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In the context of a rapidly evolving Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) market and increasing debate about the design of a future global climate regime, it is essential to understand which types of projects are undertaken along industrial value chains, and also the influence of company characteristics (e.g. size, raw material base, product type, ownership and location) on firms' CDM participation and choice of project type. The Indian pulp and paper industry was examined for its energy intensity and its diversity in terms of both mitigation opportunities and company characteristics. Large firms were found to be more likely than small firms to participate in CDM. Although CDM projects in large and small firms generate similar amounts of certified emission reductions (CERs), the type of technology implemented in those projects varies strongly with company size due to differing levels of capabilities and capital. Mill size and raw material base also affect participation and choice of project type. A structured approach is suggested for analysing how to engage different subsectors of an industry in mitigation efforts based on transnational sectoral approaches, domestic sectoral approaches, and programmatic CDM. Preliminary policy recommendations are offered for the Indian pulp and paper industry, as well as insights that are transferable to other countries. A one-size-fits-all sectoral approach is difficult to implement and a strategy for differentiated treatment based on company characteristics is required to reflect local development priorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how monetary policy can be calibrated to promote a greening of finance. The paper reviews existing literature and notes a tendency to either focus narrowly on one policy instrument or provide a menu of options, without much depth or discrimination. This Perspective paper undertakes a theory-based analysis of green monetary policy options using an institutional approach to monetary economics. In so doing, it identifies a policy mix that would reorient finance by structurally modifying the relative incentives of financing green vs dirty assets. More specifically, the proposed green central banking strategy consists in the combined adoption of several, recalibrated monetary policy instruments. The two main ones are core elements of central banks' collateral policies: making (more) green assets eligible in credit operations with central banks and using so-called 'haircuts' to give green assets preferential treatment over dirty assets in those credit operations. Combined, the adoption of the proposed, recalibrated instruments promises to reorder the collateral asset hierarchies that are the backbone of modern financial systems, providing strong financial incentives for enhanced financing of investment in green assets and divestment from dirty assets. Monetary policy can help speed up a greening of the financial sector. Enhanced financing of green assets, as well as divestment from dirty assets, can be incentivized through a range of monetary policy tools. Among the most potent green monetary policy tools is differentiated treatment of green and dirty assets in credit operations, known as collateral policy. Several green monetary policy options can be pursued without compromising other monetary policy objectives (such as price stability). While most central banks currently remain reluctant to engage proactively with such policy tools, the increasing manifestation of climate change is likely to erode such resistance in coming years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The last two decades have seen an increase in climate financing channelled to the Global South from multiple sources, putting a spotlight on climate finance coordination challenges in recipient countries. However, the climate finance coordination debate has largely been centred at climate finance provision at the global level. Emerging literature has called on recipient countries to establish effective climate finance coordination mechanisms. Yet, the calls have not clarified what accounts for an effective coordination mechanism. This paper addresses the gap by analyzing stakeholder perceptions of effective climate finance coordination in Kenya. Kenya has instituted a legal and institutional framework to guide climate finance coordination, but challenges of coordination persist. Using the political economy framework, the paper analyzes political economy factors influencing stakeholder perceptions and climate change policy implementation to identify political contestations that need to be reconciled. Data is drawn from relevant literature, 29 key informant interviews and 4 focus group discussions at the national level in Nairobi and at the sub-national level in Turkana County. Deductive thematic analysis is adopted for coding and analyzing data. Results indicate that different ideologies, interests, incentives, politics, power relations and contestation over resources largely influence stakeholder perceptions of an effective climate finance coordination mechanism and climate policy implementation. The operationalization of the National Climate Change Council and the National Climate Change Fund are the most contested. The paper calls on policy actors to reconcile political issues of contention for recipient countries to institute coordination mechanisms that gain ownership and widespread legitimacy from stakeholders. Underlying political economy factors including different ideologies, interests, politics, incentives, power relations and contestation over resources largely influence stakeholder perceptions of effective climate finance coordination as well as climate change policy implementation. The consequential political contestations need to be reconciled; otherwise, the established coordination mechanism is less likely to gain ownership and widespread legitimacy from climate change stakeholders. This calls for meaningful and extensive stakeholder engagements and consensus building to minimize contention, particularly over the operationalization of the National Climate Change Council and the National Climate Change Fund in Kenya. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Citizens' assemblies on climate change are increasingly popular to support democratic decision-making. Such Climate Assemblies (CAs) convene representative groups of citizens formulating policy proposals after hearing experts and deliberating intensely. CAs may help addressing climate policy issues more effectively partly because their members need not worry about re-election. CAs' effectiveness depends on their design such as the issues chosen (or not chosen) for deliberation. Agenda-setters exert substantial power by selecting certain issues and by choosing framings that benefit some solutions over others. In this paper I ask: What characterizes agendas that are suitable and legitimate for deliberation in CAs? The aim is to support practitioners in making informed agenda choices for CAs by providing a list of ten widely accepted guiding principles based on expert interviews, policy documents, and information gathered from the Knowledge Network on Climate Assemblies (KNOCA). The paper systematically discusses trade-offs of various agenda choices in the light of different CA rationales. Results show that those with system-supporting rationales tend to favour narrower agendas tailored to political demands aiming to increase immediate policy impact; those with system-disrupting rationales prefer more open agendas allowing citizens to challenge existing political practices and worldviews. Results support earlier arguments that distinctions of entire deliberative processes in either top-down or bottom-up are too simplistic and that a tool-box approach is more useful. Insights appear relevant for debates of deliberative minipublics more generally. Future research should investigate whom to involve in setting CA agendas and with how much power. Effective agenda design hinges on rationales on how to achieve assembly objectives which depend on authorities' ambition for climate action. Given high ambition, system-supportive rationales aiming for policy impact favour narrower agendas tailored to demands of the policy process but risk low transformativeness. Given low ambition, system-disruptive rationales aiming to challenge established practices and worldviews favour more open agendas but risk low impact if assemblies are not politically embedded or able to mobilize opposition groups. Assembly designs are seldom purely supportive or disruptive but often hybrid. Agenda-setting has many dimensions allowing for productive combinations of disruptive and supportive elements tailored to contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has established three rounds of low-carbon pilot city initiatives. However, a gap exists between policy making and successful implementation, and the effects on greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction were found to be different among pilots. This paper considers the question of how low-carbon policies in cities can be implemented effectively and how policy combinations are adopted for GHG emissions reduction. It uses a mixed research approach, including Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and field investigation in Pilot Y (situated in the southwest China). The results show that, first, financial support and monitoring systems are necessary conditions, while political leadership is a sufficient condition. This means that the absence of financial support or monitoring systems could lead to increased GHG emissions, while the presence of political leadership always promotes the reduction of GHG emissions but may not be sufficient on its own to achieve them. Second, the target responsibility system (TRS) – a system used by higher government levels to assess the policy implementation of lower government levels – and human resource mechanisms cannot effectively lead to the promotion of GHG emissions reduction. Finally, in the absence of TRS and human resource mechanisms, environmental information disclosure (EID) was found to effectively promote low-carbon urban development by encouraging public participation. This paper reveals the complexity of the implementation of low-carbon policies in cities, identifies the link between city-level and national action, and enriches the theoretical explanation of governance and low-carbon policy implementation gaps in China. Key policy insights China's low-carbon pilot city project is critical for reducing GHG emissions, however, the effects of the low-carbon pilot city programmes varied greatly. Financial support and monitoring systems are necessary conditions, while political leadership is a sufficient condition to achieve cities' GHG emissions reduction goals. Local low-carbon development is limited and not put into practice at the city level in China, in part because of the absence of financial support and limited political attention. This study highlights the key conditions of organizational behaviour at the meso-level, and enriches the theoretical explanation of environmental policy implementation gaps in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the effects of the collateral-based monetary policy, implemented by the People's Bank of China, on green financing costs. Employing a Difference-in-Differences (DID) method to examine credit spreads of financial bond in primary and secondary markets from 2017 to 2019, our findings highlight a significant decrease of 26 basis points (bps) in the financing costs of green financial bonds in the primary market, with a 12-bps decline in the secondary market post-policy. Our study underscores the crucial role of implicit credit enhancement provided by the People's Bank of China's collateral endorsement. Interestingly, the liquidity provision mechanism, where investors pay premiums to secure liquidity support, does not find empirical backing in the specific context of China's bond market. These findings illuminate the effectiveness of collateral-based monetary policies in reducing green financing costs, offering valuable insights for using collateral strategies to green monetary policies. Collateral-based policies' success in reducing green financing costs suggests a strategic avenue for supporting green monetary policy goals. Implicit credit enhancement serves as a crucial mechanism driving this cost reduction. The People's Bank of China's experience exemplifies the robustness of such policies without requiring strict collateral scarcity, highlighting broad policy applicability. Collateral-based monetary policy could drive the 'green premium', broadening green bond appeal beyond just environmentally-focused investors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Local climate change impacts hit hard at smallholder farmers in developing countries due to their overreliance on rain-fed farming. Whilst ecosystem-based adaptation (EbA) to climate change holds an answer to smallholder farmers' adaptation needs, there are inadequate empirical results from the field to support formulation of effective adaptation strategies. Hence, this paper aimed at investigating EbA practices adopted by farmers, in North-Western Ghana to ameliorate local climate change impacts, with emphasis on benefits and associated challenges. The study methods were cross-sectional survey, mixed methods, and case study approach, with all data collected in the Wa West District of Ghana. Data were gathered using questionnaire, focus group discussion (FGD) and interviews. Data from the questionnaire were entered into SPSS version 20 to analyze associations between the variables using cross-tabulation. Descriptive statistics, in the form of percentages