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Over the past decade, Mexican climate policy has captured worldwide attention for its ambition and level of commitment to international goals. Mexico was one of the first countries to adopt a climate change act, the 2012 General Law on Climate Change (referred to as the Mexican Climate Act, MCA). However, Mexico has been unable to fulfil its self-imposed climate goals and the innovative national climate legislation has only produced limited results. By assessing the functioning of the Inter-Ministerial Commission on Climate Change (CICC) and the National System on Climate Change (SINACC), this article analyses how and why climate policy fragmentation occurs during MCA implementation. This paper argues that the lack of integration observed in the Mexican case is the result of a dynamic process characterized by multi-level paralysis, which is caused by three interconnected factors: (1) weakness of the Mexican federal system affecting vertical integration of climate policy (CPI); (2) ambiguities in MCA mandates impeding horizontal CPI; and (3) uneven leadership in Mexican climate policy that generates a breach between promises made abroad and actual domestic implementation capacities. The empirical findings of this paper are based upon quantitative and qualitative content analyses applied to the minutes of meetings of both the CICC and the SINACC, together with 22 elite-interviews with officers close to the policy process. This paper concludes that if there is a blueprint for organizing the Mexican administrative system, it has to start with rethinking the role of climate federalism. Key policy insights Mexican climate policy suffers from policy fragmentation and administrative instruments conceived for integration are not functioning properly. A reform of both is needed. Three interconnected factors generate policy fragmentation in Mexico: weakness of the Mexican federal system affecting collaboration across levels of government (vertical CPI); ambiguities in MCA mandates impeding coordination (horizontal CPI); and uneven leadership that generates a breach between the promises made abroad and actual domestic implementation capacities. Mexico has to rethink the role of climate federalism. The country adopted a model not suitable to its political and administrative culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of a rapidly evolving Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) market and increasing debate about the design of a future global climate regime, it is essential to understand which types of projects are undertaken along industrial value chains, and also the influence of company characteristics (e.g. size, raw material base, product type, ownership and location) on firms' CDM participation and choice of project type. The Indian pulp and paper industry was examined for its energy intensity and its diversity in terms of both mitigation opportunities and company characteristics. Large firms were found to be more likely than small firms to participate in CDM. Although CDM projects in large and small firms generate similar amounts of certified emission reductions (CERs), the type of technology implemented in those projects varies strongly with company size due to differing levels of capabilities and capital. Mill size and raw material base also affect participation and choice of project type. A structured approach is suggested for analysing how to engage different subsectors of an industry in mitigation efforts based on transnational sectoral approaches, domestic sectoral approaches, and programmatic CDM. Preliminary policy recommendations are offered for the Indian pulp and paper industry, as well as insights that are transferable to other countries. A one-size-fits-all sectoral approach is difficult to implement and a strategy for differentiated treatment based on company characteristics is required to reflect local development priorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses 556 model scenarios assessed by IPCC's Working Group-III for the 6th Assessment Report, which have an underlying 10-region classification and correspond to restricting warming levels to 1.5 ℃ and 2 ℃. We show that across all scenarios, the current global inequalities in incomes, energy use, and emissions, are projected to continue even in 2050. Scenarios also project higher per capita fossil fuel use and lower carbon dioxide removal in developed countries in 2050 compared to developing countries. Our results demonstrate the scale and scope of unequal outcomes in these scenarios, that have been anticipated by theoretical critiques of the underlying models. The paper explores the potential reasons for the unequal outcomes of the scenarios focusing on the two key issues of scenario design and modelling framework. Our analysis also suggests that instead of summary assessments focusing on singular median values or percentile ranges, as undertaken in the IPCC report, more could be learned from focusing on differences between models or considering outliers that could present new and innovative solutions to the determination of equitable and efficient future mitigation pathways. Our analysis underlines the need for new frameworks for emissions modelling and scenario building, for constructing possible futures that can also foreground equity and climate justice. Key Policy Insights: Scenarios assessed by IPCC project continuing global inequality in 2050. Inequality is pervasive across all variables – energy, fuel use, GDP, and emissions. Higher CO2 reduction and CDR are projected for some developing regions. IPCC must comprehensively review scenario assessment and reporting processes to ensure the transparent representation of all scenarios in the literature. There is a need for new scenario and modelling frameworks that consider and include climate equity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how monetary policy can be calibrated to promote a greening of finance. The paper reviews existing literature and notes a tendency to either focus narrowly on one policy instrument or provide a menu of options, without much depth or discrimination. This Perspective paper undertakes a theory-based analysis of green monetary policy options using an institutional approach to monetary economics. In so doing, it identifies a policy mix that would reorient finance by structurally modifying the relative incentives of financing green vs dirty assets. More specifically, the proposed green central banking strategy consists in the combined adoption of several, recalibrated monetary policy instruments. The two main ones are core elements of central banks' collateral policies: making (more) green assets eligible in credit operations with central banks and using so-called 'haircuts' to give green assets preferential treatment over dirty assets in those credit operations. Combined, the adoption of the proposed, recalibrated instruments promises to reorder the collateral asset hierarchies that are the backbone of modern financial systems, providing strong financial incentives for enhanced financing of investment in green assets and divestment from dirty assets. Monetary policy can help speed up a greening of the financial sector. Enhanced financing of green assets, as well as divestment from dirty assets, can be incentivized through a range of monetary policy tools. Among the most potent green monetary policy tools is differentiated treatment of green and dirty assets in credit operations, known as collateral policy. Several green monetary policy options can be pursued without compromising other monetary policy objectives (such as price stability). While most central banks currently remain reluctant to engage proactively with such policy tools, the increasing manifestation of climate change is likely to erode such resistance in coming years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The last two decades have seen an increase in climate financing channelled to the Global South from multiple sources, putting a spotlight on climate finance coordination challenges in recipient countries. However, the climate finance coordination debate has largely been centred at climate finance provision at the global level. Emerging literature has called on recipient countries to establish effective climate finance coordination mechanisms. Yet, the calls have not clarified what accounts for an effective coordination mechanism. This paper addresses the gap by analyzing stakeholder perceptions of effective climate finance coordination in Kenya. Kenya has instituted a legal and institutional framework to guide climate finance coordination, but challenges of coordination persist. Using the political economy framework, the paper analyzes political economy factors influencing stakeholder perceptions and climate change policy implementation to identify political contestations that need to be reconciled. Data is drawn from relevant literature, 29 key informant interviews and 4 focus group discussions at the national level in Nairobi and at the sub-national level in Turkana County. Deductive thematic analysis is adopted for coding and analyzing data. Results indicate that different ideologies, interests, incentives, politics, power relations and contestation over resources largely influence stakeholder perceptions of an effective climate finance coordination mechanism and climate policy implementation. The operationalization of the National Climate Change Council and the National Climate Change Fund are the most contested. The paper calls on policy actors to reconcile political issues of contention for recipient countries to institute coordination mechanisms that gain ownership and widespread legitimacy from stakeholders. Underlying political economy factors including different ideologies, interests, politics, incentives, power relations and contestation over resources largely influence stakeholder perceptions of effective climate finance coordination as well as climate change policy implementation. The consequential political contestations need to be reconciled; otherwise, the established coordination mechanism is less likely to gain ownership and widespread legitimacy from climate change stakeholders. This calls for meaningful and extensive stakeholder engagements and consensus building to minimize contention, particularly over the operationalization of the National Climate Change Council and the National Climate Change Fund in Kenya. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Citizens' assemblies on climate change are increasingly popular to support democratic decision-making. Such Climate Assemblies (CAs) convene representative groups of citizens formulating policy proposals after hearing experts and deliberating intensely. CAs may help addressing climate policy issues more effectively partly because their members need not worry about re-election. CAs' effectiveness depends on their design such as the issues chosen (or not chosen) for deliberation. Agenda-setters exert substantial power by selecting certain issues and by choosing framings that benefit some solutions over others. In this paper I ask: What characterizes agendas that are suitable and legitimate for deliberation in CAs? The aim is to support practitioners in making informed agenda choices for CAs by providing a list of ten widely accepted guiding principles based on expert interviews, policy documents, and information gathered from the Knowledge Network on Climate Assemblies (KNOCA). The paper systematically discusses trade-offs of various agenda choices in the light of different CA rationales. Results show that those with system-supporting rationales tend to favour narrower agendas tailored to political demands aiming to increase immediate policy impact; those with system-disrupting rationales prefer more open agendas allowing citizens to challenge existing political practices and worldviews. Results support earlier arguments that distinctions of entire deliberative processes in either top-down or bottom-up are too simplistic and that a tool-box approach is more useful. Insights appear relevant for debates of deliberative minipublics more generally. Future research should investigate whom to involve in setting CA agendas and with how much power. Effective agenda design hinges on rationales on how to achieve assembly objectives which depend on authorities' ambition for climate action. Given high ambition, system-supportive rationales aiming for policy impact favour narrower agendas tailored to demands of the policy process but risk low transformativeness. Given low ambition, system-disruptive rationales aiming to challenge established practices and worldviews favour more open agendas but risk low impact if assemblies are not politically embedded or able to mobilize opposition groups. Assembly designs are seldom purely supportive or disruptive but often hybrid. Agenda-setting has many dimensions allowing for productive combinations of disruptive and supportive elements tailored to contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Transitioning to a low-carbon economy while promoting sustainable development requires behavioural changes and mobilization of significant investments. Key instruments being used for that include carbon pricing initiatives, such as carbon taxes and cap-and-trade policies, and, more recently, green bonds. Although the literature has provided some evidence on emission reduction associated with carbon pricing initiatives, there is a lack of investigations on the environmental performance of green bonds; and only theoretical models describe the potential benefits of combining both. Aiming to fill this gap, this study uses regression analysis and annual data for 150 countries between 1990 and 2019 to assess how carbon pricing initiatives and green bonds relate to carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. This paper makes two main contributions. First, it examines how two climate instruments, carbon pricing and green bonds, relate to CO2 emissions. Previous research has focused only on individual instrument assessments and mainly on carbon pricing. Second, this paper empirically analyses whether there are interaction effects of the two instruments, an assessment not previously undertaken. The results suggest that the implementation