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Australia is establishing an economy-wide emissions trading scheme, with a detailed proposal tabled by government in December 2008 and a scheme start planned for 2011. The proposal is for unilateral linking through the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation, but no initial bilateral linkages. Concerns about permit prices rising too high are prominent, and are reflected in a ban on permit sales and a price cap provision. This article evaluates the proposed Australian scheme with regard to international emissions trading and linkages. Different scenarios for the Australian permit price under unilateral linking are considered. Options for bilateral linking with the European Union and New Zealand schemes are evaluated. We argue that Australia should dismantle the obstacles to linking, including the proposed price cap, and move towards bilateral linking with suitable schemes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recognizing the potential for over- as well as under-estimating the mitigation costs of non-CO2 greenhouse gases in an offset programme, this article examines the accuracy of cost estimates prepared by government agencies for the control of other types of emissions from small/medium sources via an offset programme. Specifically, analogy is made to the control of SOx and NOx controlled by California's Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) Program. Even allowing for the energy crisis in 2000-2001 that drove up NOx emissions and control costs, it appears that the engineering cost methods used turned out to be generally accurate, defined as ±25%. Although such a finding does not ensure that the same results will apply to the case of non-CO2 GHGs, it certainly reinforces the growing literature on ex ante-ex post cost comparisons of environmental controls. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Distributive justice in climate change has been of interest both to the ethics and to the climate policy communities, but the two have remained relatively isolated. By combining an applied ethics approach with a focus on the details of a wide range of proposed international climate policies, this article proposes two arguments. First, three categories of proposals are identified, each characterized by its assumptions about the nature of the 'problem' of climate change, the burdens that this problem imposes, and its application of distribution rules. Each category presents potential implications for distributive justice. The second, related, argument is that assumptions about technology, sovereignty, substitution and public perceptions of ethics shape the distributive justice outcomes of proposed policies even though these areas have largely been overlooked in discussions of the subject in either literature. The final lesson of this study is that the definition, measurement and distribution of burdens are all critical variables for distributive justice in climate policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Irrespective of mitigation efforts, adaptation measures will be needed in most parts of the world. The greatest challenge will be for developing countries. The estimated needs for adaptation funding in developing countries are considered in the context of the status and 'delivery' of the current financing efforts made under the UN regime and the anticipated Adaptation Fund. A considerable gap exists between the actual (as well as projected) supply of funding and estimated adaptation needs. A number of alternative financial mechanisms are suggested to close the gap between estimated needs and actual delivery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Managing local and global risks from the geological storage of CO2 under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) presents three main challenges. First, the CDM procedures must be adapted to the specifics of the technology. Second, storage must last far longer than the crediting period, leaving questions about the management of long-term risks. Third, management of local environmental, health and safety risks falls largely outside the CDM governance framework. CDM procedures could be adapted to successfully manage the short-term global risk of carbon dioxide re-entering the atmosphere during the CDM crediting period, but local environmental, health and safety risks and longterm global risk cannot be ensured under existing structures. To better manage these risks, the implications for the CDM are: (1) to provide guidance on site characterization requirements, and have an independent auditor verify that the proposed geological storage site has a high likelihood of safely containing the injected carbon dioxide; (2) to require that carbon capture and storage (CCS) project design documents specify post-crediting-period commitments; and (3) to support CCS specific capacity building. But because CDM governance is designed to strike a balance between respecting host country sovereignty and ensuring high-quality emission reduction credits, some limitations to risk management of geological storage under the CDM remain. These limitations should be weighed against the potential benefits of including CCS in the CDM. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the verified emissions for the 2005 and 2006 trading years, the actual emissions and allowances for each installation covered by the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) were compared. Based on data available for 24 Member States as of May 2007, this article uses a thorough data analysis for about 9,900 installations to investigate evidence on three issues: first, the stringency of the total allocation cap and allocation differences both among the Member States and a selection of emission- intensive sectors; second, the distribution of the size of installations; and third, the spread of allocation discrepancies and possible allocation biases regarding the size of installations. There is a surprisingly high spread of allocation discrepancies, which provide evidence for treating small installations differently from large ones: the inequality of distribution of the size of installations, between allocated and verified allowances, variations in the spread of the allocation discrepancies both by country and by sector reflecting the implementation of National Allocation Plans, the size of an installation and its allocation discrepancy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]