and frequencies, were then generated from the survey data and integrated with the qualitative information in the presentation of results. Also, statistical significance of the relationships was analyzed using chi-square test. Chi-squared tests were done to determine associations between socio-economic and environmental factors, and challenges and benefits associated with the adoption of EbA practices. This was necessary to give further insights to inform policy-related decisions aimed at addressing EbA adoption challenges. The results revealed that farmers use a combination of practices rather than single practice. Farmers integrated crops and trees and keep local breed of farm animals. Benefits of EbA included improvements in soil fertility leading to high crop yield and availability of food and income. Challenges of adopting EbA were the long timespan for benefits of most EbA practices to begin to accrue, lack of extension information and increasing cost of hired labour. It is recommended that tree integration should emphasis trees with multiple benefits and compatible with food crops. For the achievement of food security policy objectives, agroforestry promotion should focus on the integration of fruit tree crops and food crops to address hunger and increase farmers' incomes. Mobile extension technology should be exploited by government for the provision of EbA-specific information to farmers to bridge the extension services gap. Climate change policy of government should include the planting of non-fruit trees as windbreaks to provide multi-purpose benefits including provision of stakes for yam farmers, live-fencing and firewood for women. There is the need for government policy objectives to include EbA by farmers under the flagship 'planting for food and jobs' programme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change is a key socioeconomic and environmental concern in South Africa. The South African government introduced several climate change initiatives to address the impacts of climate change, resulting in the proliferation of climate adaptation policies across spheres of government. This paper studies different climate change adaptation policies and climate policy paradigms (CPP) to understand the adaptation landscape; it explains and compares the changes in CPP in South Africa over time. We mapped 40 policy documents from 2004 to 2022, which shows 12 national policies, 12 provincial (sub-national) policy documents and 14 metropolitan city policy documents. We then used 12 national policy documents to illustrate and understand the CPP. The research shows that different stakeholders have shaped climate change adaptation policy, both private and public firms advised on climate change policy and there are a number of different funding partners supporting the adaptation policy like GEF, C40 and GIZ. The changing policy environment has introduced new frameworks, objectives and processes. Therefore, more efforts will be needed going forward to guide adaptation policy across national, provincial and local governments. We find that several CPPs have emerged, that is different paradigms encompassing a range of policy goals, framings and instruments. The present National CC Adaptation Strategy (NCCAS) mandates adaptation across all levels of government and allows all important stakeholders to address climate change consequences. This NCCAS increases the number and ambition of adaptation policy, encourages integrated approaches, policy coherence and clear direction on how to handle climate risks and impacts in varied South Africa and its global commitment. Changes in policy paradigm enable the use of new policy instruments, including funding and budget mechanisms. Finally, climate adaptation policy has become more ambitious and stringent, requiring all levels of government to plan for climate change. The climate change policy landscape in South Africa has grown over the past 18 years, with policy development across different spheres of government (national, sectoral, provincial and metros), New CPPs have emerged, supported by new policy frames, goals and instruments. The NCCAS provides a clear policy goal, which also provides new policy instruments to implement climate actions and acts to enhance integrated approaches, The lack of domestic budget allocation remains a challenge for national government, but external partnerships have begun to provide support for policy development. Notably, a shift from a flexible to stringent approach to climate policy is needed to deliver effective climate action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rapid urbanization and climate change are two grand challenges faced by many cities in pursuing sustainable urban development. While ecosystem-based adaptation practices are increasingly recognized and adopted across the world as an important urban development strategy, their effective implementation in diverse biophysical conditions and development contexts is of interest, requiring scientific research and learning. This paper presents the case of China in implementing an ecosystem-based approach – sponge city development – to address the water-related challenges of urbanization and climate change. It draws on the literature to synthesize understanding of the interaction between the urban landscape, urban development, and ecosystem services, and proposes mainstreaming an ecosystem service framework in spatial planning and performance evaluation to guide ecosystem-based adaption practices. Focusing on China's practice, the paper develops a five-step procedure for operationalizing and mainstreaming ecosystem services so as to improve policy implementation for sponge city development. This paper aims to provide a practical perspective to help enhance ecosystem-based adaptation in urban development to better address the challenges of urbanization and climate change. Cities are increasingly looking into ecosystem-based adaptation, as an integrated part of urban development, to increase resilience to climate change and to promote urban sustainability. China's experience with implementing a national initiative called sponge city development contributes to learning and an understanding of ecosystem-based adaptation practices to address urbanization and climate change challenges. Existing literature shows the need and potential for an ecosystem service framework to guide spatial planning and performance evaluation for ecosystem-based adaptation. China is in a unique position to mainstream an ecosystem service framework in sponge city development to improve current practice and to promote climate-resilient and ecosystem-integrated urban development. A five-step empirical procedure outlines a systematic approach for mainstreaming ecosystem services, contributing to the literature and policy practice to build urban resilience and sustainability in the face of urbanization and climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change policies are prepared in a power-loaded environment, where different policy actors interact to meet their personal or collective interests. This paper argues that the 'power interplay' between actors plays a significant role in shaping and re-shaping climate change policies. We present examples from South Asia (Nepal, India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan) to show how actors' power interplay at the local, sub-national, national and transboundary levels influences climate change policy-making. We show that negative effects of power interplay are prominent in the climate policy domain of South Asia, including short-termism of local adaptation plans, exclusion of certain policy actors in the policy-making processes, lack of transboundary-level adaptation, and lack of coordination between actors. Nuances also exist, such as the state's authority in prioritizing technical solutions, exclusionary design and implementation of climate policies, and an agenda of securitization; these can further marginalize the actors involved in climate change policy processes. The negative effects of power interplay in South Asia can limit the success of on-the-ground implementation of adaptation and mitigation strategies, limit adaptive capacity among communities, and possibly counter the development of a strong climate change solutions space. Lastly, we argue that there are no silver bullet solutions to power asymmetries and appeal to policy actors – in South Asia and elsewhere – to design context-specific and power-sensitive policy-making approaches. Negative effects of power interplay have led to the exclusion of certain policy actors (especially communities at risk) in policy-making processes and a lack of transboundary-level adaptation in South Asia. Hard infrastructure-based adaptation measures tend to exacerbate the vulnerability of the communities at risk in South Asia. Policy actors must design context-specific and power-sensitive policy-making climate adaptation and mitigation approaches to reduce the negative impacts of power interplay. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Paris Agreement's nationally driven structure puts the spotlight on financing strategies at the national level. The role of national funding vehicles in mobilizing climate finance, however, has not received extensive attention. This paper remedies this gap by introducing a novel dataset of national climate funds established in developing countries. The database creates an inventory of national financing vehicles and tracks their major attributes, including scope, legal form, and the host, among others. We show that 39 countries have established national climate funds. These funds seek to access and mobilize finance from various sources, domestic and international. Most of these funds have broad mandates to tackle climate change, while a smaller share has a more targeted, sectoral focus. Funding sources vary from taxes to international aid. The funds offer a limited range of financial instruments, primarily awarding grants. The funds also differ in how integrated they are with overarching climate plans and strategies. We also find that most developing countries use existing budget lines to target finance towards climate change objectives. Only five countries track public expenditure on the basis of dedicated budget codes. This paper contributes to the literature by providing an empirical basis to pursue questions regarding the role and effectiveness of national climate funds. For policymakers, the limited range of instruments at the disposal of many of these national climate funds also suggests a need to ensure that the national climate funds have the design features they need to support the implementation of national policy goals. Key policy insights Systematic data on public climate finance are scarce. Most governments do not use climate change codes to track their expenditures related to climate change. Policymakers should adopt practices that will help instil transparency in public expenditure on climate change. Policymakers have to revisit the design features of national climate funds such as legal form and areas of operation as the wider operating context changes. Funds accredited with multilateral climate funds are underutilized by fund contributors. The Green Climate Fund's direct access modality offers one major avenue to foster synergies between national climate funds and multilateral climate funds. Policymakers have the opportunity to harvest lessons from existing funds and calibrate climate policies accordingly, especially as countries contemplate setting revenue-generating carbon prices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been tasked with quickly devising a climate change strategy that helps its members meet collective climate change and development goals while maintaining financial stability. In this paper, we develop an analytical framework of the 'macro-critical' nature of climate change and use that framework to examine the extent to which the IMF has incorporated the macro-economic aspects of climate change in recent years. We deploy textual analysis algorithms to perform a baseline analysis of the extent to which the IMF's main bilateral surveillance activities—Article IV reports and Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs)—have focused on climate risks between 2017 and 2021. We find that IMF surveillance activity has paid little and uneven attention to climate risks in Article IV reports, and even less so in FSAPs. However, recent Article IV and FSAP assessments have piloted climate risk analyses that present an opportunity to be expanded and incorporated systematically. The analytical framework, baseline analysis, and methodology will allow future analysts to monitor IMF climate performance over time. Key policy insights Multilateral institutions should analyze and incorporate 'macro-critical' climate risks to fiscal and financial systems in their policy frameworks toolkit. The IMF needs to rapidly fill this gap in the climate policy architecture through reforms to its surveillance, advisory, and lending functions. The IMF, as a safeguard of monetary and financial stability, should incorporate climate risks cohesively and comprehensively into its analysis, including spillover or the cross-border consequences of climate change, and reallocate its tools and resources to this end. This paper provides a method and baseline from which to evaluate the evolution of IMF policy toward incorporating climate risk into its bilateral surveillance toolkit, specifically Article IV exercises and FSAPs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States (U.S.) and China are key to meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement and reaching carbon neutrality by around mid-century. Despite differences, carbon neutrality will be met more rapidly if the two countries coordinate and facilitate synergies in carbon-neutral technologies and policy development and implementation. Building on long-term pathway models in the U.S. and China, current emissions trends and sources, and a policy analysis, this paper puts forward a novel framework for U.S.