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The latest climate science provides stark warnings around the need for a transition away from further oil and gas exploration. Denmark, as a leader in the oil and gas transition, has already cancelled new oil and gas permits and is pursuing the phase-out of existing oil production in the Danish North Sea by 2050. Progress in other areas of the world, however, is more circumscribed, giving rise to a landscape of both 'leaders' and 'laggards' across value chains. This Special Issue unites the need for market-led oil and gas just transitions with net zero emission ambitions, critically analyzing the potential for a just transition (or transitions) by 2040. This editorial provides introductory context to nine articles and summarizes their key policy insights. The nine contributions present interdisciplinary and mixed method perspectives from globally diverse country contexts. Papers explore oil and gas transitions across the value chain and with attention to a range of stakeholders and processes, including public norm development, tribunals, and industry investments. Whilst there is growing consensus across various actors and institutions in society around the need to phase-out oil and gas, the papers also showcase that care must be taken to avoid perverse incentives, engage the public, steer investment, engage with controversies, account for emerging producers, consider country phase-out sequencing, account for indirect and direct job losses, and consider investor compensation caps. Across all contributions, and alongside reflections of the various barriers and enablers for obtaining just outcomes, considerations of just transitions thinking appear in several different ways. They appear conceptually, empirically (in terms of research findings), as guidance for decision-making, and as an aspirational outcome or target to be obtained; that is, just transition is treated in the same way as the phase-out of oil and gas - as a process and a goal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Equity issues have long been debated within international climate politics, focused on fairly distributing reductions in territorial emissions and fossil fuel consumption. There is a growing recognition among scholars and policymakers that curbing fossil fuel supply (as well as demand) can be a valuable part of the climate policy toolbox; this raises the question of where and how the tool should be applied. This paper explores how to equitably manage the social dimensions of a rapid transition away from fossil fuel extraction. Fossil fuel extraction leads to benefits for some people (such as extraction workers) and harms for others (such as pollution-affected communities). A transition must respect and uphold the rights of both groups, while also staying within climate limits, as climate impacts will fall most heavily on the world's poor. This paper begins by reviewing how extraction affects economies and communities and the different transitional challenges they face. Based on that review, it then examines three common equity approaches -- economic efficiency, meeting development needs, and effort-sharing. Drawing lessons from the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches, the paper proposes five principles as a basis for equitably curbing fossil fuel extraction within climate limits: (1) Phase out global extraction at pace consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C; (2) Enable a just transition for workers and communities; (3) Curb extraction consistent with environmental justice; (4) Reduce extraction fastest where doing so will have the least social costs; (5) Share transition costs fairly, according to ability to bear those costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mobilizing climate finance for climate change mitigation is a crucial part of meeting the 'well-below' 2°C goal of the Paris Agreement. Climate finance refers to investments specifically in climate change mitigation and adaptation activities, which involve public finance and the leveraging of private finance. A large proportion of climate finance is Official Development Assistance (ODA) from OECD countries to ODA-eligible countries. The evidence shows that the largest proportion of climate finance for climate change mitigation has been channelled to the development of renewable energy, with a much smaller proportion flowing to other crucial forms of clean energy-related measures, such as demand-side management (DSM) (particularly sustainable cooling) and carbon capture, usage and storage (CCUS). This forms the rationale and aim of this synthesis paper: to review the role of climate finance to develop clean energy beyond renewables. In doing so, the paper draws on practical policy and programme experiences of some donor countries, such as the UK, and Development Finance Institutions (DFIs). This paper argues that a greater amount of climate finance from OECD countries to ODA-eligible fossil fuel-intensive emerging economies and developing countries is required for sustainable cooling and CCUS, particularly in the form of technical assistance and clean energy innovation. Key policy insights Demand-side management (DSM) and carbon capture, usage and storage (CCUS) are underfunded in climate finance compared with the promotion of renewables. Climate finance for sustainable cooling, in particular, represents just 0.04% of total ODA, despite cooling projected to represent 13% of global