of nationwide carbon pricing initiatives is associated with an 11% reduction in CO2 emissions on average. By comparison, green bond issuances are associated with an average 14% reduction in CO2 emissions. Further, no statistically significant interaction effects between carbon pricing initiatives and green bonds were observed. The results must be cautiously interpreted and cannot be attributed solely to the instruments studied since heterogeneous effects, biases from distinct sources, and the existence of complementary policies might influence the results. Carbon pricing initiatives, such as carbon taxes and cap-and-trade schemes, and green bonds are being used to promote the transition to a low-carbon economy. Investigation into green bonds and their impact on emissions is scarce and to date, only theoretical models analysed potential interaction effects of their combination with carbon pricing. The results show an average of 11% reduction in CO2 emissions associated with carbon pricing initiatives and of 14% reduction in CO2 emissions associated with green bonds issuances. While the results show promise in the emission reduction performance of these two instruments, caution in interpreting these results is advised as complementary policies, biases from distinct sources, and evidence of heterogeneous effects make it challenging to disentangle the effect of individual policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Governments and international organizations are increasingly using public funds to mobilize and leverage private finance for climate projects in the Global South. An important international organization in the effort to mobilize the private sector for financing climate mitigation and adaptation in the Global South is the Green Climate Fund (GCF). The GCF was established under the UNFCCC in 2010 and is the world's largest dedicated multilateral climate fund. The GCF differs from other intergovernmental institutions through its fund-wide inclusion of the private sector, ranging from project design and financing to project implementation. In this paper, we investigate private sector involvement in the GCF through a qualitative exploratory research approach. We ask two main questions: Do private sector projects deliver on their ambitious goals? What are the tensions, if any, between private sector engagement and other principles of the GCF (most importantly the principles of country ownership, mitigation/adaptation balance, transparency, and civil society participation)? This paper argues that private sector involvement does not provide an easy way out of the financial constraints of public climate financing. We show that the GCF fails to deliver on its ambitious goals in private sector engagement for a number of reasons. First, private sector interest in GCF projects is thus far underwhelming. Second, there are strong tradeoffs between private sector projects and the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) principles of country ownership, transparency, and civil society participation. Third, private sector involvement is creating a mitigation bias within the GCF portfolio. Fourth, while the private sector portfolio is good at channeling funds to particularly vulnerable countries, it does so mostly through large multi-country projects with weak country ownership. Fifth, there is a danger that private climate financing based on loans and equity might add to the debt burden of developing countries, destabilize financial markets, and further increase dependency on the Global North. The main problem of GCF private sector engagement is lack of interest from the private sector. For now, the GCF will strongly rely on public funds for its mission; thus establishing a strong track record of high impact climate projects should take priority over the promises of mobilizing private financial resources. Given the strong mitigation bias of private sector projects, public sector financing needs to be even more focused on climate adaptation. The GCF needs to ensure that the private sector's short-term interests in profitability do not undermine its own long-term goal of transformational change and development. The GCF needs to make sure that private sector projects are compatible with Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) principles and its own rules on country ownership, transparency, and civil society participation. The GCF needs to pay more attention to building a sound institutional framework to ensure that climate finance does not add to the already existing debt burden, economic dependency, and financial instability of partner countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Institutional investors, who control as much as $154 trillion globally, may play an important role in shaping the energy transition as major stakeholders in fossil fuel producing, distributing and consuming companies. Research on investors and fossil fuels has focused largely on the divestment movement or on shareholder engagement. However, given their limited success to date, additional strategies to influence the fossil fuel sector are merited. This review paper expands the scope of attention to investors, asking: what strategies for influencing the fossil fuel industry are available to institutional investors and what are the implications of these for achieving an inclusive fossil fuel phase-out? Through a systematic review of 153 papers, we identify seven strategies for influencing the fossil fuel phase-out: divestment, shareholder engagement, hiring practices, engaging the financial sector, engaging indirect financial actors, litigation, and green investment. These strategies represent ways for investors to increase the impact of their engagements, as well as areas deserving greater attention from academics, policymakers, and activists. Across these strategies, we note trade-offs in favour of financial returns at the expense of social, ecological, and equity outcomes. We argue that future research should focus on: (a) the role of under-studied actors in aligning finance with climate goals; (b) the implications of investor action for an inclusive energy transition; and (c) policy solutions capable of overcoming investors' short-term profit motives to instead incentivise long-term investor engagement with climate issues. Legal mandates and uncertainties in how to apply fiduciary responsibility with respect to climate change result in investors and asset managers prioritizing short-term profits at the expense of climate goals. Voluntary investor efforts focus predominantly on transparency and disclosure and are insufficient to meet climate goals. Legally binding decarbonization strategies are needed to align finance with the Paris Agreement. Influence over investment strategies is increasingly concentrated in a small number of powerful actors. Policymakers should consider not only asset owners, but also asset managers, index providers, and proxy advisory firms. Investors can increase their climate action by incorporating policies on climate into their mandates for asset managers and engaging with fossil fuel financiers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A mid-century net zero target creates a challenge for reducing the emissions of emissions-intensive, trade-exposed sectors with high cost mitigation options. These sectors include aluminium, cement, chemicals, iron and steel, lime, pulp and paper and petroleum refining. Available studies agree that decarbonization of these sectors is possible by mid-century if more ambitious policies are implemented soon. Existing carbon pricing policies have had limited impact on the emissions of these sectors because their marginal abatement costs almost always exceed the tax rate or allowance price. But emissions trading systems with free allowance allocations to emissions-intensive, trade-exposed sectors have minimized the adverse economic impacts and associated leakage. Internationally coordinated policies are unlikely, so implementing more ambitious policies creates a risk of leakage. This paper presents policy packages a country can implement to accelerate emission reduction by these sectors with minimal risk of leakage. To comply with international trade law the policy packages differ for producers whose goods compete with imports in the domestic market and producers whose goods are exported. Carbon pricing is a critical component of each package due its ability to minimize the risk of adverse economic impacts on domestic industry, support innovation and generate revenue. The revenue can be used to assist groups adversely impacted by the domestic price and production changes due to carbon pricing and to build public support for the policies. A country with a mid-century net zero GHG emission target likely will need to implement more ambitious mitigation policies soon for emission-intensive sectors such as aluminium, cement, chemicals, iron and steel, lime, pulp and paper and petroleum refining. More ambitious mitigation policies are likely to vary by country and be implemented at different times, creating a risk of leakage due to industrial production shifts to other jurisdictions. More ambitious mitigation policy packages, compatible with international trade law, that a country can implement to reduce emissions from these sectors with minimal risk of leakage are available but differ for producers whose goods compete with imports in the domestic market and those whose goods are exported. Carbon pricing is a critical component of each package due its ability to minimize the risk of adverse economic impacts on domestic producers, support innovation and generate revenue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a pressing need to curb the extraction of fossil fuels, alongside their use and consumption, to remain within reach of the 1.5C global warming limit. Yet, a reduction in the supply of fossil fuels does not inherently indicate a just or equitable transition. A growing number of papers are proposing approaches and criteria for determining the allocation of remaining production of fossil fuels and the sequencing of countries phasing out extraction and production. With a focus on oil, this paper identifies, and reviews 15 criteria found in the literature for determining the sequencing of phase out of fossil fuel supply. These criteria are economic efficiency, wealth, dependence, development, historical responsibility, procedural justice, and variations within these approaches. In addition, this paper reviews the extent to which these criteria have been operationalized and discusses the just transition implications of pursuing a fossil fuel supply phase out based on the criteria and indicators identified. This review suggests that the sequencing of countries that phase out oil extraction differs depending on the criteria adopted but that there are gaps in the criteria identified and in their operationalization, with implications for how to usher in just transitions. This paper calls for a more holistic view of the equity implications of a global phase out, supported by further research broadening and deepening the scope of equity considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The latest climate science provides stark warnings around the need for a transition away from further oil and gas exploration. Denmark, as a leader in the oil and gas transition, has already cancelled new oil and gas permits and is pursuing the phase-out of existing oil production in the Danish North Sea by 2050. Progress in other areas of the world, however, is more circumscribed, giving rise to a landscape of both 'leaders' and 'laggards' across value chains. This Special Issue unites the need for market-led oil and gas just transitions with net zero emission ambitions, critically analyzing the potential for a just transition (or transitions) by 2040. This editorial provides introductory context to nine articles and summarizes their key policy insights. The nine contributions present interdisciplinary and mixed method perspectives from globally diverse country contexts. Papers explore oil and gas transitions across the value chain and with attention to a range of stakeholders and processes, including public norm development, tribunals, and industry investments. Whilst there is growing consensus across various actors and institutions in society around the need to phase-out oil and gas, the papers also showcase that care must be taken to avoid perverse incentives, engage the public, steer investment, engage with controversies, account for emerging producers, consider country phase-out sequencing, account for indirect and direct job losses, and consider investor compensation caps. Across all contributions, and alongside reflections of the various barriers and enablers for obtaining just outcomes, considerations of just transitions thinking appear in several different ways. They appear conceptually, empirically (in terms of research findings), as guidance for decision-making, and as an aspirational outcome or target to be obtained; that is, just transition is treated in the same way as the phase-out of oil and gas - as a process and a goal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent scholarly work on sustainability transitions has highlighted the importance of the development of norms against fossil fuels, or Anti-Fossil Fuel Norms (AFFNs), for climate mitigation. However, further research is needed to understand the mechanisms and conditions by which such norms are developed and secured for successful sustainability transitions. This paper contributes to addressing this, through analysing the case of the Republic of Ireland, probing the emergence of norms against fossil fuels and notably against natural gas (also referred to here as 'fossil gas'). Whilst Ireland is considered an overall laggard on climate action, in recent years the country has witnessed several ground-breaking supply-side moves against fossil fuels. Drawing on in-depth original research interviews and analysis of key political sources, including parliamentary debates and policy documents, the paper finds evidence of norms against fossil gas emerging in the Irish case. The analysis contributes insights into the iterative development of AFFNs at the domestic level, the role of environmental movements, and broader lessons