-China coordination on carbon neutrality. The analysis reveals similar technology and policy pathways, policy gaps, and shared milestones for decarbonization in 2030, 2040, and 2050-2060. The main technological pathways focus on reductions in energy demand and non-energy-related CO2 emissions, decarbonization of electricity and fuels, and increases in electrification rates and CO2 sequestration. Given existing domestic policies and opportunities for further action, areas for coordination on carbon neutrality include common policy milestones; dialogue and technical exchange; research, development, and demonstration (RD&D); and international climate leadership. Despite escalated tensions between the U.S. and China, and challenges for climate cooperation, coordination between both countries on carbon neutrality is both possible and necessary. Carbon neutrality will be met more swiftly if the U.S. and China coordinate and facilitate synergies in carbon-neutral technologies and policy. Despite the rise in geo-political tensions between the U.S. and China, coordination on carbon neutrality is both possible and necessary. An analytical framework for U.S.-China coordination on carbon neutrality, includes technology and policy pathways, and common milestones of key sectors' decarbonization for 2030, 2040, and 2050-2050. The two countries could coordinate on common policy milestones, dialogue and technical exchange, research and development, and international climate leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows are considered to be an important source of private financing for several emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs). However, the high susceptibility of these countries to climate change impacts vis-à-vis their developed counterparts may reduce their attractiveness as a favourable destination for FDI inflows. EMDEs with significant exposure to physical climate risks present a higher incidence of financial risks for foreign investors, which may in turn discourage them from locating themselves in such jurisdictions where their profitability and operations could be jeopardized by climate disasters. Given this context, we empirically investigate how physical climate risks influence FDI inflows to 68 EMDEs using data from over two decades, from 1995 to 2017. We contribute to an emerging body of literature that assesses the impact of climate risks on macro-financial variables by focusing specifically on FDI inflows. Although we abstain from making strong causal claims in our paper, we account for endogeneity concerns extensively and our empirical results show that higher climate risks adversely impact FDI inflows to EMDEs. However, we find these negative effects can be mitigated to a significant degree by strengthening financial sector development in the host country, as it increases their capacity to absorb some of these climate risks more effectively. Key policy insights Emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs) that are more vulnerable and exposed to physical climate risks tend to be less attractive destinations for FDI inflows. Negative effects of physical climate risks on FDI inflows tend to be mitigated in EMDEs with a high degree of financial development. Well-developed, deep, and inclusive financial markets give EMDEs the capacity to absorb and manage various financial risks including those arising from climate change impacts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humankind faces a Triple Challenge: averting dangerous climate change, reversing biodiversity loss, and supporting the wellbeing of a growing population. Action to address each of these issues is inherently dependent on action to address the others. Local, national, and international policy goals on climate change, biological diversity, and human wellbeing have been set. Current implementation measures are insufficient to meet these goals, but the Triple Challenge can still be met if governments, corporations, and other stakeholders take a holistic perspective on management of land and waters. To inform this effort, we identify a set of priority policy responses drawn from recent international assessments that, whilst not being the only potential solutions, can form the core of such a holistic approach. We do this through an iterative process using three methodological approaches: (i) structured literature review; (ii) deliberative expert analysis; and (iii) wider consultation, before synthesizing into this paper. Context-appropriate implementation of responses will be needed to capitalize on potential policy synergies and to ensure that unavoidable trade-offs between management of land and waters for climate mitigation, biodiversity restoration, and human wellbeing outcomes are made explicit. We also set out four approaches to managing trade-offs that can promote fair and just transitions: (1) social and economic policy pivoting towards 'inclusive wealth'; (2) more integrated policymaking across the three areas; (3) 'Triple Challenge dialogues' among state and non-state actors; and (4) a new research portfolio to underpin (1), (2), and (3). Multiple recent global assessments provide a strong scientific basis for action on each of the three aspects of the Triple Challenge – climate, biodiversity, and human wellbeing (with a focus on food and nutrition) – but they do not provide an integrated perspective on how to address them simultaneously. Synthesis of these assessments identifies a portfolio of five core policy responses that deliver across the Triple Challenge: (i) rapidly cutting fossil fuel use; (ii) promoting sustainable, healthy diets; (iii) increasing food productivity and cutting food loss and waste; (iv) implementing nature-based solutions at scale; and (v) strengthening governance and management of land and waters. Even with widespread implementation of that portfolio, trade-offs between climate, biodiversity, and wellbeing outcomes might be unavoidable. Policymakers, researchers, and other actors should explicitly identify such trade-offs, and take steps to ensure management priorities are set through equitable dialogue processes informed by integrated research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Financial risks related to climate change and biodiversity loss are currently being addressed in a largely siloed manner. Neglecting their interconnections, however, may lead to 'blind spots' and misestimations of systemic financial risk, potentially undermining progress on both climate finance policy and emerging policy on biodiversity-related financial risks (BRFR). In particular, the 'risk measurement–based' approach dominating climate finance policy, which is now being taken up to address BRFR, is poorly equipped to address the radical uncertainty that characterises both types of risks. Furthermore, many BRFR may materalise over a more immediate horizon than climate risks. In this paper, we examine how central banks and financial supervisors are approaching the topic of BRFR in relation to climate-related financial risk. We argue that policymakers should focus upon the broader concept of systemic environmental-financial risks to account for the interactions and trade-offs between both domains of biodiversity and climate change. Instead of seeking evidence of financial materiality before acting, focusing on how the financial system is actively facilitating direct drivers of environmental damage offers a way for financial policymakers to assess potential sources of such risks on the basis of information available today. In turn, policy interventions should aim to reduce harmful flows of finance that may lead to the crossing of dangerous ecological tipping points. Financial policymakers need to think beyond siloes, and act on a precautionary basis to manage climate- and biodiversity-related financial risks concurrently. Financial authorities, coordinating with relevant government departments, should define business activities that are most harmful to climate and biodiversity, especially those contributing to ecological tipping points, e.g. activities linked to tropical deforestation, which will damage both domains. To aid transparency and supervisory risk assessment, financial supervisors could require the mandatory disclosure of portfolio composition, risk management, and due diligence procedures relating to the financing of identified harmful activities. Financial regulators could use their toolkits to discourage the financing of such activities, e.g. by applying punitive capital requirements. This approach may require greater coordination between central banks and other government departments to maintain democratic legitimacy and support existing central bank mandates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ecosystems provide essential services that form the basis of human well-being. Climate change-induced losses and damages to ecosystem services (l&d-ES) thus have significant impacts on societies. Yet, little of the work on losses and damages (l&d) has focused on ecosystem services. Also in international climate negotiations, where the debate emerged with the establishment of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM), there remains space for better understanding and addressing l&d-ES. Part of the explanation of this lies in the challenge of assessing such l&d. To address this gap, this paper reviews scientific literature and data obtained from Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNAs) to explore ways forward for more in depth assessments. The review confirms that little attention has been given to the topic, identifying 27 relevant scientific papers with only 6 providing a disaggregated monetary value for l&d-ES. Also amongst the 64 analyised PDNAs, only 12 report such disaggregated value; valuing just one ecosystem service per impacted ecosystem. The review finds that the majority of both the scientific literature and the PDNAs relies on extrapolating values from the literature. To enhance l&d-ES assessment and, with that, the opportunity for better understanding, recognition and uptake by e.g. the WIM, this paper makes three recommendations: 1. establishing a baseline of ecosystems recognized for their services of disaster risk reduction and/or climate change adaptation, while highlighting the need for an accessible and representative benefit transfer database; 2. enhancing collaboration between scientists and practitioners; and 3. quantitatively increasing data on l&d-ES. Key policy insights There remains space for better understanding and addressing l&d-ES. To facilitate assessing l&d-ES, the establishment of ecological baselines should be encouraged for ecosystem services that can be reported on in other circumstances. Additionally, a benefit transfer database is needed that is that is geographically and ecologically representative, explicitly oriented towards l&d-ES, and easily accessible to both researchers and decision-makers. Considering the divergence of ecosystems addressed by different stakeholders, it may be advisable to encourage the collaboration of a wide stakeholder range, including scientists, to collect data that advance the understanding of l&d-ES. Disaggregated assessment of l&d-ES should be quantitatively increased and the WIM could encourage the reporting of l&d-ES, in order to expand the database and understanding of l&d-ES. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People experiencing homeless have greater vulnerabilities in relation to climate change that require a range of policy and systems approaches. There are two interrelated areas that policymakers can consider in relation to climate change and homelessness: migration and exposure. This synthesis of the available data and expert opinion provides practical information to policymakers, with specific strategies alongside case examples. The data captured here is through systematic reviews, and expert opinion is generated through input from a year-long series of five virtual think tanks. Throughout this synthesis paper, an emphasis is placed on explicitly addressing homeless populations in the policies and plans designed to address climate change-related impacts. Prevention-oriented plans are shown to be more effective in terms of outcomes and cost-effectiveness compared to the more commonly deployed crisis response models. Another key issue considered is the availability of relevant data with which to target policy responses and evaluate outcomes. Data-driven responses tend to be more successful, though relevant data are, to date, lacking for homeless and other marginalized populations. Moreover, effective policy design in this area needs to be intersectional and inclusive, tailored to the needs of local communities and developed in consultation with lived experience stakeholders, including service providers. Policies that ignore local input tend to fail. Prevention-oriented, culturally-situated, and trauma-informed systems and services hold the greatest promise in responding to the severe health risks and inequities that homeless populations face in the climate crisis. Key policy insights Prevention-oriented measures are key, with most focussing on the availability of affordable housing and upgrading housing and living conditions of vulnerable populations. There is a need to include lived experience and input from local communities, especially when designing measures that will impact livelihoods, such as planned migration. Disaster, crisis response, and aftercare plans need to outline explicit measures