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The effectiveness of carbon price in emissions trading schemes (ETS) is an important issue in China in the context of its ambitious climate change goals. This paper adopts a staggered difference-in-differences model to estimate whether China's ETS reduced CO2 emissions while maintaining economic growth even under low carbon prices. The results indicate that despite the low carbon prices, the ETS effectively reduced CO2 emissions without undermining the economy. Specifically, an increase of $1 in the carbon price reduced CO2 emissions by 1.69% and increased the per capita GDP by $286. The carbon price primarily achieved emission reduction and promoted economic development through channels, such as technological innovation, foreign direct investment, energy mix, and industrial structure. Carbon leakage to neighboring regions was not evident. Heterogeneity analysis showed that the environmental effects of the carbon price were more pronounced in regions with higher levels of economic development and CO2 emissions. Conversely, the economic effects of the carbon price were more pronounced in regions with lower levels of economic development and CO2 emissions. The carbon price achieved significant economic effects in regions that solely adopted the free allocation mode of emission allowances, while regions that used a combination of free allocation and auctioning experienced substantial emission reduction effects. Despite low carbon prices, China's ETS effectively reduced CO2 emissions without compromising economic growth. This finding provides new empirical evidence for the effectiveness of carbon price as well as decision support for the future promotion of ETS. Technological innovation, FDI, energy mix, and industrial structure are crucial channels through which the carbon price achieves emission reduction and promotes economic development. The absence of carbon leakage to neighboring regions suggests that ETS is an internally effective mechanism for emission control. Heterogeneity analysis showed that regional characteristics and allowance allocation modes can influence the effectiveness of carbon price, thus emphasizing the importance of targeted policy design and appropriate allocation methods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States (U.S.) and China are key to meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement and reaching carbon neutrality by around mid-century. Despite differences, carbon neutrality will be met more rapidly if the two countries coordinate and facilitate synergies in carbon-neutral technologies and policy development and implementation. Building on long-term pathway models in the U.S. and China, current emissions trends and sources, and a policy analysis, this paper puts forward a novel framework for U.S.-China coordination on carbon neutrality. The analysis reveals similar technology and policy pathways, policy gaps, and shared milestones for decarbonization in 2030, 2040, and 2050-2060. The main technological pathways focus on reductions in energy demand and non-energy-related CO2 emissions, decarbonization of electricity and fuels, and increases in electrification rates and CO2 sequestration. Given existing domestic policies and opportunities for further action, areas for coordination on carbon neutrality include common policy milestones; dialogue and technical exchange; research, development, and demonstration (RD&D); and international climate leadership. Despite escalated tensions between the U.S. and China, and challenges for climate cooperation, coordination between both countries on carbon neutrality is both possible and necessary. Carbon neutrality will be met more swiftly if the U.S. and China coordinate and facilitate synergies in carbon-neutral technologies and policy. Despite the rise in geo-political tensions between the U.S. and China, coordination on carbon neutrality is both possible and necessary. An analytical framework for U.S.-China coordination on carbon neutrality, includes technology and policy pathways, and common milestones of key sectors' decarbonization for 2030, 2040, and 2050-2050. The two countries could coordinate on common policy milestones, dialogue and technical exchange, research and development, and international climate leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although China is the world's largest investor in renewable energy, its overseas energy investments are primarily in fossil fuels. This is a cause of major concern as countries across the globe need to transition toward low-carbon development trajectories to meet the 1.5-degree warming target of the Paris Agreement. In this paper, we present data up until and including 2019 showing that power generation investment in renewables domestically (excluding medium and large hydro) is 77% while only 22% overseas. We add to the literature on the institutional environment surrounding Chinese overseas investment by finding that in addition to general barriers to renewables, such as higher up-front costs and different income cycles, Chinese renewable firms face significant structural financing disadvantages vis-à-vis conventional energy firms. We find that the underlying reason is that Chinese fossil fuel companies are largely state-owned while renewable companies are largely private-owned. The disadvantage then materializes through the Chinese financial system's preference for state-owned enterprises. Lastly, we identify concrete policy options to overcome the disadvantage by addressing five types of actors: 1) policy banks that can emphasize their development focused mandate, 2) state-owned commercial banks currently financing the majority of Chinese overseas energy projects, 3) smaller financial institutions currently not involved in this type of financing overseas, 4) Sinosure, currently focusing on insuring fossil fuel projects, and 5) Chinese energy, utility, and construction companies that would benefit from further diversifying into renewables. Key policy insights The proportion of renewables in Chinese power generation investment is 77% domestically while only 22% overseas. Chinese fossil fuel companies are largely state-owned, while renewable companies are largely private-owned. The key barrier for Chinese renewable energy companies going overseas is their lack of access to finance. Chinese financial institutions favor state-owned over privately-owned organizations, both domestically and overseas. Consequently, a key reason for renewable/fossil disproportions is that Chinese renewable energy companies are largely private-owned. The favoritism can be overcome through policies targeting 1) policy banks, 2) state-owned commercial banks, 3) smaller financial institutions, 4) Sinosure, or 5) Chinese energy, utility, and construction companies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]