for the development of a just transition away from fossil gas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global warming will lead to more frequent and intense heatwaves across all regions of the world in the coming decades. Adaptation at the individual level plays a key role in helping populations cope with these extreme events. This study undertakes a systematic review of the academic literature on the determinants of heat-adaptive behaviours (HABs) following the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines. A Boolean algorithm was used on two online databases (PubMed and Web of Science Core Collection) to retrieve 73 relevant, quantitative, peer-reviewed papers. All included studies focus on high-income economies (N = 48) or middle-income economies (MIEs, N = 25). A meta-analysis was performed on 34 studies using a random-effects model, with an emphasis on heat-related perceptions (perceived efficacy, risk and threat) and heat-related knowledge (HRK), as these variables are the most likely levers of behavioural change. Perceived efficacy, HRK, perceived threat and gender (i.e. being female) are positively associated with the adoption of HABs. A moderation analysis reveals heterogeneity in the effect of these variables by country income group, with low HRK and perceived threat constituting stronger barriers to HABs in MIEs. This study also highlights various gaps in the current literature, regarding the populations studied, the statistical methods used, and the lack of standardization of HABs and perception concepts. Key policy insights: Heat-adaptive behaviours (HABs) are influenced by both psychological and non-psychological factors. Information and communication campaigns may be designed to influence the determinants of psychological factors and use them as adaptation levers. Policymakers should implement information campaigns to underline the characteristics and adverse health effects of heatwaves, as well as reminding people of ways to cope with heatwaves, especially in middle-income economies (MIEs). Information and prevention campaigns in MIEs should clearly highlight the frequency and severity of the health hazards associated with heatwaves in order to improve public awareness of these risks. Information campaigns based on simple infographics showing the most effective HABs and reminding people of the efficacy of HABs to reduce heatwave health risks may be especially impactful in high-income economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scenario-guided foresight processes are increasingly used to engage a broad range of stakeholders in sharing knowledge, reflecting, and setting priorities to respond to present and future climate change related dynamics. They are particularly useful to inform agricultural policies and planning in the face of a changing climate. Such participatory approaches are key to integrating multidisciplinary expertise, perspectives, and viewpoints, and ensuring that the multi-faceted vulnerabilities and the development needs of diverse groups are addressed in the design, planning, and implementation of climate adaptation policy. However, in practice, ensuring meaningful participation in the policy process is far from straightforward. In this paper, we examine the integration of gender and social inclusion considerations in 15 scenario-guided foresight use cases across Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia to determine the ways in which gender and social inclusion dynamics were considered and integrated at different stages of scenario-guided planning processes. To inform the analysis, we use qualitative data from key informant interviews, interviewing scenario coordinators and a gender and social inclusion expert who was engaged in one of the cases; we also review associated reports and outputs. The results suggest that few scenario-guided planning processes centred gender and social inclusion considerations from an early stage and consistently throughout the interventions, translating often into low diversity of stakeholders and insufficient depth reached in the content produced. A number of common challenges are reported including time, budget, and human resource constraints, as well as existing power and institutional dynamics. The latter includes, for instance, low women's representation in technical organizations or important hierarchical social norms structuring discussions. While the focus on the future can disrupt established modes of doing, the complexity of foresight methods can also undermine effective participation leading to important trade-offs. Innovations in the modes of engagement and parallel processes with diverse groups can be important leverage points for inclusion within policymaking processes. Key policy insights: Gender and social inclusion should be prioritized from the onset and integrated at different stages of scenario-guided planning processes, notably by allocating more time, human, and financial resources to ensure inclusiveness. Parallel consultations among diverse organizations and groups can provide effective spaces for often-sidelined or marginalized groups' interests and needs to be integrated into policy decision-making given the existing power structures that regulate access to many workshops and related discussions. Multi-scale engagements with different networks also help deepen understanding and reconcile gaps across scales of decision-making (e.g. from local level to national level). Practitioners should further their use of foresight processes and development of tools and methods for integrating gender and social inclusion in these as part of the policy process, as well as strengthen the capacities, expertise, and role of conveners. Promotion and dissemination of existing gender and social inclusion research and documentation as well as support for learning and reflection to refine identified leverage points can lead to improved success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the effects of the collateral-based monetary policy, implemented by the People's Bank of China, on green financing costs. Employing a Difference-in-Differences (DID) method to examine credit spreads of financial bond in primary and secondary markets from 2017 to 2019, our findings highlight a significant decrease of 26 basis points (bps) in the financing costs of green financial bonds in the primary market, with a 12-bps decline in the secondary market post-policy. Our study underscores the crucial role of implicit credit enhancement provided by the People's Bank of China's collateral endorsement. Interestingly, the liquidity provision mechanism, where investors pay premiums to secure liquidity support, does not find empirical backing in the specific context of China's bond market. These findings illuminate the effectiveness of collateral-based monetary policies in reducing green financing costs, offering valuable insights for using collateral strategies to green monetary policies. Collateral-based policies' success in reducing green financing costs suggests a strategic avenue for supporting green monetary policy goals. Implicit credit enhancement serves as a crucial mechanism driving this cost reduction. The People's Bank of China's experience exemplifies the robustness of such policies without requiring strict collateral scarcity, highlighting broad policy applicability. Collateral-based monetary policy could drive the 'green premium', broadening green bond appeal beyond just environmentally-focused investors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

City leaders around the world are setting ambitious targets for emissions reductions. Yet the pathway to achieving this remains largely unspecified. Starting with this objective, the paper explores the merits of deploying a mission-oriented framework within the context of a 'wicked problem' by looking at a mid-sized city, Glasgow, which has a target for net zero by 2030. Focusing on themes drawn from one high-emitting sector – transport – the paper points to the real-world policy implications that stem from such a mission-oriented approach to suggest aspects of the approach that may be usefully developed further. The latter hinges on a-priori considerations given to: agency, boundaries and inter-temporality, leading to questions about the nature and scope of wickedness and argues that core issues of wickedness – uncertainty, contestation and complexity – can be amplified in local and multi-layered policy making contexts. Key policy insights Many cities are looking to reduce emissions including establishing net zero targets and a mission-oriented framework – 'concrete targets within a challenge that act as frames and stimuli for innovation' (Mazzucato and Dibb, 2019) – has been a popular framing vehicle. Such a framework reveals challenges inherent in such a 'wicked problem' at urban scales, which are interwoven with regional and national issues, institutions and influences. Exploring these for Glasgow, which hosted COP26, we highlight the policy 'problem' and 'solution' space for mid-sized cities more generally. We highlight three dimensions that reflect the nature of the urban decarbonization challenge: agency – the responsibilities of various actors in delivering change; boundaries – the interactions between actions to reduce emissions alongside wider policy ambitions such as a 'Just Transition' and 'green jobs'; and intertemporal issues – including how ambitions for rapid change might interact with the glacial progress of structural policy change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has established three rounds of low-carbon pilot city initiatives. However, a gap exists between policy making and successful implementation, and the effects on greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction were found to be different among pilots. This paper considers the question of how low-carbon policies in cities can be implemented effectively and how policy combinations are adopted for GHG emissions reduction. It uses a mixed research approach, including Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and field investigation in Pilot Y (situated in the southwest China). The results show that, first, financial support and monitoring systems are necessary conditions, while political leadership is a sufficient condition. This means that the absence of financial support or monitoring systems could lead to increased GHG emissions, while the presence of political leadership always promotes the reduction of GHG emissions but may not be sufficient on its own to achieve them. Second, the target responsibility system (TRS) – a system used by higher government levels to assess the policy implementation of lower government levels – and human resource mechanisms cannot effectively lead to the promotion of GHG emissions reduction. Finally, in the absence of TRS and human resource mechanisms, environmental information disclosure (EID) was found to effectively promote low-carbon urban development by encouraging public participation. This paper reveals the complexity of the implementation of low-carbon policies in cities, identifies the link between city-level and national action, and enriches the theoretical explanation of governance and low-carbon policy implementation gaps in China. Key policy insights China's low-carbon pilot city project is critical for reducing GHG emissions, however, the effects of the low-carbon pilot city programmes varied greatly. Financial support and monitoring systems are necessary conditions, while political leadership is a sufficient condition to achieve cities' GHG emissions reduction goals. Local low-carbon development is limited and not put into practice at the city level in China, in part because of the absence of financial support and limited political attention. This study highlights the key conditions of organizational behaviour at the meso-level, and enriches the theoretical explanation of environmental policy implementation gaps in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A desire to shift from fossil fuels to non-carbon-emitting energy sources has become an imperative supported by national, state, and local policies. In the U.S., a diverse array of policies at multiple levels of government have helped the solar industry achieve exponential growth. These advancements, however, are mediated by local implementation processes, which might be expected to have a large impact in the context of U.S. federalism. This paper investigates the effects of two countervailing forces – policy incentives and implementation disincentives – on residential solar adoption in New Jersey. The New Jersey case study includes two complementary analyses designed to illuminate policy incentives and implementation disincentives, respectively. The first is an interrupted time-series analysis that evaluates the effects of federal and statewide renewable energy policies on residential photovoltaic (PV) growth. The second is a set of semi-structured in-depth interviews with solar industry experts, providing implementation insights from the solar industry and indirectly portraying residential customers' experiences. Results confirm that market-based instruments at the state-level play a crucial role in increasing the relative financial advantage of these systems and, thus, the attraction of residential solar PV to adopters. In addition, the behaviours of future adopters and the valuation of this technology as an investment in the housing market will impact the spread of residential PV systems in the future. Unfortunately, case study findings also confirm that an absence of standardized solar application procedures and outdated interconnection standards is a significant drag on the adoption rate. This highlights a need for policymakers to place greater emphasis on local implementation pathways in solar policy design. Options to achieve this include more robust ex-ante coordination among state and local levels of government and with industry to standardize implementation processes. While U.S. federalism may at times be constraining, our results suggest that even minimal levels of ex-ante coordination can lead to implementation gains that will have a large impact on solar diffusion outcomes. Federal and state-level financial incentives significantly impact the residential photovoltaic