for homeless populations. There is a need for cross-sectoral alignment of policy and intervention responses. Successful approaches tend to be culturally-situated and trauma-informed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last decades several Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) have been implemented to interrupt the intergenerational transmission of poverty. More recently, they have also been used as a policy response to provide support to households hit by the COVID crisis. CCTs are being deployed as a development tool to reduce local communities' vulnerability, increasing their resilience and capacity to adapt. In this context, this paper investigates if CCTs can reduce vulnerability to climate change by increasing the adaptative capacity of local communities. Indeed, while some literature has found that CCTs can reduce specific dimensions of vulnerability to socio-economic shocks, we argue that more research is necessary to understand their impact on vulnerability to climate change. Empirically, we use a panel of household survey data collected in Colombia in 2002 and 2006. We employ a difference-in-differences approach to analyse the impact of the CCT programme Familia en Acción (FA) CCTs on rural households. We consider seven components of vulnerability linked to climate change aggregated in an index: wealth, health, access to information, access to basic facilities, financial vulnerability, resilience to natural disasters, and nutrition. Our results differ from previous research and indicate that CCTs provided by the FA program do not decrease vulnerability to climate change. This finding suggests that CCTs are not a universal solution to reducing vulnerability to climate change and may be ineffective in specific contexts. The literature often assumes that CCTs can have a mitigating effect on vulnerability to climate change. Our research shows that in the context of Colombia, this assumption is incorrect. The idea that providing monthly payments to households can reduce vulnerability to climate change should be considered with caution, given limited empirical evidence. Policy makers and scholars should consider the multidimensional nature of vulnerability and design targeted interventions and avoid considering CCTs as a panacea to all aspects of vulnerability to climate change. Our models show that the FA programme failed to have a significant impact in reducing vulnerability to climate change using several different specifications. We show that CCTs do not have an impact on numerous essential components such as wealth, health, access to infrastructure, information and knowledge, financial coping mechanisms, food consumption, and exposure to natural disasters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many studies have emphasized the importance of community-based natural resource management institutions in adapting to climate change and responding to the global shift towards individualized land tenure regimes. However, few have reported on the innovative institutions developed by some rural communities to rebuild community cooperation and rural adaptive capacity. This paper draws on four comparative cases from the Tibetan Plateau to assess how locally developed community cooperative institutions mediate herders' access to markets and resources to foster adaptive capacity and adaptation in response to snow-related catastrophes. Results demonstrate that community cooperative institutions are more effective in improving adaptive capacity than the market-based adaptation strategies that are the predetermined outcome of individualized tenure regimes. When such cooperative institutions exist, community members are able to apply both household and community collective adaptation strategies, resulting in better livelihood outcomes. Community cooperative institutions effectively address individual needs and priorities by clarifying entitlements and market-based networks. They rebuild community collective action and cooperative business entities that improve herders' ability to access resources and markets more equally by distributing benefits to all community members. This study concludes that following the establishment of individualized land tenure regimes, rebuilding community cooperation necessitates hybridization of property rights arrangements, reformed institutions, and social networks operating across levels of governance to facilitate interdependent interactions between collective and individual adaptation strategies. Such community cooperation offers new opportunities for improving adaptive capacity in pastoral regions and elsewhere. Market-based institutions and adaptation strategies are significant components of climate adaptation policies in pastoral and agricultural regions, though they face equity and collective action-building challenges. Adaptative capacity should be understood as a function of cross-level interactions among individuals, community organizations, and external stakeholders. These cases of community cooperative institutions offer new insights into coordinating the interactions between individual-level and community-level adaptation practices. Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) institutions can restore collective management of natural resources and stimulate formal economic cooperation to build bridging networks with other stakeholders; this generates opportunities for all community members to more broadly access resources and markets to improve adaptive capacity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to improve understanding of how EU citizens' left-right political positions and ideological polarization on climate change affect their views on both agriculture and diet in the context of climate change policy. It uses the methods of survey research and quantitative analyses of the data (principal components and regression analysis). The work combines the Farm- and Fork-related branches of Eurobarometer 93.2 (2020) and focuses on citizens' responses to a more climate-friendly agriculture and their ideas about 'eating a healthy and sustainable diet'. The analysis revealed different degrees of citizen support for a more climate-friendly agriculture and climate-friendly dietary options (including meat reduction). Citizens' left-right political position correlated negatively with support for a more climate-friendly agriculture and support for climate-friendly dietary options, but only in the Northwestern European countries. In these countries, the expected positive correlations between level of education and pro-environmental variables were found, but these correlations were not observed among the right-leaning participants. However, the positive correlation between support for a more climate-friendly agriculture and support for climate-friendly dietary options was less strongly affected by left-right political positions. Hence, public opinion is moving in the direction of EU climate policy over time; however, citizens did not fully acknowledge the priority of meat reduction in this context. Political and ideological polarization has seriously interfered with attempts to promote a more climate-friendly agriculture (Farm) and changes in dietary thinking including meat reduction (Fork). To promote these changes, more work must be done on the role of cultural identities in relation to climate issues. Yet, EU citizens showed an increasing support for more climate-friendly agriculture, which correlated positively with support for climate-friendly dietary options across the left-right political spectrum. Science-based information regarding climate risks and/or loyalty to local farmers may play a role in shaping these opinions. The priority of meat reduction needs considerably more attention to achieve the EU's climate objectives. For citizens, both nutritional (health) and environmental (i.e. climate change, as well as species decline and farm animal welfare) reasons can be strong motivating factors to consider meat reduction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thailand's Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) aims to reduce 20 to 25% of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions with respect to the projected reference level of NDC in 2030, respectively, in its unconditional and conditional scenarios. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states that limiting global temperature rise to 1.5°C would require net zero carbon dioxide emissions globally by around 2050. Thailand's current energy system is highly fossil fuel dependent and requires enormous transformations to achieve more stringent GHG emission reduction targets beyond its NDC. This paper seeks to estimate the level and the intensities of Thailand's energy system and their economy-wide effects post-2030 under the business as usual and 16 GHG emission reduction scenarios ranging from 30 to 100% by 2050. A computable general equilibrium analysis using the AIM/Hub model is employed to estimate the macroeconomic impacts of meeting the unconditional and conditional emission reductions of Thailand's NDC in 2030 along with varying GHG emission reductions in 2050. Results show that renewables – constituting solar, wind, biomass and hydro and carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies account for more than 95% in the power generation mix by 2050, if 100% GHG emission reduction from the 2010 level is to be achieved. Electricity generation based on biomass both with and without CCS will occupy a major share in the investments by 2050 in all the conditional and unconditional NDC scenarios. A rapid increase in carbon sequestration occurs from 2040 onwards through the deployment of CCS and bioenergy with CCS (BECCS) technologies in all the conditional and unconditional NDC scenarios. Carbon prices lie in the range of 3.4–266.2 US$/tCO2eq during 2025–2050 to achieve 100% GHG emission reductions in 2050. Imposition of early stringent mitigation target lowers the carbon prices in the conditional scenarios towards 2050 when compared to the unconditional scenarios. The rapid uptake of CCS, energy efficiency improvements and electrification of the end-use technologies are identified to be the key measures to transform the energy system of Thailand. By 2050, the Thai economy would face a higher fall in both the GDP and household consumption in the unconditional scenarios than those in the conditional scenarios at all levels of GHG emission reduction. Results indicate that early mitigation efforts can be less costly than the delayed ones in the long-term. The cumulative investment needed to achieve decarbonization in Thailand is estimated to exceed 355 billion US$2005 over the period 2010–2050 in the 100% GHG reduction scenarios. The transmission and distribution investments in the power sector need to increase by 30–35% to attain 100% GHG emission reductions during 2010–2050. The trade deficit improves by up to 23–29% in the various GHG mitigation scenarios in 2050. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'Losses and damages' refer to impacts of climate change that have not been, or cannot be, avoided through mitigation and adaptation efforts. After the establishment of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM), Loss and Damage is now considered the third pillar – besides mitigation and adaptation – of climate action under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This paper studies what the Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC WGII AR5) has to say about this emerging topic. We use qualitative data analysis software (text mining) to assess which climatic stressors, impact sectors and regions the report primarily associates with losses and damages, and compare this with the focus areas of the WIM. The study reveals that IPCC WGII AR5 primarily associates losses and damages with extreme weather events and economic impacts, and treats it primarily as a future risk. Present-day losses and damages from slow-onset processes and non-economic losses receive much less attention. Also, surprisingly, AR5 has more to say about losses and damages in high-income regions than in regions that are most at risk, such as small island states and least developed countries. The paper concludes with recommendations to the IPCC for its 6th Assessment Report (AR6) to include more evidence on losses and damages from slow-onset processes, non-economic losses and damages and losses and damages in vulnerable countries. Key policy insights IPCC WGII AR5 discusses evidence about losses and damages predominantly in relation to sudden-onset disasters and economic costs. More research is needed on losses and damages from slow-onset processes and non-economic loss and damage, particularly in vulnerable countries in the Global South. Funding agencies should support research in these areas and IPCC WGII AR6 should pay more attention to these topics. Losses and damages are not only a future risk, but already a present-day reality for vulnerable people in climate hotspots. People-centred research by social scientists is crucial for enhancing understanding of what losses and damages mean in the real world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Article 8 of the 2015 Paris Agreement calls on the parties to cooperate to address 'loss and damage' associated with the adverse effects of climate change. Insurance is one of the solutions that the provision points to in this respect. This paper examines whether so-called parametric risk pooling may provide a useful tool to this end by examining lessons from three multi-country parametric risk pooling schemes. The examination shows that parametric risk pooling schemes require careful design in order to work optimally and that even then, they do not represent a miracle solution. In particular, the paper points