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The Paris Agreement establishes provisions for using international carbon market mechanisms to achieve climate mitigation contributions. Environmental integrity is a key principle for using such mechanisms under the Agreement. This paper systematically identifies and categorizes issues and options to achieve environmental integrity, including how it could be defined, what influences it, and what approaches could mitigate environmental integrity risks. Here, environmental integrity is assumed to be ensured if the engagement in international transfers of carbon market units leads to the same or lower aggregated global emissions. Four factors are identified that influence environmental integrity: the accounting for international transfers; the quality of units generated, i.e. whether the mechanism ensures that the issuance or transfer of units leads to emission reductions in the transferring country; the ambition and scope of the mitigation target of the transferring country; and incentives or disincentives for future mitigation action, such as possible disincentives for transferring countries to define future mitigation targets less ambitiously or more narrowly in order to sell more units. It is recommended that policy-makers combine several approaches to address the significant risks to environmental integrity. Key policy insights Robust accounting is a key prerequisite for ensuring environmental integrity. The diversity of nationally determined contributions is an important challenge, in particular for avoiding double counting and for ensuring that the accounting for international transfers is representative for the mitigation efforts by Parties over time. Unit quality can, in theory, be ensured through appropriate design of carbon market mechanisms; in practice, existing mechanisms face considerable challenges in ensuring unit quality. Unit quality could be promoted through guidance under Paris Agreement Article 6, and reporting and review under Article 13. The ambition and scope of mitigation targets is key for the incentive for transferring countries to ensure unit quality because countries with ambitious and economy-wide targets would have to compensate for any transfer of units that lack quality. Encouraging countries to adopt ambitious and economy-wide NDC targets would therefore facilitate achieving environmental integrity. Restricting transfers in instances of high environmental integrity risk - through eligibility criteria or limits - could complement these approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ahead of the Conference of Parties (COP) 24 where countries will first take stock of climate action post Paris, this paper assesses India's progress on its nationally determined contribution (NDC) targets and future energy plans. We find that, although India is well on track to meet its NDC pledges, these targets were extremely modest given previous context. Furthermore, there is considerable uncertainty around India's energy policy post 2030 and if current plans for energy futures materialise, the Paris Agreement's 2 degrees goal will be almost certainly unachievable. India's role in international climate politics has shifted from obstructionism to leadership particularly following the announcement of withdrawal by the United States from the Paris Agreement, but analysis reveals that India's 'hard' actions on the domestic front are inconsistent with its 'soft' actions in the international climate policy arena. Going forward, India is likely to face increasing calls for stronger mitigation action and we suggest that this gap can be bridged by strengthening the links between India's foreign policy ambitions, international climate commitments, and domestic energy realities. Key policy insights India's NDC pledges on carbon intensity and share of non-fossil fuel capacity are relatively modest given domestic context and offer plenty of room to increase ambition of action. India's 'soft' leadership in global climate policy can be matched by 'hard' commitments by bringing NDC pledges in line with domestic policy realities. There is significant uncertainty around future plans for coal power in India which have the potential to exceed the remaining global carbon budget for 2 degrees. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Paris Agreement is the last hope to keep global temperature rise below 2°C. The consensus agrees to holding the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and to aim for 1.5°C. Each Party’s successive nationally determined contribution (NDC) will represent a progression beyond the party’s then current NDC, and reflect its highest possible ambition. Using Ireland as a test case, we show that increased mitigation ambition is required to meet the Paris Agreement goals in contrast to current EU policy goals of an 80-95% reduction by 2050. For the 1.5°C consistent carbon budgets, the technically feasible scenarios' abatement costs rise to greater than €8,100/tCO2 by 2050. The greatest economic impact is in the short term. Annual GDP growth rates in the period to 2020 reduce from 4% to 2.2% in the 1.5°C scenario. While aiming for net zero emissions beyond 2050, investment decisions in the next 5-10 years are critical to prevent carbon lock-in. Key policy insights Economic growth can be maintained in Ireland while rapidly decarbonizing the energy system. The social cost of carbon needs to be included as standard in valuation of infrastructure investment planning, both by government finance departments and private investors. Technological feasibility is not the limiting factor in achieving rapid deep decarbonization. Immediate increased decarbonization ambition over the next 3-5 years is critical to achieve the Paris Agreement goals, acknowledging the current 80-95% reduction target is not consistent with temperature goals of ‘well below’ 2°C and pursuing 1.5°C. Applying carbon budgets to the energy system results in non-linear CO2 emissions reductions over time, which contrast with current EU policy targets, and the implied optimal climate policy and mitigation investment strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Investments in adaptation are required to reduce vulnerability and strengthen the resilience