solar adoption rate. The absence of streamlined interconnection application procedures and outdated interconnection standards for the grid limit the residential PV adoption in New Jersey. Our findings underline the importance of paying equal attention to both policy design and to technical standards to underpin implementation processes, especially in the decentralized context of U.S. federalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Local climate change impacts hit hard at smallholder farmers in developing countries due to their overreliance on rain-fed farming. Whilst ecosystem-based adaptation (EbA) to climate change holds an answer to smallholder farmers' adaptation needs, there are inadequate empirical results from the field to support formulation of effective adaptation strategies. Hence, this paper aimed at investigating EbA practices adopted by farmers, in North-Western Ghana to ameliorate local climate change impacts, with emphasis on benefits and associated challenges. The study methods were cross-sectional survey, mixed methods, and case study approach, with all data collected in the Wa West District of Ghana. Data were gathered using questionnaire, focus group discussion (FGD) and interviews. Data from the questionnaire were entered into SPSS version 20 to analyze associations between the variables using cross-tabulation. Descriptive statistics, in the form of percentages and frequencies, were then generated from the survey data and integrated with the qualitative information in the presentation of results. Also, statistical significance of the relationships was analyzed using chi-square test. Chi-squared tests were done to determine associations between socio-economic and environmental factors, and challenges and benefits associated with the adoption of EbA practices. This was necessary to give further insights to inform policy-related decisions aimed at addressing EbA adoption challenges. The results revealed that farmers use a combination of practices rather than single practice. Farmers integrated crops and trees and keep local breed of farm animals. Benefits of EbA included improvements in soil fertility leading to high crop yield and availability of food and income. Challenges of adopting EbA were the long timespan for benefits of most EbA practices to begin to accrue, lack of extension information and increasing cost of hired labour. It is recommended that tree integration should emphasis trees with multiple benefits and compatible with food crops. For the achievement of food security policy objectives, agroforestry promotion should focus on the integration of fruit tree crops and food crops to address hunger and increase farmers' incomes. Mobile extension technology should be exploited by government for the provision of EbA-specific information to farmers to bridge the extension services gap. Climate change policy of government should include the planting of non-fruit trees as windbreaks to provide multi-purpose benefits including provision of stakes for yam farmers, live-fencing and firewood for women. There is the need for government policy objectives to include EbA by farmers under the flagship 'planting for food and jobs' programme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The effectiveness of carbon price in emissions trading schemes (ETS) is an important issue in China in the context of its ambitious climate change goals. This paper adopts a staggered difference-in-differences model to estimate whether China's ETS reduced CO2 emissions while maintaining economic growth even under low carbon prices. The results indicate that despite the low carbon prices, the ETS effectively reduced CO2 emissions without undermining the economy. Specifically, an increase of $1 in the carbon price reduced CO2 emissions by 1.69% and increased the per capita GDP by $286. The carbon price primarily achieved emission reduction and promoted economic development through channels, such as technological innovation, foreign direct investment, energy mix, and industrial structure. Carbon leakage to neighboring regions was not evident. Heterogeneity analysis showed that the environmental effects of the carbon price were more pronounced in regions with higher levels of economic development and CO2 emissions. Conversely, the economic effects of the carbon price were more pronounced in regions with lower levels of economic development and CO2 emissions. The carbon price achieved significant economic effects in regions that solely adopted the free allocation mode of emission allowances, while regions that used a combination of free allocation and auctioning experienced substantial emission reduction effects. Despite low carbon prices, China's ETS effectively reduced CO2 emissions without compromising economic growth. This finding provides new empirical evidence for the effectiveness of carbon price as well as decision support for the future promotion of ETS. Technological innovation, FDI, energy mix, and industrial structure are crucial channels through which the carbon price achieves emission reduction and promotes economic development. The absence of carbon leakage to neighboring regions suggests that ETS is an internally effective mechanism for emission control. Heterogeneity analysis showed that regional characteristics and allowance allocation modes can influence the effectiveness of carbon price, thus emphasizing the importance of targeted policy design and appropriate allocation methods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change is a key socioeconomic and environmental concern in South Africa. The South African government introduced several climate change initiatives to address the impacts of climate change, resulting in the proliferation of climate adaptation policies across spheres of government. This paper studies different climate change adaptation policies and climate policy paradigms (CPP) to understand the adaptation landscape; it explains and compares the changes in CPP in South Africa over time. We mapped 40 policy documents from 2004 to 2022, which shows 12 national policies, 12 provincial (sub-national) policy documents and 14 metropolitan city policy documents. We then used 12 national policy documents to illustrate and understand the CPP. The research shows that different stakeholders have shaped climate change adaptation policy, both private and public firms advised on climate change policy and there are a number of different funding partners supporting the adaptation policy like GEF, C40 and GIZ. The changing policy environment has introduced new frameworks, objectives and processes. Therefore, more efforts will be needed going forward to guide adaptation policy across national, provincial and local governments. We find that several CPPs have emerged, that is different paradigms encompassing a range of policy goals, framings and instruments. The present National CC Adaptation Strategy (NCCAS) mandates adaptation across all levels of government and allows all important stakeholders to address climate change consequences. This NCCAS increases the number and ambition of adaptation policy, encourages integrated approaches, policy coherence and clear direction on how to handle climate risks and impacts in varied South Africa and its global commitment. Changes in policy paradigm enable the use of new policy instruments, including funding and budget mechanisms. Finally, climate adaptation policy has become more ambitious and stringent, requiring all levels of government to plan for climate change. The climate change policy landscape in South Africa has grown over the past 18 years, with policy development across different spheres of government (national, sectoral, provincial and metros), New CPPs have emerged, supported by new policy frames, goals and instruments. The NCCAS provides a clear policy goal, which also provides new policy instruments to implement climate actions and acts to enhance integrated approaches, The lack of domestic budget allocation remains a challenge for national government, but external partnerships have begun to provide support for policy development. Notably, a shift from a flexible to stringent approach to climate policy is needed to deliver effective climate action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Adaptation tracking is crucial for understanding progress in responding to climate change impacts across space and time. However, adaptation tracking is constrained by the lack of agreement on how to measure adaptation. While there has been significant focus on government plans and other documented adaptation as the basis for adaptation tracking, emerging literature also advocates for inclusive approaches that consider multiple experiences and priorities when designing and using adaptation tracking indicators. However, little literature empirically investigates the specifics of what this integrated approach is or what it could achieve. We address this gap using a thematic analysis of 48 focus group discussions and of government policies to compare the perspectives of livestock keepers and governments in Eastern Africa on climate risks and adaptation in livestock systems. The results show considerable similarities in how they perceive climatic hazards, impacts, adaptation strategies, goals, and adaptive capacities, highlighting elements that could be recognized as relevant by both sets of stakeholders. However, the differences underscore the value of an integrated approach as it supports the recognition of variations in climate risks and adaptation options across contexts as well as capturing diverse effects of adaptation across scales. Insights from this paper contribute to discussions on developing integrated adaptation tracking frameworks that take into account the contextual nature of climate hazards, impacts, adaptation strategies, adaptive capacities, and adaptation goals. Governments and livestock keepers perceive climate hazards, impacts, adaptation strategies, adaptive capacity, and adaptation goals in largely similar ways. Differences in governmental and livestock keeper perspectives provide the basis for integrating them in the development of adaptation tracking indicators. Drawing on multiple experiences, priorities, and knowledges could support more effective tracking of adaptation progress by considering the various scales and contexts within which adaptation occurs. Integration requires an adaptation tracking framework that utilizes core indicators that have broader relevance and additional ones that address the context-specificity of climate hazards, impacts, adaptive capacities, adaptation strategies, and adaptation goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emissions trading schemes (ETS) area is a leading climate policy instrument worldwide and have been widely discussed and researched. However, few studies to date focus on the nexus of ETS and income inequality, an important socioeconomic phenomenon. To fill this gap, taking China as an example, this paper discusses the influence of ETS on income inequality and its dynamic changes using a time-varying differences-in-difference model combined with a propensity score matching approach. The results demonstrate that China's pilot ETS has contributed to reducing income inequality. Various robustness tests support this conclusion. Moreover, the strength of ETS's contribution to reduction in income inequality gradually increases over time. We further analyze the mediating effects of carbon intensity, energy consumption, industrial structure, and technological innovation. ETS reduces income inequality by reducing coal consumption. The regional heterogeneity analysis shows that, unlike in other regions, ETS has a positive impact on income inequality (i.e. it increases it) in the eastern region in China due to its optimized energy structure and relatively complete, open, and flexible economy system. The paper discusses the above findings and their policy implications. It is also designed to promote research on ETS and to diversify research perspectives of income inequality from both theoretical and practical aspects. Evidence from China's pilot experience with ETS shows that it contributes significantly to balancing income distribution and alleviating the increasingly acute social conflicts caused by income inequality. This provides new theoretical and decision support for the promotion of ETS in the future. The energy revolution driven by ETS promotes income redistribution, which is conducive to income equality. Governments should enforce the constraints of ETS on power generation companies; guide capital to invest more in the non-thermal power industry, especially the renewable energy power sectors; and guide and regulate the income distribution in new power sectors. Governments' revenue from ETS can and should be used to further redistribution of income and to reduce income inequality. A higher number of free quotas and a lower carbon price could be imposed on low-profit or labor-intensive industries to reduce their emission costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rapid urbanization and climate change are two grand challenges faced by many cities in pursuing sustainable urban development. While ecosystem-based adaptation practices are increasingly recognized and adopted across the world as an important urban development strategy, their effective implementation in diverse biophysical conditions and development contexts is of interest, requiring scientific research and learning. This paper presents the case of China in implementing an ecosystem-based approach – sponge city development – to address the water-related challenges of urbanization and climate change. It draws on the literature to synthesize understanding of the interaction between the urban landscape, urban development, and ecosystem services, and proposes mainstreaming an ecosystem service framework in spatial planning and performance evaluation to guide ecosystem-based adaption practices. Focusing on China's practice, the paper develops a five-step procedure for operationalizing and mainstreaming ecosystem services so as to improve policy implementation for sponge city development. This paper aims to provide a practical perspective to help enhance ecosystem-based adaptation in urban development to better address the challenges of