out that the three schemes only provide a limited response in the period directly after a devastating hazard has struck. Therefore, the ensuing support required must come from other sources. The paper concludes that parametric risk pooling may provide a valuable tool for addressing loss and damage, but must be complemented by a range of other tools to comprehensively address the loss and damage challenges posed by climate change. Key policy insights Parametric insurance schemes can provide a useful tool to respond to natural hazards caused by climate change in developing countries. Parametric insurance schemes require careful design and only provide interim coverage between the time when a natural hazard occurs and when classic humanitarian aid arrives. Due to continued financial limitations on the part of the insurance-takers, parametric insurance in developing countries is dependent upon donor assistance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The majority of developing countries have indicated capacity building as a condition for implementing their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement. This is in the context of shortfalls in past initiatives on capacity building under different bilateral and multilateral agencies including bodies of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which can be largely attributed to their short-term, ad-hoc, supply-driven, and project-based nature. Article 11 of the Paris Agreement points to a potentially new paradigm for capacity building. Based on a review of literature on past experience, as well as analysis of countries' capacity building perspectives in the NDCs, this paper attempts to draw lessons for better capacity building for NDC implementation. The paper aims at answering the questions: What are the capacity building needs expressed in the NDCs? Where are the matches and mismatches with past efforts, and what kind of capacity building can address the current needs? We propose a capacity building framework that addresses climate change as a long term problem. We suggest that universities in developing countries should serve as central hubs for a sustainable, institution-based capacity building system, supported by strengthened partnerships and long term financing. Finally, we suggest that, for the next round of NDCs, developing countries should be more explicit and specific in their demands and approaches to capacity building. Key policy insights The next round of developing countries' NDCs should be more specific about their capacity building needs and align them better with the financial support system under the Paris Agreement. The capacity building needs identified in the NDCs fall short of learning from previous efforts, including that capacity building must be specific and demand-driven, to ensure country ownership. A new framework for capacity building needs to be established, with: a capacity building mechanism under the UNFCCC, developing country universities as the central hub; strengthened partnerships; and a long term financial support system. This framework should be tailored towards the differences in capacity needs among different groups of developing countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Populism and its rhetoric are on the rise. Political actors across different ideological camps and parties are employing dispositional blame attribution, emphasizing the non-responsiveness of 'corrupt elites' to the needs of 'good and honest' people. In this paper, we focus on one specific and common area of blame attribution; climate change. In particular, in the United States, a central player in global climate governance, climate change is a very contested issue. The successes of populist candidates in both major US parties suggest that populism could affect citizen support for climate mitigation policies. The often abstract, elite-driven, and technical nature of climate change makes this issue an ideal target for populist critique. Our paper offers an empirical assessment of this claim. First, we test whether populism truly has an independent effect on people's climate attitudes. Second, we assess to what extent frames about elite responsiveness are important heuristics for individuals in their formation of preferences concerning climate policies. To accomplish this goal, we fielded representative US surveys (N = 3000) and collected both observational and experimental data. Results suggest that populist attitudes enhance the effects of partisanship, rather than creating an independent, orthogonal dimension. Populist Democrats support climate policies more than non-populist Democrats do, whereas populist Republicans oppose such policies more than non-populist Republicans do. Additionally, while our experimental results indicate that populist treatments blaming elites for being non-responsive to citizens' preferences do not affect policy support, we also find that reassuring individuals that political elites care about citizens' needs and preferences in relation to climate policy increases support for the latter. Key policy insights Citizens' support is central for implementing ambitious climate policies. Populist attitudes amplify partisanship effects on public opinion about climate policy. Populist discourse per se is not an obstacle to adopting ambitious climate policy in the US. Political entrepreneurs can foster support for climate policies by emphasizing elite responsiveness to citizens' needs and preferences. Populist attacks on established elites are unlikely to derail support for climate policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU's work on climate change is key to the regional and international fight against the problem, and disruptions to it have global implications. When analyzing the effects of the UK's decision to leave the EU (Brexit) on EU climate action, this paper looks at two types of impact. The first is related to UK absence from EU climate policy, finance and diplomacy following the actual UK departure from the EU. The second is related to the costs attached to the withdrawal process, including the additional costs and uncertainty created by the delayed UK departure. These latter implications of Brexit have been less explored by the literature, although the last years provide plenty of evidence for them. The paper finds that the impact of Brexit on EU climate action is mainly negative, without denying some potential positive impact and while acknowledging the limitations of a study that entails forecasting in an uncertain political context. Key policy insights Following Brexit, the EU will lose a member that supported its climate action internally and internationally through commitment to high emissions reduction targets at the EU level, policy solutions, and financial and diplomatic support. The withdrawal process itself has had a negative impact on EU climate action: Brexit has hijacked the EU agenda, captured EU human and administrative resources and increased the uncertainty in which investors and businesses operate. Planning for separate European Councils to deal with Brexit could prevent agenda hijacking. Both the EU and UK also need to provide businesses with a clear regulatory framework. A repeatedly postponed Brexit has caused additional damage, by prolonging uncertainty. Continuing to work with the UK on climate during the Brexit negotiations and after the UK departure should be a priority for the EU, as well as ensuring the willingness to cooperate is not spoiled by mutual resentment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change communication on social media plays a prominent role in efforts undertaken by state agencies, NGOs, and international organizations, to make citizens aware of this phenomenon. The images used to communicate climate change are of great importance, since they can help to effectively raise citizen awareness. Building upon news values theory and the concept of availability heuristics, this research paper aims to identify principles that can be used for effective visual communication of climate change on social media on a cross-national scale, based upon analyses of characteristics of images that foster interaction on Twitter. We conducted a content analysis of a random selection of images (photographs, illustrations, and graphics, n = 380), posted on Twitter that were included in the so-called 'top tweets' about climate change. The results indicate that the types of images that are used on social media are relatively similar to those employed by conventional media, although images of identifiable people are less frequently shown on social media. We also deduced that four practical principles are especially relevant to foster user interaction on Twitter through images: (i) show 'real people' (i.e. non-staged images of people that transmit real emotions), (ii) tell a story, (iii) include a local connection, and (iv) show impacts or actions by people who are directly affected. These practical principles are based on the more general principles of meaningfulness and personification, two foundations that can help to overcome some of the main barriers to citizens' perception of climate change as a relevant issue with serious consequences in their lives. Campaigns on social media that use imagery based on these practical and general principles can be effective in communicating the shared responsibility to address climate change. This can have a relevant impact on social perception, since it can encourage citizens to care about climate, which is regarded as necessary to increase participation in climate action. Social media can play a prominent role in campaigns to make citizens aware of climate change. Images can help to effectively raise citizen awareness of climate change. Four practical principles can be effective in increasing user interaction on social media with images about climate: show 'real' people, tell a story, include a local connection, and show people who are directly affected. Visual campaigns based on the more general principles of meaningfulness and personification can be effective in representing climate change as a relevant issue in citizens' lives. These practical and more general principles can have a relevant impact on the social perception of climate change and increase citizen participation in climate debate and action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emissions trading, also known as cap-and-trade systems, has not yet fulfilled its function of mitigating overall global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The reasons for this failure are manifold and have been broadly discussed at political and empirical levels in the last decades. However, much can still be said from a philosophical perspective. Such an analysis is not limited to the evaluation of cap-and-trade systems' lack of efficiency and the consequences arising from it but goes deeper into the moral questions underlying cap-and-trade systems. This is how this paper attempts to contribute to and expand the debate on emissions trading at different levels. By examining a popular analogy between traditional and climate commons, I challenge some of the economic and normative assumptions at the core of cap-and-trade systems. I argue that these assumptions lead to misguided conclusions in responding to the causes of climate change. This will partly explain why, although emissions trading is intended to fulfil a duty to mitigate greenhouse gases, we should not pin all our hopes on it just yet. Key policy insights The problems associated with free access to the traditional and climate commons can be conceived of in an analogous way, but the solutions to address them cannot. These include market-based policies focusing on the distribution of property rights over the atmosphere's capacity to absorb GHGs. Like other common resources, the atmosphere's capacity to absorb GHGs is limited and subject to deterioration due to free access and competing consumption. Unlike other common resources, there is no ability to restrict, control or sanction non-cooperative behaviour that continues to pollute the atmosphere. This poses a major challenge to the effectiveness of cap-and-trade systems. Emissions trading systems can be attractive mechanisms for pursuing GHGs targets by minimizing the costs of pollution while limiting the impact of mitigation on the overall economy. Nevertheless, even efficient emissions trading systems fail to fully address the moral concerns that lie at the heart of our current climate crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate-induced population displacement and resettlement is an ongoing problem around the world, and one that is being exacerbated by climate change. To date, most attempts to address this problem have taken a top-down approach in which international justice, legal and humanitarian frameworks are extended 'downwards' by policymakers and governments to local populations. However, there has been limited systematic work that emphasizes the abilities of affected peoples themselves to develop and formulate their own justice-based solutions. This paper presents an analytical framework for thinking about 'bottom-up' claims-making that emphasizes naming, blaming, claiming and framing. The framework enables claims-making to be distinguished from other forms of community-based agency, such as adaptation. The paper also suggests a normative framework to support policymakers and practitioners in helping communities facing displacement to make claims. The normative framework focuses on the barriers to, and opportunities for, claims-making 'from below'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) has emerged as a promising climate change mitigation mechanism in developing countries. In order to identify the enabling conditions for achieving progress in the implementation of an effective, efficient and equitable REDD+, this paper examines national policy settings in a comparative analysis across 13 countries with a focus on both institutional context and the actual setting of the policy arena. The evaluation of REDD+ revealed that countries across Africa, Asia and Latin America are showing some progress, but some face backlashes in realizing the necessary transformational change to tackle deforestation and forest degradation. A Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) undertaken as part of the research project showed two enabling institutional configurations facilitating progress: (1) the presence of already initiated policy change; and (2) scarcity of forest resources combined with an absence of any effective forestry framework and policies. When these were analysed alongside policy arena conditions, the paper finds that the presence of powerful transformational coalitions combined with strong ownership and leadership, and performance-based funding, can both work as a strong incentive for achieving REDD+ goals. Key policy insights The positive push of already existing policy change, or the negative stress of resource scarcity together with lack of effective policies, represents institutional conditions that can support REDD+ progress. Progress also requires the presence of powerful transformational coalitions and strong ownership and leadership. In the absence of these internal drivers, performance-based funding can work as a strong incentive. When comparing three assessments (2012, 2014, 2016) of REDD+ enabling conditions, some progress in establishing processes of change can be observed over time; however, the overall fluctuation in progress of most countries reveals the difficulty in changing the deforestation trajectory away from business as usual. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The global and long-term nature of climate change conflicts with the self-interest and short-term dominated priorities of decision-makers. Climate change mitigation makes sense at the global level, but not at the level of the individual decision-maker. This conflict has been and remains the main obstacle to effective global cooperation and mitigation. This paper proposes a framework that aligns climate action with short-term self-interest through results-based payments to governments. Its key components are: determining an emission benchmark for each country as well as a price for carbon saving; paying countries annually for reducing emissions below their respective benchmark; a new international fund to finance these annual payments by borrowing capital from private investors; and repaying borrowings in the long-term through payments made by countries to the fund based on a predetermined allocation mechanism. This framework would offer important benefits over an approach focused on allocating climate action or a carbon budget among countries. These include the improved prospect of reaching an effective climate agreement and delivering fast and dramatic mitigation thanks to stronger political commitment, the transformation of short-term self-interest from an obstacle into a driver of climate action, and the additional financing created. The paper also proposes a pilot scheme focusing on hydrofluorocarbon emissions with a considerably lower financing requirement. This offers the possibility of an alternative financing mechanism, and thus a faster and more straightforward implementation path. Short-term financial incentives offered to governments could turn policy action from a burden into an opportunity from their perspective unlocking a huge potential for timely mitigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mitigating climate change is often framed as the ultimate collective action problem of this era and great emphasis is made on the need for approaches that foster 'cooperation' and 'consensus'. This paper argues that the irony of this rhetoric could not be more stark; climate policy framing is an exclusionary process, and climate mitigating interventions that are engineered essentially to address neoliberal economic concerns rather than environmental challenges are often the source of multiple new conflicts. In this regard, this paper shows how the response of local non governmental organisations (NGOs) to hydropower development in the Darjeeling region of West Bengal in the Eastern Himalayas bears evidence to Gramscian analyses of 'the manufacture of consent' between elite bourgeois actors – the state, formal civil society, political parties and the private sector. Such 'associational' unions are only occasionally interrupted, as in the case of the people's movement, Affected Citizens of Teesta (ACT) in North Sikkim. Finding a balance between resistance and enabling political space to think and act differently, the movement led to the cancellation of several hydropower projects put forward in the name of climate mitigation, and in the process, drew attention to political processes involved in the manufacture of consent. Using case studies from the Darjeeling and Sikkim regions, this paper distinguishes between Gramsci's vision of the political space of disruption vis-à-vis the covert agenda of climate consensus. Key policy insights A politics of consensus in relation to climate change is an outcome of, and in turn reiterates, a narrowing of distance between the state and civil society. Including civil society in climate policy decision making and implementation is considered positive and inclusive, however, it is important to note that civil society is not always and everywhere inclusive and transformative. Both at global and national levels, it is claimed that climate change interventions happen in an overall framework of participatory, inclusive environmental governance; in relation to hydropower development, we note that this is hardly the practice on the ground. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conflicts over natural resources are likely to escalate under changing socio-economic contexts and climate change. This paper tests the effectiveness of what we term Adaptive Learning and Deliberation (ALD) in understanding and addressing conflicts over the local management of forests and water, drawing on experimental work in Nepal. Based on a three-year action research project, the paper offers policy and practical insights on how complex and protracted conflicts can be addressed through the researcher-facilitated enquiry and deliberative processes that form the core of the ALD approach. The conflicts included in the study are a result of diverse environmental, political and economic factors. We analyze experimental practices in two sites, where our research team facilitated the ALD process, gathering evidence in relation to conflicting institutional issues, all of which was then fed into researcher-mediated and evidence-informed deliberations on conflict management. The analysis shows that the ALD process was helpful in rearranging local institutions to accommodate the interests of the conflicting groups and, to some extent, to challenge some of the underlying exclusionary provisions of forest and water institutions in Nepalese society. We also identify three key limitations of this approach – transaction costs, the need for strong research and facilitative capacity within the research team, and researchers' engagement with the conflicting stakeholders. Key policy insights Natural resource-based conflicts are intensifying in Nepal in recent years, due to heavy reliance of people on these resources for livelihoods, poor governance, and protection-oriented policies. Improved ways to facilitate cooperation among conflicting stakeholders are needed, as standard methods have often failed to address socio-environmental drivers of conflicts. The ALD approach can potentially help mitigate conflict and foster cooperation in natural resource management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global climate change governance has changed substantially in the last decade, with a shift in focus from negotiating globally agreed greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction targets to nationally determined contributions, as enshrined in the 2015 Paris Agreement. This paper analyses trends in adoption of national climate legislation and strategies, GHG targets, and renewable and energy efficiency targets in almost all UNFCCC Parties, focusing on the period from 2007 to 2017. The uniqueness and added value of this paper reside in its broad sweep of countries, the more than decade-long coverage and the use of objective metrics rather than normative judgements. Key results show that national climate legislation and strategies witnessed a strong increase in the first half of the assessed decade, likely due to the political lead up to the Copenhagen Climate Conference in 2009, but have somewhat stagnated in recent years, currently covering 70% of global GHG emissions (almost 50% of countries). In comparison, the coverage of GHG targets increased considerably in the run up to adoption of the Paris Agreement and 89% of global GHG emissions are currently covered by such targets. Renewable energy targets saw a steady spread, with 79% of the global GHG emissions covered in 2017 compared to 45% in 2007, with a steep increase in developing countries. Key policy insights The number of countries that have national legislation and strategies in place increased strongly up to 2012, but the increase has levelled off in recent years, now covering 70% of global emissions by 2017 (48% of countries and 76% of global population). Economy-wide GHG reduction targets witnessed a strong increase in the build up to 2015 and are adopted by countries covering 89% of global GHG emissions (76% not counting USA) and 90% of global population (86% not counting USA) in 2017. Renewable energy targets saw a steady increase throughout the last decade with coverage of countries in 2017 comparable to that of GHG targets. Key shifts in national measures coincide with landmark international events - an increase in legislation and strategy in the build-up to the Copenhagen Climate Conference and an increase in targets around the Paris Agreement - emphasizing the importance of the international process to maintaining national momentum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a detailed analysis of the Tokyo Metropolitan Emissions Trading Scheme (Tokyo ETS), Japan’s first emissions trading scheme with mandatory cap initiated by the government of Tokyo. Unlike trading schemes in other countries, the Tokyo ETS covers indirect emissions from the commercial sector. It is well known that a variety of market barriers impede full realization of energy efficiency opportunities, especially in the commercial sector. Experiences with the Tokyo ETS should therefore provide important lessons for the design of climate change mitigation policies, especially when targeting the commercial sector. The emissions from covered entities have been drastically reduced from those at the scheme’s outset, with an average 14% reduction as of the end of the first commitment period of five years (2010-2014) compared with 2009 levels. This paper shows that the Tokyo ETS alone did not cause these reductions; there were other drivers. Among them, the energy savings triggered by the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 were crucial. The contribution of credit trading, in contrast, was limited since most of the covered entities reduced emissions by themselves. Through an investigation of official reports, an assessment of the emissions data from the covered entities compared to those of uncovered entities and in-depth interviews with firms covered by the scheme, this paper confirms that the main drivers of emissions reductions by covered entities were separate from the ETS. In fact, the advisory aspect of the scheme seems to be much more important in encouraging energy-saving actions. Key policy insights Most of the observed emission reductions were not caused by the Tokyo ETS alone. An advisory instrument was crucial to the effectiveness of the Tokyo ETS. The experience of the Tokyo ETS suggests that making full use of the advantages of emissions trading is difficult in the case of the commercial sector. Price signals have not provided a stimulus to climate change mitigation actions, which implies that establishing a cap to yield effective carbon prices poses a challenge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Capacity building for climate change is widely acknowledged to be a central means of implementation, and yet within the UNFCCC regime it is a messy and ambiguous concept which eludes attempts to clearly define its underlying goals, processes, actors and outcomes. In this paper, we use documents from the UNFCCC to examine the implicit logic(s) underlying the ambiguity of capacity building in the regime through a knowledge politics lens. Our study finds that there are two distinct narratives guiding capacity building in the regime: The first narrative focuses on building techno-managerial capacities utilizing standardized data to address climate change through short-term and project-based processes. The second narrative attempts to open up capacity building to plural forms of knowledge, meaningfully engaging a diverse range of actors including Indigenous Peoples, gender-specific constituencies and communities, and using transdisciplinary and holistic approaches. Our research suggests that while the former narrative is largely centralized, institutionalized and well-supported by the UNFCCC, the latter is disparate and frequently lacks necessary financial, technical, and institutional resources. Despite this, some recent developments point toward the possibilities of widening the scope of capacity