost all UNFCCC Parties, focusing on the period from 2007 to 2017. The uniqueness and added value of this paper reside in its broad sweep of countries, the more than decade-long coverage and the use of objective metrics rather than normative judgements. Key results show that national climate legislation and strategies witnessed a strong increase in the first half of the assessed decade, likely due to the political lead up to the Copenhagen Climate Conference in 2009, but have somewhat stagnated in recent years, currently covering 70% of global GHG emissions (almost 50% of countries). In comparison, the coverage of GHG targets increased considerably in the run up to adoption of the Paris Agreement and 89% of global GHG emissions are currently covered by such targets. Renewable energy targets saw a steady spread, with 79% of the global GHG emissions covered in 2017 compared to 45% in 2007, with a steep increase in developing countries. Key policy insights The number of countries that have national legislation and strategies in place increased strongly up to 2012, but the increase has levelled off in recent years, now covering 70% of global emissions by 2017 (48% of countries and 76% of global population). Economy-wide GHG reduction targets witnessed a strong increase in the build up to 2015 and are adopted by countries covering 89% of global GHG emissions (76% not counting USA) and 90% of global population (86% not counting USA) in 2017. Renewable energy targets saw a steady increase throughout the last decade with coverage of countries in 2017 comparable to that of GHG targets. Key shifts in national measures coincide with landmark international events - an increase in legislation and strategy in the build-up to the Copenhagen Climate Conference and an increase in targets around the Paris Agreement - emphasizing the importance of the international process to maintaining national momentum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global climate change mitigation action is hampered by systematic under-assessment of national ‘fair shares’, largely on the basis of perceived national interests. This paper aims to inform discussions centred on South Africa’s nationally determined contribution (NDC) by estimating (1) emissions reduction pathways for the country using the Climate Equity Reference Calculator (CERC) assuming a maximum 2°C aggregate warming target and (2) the likely economy-wide net mitigation costs or savings associated with reaching these pathways if known lower-cost mitigation measures, identified through the national mitigation potential analysis, are prioritised. The cumulative net savings associated with achieving the CERC ‘fair share’ emissions pathway, assuming the moderate use of low carbon power generation measures, would reach $5.3 billion by 2030. Net savings could be substantially greater reaching $46.8 billion by 2030 assuming power generation focuses on moving towards full decarbonisation. An unconditional commitment to the mitigation action implied by the ‘fair share’ emissions pathway therefore seems reasonable and prudent purely from the point of view of net country-wide savings. Only if power generation moves towards full decarbonisation would there be a reasonable chance of achieving the more ambitious CERC domestic emissions pathway. However, the significant additional cost associated with achieving the domestic emissions pathway should be conditional on international assistance. Key policy insights South Africa can only achieve its ‘fair share’ of the global mitigation effort if greater use is made of renewable energy options, and can realise significant net savings if it does so. Further emissions reductions would incur costs and require significant upscaling of the share of renewable energy and full implementation of all non-power generation mitigation measures available. Committing to this further mitigation action contingent on international finance would both strengthen the nation’s position in climate negotiations and support the provision of finance for those vulnerable developing nations that bear little or no responsibility for climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In December 2015, China joined 190 plus nations at Paris in committing to the goal of limiting the rise in global average temperature to ‘well below’ 2°C. Carbon budget analysis indicates that goal will require not only that the European Union and US reduce their emissions by greater than 80% by 2050, but that China at least comes close to doing so as well, if any budget is to be left over for the rest of the world (RoW). Given that RoW emissions are, and will come from, low-income and emerging nations, China’s emission reduction potential is of no small consequence. In this paper, we use the Kaya identity to back out changes in the drivers of CO2 emissions, including gross domestic product (GDP), energy intensity (E/GDP) and the carbon content of energy (C/E), the latter two calculated to be consistent with China’s long-term GDP growth rate forecasts and specified 2050 CO2 emission reduction targets. Our results suggest that even achieving China’s highly optimistic renewable energy targets will be very far from sufficient to reduce China’s CO2 emissions from 9.1 Gt it emitted in 2015 to much below 3 Gt by 2050. Even reducing its emissions to 5 Gt will be challenging, yet this falls far short of what is needed if the world is to meet its ‘well below’ 2°C commitment. Key policy insights Under the Paris Agreement there is great pressure on China to very substantially reduce its emissions by 2050. While China has attached great importance to renewables and nuclear energy development, even achieving the most optimistic targets would not be sufficient to reduce China’s emissions from 9.1 Gt in 2015 to much below 3 Gt by 2050. China’s emission reduction potential falls far short of what is needed if the world is to meet its Paris ‘well below’ 2°C commitment, even if the EU and US reduce their emissions to zero by 2050. Emission cuts consistent with the Paris Agreement will require that China and the world give much greater weight to advancing research and development of scalable low-, zero- and negative-carbon sources and technologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is clear that developing countries will have to be part of the global mitigation effort to avoid ‘dangerous climate change’, and, indeed, many of them are already undertaking significant actions on multiple fronts to help address this problem, even if they have not yet taken on legally binding commitment under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Since the deployment of GHG-mitigating technologies is already a significant part of this effort and likely to be even more so in the future, drawing lessons from existing programmes can help accelerate and enhance the effectiveness of this deployment process. Accordingly, this article aims to examine the deployment of wind and solar power in India, paying specific attention to the role of public policy in incentivizing and facilitating this deployment, how these policies have evolved over time, what has shaped this evolution, and what the learning has been over this period. Through this analysis, the intention is to draw out key lessons from India's experience with deployment policies and programmes in these two sectors and highlight the issues that will need to be given particular consideration in the design of future domestic policies and international cooperation programmes to enhance the move towards climate-compatible development in India. Many of these lessons should also be relevant for other developing countries that are attempting to balance their climate and developmental priorities through the deployment of renewable energy technologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]