urbanization and climate change. Cities are increasingly looking into ecosystem-based adaptation, as an integrated part of urban development, to increase resilience to climate change and to promote urban sustainability. China's experience with implementing a national initiative called sponge city development contributes to learning and an understanding of ecosystem-based adaptation practices to address urbanization and climate change challenges. Existing literature shows the need and potential for an ecosystem service framework to guide spatial planning and performance evaluation for ecosystem-based adaptation. China is in a unique position to mainstream an ecosystem service framework in sponge city development to improve current practice and to promote climate-resilient and ecosystem-integrated urban development. A five-step empirical procedure outlines a systematic approach for mainstreaming ecosystem services, contributing to the literature and policy practice to build urban resilience and sustainability in the face of urbanization and climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the drivers of private investment in renewable energy by source of financing for 13 economies over the period 2008–2018, with a focus on a sub-panel of Asian economies. Sources of financing – asset finance, corporate research and development (R&D), public market, and venture capital and private equity – vary not only across years and renewable energy sources, but also across countries. Using a fixed effects panel model, this paper provides a first quantitative estimate of the effect of government renewable energy policies on private investment across different sources of financing, with four main findings. First, while government expenditure on R&D positively affects private investment from asset finance and corporate R&D, it is not the most important driver in terms of the magnitude of the elasticity. Second, feed-in tariffs have a particularly strong effect on stimulating renewable energy investment financed through public markets, with the findings particularly strong for the Asian sub-sample. Third, tax incentives have a mixed impact across sources of financing. Fourth, technology costs and energy prices have considerable effects on driving renewable energy investment from asset finance, with the impact notably more pronounced for the Asian sub-sample. Key policy insights To maximize the impact of government R&D, policies should aim to facilitate a smoother investment environment for the private sector in the areas of asset finance and corporate R&D. This could include targeted subsidies and tax relief measures. Enhanced FIT mechanisms should be developed, particularly in Asia, to leverage greater investment financed via publicly quoted markets. This could also include more favourable initial fiscal incentives and terms of agreement. Tax incentives should be used with caution. While tax incentives have a positive effect on investment in renewable energy overall, they may negatively affect investment financed by corporate R&D and venture capital and private equity, i.e. private financing sources that are crucial for technology R&D and manufacturing scale-up. Countries with lower regulatory quality may need to offer higher FIT rates for policies to be effective in attracting private investment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Relying on the digital economy may help reconcile contradictions between the need to improve quality of life (QoL) and the need to reduce carbon emissions. Yet, previous research has not systematically explored the correlation between the digital economy, QoL, and carbon emissions. This paper explores the influence of the digital economy and of changes in QoL on carbon emissions, using a system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model. To do this we first use principal component analysis to calculate an objective QoL and a digital economy index using provincial panel data in China from 2006 to 2018. The results demonstrate that both the digital economy and QoL exhibit inverted U-shaped effects on carbon emissions. Our results also show that the growth of the digital economy improves QoL while mitigating the influence of QoL on carbon emissions. Thus, these findings illustrate that policymakers can rely upon the digital economy to help reconcile potential conflicts that arise between QoL and carbon emission reduction goals. Overall, these findings add a new dimension to carbon reduction policies. We propose that policymakers can improve QoL and reduce carbon emissions by coordinating the scale and efficiency-enhancing effects of developing the digital economy. In addition, regions that rely on energy industries should consider the efficiency-enhancing effect of the digital economy when formulating provincial and national emission reduction policies. China aims to improve the QoL of its citizens while achieving carbon peak and neutrality goals in the coming decades. This study demonstrates how the digital economy can both improve QoL and reduce carbon emissions. Given the non-linear impact of QoL on carbon emissions, policymakers should not be concerned that climate mitigation policies will deter or damage efforts to generate to QoL improvements. Countries should develop digital economies to improve QoL while simultaneously paying attention to its efficiency improvement effect, which can reduce carbon emissions. Policymakers should focus on the enhanced efficiency improvement effect of the digital economy on the allocation of resources, particularly in regions with energy-intensive industries as economic pillars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policymakers and governments increasingly frame climate protection in terms of green growth, arguing that continued economic growth and climate protection are complementary and mutually beneficial. With such framing, governments hope to overcome the global common goods problem associated with climate change and to enable higher ambition on climate action within and across states. Yet, no empirical evidence to date has been provided on how widespread the support for green growth is in international climate politics. This paper, therefore, investigates which countries employ green growth framings at UNFCCC negotiations, and whether this relates to domestic factors, in particular economic structure, level of development and climate impacts. We conduct panel-data analysis on green growth positions derived from hand-coding a unique dataset of High-level Segment statements at the Convention of the Parties (COPs) from 2010 to 2019 for 151 countries. The results reveal that, to date, green growth proponents are those countries with the most advanced national clean energy technology (CET) capacities – as measured by the Green Complexity Index. The findings highlight that green growth is not promoted by all countries at international climate negotiations. In international climate negotiations, climate protection is increasingly framed as a green growth opportunity to motivate global ambition. Clean Energy Technology (CET) leading countries are more likely to use green growth framings than other less-technologically advanced peers and those with high exposure to climate risks. Mechanisms to support green growth pathways for all countries should be scaled up, including technology transfer and finance to foster local capacities and human capital. Given that green growth framings are not universally endorsed, further emphasis should be placed on additional co-benefits of climate action beyond economic growth, such as food and energy security, adaptation and resilience-building. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of digital technologies poses opportunities and challenges for transparency and accountability in climate governance. This paper examines their impact on information flows and accountability in the context of climate outcomes, analyzing three case examples (World Bank Climate Warehouse, Climate TRACE, and OpenClimate) to assess the potential of digital solutions to improve data availability and reliability, particularly for non-state actors (NSAs). Using Ostrom's 'rules in use' framework, we explore how digital technologies shape transparency outcomes, highlighting challenges and unintended consequences. We analyze how these initiatives frame, design, and implement their rules for digital approaches to define their participants' data collection, purpose, and access rules, all of which are crucial aspects impacting transparency and accountability for the Paris Agreement. Our findings reveal uncertainties in the rules' operationalization for these digital technologies that undermine their potential to enhance transparency. Three key issues emerge: (1) establishing appropriate rules to govern data quality for accuracy and credibility; (2) addressing power imbalances to foster inclusive and equitable transparency; and (3) aligning rules in use across digitally-enabled solutions to promote coordination and facilitate polycentrism in the post-Paris climate regime. These insights shed light on the role of digital approaches in bridging transparency and accountability gaps, emphasizing the need for careful rule design and coordination for effective implementation in global climate governance. Digital technologies have the potential to generate new modes of transparency within the Paris climate governance system, particularly at the level of non-state and subnational actors. By comparing three case examples employing digital technologies to improve climate data, we evaluate various formal and informal 'rules in use' for generating data and facilitating sharing across actors and initiatives to enhance transparency and accountability. To leverage the potential of digital technologies in advancing transparency and accountability in climate governance, policymakers should prioritize the alignment of rules in use, address power imbalances, and ensure the creation of appropriate rules governing data quality and structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As an instrument supporting the realization of EU climate neutrality targets by 2050 and encouraging decarbonization outside its borders, the current proposed Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is facing opposition from some countries. Focusing on Brazil, this paper evaluates the impacts of the CBAM on the Brazilian economy through a comprehensive analysis of various scenarios based on the potential EU implementation of the CBAM and Brazil's climate scenarios. Results obtained in this research alleviate concerns of detrimental and competitiveness losses from Brazilian industries. Rather, the implementation of the EU CBAM improves the trade balance of Brazil's Energy-Intensive Industries (EII). The relatively low CO2 contents of Brazilian EII are elemental to this result, while contributions of carbon-free technologies in electricity generation are also critical factors in maximizing this trade surplus. Other consequential factors affecting these results are the contributions of CO2 removal from Brazil's forestry of land used, and homogeneity of CBAM-imposed products. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change policies are prepared in a power-loaded environment, where different policy actors interact to meet their personal or collective interests. This paper argues that the 'power interplay' between actors plays a significant role in shaping and re-shaping climate change policies. We present examples from South Asia (Nepal, India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan) to show how actors' power interplay at the local, sub-national, national and transboundary levels influences climate change policy-making. We show that negative effects of power interplay are prominent in the climate policy domain of South Asia, including short-termism of local adaptation plans, exclusion of certain policy actors in the policy-making processes, lack of transboundary-level adaptation, and lack of coordination between actors. Nuances also exist, such as the state's authority in prioritizing technical solutions, exclusionary design and implementation of climate policies, and an agenda of securitization; these can further marginalize the actors involved in climate change policy processes. The negative effects of power interplay in South Asia can limit the success of on-the-ground implementation of adaptation and mitigation strategies, limit adaptive capacity among communities, and possibly counter the development of a strong climate change solutions space. Lastly, we argue that there are no silver bullet solutions to power asymmetries and appeal to policy actors – in South Asia and elsewhere – to design context-specific and power-sensitive policy-making approaches. Negative effects of power interplay have led to the exclusion of certain policy actors (especially communities at risk) in policy-making processes and a lack of transboundary-level adaptation in South Asia. Hard infrastructure-based adaptation measures tend to exacerbate the vulnerability of the communities at risk in South Asia. Policy actors must design context-specific and power-sensitive policy-making climate adaptation and mitigation approaches to reduce the negative impacts of power interplay. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This perspective paper proposes a new conceptual framework for bottom-up climate mitigation: the Fossil Free Zones (FFZs) framework. The aim of the framework is to facilitate grassroots, goal-driven climate action, and government policy at increasingly higher levels, with a view to 'tipping' social systems away from their reliance on fossil fuels. The paper outlines the framework and the theory of change on which it is predicated, after first introducing the historical precedent that inspired it – the system of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones. The FFZs framework offers two main advantages over other anti-fossil fuel initiatives – such as the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty Initiative – though it is intended and designed to complement these, not compete with them. First, the FFZs framework combines a unified and accessible discursive frame with a focus on practical decarbonising activities at multiple levels of governance. The discursive frame promotes the diffusion of anti-fossil fuel norms while the practical activities promote positive (reinforcing) social, technological, economic and other feedback effects. Second, the combined focus on supply and demand increases the political resilience of anti-fossil fuel initiatives in the face of fossil fuel price fluctuations, and promotes cooperation between producer regions and urban consumer centres. Anti-fossil fuel activism has become a global phenomenon, but fossil fuel production and combustion continue to rise, threatening climate objectives. A system of Fossil Free Zones is proposed to further mobilise grassroots and subnational action against fossil fuels, and build anti-fossil fuel norms. A Fossil Free Zone is a geographic area characterised by the absence of fossil fuel production and consumption, with intermediate statuses based on fuel types and activities, e.g. 