building. We argue that to realize the potential of capacity building as a concept that can enable transformative and emancipatory action in the era of climate change, we must look for pathways to promote the second narrative that gives meaningful space for marginalized actors to participate in, direct, and benefit from the capacity building agenda. Key policy insights Capacity building, a widely acknowledged core means of implementation within the UNFCCC, remains ambiguous and messy on the surface but is underlined by two distinct narratives The first narrative is guided by techno-managerial and standardized data-driven goals and is well-supported and systematized within the UNFCCC The second narrative focuses on inclusive and diverse capacity building supported by transdisciplinary and holistic approaches, but remains disparate and under-funded in the UNFCCC More support and access to resources for the second narrative are required if we are to widen and deepen capacity building for climate action [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Capacity building is defined as a process by which stakeholders increase their knowledge, skills and resources in order to improve their ability to adapt in a fast-changing world. Universities play a key role in the promotion of sustainability and implementation of the 2030 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) through capacity building. However, universities in developing countries face significant challenges in the implementation of capacity building programmes for sustainability given the lack of procedures that facilitate the systematic integration of multiple stakeholderś epistemologies, methodologies and objectives. In this paper, we present a capacity building approach as a problem-focused process that follows a multi-domain/multi-stakeholder scheme, and provides alignment with the functions and responsibilities of different sectors of society. The approach involves the use of a decision-support tool for sustainability that enables stakeholders to actively participate in decision-making processes. We illustrate the implementation of the capacity building approach through two case studies and show how general and specific capacities tailored to the different stakeholders can be developed. Our approach to capacity building accentuates the role of universities in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean as research and innovation hubs that could help design and implement flexible, transparent and robust strategies towards achievement of sustainability in the region. Key policy insights Capacity building to address the sustainable development goals should aim to develop sets of interlinked capacities for sustainability across stakeholder groups. Capacity building should take into account the regional institutional contexts in which universities in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean are embedded. Effective implementation of capacity building must be tailored to the different roles and functions of the actors involved. Thematic, technical, evaluative and procedural domains provide a comprehensive framework to build capacities, which can be continuously adapted according to the functions and responsibilities of the actors. Capacity building approaches to address climate change vulnerability require decision-support tools to inform policy-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the establishment of the Climate Convention and its recent Paris Agreement, capacity building has been considered as a fundamental prerequisite for achieving the goals of the climate regime. Various institutional architectures have been explored, while the 2015 Paris Climate Conference (COP21) established the Paris Committee on Capacity-Building aiming to address needs and gaps, along with promoting current, emerging, and further capacity-building efforts. Efforts to build capacity have been underway for decades but have largely failed in their objectives as they were not designed from, and rooted in, the local context. Drawing from the author's more than 40 years of personal experience in capacity building in Africa, this paper sheds light on the systemic challenges involved in building capacities. Arrangements that do not entail working on, or being led by, an agenda set by those in capacity needs are not, by definition, capacity mobilization or capacity building efforts. It is argued that capacity is tied to self-reliance and self-determination and thus ability to set and pursue the recipient's own agenda must be at the core of development narratives. Key policy insights Self-reliance and self-determination are at the core of capacity development. Therefore, countries need to set and pursue their own agenda by creating and following a bottom-up and inclusive development narrative. Intellectual, financial, and other important resources need to fall under the control of local leadership. Partnerships and networks of research centres think tanks and similar institutions in the South should be created and maintained to build capacities. Climate change, while a global issue, must be addressed based on a deep understanding of the local and national contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Calls for transformative adaptation to climate change require attention to the type of capacity building that can support it. Community-level capacity building can help to ensure ownership and legitimacy of longer-term interventions. Given that marginalized communities are highly vulnerable to climate risk, it is important to build their capacity to adapt locally and to integrate their perspectives into higher-level adaptation measures. Current adaptation policy does not pay sufficient attention to this. Using a Cape Town-based project on water governance in low-income urban settlements, this paper explores how a transdisciplinary research project supported capacity building. Our findings suggest that knowledge co-creation at the community level is central to the capacity building that is needed in order to inform transformative adaptation. The collaborative methodology used is also important; we illustrate how a transdisciplinary approach can contribute to transformative adaptation where knowledge is co-produced to empower community-level actors and organizations to assert their perspectives with greater confidence and legitimacy. We argue that if capacity building processes shift from the top-down transferal of existing knowledge to the co-creation of contextual understandings, they have the potential to deliver more transformative adaptation. By considering diverse sources of knowledge and knowledge systems, capacity building can start to confront inequalities and shift dominant power dynamics. Adaptation policy could provide more guidance and support for community-level transdisciplinary processes that can enable this type of transformative adaptation. Key policy insights To address equity and justice issues as well as climate risk, adaptation policy needs to better support transformative adaptation. Community-level capacity building, called for by developing countries, will benefit from more attention to bottom-up approaches as a complement to top-down ones. Community-led research that draws on a diversity of knowledge systems can effectively inform the development of transformative adaptation interventions. Transdisciplinary research methods present a promising pedagogical approach to building transformative adaptation capacity. Adaptation policy for capacity building would benefit from a broader understanding of governance that includes local participation and values bottom-up contributions. A priority for capacity building is getting previously excluded actors a spot at the negotiating table as well as skills to substantiate their arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Generating and disseminating specific climate change knowledge is critical for sub-national policymakers. It allows them to address regional particularities, balance mitigation and adaptation policies, and deliver transparent governance. In this paper, we show how knowledge maps can be used in this endeavour. We examined a case study in Galicia, a region in Spain with a recently approved climate change strategy, where physical, geographic and socio-economic features shape region-specific scientific knowledge. The practical methodology used in this study can be generalized to aid other sub-national governments in adapting their local actions to the general policy frameworks designed by national and international initiatives. Therefore, our work illustrates how sub-national policymakers and researchers can collaborate to identify and prioritize key knowledge areas to face the regional challenges posed by climate change. Furthermore, our work can uncover imbalances in the body of knowledge on mitigation and adaptation that could lead to biases in policymaking. Finally, we show how a knowledge map can guide policymakers in allocating public resources to support research in a meaningful and impactful way, depending on the demand for the research and the challenges stemming from climate change. Key policy insights Sub-national policymakers often lack the availability of specific and useful knowledge on climate change and its consequences. A widely accepted climate change knowledge framework is necessary because knowledge structure in scientific circles differs greatly from its conception in the political arena. The quality of sub-national governance influences the collaboration between policymakers and researchers and the efficiency of the knowledge system in targeting climate change challenges specifically linked to the region at stake. A knowledge mapping process, such as the one elaborated here can usefully engage decision-makers, researchers, and other stakeholders to advance evidence-based policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding under what conditions individuals are willing to support policies aimed at mitigating climate change has important consequences for the legitimacy, costs, effectiveness, and longevity of any policy alternative. Given the politicized nature of climate change, one factor that has been found to be important in explaining public support is partisan political communication. It has, for example, been shown how political communication has important effects on public beliefs and attitudes regarding climate change. A lack of country comparative studies, together with methodological limitations in previous research, has, however, led to a limited understanding of how these processes work, especially in a comparative perspective. In this paper, the effects of political communication on public support for climate mitigation, and the cross-country variations of these effects, is studied. Specifically, this paper investigates: (1) to what degree individual policy attitudes varies across party lines, (2) to what degree variations in policy attitudes can be explained by the effect of party cues, and (3) to what extent the effect of partisanship and political communication varies across political contexts. Using original data from a country comparative online public opinion survey covering Australia, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden political communication is found to significantly influence public policy attitudes in all contexts studied, albeit to different degrees. POLICY RELEVANCE How individuals perceive and respond to the introduction of public policy is of considerable importance for the chance of any policy being effective. Understanding of how individual policy attitudes are formed is therefore of great importance to the design and implementation of public policy, climate mitigation policy included. Understanding of cross-country variations of factors influencing public policy attitudes is furthermore important for possibilities to effectively import or export policy solutions across political contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