of food systems to the impacts of climate change. For low-income nations, international financing plays a central role in supporting adaptation. In this article, we document and examine adaptation projects targeting food systems financed through funding bodies of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). We find that between 2004 and 2015, 3% (n = 96) of adaptation projects supported through the UNFCCC explicitly focused on the production, processing, distribution, preparation and/or consumption of food, with US$546 m mobilized through funding bodies directly and US$1.44bn through co-financing. Agriculture is the most common sector supported, with extreme weather events the primary climate change-related impact motivating nations to apply for adaptation financing. The majority of actions are documented to adapt the food production component of food systems, with limited focus within projects on the full range of food system vulnerability and the implications on food security. Key policy insights Enhanced international adaptation financing targeting food systems is needed, and in particular financing to address limited adaptation readiness Supported food system projects should include holistic assessments of the entire food system in order to prioritize sector and food system component issue areas for short- and long-term efficiency To better analyse food system linkages and aid in the prioritization of adaptation activities, adaptation-directed funds should consider placing a higher emphasis on a cross-sectoral approach within projects Linkages between official development assistance and adaptation-directed funds could help optimize financing for food systems and mainstream food system adaptation efforts [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We live in a rapidly advancing digital information age where the ability to discover, access and utilize high-quality information in a reliable and timely manner is often assumed to be the norm. However, this is not always the experience of researchers, practitioners and decision makers responding to the challenges of a rapidly changing climate, despite the billions now being made available for investment in climate change adaptation initiatives throughout the world and particularly in developing countries. In recognition of the importance of information in adaptation planning, Article 7.7 of the Paris Agreement sets out clear guidance for parties to develop, share, manage and deliver climate change knowledge, information and data as a means to strengthening cooperation and action on adaptation. This article provides some key lessons and insights on climate change information and knowledge management (IKM) in small island developing States (SIDS) from the perspective of Pacific SIDS. A situation analysis of current climate change IKM practices in Fiji, Tonga and Vanuatu was conducted and key barriers to effective climate change IKM identified. The outcome of this article is a range of pragmatic policy considerations for overcoming common barriers to climate change IKM in the Pacific, which may be of value to SIDS more widely. Key policy insights The partnership approach of co-investigating climate change IKM barriers in collaboration with Pacific SIDS generated considerable trust, a shared purpose and therefore rich IKM lessons and insights. Turning climate change IKM aspirations into practice is significantly more complicated than expected, and requires a long-term commitment from both national governments and development partners. Pacific SIDS need to establish national guiding climate change IKM Frameworks that leverage rather than duplicate growing national investments in whole-of-government IKM. Reframing climate change IKM in the Pacific towards demand and user needs will be critical to ensuring widespread ownership and participation in IKM solutions that lead to greater adaptation and resilience outcomes. It is also critical that IKM activities in SIDS support the development of national capacity to scope, develop, deploy and maintain decision support systems. Federated IKM systems are ideal for encouraging greater IKM collaboration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Continued global action on climate change has major consequences for fossil fuel markets, especially for coal as the most carbon-intensive fuel. This article summarizes current market developments in the most important coal-producing and coal-consuming countries, resulting in a critical qualitative assessment of prospects for future coal exports. Colombia, as the world’s fourth largest exporter, is strongly affected by these global trends, with more than 90% of its production being exported. Market analysis finds Colombia in a strong competitive position, owing to its low production costs and high coal quality. Nevertheless, market trends and enhanced climate policies suggest a gloomy outlook for future exports. Increasing competition on the Atlantic as well as Pacific market will keep coal prices low and continue pressure on mining companies. Increasing numbers of filed bankruptcies and lay-offs might be just the beginning of a carbon bubble devaluing fossil fuel investments and leaving them stranded. Colombia largely supplies European and Mediterranean consumers but also delivers some quantities to the US Gulf Coast, and to Central and South America. Future coal demand in most of these countries will continue to decline in the next decades. Newly constructed power plants in emerging economies (India, China) are unlikely to compensate for this downturn owing to increasing domestic supply and decreasing demand. Therefore, maintaining or even increasing mining volumes in Colombia should be re-evaluated, taking into account new economic realities as well as local externalities. Ignoring these risks could lead to additional stranded investments, aggravating the local resource curse and hampering sustainable economic development. Key policy insights The climate policies of most of Colombia’s traditional trade partners target steam coal as the more emission-intensive fossil fuel, with many countries implementing or considering a coal phase-out. Coal exporters should re-evaluate their operations and new investments taking into account this new policy