'coal supply free zone'. Motivated groups set zone-related goals and work toward them, cooperating with others and across different levels of government as necessary, and declare the zones they have achieved. Ultimately, Fossil Free Zones could become institutionalised at national and international level, as has occurred with Nuclear Weapon Free Zones. Fossil Free Zones combine discursive framing with practical decarbonising activities, and address fossil fuel production and consumption, improving on other anti-fossil fuel initiatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This perspective paper explores the potential of climate finance to support Caribbean Small Island Developing States (SIDS) efforts in achieving their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement. Through a content analysis of sixteen Caribbean countries NDCs, it provides, first, a comprehensive overview of SIDS countries' perspectives on climate financing needs for mitigation and adaptation activities in meeting their climate targets. Second, the paper examines whether Caribbean SIDS acknowledge a role for domestic financing and international and domestic fiscal policy reform within their NDCs, as a way to address climate change mitigation and adaption. The analysis of Caribbean SIDS NDCs reveals that only eight countries provide clear cost estimates for mitigation activities, five for adaptation and one with a combined cost. This gives a total of US$51.3 billion for the combination of Caribbean countries across their NDCs. The majority of climate change activities identified in the NDCs are conditional on the provision of international climate finance. While some countries discuss domestic sources of finance, few note the need for domestic fiscal policy reform to counteract direct and underlying drivers of greenhouse gas emissions and their reduction. The findings suggest that, while much attention is directed to inadequate quantities of international climate finance, fiscal policy and the use of domestic finances are important for realizing transformative change and yet receive little attention from in-country policymakers. Caribbean SIDS suffer from a significant climate finance gap. Caribbean countries cannot remain dependent on international climate finance and must pursue more innovation and diversified options to achieve climate goals. Caribbean countries struggle to use domestic policy and investment options to align finance and incentives to promote their climate goals. The region faces challenges inherent in aligning domestic fiscal policies and other economic and regulatory incentives, as well as private sector investment, to complement and augment international climate finance objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this study is to investigate how political and technical factors influence climate finance coordination in different country contexts. Emerging scholarly and policy literature calls for the improved coordination of climate finance to enhance the effectiveness of multiple sources of funding for adaptation and mitigation purposes, with country ownership over coordination emerging as a potential approach. However, few studies have examined how climate finance coordination unfolds at the national level in developing countries. This paper presents findings from a comparative assessment of climate finance coordination practices in Kenya and Zambia, drawing on semi-structured interviews, policy documents, and relevant literature. Specifically, the paper investigates how political and technical forces shape climate finance coordination in contexts with varying country ownership over the coordination process. We find that political factors relating to power dynamics, framings of climate finance, and vested interests play a strong role in shaping how actors interact, hampering coordination efforts within the climate finance landscape in both countries. This adds a new dimension to calls for greater country ownership, which we suggest needs to be paired with a critical examination of political struggles and contestation. Underlying political factors relating to conflicting vested interests, different framings and discourses, political will, and power dynamics play a substantive and overarching role in shaping climate finance coordination in Kenya and Zambia. These political factors limit the extent to which greater country ownership translates to better or more effective coordination of climate finance; as such, ownership needs to be examined in the context of political struggles and contestation. Instead of just aiming to improve coordination through more formalized coordination structures, capacity building and reduced fragmentation, countries also need to be more transparent and acknowledge the deep-seated interests within the climate finance landscape, to make visible the winners and losers of various coordination mechanisms and structures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate-resilient agriculture (CRA) is among the top policy priorities for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in their food, agriculture, and forestry sectors. However, the strategies that have been adopted to date have failed to produce positive changes or alter climate change trajectories. Scientific evidence is crucial for evidence-based policy making in this arena and elsewhere. We undertake a scoping review to explore what is known from the existing scientific literature about the policy recommendations for CRA in ASEAN. We follow the PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) guidelines for new systematic reviews. Furthermore, we conduct a content analysis to classify the policy recommendations into eight CRA policy categories and to investigate how the policies identified in the reviewed articles reinforce the climate resilience capacities (CRC) needed for CRA. The synthesis review is based on 47 papers. This research contributes to climate resilience literature, and explains how the results of this study could be applied in policy analysis to build CRC within the agricultural sector. The knowledge generated by this study can support policy design, and therefore support the building of an enabling environment for CRA for ASEAN and elsewhere. Scientific literature on CRA typically recommends policies that support communication and knowledge sharing and advance research and technology development, often in combination with risk management- and/or environmental/climate support. There is insufficient evidence on actual policies enabling CRA. This result may also reflect a lack of research on some of the identified CRA policy categories, such as agricultural production support, investment support, infrastructural support, land use regulation and certification. This synthesis review identifies literature addressing policy capacity to achieve CRA goals. Adaptability and transformability are key dimensions of policy capacity enabling responsive actions to climate change, mainly via social learning, in-depth learning and research and technology development. Literature pays little attention to anticipation and robustness, facilitating proactive ex-ante initiatives and coping for climate change; we argue that these dimensions of capacity merit further research. This synthesis demonstrates key gaps in research and understanding of CRA and related policies targeting capacity building, followed by a need to raise awareness of the importance of such policies. It also points to the need to enable preparation for climate-related crisis planning, through use of anticipatory policies and tools, such as climate predictions to inform planning of robust prevention measures. Last but not least, the synthesis identifies that representation across the ASEAN countries and the type of agricultural systems in is unbalanced; research from Vietnam and Malesia and research on rice production or rice in combination with other crops or shrimp are over-represented. We argue that research on climate change adaptation for other important agricultural production systems, covering the remaining ASEAN countries, is needed to fill this gap. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Communities are already grappling with climate change's acute effects, evidenced by the growing frequency and intensity of extreme events worldwide. Strategies to encourage adaptation to climate change are urgently needed, particularly to preempt common ineffective and maladaptive responses. The United States provides a notable case study for testing the potential for economic incentives to drive voluntary adaptation in vulnerable coastal communities where mandates through building codes have proven insufficient to limit economic losses. This paper analyzes a novel survey of 662 coastal households in the hurricane-exposed state of North Carolina. Our findings suggest that homeowners who believe adaptation measures increase the market value of their homes are more likely to have homes with these upgrades. Furthermore, they are more likely to have taken actions to upgrade their homes after purchase and to express stronger intentions to invest in future upgrades. While perceived affordability plays a role in their upgrading actions, it seems unrelated to future intentions. Uptake, or intended uptake, of climate adaptation measures by coastal homeowners is not driven by the perceived efficacy in preventing future losses, challenging a tactic commonly used in policy messaging. Instead, reducing climate-related hurricane losses requires a greater valuation of climate adaptation measures in real estate markets. The need to elevate market value over efficacy in governmental and non-governmental efforts to promote adaptation may be relevant to adaptation for other types of extreme events or in other locations globally where real estate is a prized investment with the potential for significant returns. The conventional policy-driven messaging of adaptation efficacy – avoided losses as the reason to adapt – is not successfully driving homeowner actions. Reducing climate-intensified hurricane losses requires more certain benefits to homeowners; greater valuation of adaptation measures in real estate markets can provide such benefits. Perceived affordability is not the primary barrier to action, though policies should continue to encourage the development of cost-effective adaptation strategies. Mandatory disclosure during home sales and greater emphasis on adaptation measures in real estate listings can bolster discourse and valuation of measures to reduce vulnerability to climate-intensified extreme events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Methane emissions reduction can make an effective contribution to national climate policy objectives in countries with high ratios of methane to carbon dioxide emissions. This paper explores the physical science basis for Irish climate policy targets in a 'split-gas' approach i.e. separate targets for CO $_2$ 2 and methane. Explicit calculations of Ireland's historic and future warming contribution show that the planned phaseout in fossil-CO $_2$ 2 emissions by 2050, together with relatively modest but sustained falls in methane emissions from agriculture, can lead to early stabilization of Ireland's contribution to global warming. It is proposed that this 'temperature neutrality' concept provides a pragmatic framework for aligning national climate policy with Article 2.1(a) of the Paris Agreement in countries with high shares of agricultural methane emissions. National methane reductions required to achieve temperature neutrality by a target year are shown to depend on realized future atmospheric methane concentrations, with lower concentrations requiring stronger national reductions and vice versa. Temperature neutrality (TN) is a physically well-defined concept that can be used to balance emissions of methane and long-lived greenhouse gases and to align national with global climate policy goals. Policymakers in countries with significant shares of agricultural methane emissions should evaluate the relative merits of Global Warming Potential (GWP $_{100}$ 100 ) net-zero and temperature neutrality approaches when setting policy targets. Simple Climate Model assessments of national warming contributions help inform emissions targets in countries with significant agricultural methane emissions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Capacity-building is acknowledged as an essential requirement for addressing environmental and developmental challenges in developing countries. In particular, the capacity to manage technological change is an important prerequisite for climate change mitigation, adaptation and green growth. Despite the importance of such capacity, there are surprisingly few empirical accounts unpacking its different dimensions and exploring how it might be built in developing countries in the context of climate and sustainable development challenges. In this paper, we contribute to this sparse literature through an in-depth qualitative case study on energy efficiency in India. Specifically, we take a systemic and evolutionary perspective to investigate how the Bureau of Energy Efficiency developed and implemented its programs to promote energy efficiency in household appliances, light-emitting-diode lamps and energy-intensive industries – and how in doing so, both drew upon existing capacity within and outside the country, and also built new capacity, to achieve significant energy savings. Key policy insights Since the capacity to manage technological change is distributed among a range of actors, policymakers require the ability to understand capacity needs from multiple actors' perspectives. Policymakers need to respond to evolving capacity needs over the course of a program – from strategic program design, trust-building and resource mobilization in early stages, to administration in later stages. 