emissions by 2030. Public investment in CCUS is limited at US $28 billion since 2007, despite the costs of meeting the Paris Agreement estimated to be 40-128% more expensive without CCUS. Additional climate finance for these sectors should not come at the expense of funding for renewables but should be complementary to it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines power relations, coalitions and conflicts that drive and hinder institutional change in South African climate policy. The analysis finds that the most contested climate policies are those that create distributional conflicts where powerful, non-poor actors will potentially experience real losses to their fossil fuel-based operations. This finding opposes the assumption of competing objectives between emissions and poverty reduction. Yet, actors use discourse that relates to potentially competing objectives between emissions reductions, jobs, poverty reduction and economic welfare. The analysis relates to the broader questions on how to address public policy problems that affect the two objectives of mitigating climate change and simultaneously boosting socio-economic development. South Africa is a middle-income country that represents the challenge of accommodating simultaneous efforts for emissions and poverty reduction. Institutional change has been constrained especially in the process towards establishing climate budgets and a carbon tax. The opposing coalitions have succeeded in delaying the implementation of these processes, as a result of unequal power relations. Institutional change in South African climate policy can be predominantly characterized as layering with elements of policy innovation. New policies build on existing regulations in all three cases of climate policy examined: the climate change response white paper, the carbon tax and the renewable energy programme. Unbalanced power relations between coalitions of support in government and civil society and opposition mainly from the affected industry result in very fragile institutional change. Key policy insights The South African government has managed to drive institutional change in climate policy significantly over the past 7 years. Powerful coalitions of coal-related industries and their lobbies have constrained institutional change and managed to delay the implementation of carbon pricing measures. A successfully managed renewable energy programme has started to transform a coal- and nuclear-powered electricity sector towards integrating sustainable energy technologies. The programme is vulnerable to intergovernmental opposition and requires management at the highest political levels. Potential conflict with poverty reduction measures is not a major concern that actively hinders institutional change towards climate objectives. Predominantly non-poor actors frequently use poverty-related discourse to elevate their interests to issues of public concern. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate-induced population displacement and resettlement is an ongoing problem around the world, and one that is being exacerbated by climate change. To date, most attempts to address this problem have taken a top-down approach in which international justice, legal and humanitarian frameworks are extended 'downwards' by policymakers and governments to local populations. However, there has been limited systematic work that emphasizes the abilities of affected peoples themselves to develop and formulate their own justice-based solutions. This paper presents an analytical framework for thinking about 'bottom-up' claims-making that emphasizes naming, blaming, claiming and framing. The framework enables claims-making to be distinguished from other forms of community-based agency, such as adaptation. The paper also suggests a normative framework to support policymakers and practitioners in helping communities facing displacement to make claims. The normative framework focuses on the barriers to, and opportunities for, claims-making 'from below'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of international climate change obligations, Gulf Arab states have introduced policies to integrate climate policies into economic development and planning, seeking to maximize clean development opportunities yet at the same time to minimize the threats to their rentier economies caused by sudden shifts away from fossil fuels. This paper assesses the challenges and opportunities for climate policy integration in the Gulf states of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman, examining the interaction between their climate policy and their political–economic regimes. It adopts a novel analytical framework that integrates insights from climate policy integration and the political–economic theory of rentier states. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders and relevant policy documents, it reveals modest progress in integrating climate policy into economic development plans in the UAE but major impediments to climate policy integration in Oman. Both countries face significant shortfalls in climate-related financial and human resource capacities. Climate policy integration efforts have focused on the energy sector with the purpose of protecting rents from oil exports rather than advancing a low-carbon transformation of their economies. This has created structural ambiguity in the climate policy integration advanced in the UAE and Oman. Key policy insights The availability, quality and accessibility of climate-related data are serious challenges for policy makers in the UAE and Oman. Both countries have evolving institutional architectures conducive to climate policy integration. However, these are more symbolic than substantive, lacking clear policy integration strategies across the governments. The UAE and Oman both face significant shortfalls in climate-related financial and human resource capacities. Support for climate policy integration by the ruling elites in the UAE and Oman is significantly shaped by rentier interests: most climate-related initiatives have addressed the energy sector, aiming to protect rents from oil exports by reducing the domestic dependence on fossil fuels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Local governments have a key role to play in implementing climate innovations as they have jurisdiction over a significant portion of greenhouse gas emissions. Meeting the Climate Change Challenge (MC3) is the first longitudinal study exploring climate innovation in Canadian municipalities. A tri-university research collaborative, it focuses on British Columbia (BC), whose voluntary efforts to set and meet climate change goals were far more ambitious than those offered by the federal government (and almost any other province in North America at the time). These efforts included introducing a carbon tax and the Climate Action Charter voluntary agreement in 2007. Since then, 187 of the 190 local governments in BC have signed the Charter to take action on climate change. Research in the first phase of MC3explored the dynamics of innovative local responses to the coordinated suite of government legislation, complimentary policy instruments, financial incentives and partnerships with quasi-institutional partners. In the second phase, the 11 original case studies were revisited to explore the nature of transformative change in development paths and indicators of change. Methods include sentiment analysis, decomposition analysis of regional/local emissions, and modelling relationships between climate action co-benefits and trade-offs. This paper provides a synthesis of research outcomes and their implications for environmental governance at multiple scales and the potential of policy innovations to accelerate transformation towards carbon neutral economies. Key policy insights Local governments are on the front line of identifying indicators of change in current development paths and policy innovations to effect the necessary changes for transformation to carbon neutral economies. Barriers to transformational change include lack of coordination or concerted action across multiple scales of governance, electoral cycles and large swings in leadership, and lack of policy coherence across governance levels. Drivers of climate innovation include leadership at multiple levels of governance. Understanding the co-benefits (and trade-offs) of climate actions is important for integrated strategies that achieve broader sustainability goals, as well as accelerating more innovations on climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the main challenges faced by climate policy makers today is to design and implement policies capable of transferring climate policy goals into sectoral actions towards transformational pathways. Hence, climate policies need to be of cross-cutting character, lead to coherence with sectoral goals and reconcile diverging sectoral interests. Against this background, Mexico has undertaken significant efforts to reform its energy sector, including goals for clean energy and energy efficiency, and the adoption of implementation mechanisms via the Law for Energy Transition of 2015. Furthermore, Mexico has introduced a complex climate governance system, including ambitious mitigation goals. In this paper, we applied concepts of climate policy integration to analyse whether integration between the policy subsystems of energy and climate change occurred in Mexico in terms of political discourse and negotiation, policy goals and instruments, and implementation; as well as the factors at work that lead to climate policy integration. We find that on the level of political discourse and negotiation, an integration process between the energy and climate subsystems occurred, influenced by the availability and market maturity of clean energy, mitigation scenarios and external events, such as the 2015 Paris Climate Change Conference. However, a combination of decisions on integrated climate-energy policy outputs, and preparing the public administration system for the implementation of integrated policies, is needed to enable appropriate institutional mandates, budgets and instruments and avoid institutional fragmentation. Omitting to take these decisions was identified as a major shortcoming in the political-administrative system, preventing higher levels of climate policy integration. Key policy insights The Mexican Energy Transition Law shows that policy windows can be used by policy makers to attain integrated energy-climate policy outputs and to advance national mitigation and energy sector goals. In order to make full use of integrated policy decisions, the administrative system has to follow suit by also introducing mandates, budgets and policy instruments of an integrative character. Climate policy integration in practice implies identifying and using the full potential of policy windows in order to ensure the raising of ambition under the Paris Agreement as well as