All G20 countries have adopted policies to tame financial instability in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Post-pandemic financial measures are designed to support bank lending, boost financial markets' liquidity, reduce banks' funding liquidity costs, and allow for a smoother transition in monetary and fiscal policies. However, when analyzed in a broader framework that considers possible interlinkages between the pandemic and threats posed by climate change, these measures are not aligned with the goals of the Paris Agreement. Indeed, there is no evidence that recovery policies to date reflect sustainability priorities nor do they account for climate-related financial risks. The analysis carried out suggests that this failure to account for climate change could amplify the build-up of additional climate-related financial risks and of existing vulnerabilities in the financial system, leading to increased overall exposure to climate risks and thus undermining the low-carbon transition in G20 countries. Against this backdrop, the paper reviews several financial measures to avoid increasing the high carbon bias of existing policies and to explicitly address climate-related risks in the financial sector. The author proposes an enhanced macro-prudential policy framework to achieve three interrelated objectives: tackle climate-related financial risks, scale up green finance for a greener and more sustainable recovery, and preserve the global financial system's resilience. A macro-prudential strategy aligned with the goals of the Paris Agreement is needed to address carbon bias, avoid the increase of climate-related financial risks, and reorient financial flows towards sustainable investments. 'Green-enhanced' capital requirements can be used, but they need careful calibration to prevent financial instabilities, while green liquidity instruments pose fewer implementation concerns. Climate-related large exposure limits could help contain systemic risks deriving from the materialization of climate risks. Harmonized taxonomy and enhanced climate-related disclosure requirements are critical for the correct functioning of proposed climate-related financial instruments. Implementing such instruments in a post-pandemic financial policy framework could help underpin a transformative financial response to climate change while strengthening the resilience of the global financial system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Gender mediates climate vulnerability and adaptation action. Consequently, climate change adaptation policy has seen a push towards 'mainstreaming' gender and prioritizing 'gender-responsive' climate action. However, it is unclear to what extent this mainstreaming advances or obscures gender considerations and whether current climate policies reflect developments in the gender and climate change literature. This paper explores how gender is operationalized in adaptation policy in India through a policy review of 28 State Action Plans on Climate Change. We juxtapose normative goals around reducing differential vulnerability with policy approaches to mainstreaming gender and propose entry points that link advances in gender and feminist studies with climate change adaptation policy. Our analysis indicates that most subnational climate policies in India explicitly mention gender as a mediator of vulnerability and adaptive capacity but operationalize it inadequately and unevenly. We also reflect on how the heuristics of mainstreaming get operationalized in policies (gender-blind, gender-sensitive, to gender-transformative approaches) and what that means for addressing gendered vulnerability. Key policy insights While explicitly mentioned, gender concerns are unevenly operationalized in India's subnational climate policy. In most State Action Plans on Climate Change in India, gaps exist between normative goals such as reducing differential vulnerability and empowering women, and policy approaches (namely gender-blind, -neutral, -specific, -sensitive, and -transformative approaches). To be effective, the conceptualization of gender must expand beyond focussing on differences between women and men to engaging more with intersections of sex, caste, class, and resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Every country will have to prepare for climate change. Despite obvious risks to national security in terms of safety, food, and infrastructure as well as impending economic losses, countries like the United States (US) have declined to pursue meaningful federal action. The human impact of climate change – specifically climate migration and its health implications – has been largely neglected at a policy level. Yet climate migration is predicted to have tremendous consequences for people in the next 30 years and beyond, and with it comes a host of difficulties – political, cultural, economic, and structural. Preparedness will be of great importance to potential migrants and how they adapt to their receiving (host) locations. Health systems are one of the most significant institutions impacting long-term migration and these systems' strengths and weaknesses will determine the integration and well-being of migrants for years to come. A critical analysis of existing literature exposes that there is little current research on health system preparedness as it relates to climate migration, especially in the US. To help address this gap, this paper focuses on how the American health system, already fraught with limitations, can prepare for the expected increase in mostly internal migrants in the face of climate change. Key policy insights Climate migration in the US will pose huge challenges for health systems because of the American health system's unique, pre-existing weaknesses. To prepare for climate migration, federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments should focus on adopting a universal healthcare policy, shifting primary care tasks away from physicians and towards other qualified and more ubiquitous professionals, and investing in telemedicine, retail clinics, and a national electronic health record system. A 'health in all policies' approach, which applies a health lens to legislation, needs to be applied in the context of health system strengthening for climate migration since countless environmental determinants of health and infrastructural decisions shape the vulnerability of communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change increases hazards for coastal cities where a large proportion of the world's population lives. Adaptation to its impacts ought to be a key focus for planning and policymaking in highly vulnerable countries like Australia. This responsibility, however, has been largely left to local councils with mixed results. This leaves substantial parts of the population at risk where adaptation plans are lacking. Even worse, since the impacts of climate change do not respect jurisdictional boundaries, there is a spill-over risk where good adaptation planning by one council may be undermined by the lack of action in an adjacent council. These risks can be reduced if state and federal governments provide more consistent support and guidance. This paper takes an integrated approach in comparing the relevant legislation, policies, plans, and strategies related to coastal management across the national and state/territory jurisdictions in Australia. The findings indicate that there are major differences, with some states (South Australia, Victoria, Western Australia, and Queensland) having more detailed policies and plans for addressing sea level rise and coastal flooding. The findings have implications beyond Australia, particularly for those countries with more devolved or federal systems of government, and provide key lessons for adaptation to climate change. Key policy insights In the absence of national guidance and leadership, climate adaptation responses will remain uneven across jurisdictions placing more of the population at risk and undermining what adaptation plans there are. National, state, and territory policies or plans are more effective if they are consistent over time, but they are undermined by reversals when governments change between political parties that have widely varying views on climate change. Effective long-term adaptation policymaking and planning therefore require a bipartisan commitment and consistent political will across the major political parties to prioritize the problem and commit significant public resources to a response. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper assesses the importance of a strategic legal framework for action against climate change, using the UK Climate Change Act as an example. Passed in 2008, the Climate Change Act is one of the earliest and most prominent examples of framework legislation on climate change. It contains several innovative features that have since been replicated in other framework laws. We use stakeholder interviews to assess the strengths of the Act and whether it has succeeded in creating an integrated, informed and forward-looking policy process. Respondents felt that the Act had established a firm long-term framework with a clear direction of travel. However, they differed on whether the Act provided sufficient policy certainty and protection against political backsliding. Most respondents felt that the Act had changed the institutional context and the processes through which climate change is addressed. As a result, interviewees believe that the Act has helped UK climate policy to become better informed, more forward looking and better guided by statutory routines. Key policy insights A strong legal framework with statutory targets, processes and institutions can be an important tool for effective climate change governance. A broad-based framework law can make action on climate change more predictable, more structured and more evidence-based. The UK Climate Change Act is a model for such framework legislation, with important institutional features that have already been emulated in other framework laws. The main such features are statutory short-term and long-term emissions targets, a new independent advisory body (the Committee on Climate Change), clear accountability and an iterative approach to adaptation planning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of international climate change obligations, Gulf Arab states have introduced policies to integrate climate policies into economic development and planning, seeking to maximize clean development opportunities yet at the same time to minimize the threats to their rentier economies caused by sudden shifts away from fossil fuels. This paper assesses the challenges and opportunities for climate policy integration in the Gulf states of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman, examining the interaction between their climate policy and their political–economic regimes. It adopts a novel analytical framework that integrates insights from climate policy integration and the political–economic theory of rentier states. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders and relevant policy documents, it reveals modest progress in integrating climate policy into economic development plans in the UAE but major impediments to climate policy integration in Oman. Both countries face significant shortfalls in climate-related financial and human resource capacities. Climate policy integration efforts have focused on the energy sector with the purpose of protecting rents from oil exports rather than advancing a low-carbon transformation of their economies. This has created structural ambiguity in the climate policy integration advanced in the UAE and Oman. Key policy insights The availability, quality and accessibility of climate-related data are serious challenges for policy makers in the UAE and Oman. Both countries have evolving institutional architectures conducive to climate policy integration. However, these are more symbolic than substantive, lacking clear policy integration strategies across the governments. The UAE and Oman both face significant shortfalls in climate-related financial and human resource capacities. Support for climate policy integration by the ruling elites in the UAE and Oman is significantly shaped by rentier interests: most climate-related initiatives have addressed the energy sector, aiming to protect rents from oil exports by reducing the domestic dependence on fossil fuels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents the first global database of supply-side climate initiatives seeking to constrain fossil fuel production. There is a clear imperative to keep a large proportion of fossil fuel reserves underground to keep global temperature rise under 2°C above pre-industrial levels. Yet, there is no global overview of supply-side initiatives taken to constrain fossil fuel production, making it difficult to track trends, compare efforts across countries, and assess the effectiveness of different supply-side approaches. The Fossil Fuel Cuts Database presented here identifies 1302 initiatives implemented between 1988 and 2017 in 106 countries across the seven major types of supply-side approaches. Documenting temporal and geographical patterns, we show a rapid growth in the number of supply-side initiatives taken during the past decade and their highly uneven adoption across the world. Most initiatives occurred in countries with low economic dependence on fossil fuel production and limited fossil fuel exports, with the partial exception of Canada and Norway at the national level, and the US at the sub-national level. We discuss policy implications and the need for further research to identify adoption factors, effectiveness, and policy implications. The documentation of a wide range of supply-side initiatives serves as a reminder that constraints on fossil fuel production need to be analysed and considered on a par with demand-side interventions, including in Assessment Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is clear that developing countries will have to be part of the global mitigation effort to avoid ‘dangerous climate change’, and, indeed, many of them are already undertaking significant actions on multiple fronts to help address this problem, even if they have not yet taken on legally binding commitment under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Since the deployment of GHG-mitigating technologies is already a significant part of this effort and likely to be even more so in the future, drawing lessons from existing programmes can help accelerate and enhance the effectiveness of this deployment process. Accordingly, this article aims to examine the deployment of wind and solar power in India, paying specific attention to the role of public policy in incentivizing and facilitating this deployment, how these policies have evolved over time, what has shaped this evolution, and what the learning has been over this period. Through this analysis, the intention is to draw out key lessons from India's experience with deployment policies and programmes in these two sectors and highlight the issues that will need to be given particular consideration in the design of future domestic policies and international cooperation programmes to enhance the move towards climate-compatible development in India. Many of these lessons should also be relevant for other developing countries that are attempting to balance their climate and developmental priorities through the deployment of renewable energy technologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]