'System operators/integrators' can play a crucial role during the early stages of a program by helping develop capacity and sustaining it by creating a demand for such capacity, as well as bringing together actors, enabling coordination, and building coalitions among them. Preliminary analysis suggests that the Bureau of Energy Efficiency programs investigated in this paper resulted in significant energy savings and CO2 emission reductions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Paris Agreement's nationally driven structure puts the spotlight on financing strategies at the national level. The role of national funding vehicles in mobilizing climate finance, however, has not received extensive attention. This paper remedies this gap by introducing a novel dataset of national climate funds established in developing countries. The database creates an inventory of national financing vehicles and tracks their major attributes, including scope, legal form, and the host, among others. We show that 39 countries have established national climate funds. These funds seek to access and mobilize finance from various sources, domestic and international. Most of these funds have broad mandates to tackle climate change, while a smaller share has a more targeted, sectoral focus. Funding sources vary from taxes to international aid. The funds offer a limited range of financial instruments, primarily awarding grants. The funds also differ in how integrated they are with overarching climate plans and strategies. We also find that most developing countries use existing budget lines to target finance towards climate change objectives. Only five countries track public expenditure on the basis of dedicated budget codes. This paper contributes to the literature by providing an empirical basis to pursue questions regarding the role and effectiveness of national climate funds. For policymakers, the limited range of instruments at the disposal of many of these national climate funds also suggests a need to ensure that the national climate funds have the design features they need to support the implementation of national policy goals. Key policy insights Systematic data on public climate finance are scarce. Most governments do not use climate change codes to track their expenditures related to climate change. Policymakers should adopt practices that will help instil transparency in public expenditure on climate change. Policymakers have to revisit the design features of national climate funds such as legal form and areas of operation as the wider operating context changes. Funds accredited with multilateral climate funds are underutilized by fund contributors. The Green Climate Fund's direct access modality offers one major avenue to foster synergies between national climate funds and multilateral climate funds. Policymakers have the opportunity to harvest lessons from existing funds and calibrate climate policies accordingly, especially as countries contemplate setting revenue-generating carbon prices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been tasked with quickly devising a climate change strategy that helps its members meet collective climate change and development goals while maintaining financial stability. In this paper, we develop an analytical framework of the 'macro-critical' nature of climate change and use that framework to examine the extent to which the IMF has incorporated the macro-economic aspects of climate change in recent years. We deploy textual analysis algorithms to perform a baseline analysis of the extent to which the IMF's main bilateral surveillance activities—Article IV reports and Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs)—have focused on climate risks between 2017 and 2021. We find that IMF surveillance activity has paid little and uneven attention to climate risks in Article IV reports, and even less so in FSAPs. However, recent Article IV and FSAP assessments have piloted climate risk analyses that present an opportunity to be expanded and incorporated systematically. The analytical framework, baseline analysis, and methodology will allow future analysts to monitor IMF climate performance over time. Key policy insights Multilateral institutions should analyze and incorporate 'macro-critical' climate risks to fiscal and financial systems in their policy frameworks toolkit. The IMF needs to rapidly fill this gap in the climate policy architecture through reforms to its surveillance, advisory, and lending functions. The IMF, as a safeguard of monetary and financial stability, should incorporate climate risks cohesively and comprehensively into its analysis, including spillover or the cross-border consequences of climate change, and reallocate its tools and resources to this end. This paper provides a method and baseline from which to evaluate the evolution of IMF policy toward incorporating climate risk into its bilateral surveillance toolkit, specifically Article IV exercises and FSAPs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the Paris Agreement, most countries have communicated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) with mitigation targets for a single year. Single-year targets present considerable challenges when countries use international carbon markets to achieve their NDCs. This paper assesses the environmental integrity implications of the two options that countries with single-year targets can use to account for internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement: averaging and multi-year approaches. To assess the implications of these options, the paper considers a variety of scenarios for how two countries might engage with Article 6 and assesses how the choice of the accounting approach may affect aggregated emissions from the two countries. The paper finds that aggregated emissions could increase, decrease or remain unaffected, depending on: which of the two accounting approaches is chosen by the transferring and the acquiring country; whether the generation or use of ITMOs decreases, increases, or keeps constant over time; whether the countries' emissions in the target year are representative for the countries' emissions trend; and what course of action countries take in the case of a possible over- or under-achievement of their NDC targets. While averaging is simple to implement and does not require countries to establish multi-year trajectories or budgets, it can lead to higher or lower aggregated emissions from the cooperating countries, compared to the situation in which the countries achieved their targets without using Article 6. By contrast, under multi-year approaches, aggregated emissions do not change, as long as multi-year targets or trajectories are credibly defined. As countries have a free choice between averaging and multi-year approaches, they can strategically pick for each NDC implementation period the accounting approach which requires less effort to achieve a given NDC target. In aggregate, this can undermine environmental integrity. Accounting for ITMOs is most robust if all countries moved over time towards robustly defined multi-year targets or trajectories. The risk that countries may inflate multi-year trajectories could be addressed through international guidance and review on the establishment of such trajectories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates linkages between trade and climate policies by examining commitments made in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement. While environmental protection and economic growth are often perceived as conflicting policy goals, PTAs and NDCs have the potential to encourage mutually supportive approaches to climate and trade governance. Building upon three recent datasets, the paper locates a sample of 21 countries in a typology of four issue-linkage strategies across both types of instruments: policy integration, policy silos, asymmetry in favour of trade policy, and asymmetry in favour of climate policy. It finds that countries that reveal a preference for strong linkage with climate in their PTAs typically do not reveal a preference for strong trade linkage in their NDCs, and vice versa. No state from the sample favours strong policy integration. After sketching out possible explanations for this observation, the paper concludes that policy-makers have significant room for enhancing synergies between trade and climate commitments and that scholars have a role to play in this endeavour. There is substantial untapped potential for simultaneously promoting trade and tackling the climate crisis across borders in future NDCs and PTAs. In future NDCs, trade provisions, e.g. the reduction of trade barriers for climate-friendly goods and services, should be strengthened in national climate plans. Countries should make better use of climate provisions in their PTAs, e.g. to encourage their trade partners to commit to binding climate objectives and foster exchanges of climate-friendly goods and services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India is crucial to the future of the global energy system, and hence to efforts to mitigate climate change. However, projecting India's energy future is challenging because of a number of structural uncertainties related to its still emergent development process – there are multiple 'future Indias'. This is particularly so given India's unusual historical development pattern and economic structure. This paper reviews more than 40 energy system scenarios for India to 2050 including scenarios of different policy stringency. This analysis suggests that the task of drawing policy insights is hampered by widely divergent, often non-transparent and insufficiently discussed, assumptions about GDP and its structural attributes as implied by sectoral energy consumption, industrial intensity of GDP, and sectoral demand patterns. It is these assumptions that crucially drive the divergence in scenario results, even more than assumptions about energy and climate policy per se. While divergent results are important for exploring the range of possible future pathways, policy insights can only be generated if scenario producers adequately convey a sense of causality, probability and desirability underpinning their scenarios. This requires linking more detailed socio-economic scenario storylines with the input assumptions and output results of energy system scenarios. To improve modelling for policy insight, the paper proposes that more attention be devoted to developing overarching socio-economic development scenarios, linking these to sector dynamics, and unpacking and interpreting model results. Key policy insights India's development pathway is characterized by a relatively low level of industrialization, precocious growth of services, and low and slow urbanization compared to similar countries. The unusual features of India's development pathway have a material impact on its energy system. There is a wide range of uncertainty pertaining both to India's future rate of GDP growth, but also to the persistence or reversal of the aforementioned structural characteristics. Existing modelling studies do not adequately detail and contextualize assumptions about India's macro-scale development pathway, and its links to micro-scale patterns of sectoral energy demand and supply, leading to a wide divergence of results and uncertainty over how to interpret them. Addressing these lacunae requires enhanced transparency and discussion of overarching socio-economic development scenarios for development, linking these to sector dynamics, and unpacking and interpreting model results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores climate-friendly projects that could be part of the COVID-19 recovery while jump-starting the transition of the European basic materials industry. Findings from a literature review on technology options in advanced development stages for climate-friendly production, enhanced sorting, and recycling of steel, cement, aluminium, and plastics, are combined with insights from interviews with 31 European stakeholders in these sectors about the practical and economic feasibility of these technology options. Results indicate that with an estimated investment of 28.9 billion Euros, up to 20% of EU's basic materials could be produced through low-emission processes or additional recycling by 2025 with technologies that are commercially available or at pilot scale today. However, our stakeholder consultation also shows that in order to make these short-term investments viable, six main barriers need to be addressed, namely: (i) the lack of effective and predictable carbon pricing, (ii) the limited availability of affordable green electricity, (iii) the lack of a regulatory framework for circularity, (iv) low technology market readiness and funding, (v) the lack of infrastructure for hydrogen, CO2 and power, and (vi) the lack of demand for climate-friendly and recycled materials. Based on these insights, the paper proposes elements of a policy package that can create a framework favourable for investments in these technologies; these policies should ideally accompany the recovery package to give credibility to investors that the business case will last beyond the recovery period. Technologies for climate-friendly materials production, sorting and recycling can be supported as part of the recovery package but require an enabling policy framework. Combining continued free allocation with a Climate Contribution within the EU ETS can enhance economic viability of climate-friendly options. Project-based Carbon Contracts for Difference can eliminate carbon price uncertainty for climate-friendly processes. Auctions for publicly backed Contracts for Difference and Power Purchasing Agreements can guarantee price-stability of low-emission electricity. Green public