achievement of sectoral policy objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With cities being responsible for up to 70% of energy-related carbon emissions, municipal governments worldwide are becoming increasingly aware of their responsibility to act. Many large cities have committed to mitigation by becoming member of a municipal climate network, such as the C40 or the Compact of Mayors. However, there is no consistent assessment of whether membership of such networks translates into measurable outcomes. To fill this gap, we propose the use of novel outcome variables, combining financial data with geospatial information. As a starting point, this paper compares utility-scale investment in photovoltaics (PV) within the administrative boundaries of large global cities, combining the Bloomberg New Energy Finance database with information from Google Maps. We analyse 512 global cities with a population of above 1 million, and consider the impact of 5 networks and 2 reporting platforms. The results suggest that membership of the C40 network has a positive effect on utility-scale solar PV investment, while no such evidence is found for any of the other networks or reporting platforms under study. Based on our findings, we recommend that municipal climate networks increase their efforts to trigger city regulation that is conducive to solar PV investment. More generally, measuring early indicators, such as low-carbon investment, can help municipal climate networks in their role as 'commitment brokers' for climate action on the ever-more important city level. Key policy insights Cities have considerable policy space to foster utility-scale solar PV investment within their administrative boundaries. While some large global cities exhibited significant growth in utility-scale solar PV, many others with good solar potential did not have a single project by the end of 2016. Outside of China (where city boundaries often include rural areas), Tokyo tops the list with utility-scale solar PV projects by far, followed by San Diego and Rome. Membership of the C40 network appears to make a positive difference to PV investment, unlike other networks or reporting platforms. Outcome measures like low-carbon investment can be used more generally to assess the climate action performance of cities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many stabilization scenarios have examined the implications of stabilization on the assumption that all regions and all sectors of all of the world's economies undertake emissions mitigations wherever and whenever it is cheapest to do so. This idealized assumption is just one of many ways in which emissions mitigation actions could play out globally, but not necessarily the most likely. This paper explores the implications of generic policy regimes that lead to stabilization of CO2 concentrations under conditions in which non-Annex I regions delay emissions reductions and in which carbon prices vary across participating regions. The resulting stabilization scenarios are contrasted with the idealized results. Delays in the date by which non-Annex I regions begin to reduce emissions raise the price of carbon in Annex I regions relative to the price of carbon in Annex I in an idealized regime for any given CO2 concentration limit. This effect increases the longer the delay in non-Annex I accession, the lower the non-Annex I carbon prices relative to the Annex I prices, and the more stringent the stabilization level. The effect of delay is very pronounced when CO2 concentrations are stabilized at 450 ppmv, however the effect is much less pronounced at 550 ppmv and above. For long delays in non-Annex I accession, 450 ppmv stabilization levels become infeasible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper suggests a two-tiered climate insurance strategy that would support developing country adaptation to the risks of climate variability and meet the intent of Article 4.8 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The core of this strategy is the establishment of a climate insurance programme specialized in supporting developing country insurance-related initiatives for sudden- and slow-onset weather- related disasters. This programme could take many institutional forms, including an independent facility, a facility in partnership with other institutions of the donor community, or as part of a multi-purpose disaster management facility operated outside of the climate regime. Its main purpose would be to enable the establishment of public-private safety nets for climate-related shocks by assisting the development of (sometimes novel) insurance-related instruments that are affordable to the poor and coupled with actions and incentives for pro-active preventive measures. A second tier could provide disaster relief contingent on countries making credible efforts to manage their risks. Since it would be based on precedents of donor-supported insurance systems in developing countries, a main advantage of this proposed climate insurance strategy is its demonstrated feasibility. Other advantages include its potential for linking with related donor initiatives, providing incentives for loss reduction and targeting the most vulnerable. Many details and issues are left unresolved, and it is hoped that this suggested strategy will facilitate needed discussion on practical options for supporting adaptation to climate change in developing countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]