procurement and public-private partnerships can provide infrastructure for hydrogen, CO2 and electricity while creating demand for climate-friendly materials. Revising regulations on product design and end-of-life emissions can improve sorting and recycling incentives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To date, 79% of Local Authorities (LAs) in England have a climate plan to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 or sooner. Yet questions remain over the collective impact of these plans and targets in terms of their contribution to a national net zero carbon budget given that the LA targets are voluntary and largely uncoordinated. There is therefore scope to explore if and how the LA target-setting process could be improved. We evaluate regional ambition in the emissions targets of 311 English LAs. We assess whether the subnational targets are aligned with a national net zero carbon budget and whether LAs take proportionate action based on their respective capabilities. It is also unclear whether LAs have the resources to implement the often highly ambitious targets they have committed to. Using a composite indicator approach, we assess the relative capability of different LAs to decarbonize, as well as the degree of ambition they are demonstrating. We find that many LAs are not taking as much action as other LAs that may have less capability to act. This suggests that burden-sharing between regions and LAs is inequitable. We offer a series of policy recommendations to improve the fairness and effectiveness of the LA target-setting process as a climate governance mechanism, including establishing a statutory target-setting requirement with appropriate resourcing, and introducing a national net zero indicator framework to monitor progress. This framework could be used in England, or in other countries, to assess progress. It would also allow funding and resources to be better directed to regions and LAs that require more support to reach net zero emission targets, rendering the transition more 'spatially just' and enabling its delivery. Key policy insights The English LA targets contribute to achieving a national net zero carbon budget. However, there is still a 1.2 GtCO2 gap in achieving this by 2050. The most ambitious LAs did not necessarily score highly in terms of capability. Seven of the ten LAs with the highest capability scores were in London; the least capable LAs were more dispersed. Greater standardization, oversight and coordination could improve the effectiveness and fairness of LA target-setting, and help direct resources from the central government to less capable LAs and regions. This could render the targets 'spatially just' and enable their delivery. This could be achieved by developing a statutory target-setting requirement and national net zero indicator framework such as the one laid out in this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States (U.S.) and China are key to meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement and reaching carbon neutrality by around mid-century. Despite differences, carbon neutrality will be met more rapidly if the two countries coordinate and facilitate synergies in carbon-neutral technologies and policy development and implementation. Building on long-term pathway models in the U.S. and China, current emissions trends and sources, and a policy analysis, this paper puts forward a novel framework for U.S.-China coordination on carbon neutrality. The analysis reveals similar technology and policy pathways, policy gaps, and shared milestones for decarbonization in 2030, 2040, and 2050-2060. The main technological pathways focus on reductions in energy demand and non-energy-related CO2 emissions, decarbonization of electricity and fuels, and increases in electrification rates and CO2 sequestration. Given existing domestic policies and opportunities for further action, areas for coordination on carbon neutrality include common policy milestones; dialogue and technical exchange; research, development, and demonstration (RD&D); and international climate leadership. Despite escalated tensions between the U.S. and China, and challenges for climate cooperation, coordination between both countries on carbon neutrality is both possible and necessary. Carbon neutrality will be met more swiftly if the U.S. and China coordinate and facilitate synergies in carbon-neutral technologies and policy. Despite the rise in geo-political tensions between the U.S. and China, coordination on carbon neutrality is both possible and necessary. An analytical framework for U.S.-China coordination on carbon neutrality, includes technology and policy pathways, and common milestones of key sectors' decarbonization for 2030, 2040, and 2050-2050. The two countries could coordinate on common policy milestones, dialogue and technical exchange, research and development, and international climate leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Net zero has become the new organizing principle of climate politics. Though the adoption of net zero targets has created optimism in the climate regime, there remain significant concerns that it is little more than a vague aspiration. Studies have focused on various net zero definitions, as well as the adoption and robustness of net zero goals. This paper builds on these works by conducting a systematic meta-review of scholarly research on net zero from 1991 to 2021. First, we find that the literature focuses on establishing pathways and creating policies, with much less research on target-setting and implementation. Second, most net zero scholarship focuses on the energy sector, including buildings, while hard to abate sectors are underexamined. Third, there is a disproportionate focus on creating policies for net zero buildings, which are relatively easy to measure and decarbonize compared to other sectors. Finally, there is a notable absence of work on the political factors that enable or constrain the implementation of net zero policies, as well as the efficacy of these policies. This indicates an urgent need for more research on the politics of net zero. Existing scholarly research focuses primarily on the science of net zero, setting goals and translating those goals to emissions pathways. Substantively, the majority of scholarship is focused on energy – including buildings, transportation and power generation. There is a need for more research on other, often hard-to-abate sectors such as industrial processes, manufacturing and construction, agriculture and waste. More scholarly research on net zero is also needed to evaluate existing policies, both to understand which ones contribute to decarbonization (and not simply emissions reductions), and under what conditions. There is an urgent need for greater understanding about the political conditions which promote or constrain the creation and implementation of net zero policies across sectors. Without filling these research gaps, policymakers may struggle to design and implement effective net zero policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows are considered to be an important source of private financing for several emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs). However, the high susceptibility of these countries to climate change impacts vis-à-vis their developed counterparts may reduce their attractiveness as a favourable destination for FDI inflows. EMDEs with significant exposure to physical climate risks present a higher incidence of financial risks for foreign investors, which may in turn discourage them from locating themselves in such jurisdictions where their profitability and operations could be jeopardized by climate disasters. Given this context, we empirically investigate how physical climate risks influence FDI inflows to 68 EMDEs using data from over two decades, from 1995 to 2017. We contribute to an emerging body of literature that assesses the impact of climate risks on macro-financial variables by focusing specifically on FDI inflows. Although we abstain from making strong causal claims in our paper, we account for endogeneity concerns extensively and our empirical results show that higher climate risks adversely impact FDI inflows to EMDEs. However, we find these negative effects can be mitigated to a significant degree by strengthening financial sector development in the host country, as it increases their capacity to absorb some of these climate risks more effectively. Key policy insights Emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs) that are more vulnerable and exposed to physical climate risks tend to be less attractive destinations for FDI inflows. Negative effects of physical climate risks on FDI inflows tend to be mitigated in EMDEs with a high degree of financial development. Well-developed, deep, and inclusive financial markets give EMDEs the capacity to absorb and manage various financial risks including those arising from climate change impacts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humankind faces a Triple Challenge: averting dangerous climate change, reversing biodiversity loss, and supporting the wellbeing of a growing population. Action to address each of these issues is inherently dependent on action to address the others. Local, national, and international policy goals on climate change, biological diversity, and human wellbeing have been set. Current implementation measures are insufficient to meet these goals, but the Triple Challenge can still be met if governments, corporations, and other stakeholders take a holistic perspective on management of land and waters. To inform this effort, we identify a set of priority policy responses drawn from recent international assessments that, whilst not being the only potential solutions, can form the core of such a holistic approach. We do this through an iterative process using three methodological approaches: (i) structured literature review; (ii) deliberative expert analysis; and (iii) wider consultation, before synthesizing into this paper. Context-appropriate implementation of responses will be needed to capitalize on potential policy synergies and to ensure that unavoidable trade-offs between management of land and waters for climate mitigation, biodiversity restoration, and human wellbeing outcomes are made explicit. We also set out four approaches to managing trade-offs that can promote fair and just transitions: (1) social and economic policy pivoting towards 'inclusive wealth'; (2) more integrated policymaking across the three areas; (3) 'Triple Challenge dialogues' among state and non-state actors; and (4) a new research portfolio to underpin (1), (2), and (3). Multiple recent global assessments provide a strong scientific basis for action on each of the three aspects of the Triple Challenge – climate, biodiversity, and human wellbeing (with a focus on food and nutrition) – but they do not provide an integrated perspective on how to address them simultaneously. Synthesis of these assessments identifies a portfolio of five core policy responses that deliver across the Triple Challenge: (i) rapidly cutting fossil fuel use; (ii) promoting sustainable, healthy diets; (iii) increasing food productivity and cutting food loss and waste; (iv) implementing nature-based solutions at scale; and (v) strengthening governance and management of land and waters. Even with widespread implementation of that portfolio, trade-offs between climate, biodiversity, and wellbeing outcomes might be unavoidable. Policymakers, researchers, and other actors should explicitly identify such trade-offs, and take steps to ensure management priorities are set through equitable dialogue processes informed by integrated research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Financial risks related to climate change and biodiversity loss are currently being addressed in a largely siloed manner. Neglecting their interconnections, however, may lead to 'blind spots' and misestimations of systemic financial risk, potentially undermining progress on both climate finance policy and emerging policy on biodiversity-related financial risks (BRFR). In particular, the 'risk measurement–based' approach dominating climate finance policy, which is now being taken up to address BRFR, is poorly equipped to address the radical uncertainty that characterises both types of risks. Furthermore, many BRFR may materalise over a more immediate horizon than climate risks. In this paper, we examine how central banks and financial supervisors are approaching the topic of BRFR in relation to climate-related financial risk. We argue that policymakers should focus upon the broader concept of systemic environmental-financial risks to account for the interactions and trade-offs between both domains of biodiversity and climate change. Instead of seeking evidence of financial materiality before acting, focusing on how the financial system is actively facilitating direct drivers of environmental damage offers a way for financial policymakers to assess potential sources of such risks on the basis of information available today. In turn, policy interventions should aim to reduce harmful flows of finance that may lead to the crossing of dangerous ecological tipping points. Financial policymakers need to think beyond siloes, and act on a precautionary basis to manage climate- and biodiversity-related financial risks concurrently. Financial authorities, coordinating with relevant government departments, should define business activities that are most harmful to climate and biodiversity, especially those contributing to ecological tipping points, e.g. activities linked to tropical deforestation, which will damage both domains. To aid transparency and supervisory risk assessment, financial supervisors could require the mandatory disclosure of portfolio composition, risk management, and due diligence procedures relating to the financing of identified harmful activities. Financial regulators could use their toolkits to discourage the financing of such activities, e.g. by applying punitive capital requirements. This approach may require greater coordination between central banks and other government departments to maintain democratic legitimacy and support existing central bank mandates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]