environment. To prevent a race to the bottom among coal producers that would favour weak regulation, climate policy makers should also consider the local social and external costs of coal mining, including on health and the local environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the 2015 Paris Agreement are two of the most important policy frameworks of the twenty-first century. However, the alignment of national commitments linked to them has not yet been analysed for West African states. Such analyses are vital to avoid perverse outcomes if states assess targets and develop SDG implementation plans, and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) under the Paris Agreement, without integrated planning and cross-sectoral alignment. This article provides a situation analysis guided by the following questions: (a) Which priority sectors are mentioned in relation to adaptation and mitigation in West African NDCs? (b) Are the NDCs of West African states well aligned with the SDGs? (c) What are the co-benefits of NDCs in contributing towards the SDGs? and (d) How are West African states planning to finance actions in their NDCs? The study uses iterative content analysis to explore key themes for adaptation and mitigation within NDCs of 11 West African states and their alignment to selected SDGs. A national multi-stakeholder workshop was held in Ghana to examine the co-benefits of the NDCs in contributing towards the SDGs and their implementation challenges. Results show that agriculture and energy are priority sectors where NDCs have pledged significant commitments. The analysis displays good alignment between mitigation and adaptation actions proposed in NDCs and the SDGs. These represent opportunities that can be harnessed through integration into national sectoral policies. However, cross-sectoral discussions in Ghana identify significant challenges relating to institutional capacity, a lack of coordination among institutions and agencies, and insufficient resources in moving towards integrated implementation of national planning priorities to address successfully both NDC priorities and the SDGs. Key policy insights Positive alignments between West African NDCs and SDGs present opportunities for mutual benefits that can advance national development via a more climate resilient pathway. NDCs of West African states can provide mutual benefits across the water-energy-food nexus, such as through climate-smart agriculture and low carbon energy technologies. Ghanaian multi-sectoral insights show the need to empower national coordinating bodies to overcome misalignments across different sectors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In September 2018, leaders in climate action within and outside the U.S. will convene in San Francisco for the Global Climate Action Summit. They plan to demonstrate strong ongoing commitment to exceeding the goals set out in the Paris Agreement, despite U.S. federal opposition under President Trump, and to spur greater ambition among subnational governments and the private sector. Now that the Trump Administration is working to undo the progress made under President Obama, it is more important than ever that states and cities, as well as the private sector, redouble their efforts. Since the 2016 election, many U.S. states have demonstrated leadership by establishing ever-more ambitious clean energy and electric vehicle targets through legislation and executive action; by pushing back on the Trump Administration in public forums and in the courts; and by banding together to realise greater effectiveness through collective action. The commitment of leading states, cities, and businesses alone will not be enough to achieve the rapid reductions needed to keep planetary warming to 1.5 degrees C in the absence of U.S. federal efforts. But coming after a summer of extreme weather events, the Summit represents a critical opportunity to re-energise constituencies, highlight the need for urgent and ambitious action, and bring climate change to the forefront of policy conversations across the U.S. and beyond. Key policy insights The reversal of U.S. ambitious clean energy and transportation policy, including replacing the Clean Power Plan, freezing fuel standards, and withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, have created a gap at the federal level under President Trump that will be difficult - but perhaps not impossible - to fill with subnational action. States, local governments, and the private sector have shown a strengthened commitment to combating climate change and to the goals set out in the Paris Agreement through more ambitious legislative and executive targets, and regional initiatives like RGGI and cross-jurisdictional zero emissions vehicle programmes. The Global Climate Action Summit in September 2018 is a pivotal moment to energise a broader coalition within and outside the U.S. towards catalysing the level of ambition needed to exceed goals set out in the Paris Agreement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reducing fossil fuel supply is necessary to meet the Paris Agreement goal to keep warming ‘well below 2°C’, yet the Agreement is silent on the topic of fossil fuels. This article outlines reasons why it is important that Parties to the Agreement find ways to more explicitly address the phasing out of fossil fuel production under the UNFCCC. It describes how countries aiming to keep fossil fuel supply in line with Paris goals could articulate and report their actions within the current architecture of the Agreement. It also outlines specific mechanisms of the Paris Agreement through which issues related to the curtailment of fossil fuel supply can be addressed. Mapping out a transition away from fossil fuels - and facilitating this transition under the auspices of the UNFCCC process - can enhance the ambition and effectiveness of national and international climate mitigation efforts. Key policy insights The international commitment to limit global average temperature increases to ‘well below 2°C’ provides a strong rationale for Parties to the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC to pursue a phase-down in fossil fuel production, not just consumption. Several countries have already made commitments to address fossil fuel supply, by agreeing to phase down coal or oil exploration and production. Integrating these commitments into the UNFCCC process would link them to global climate goals, and ensure they form part of a broader global effort to transition away from fossil fuels. The Paris Agreement provides a number of new opportunities for Parties to address fossil fuel production. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article shows the potential impact on global GHG emissions in 2030, if all countries were to implement sectoral climate policies similar to successful examples already implemented elsewhere. This assessment was represented in the IMAGE and GLOBIOM/G4M models by replicating the impact of successful national policies at the sector level in all world regions. The first step was to select successful policies in nine policy areas. In the second step, the impact on the energy and land-use systems or GHG emissions was identified and translated into model parameters, assuming that it would be possible to translate the impacts of the policies to other countries. As a result, projected annual GHG emission levels would be about 50 GtCO2e by 2030 (2% above 2010 levels), compared to the 60 GtCO2e in the ‘current policies’ scenario. Most reductions are achieved in the electricity sector through expanding renewable energy, followed by the reduction of fluorinated gases, reducing venting and flaring in oil and gas production, and improving industry efficiency. Materializing the calculated mitigation potential might not be as straightforward given different country priorities, policy preferences and circumstances. Key policy insights Considerable emissions reductions globally would be possible, if a selection of successful policies were replicated and implemented in all countries worldwide. This would significantly reduce, but not close, the emissions gap with a 2°C pathway. From the selection of successful policies evaluated in this study, those implemented in the sector ‘electricity supply’ have the highest impact on global emissions compared to the ‘current policies’ scenario. Replicating the impact of these policies worldwide could lead to emission and energy trends in the renewable electricity, passenger transport, industry (including fluorinated gases) and buildings sector, that are close to those in a 2°C scenario. Using successful policies and translating these to policy impact per sector is a more reality-based alternative to most mitigation pathways, which need to make theoretical assumptions on policy cost-effectiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Paris Agreement establishes a global goal on adaptation which will be assessed through the global stocktake, the first attempt by the international climate change regime to measure collective progress on adaptation. This policy analysis identifies four main challenges to designing a meaningful assessment. These are: designing a system that can aggregate results; managing the dual mandate of reviewing collective progress and informing the enhancement of national level actions; methodological challenges in adaptation; and political challenges around measurement. We propose a mixed-methods approach to addressing these challenges, combining short-term needs for reporting with longer-term aims of enhancing national adaptation actions. Key policy insights Broad domains of adaptation activity could be identified within each of the objectives of the adaptation goal and progress could be measured and aggregated through simple scorecards. The goal should have both process and outcome indicators as well as some narrative linking activities to outcomes over time. Reporting could be a compilation of national data using qualitative and quantitative sources, aligning with the global stocktake’s aim of enhancing national actions over time and reducing immediate reporting burdens. There would be a complementary role at least in the short term for an expert assessment of priority areas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global climate change governance has changed substantially in the last decade, with a shift in focus from negotiating globally agreed greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction targets to nationally determined contributions, as enshrined in the 2015 Paris Agreement. This paper analyses trends in adoption of national climate legislation and strategies, GHG targets, and renewable and energy efficiency targets in almost all UNFCCC Parties, focusing on the period from 2007 to 2017. The uniqueness and added value of this paper reside in its broad sweep of countries, the more than decade-long coverage and the use of objective metrics rather than normative judgements. Key results show that national climate legislation and strategies witnessed a strong increase in the first half of the assessed decade, likely due to the political lead up to the Copenhagen Climate Conference in 2009, but have somewhat stagnated in recent years, currently covering 70% of global GHG emissions (almost 50% of countries). In comparison, the coverage of GHG targets increased considerably in the run up to adoption of the Paris Agreement and 89% of global GHG emissions are currently covered by such targets. Renewable energy targets saw a steady spread, with 79% of the global GHG emissions covered in 2017 compared to 45% in 2007, with a steep increase in developing countries. Key policy insights The number of countries that have national legislation and strategies in place increased strongly up to 2012, but the increase has levelled off in recent years, now covering 70% of global emissions by 2017 (48% of countries and 76% of global population). Economy-wide GHG reduction targets witnessed a strong increase in the build up to 2015 and are adopted by countries covering 89% of global GHG emissions (76% not counting USA) and 90% of global population (86% not counting USA) in 2017. Renewable energy targets saw a steady increase throughout the last decade with coverage of countries in 2017 comparable to that of GHG targets. Key shifts in national measures coincide with landmark international events - an increase in legislation and strategy in the build-up to the Copenhagen Climate Conference and an increase in targets around the Paris Agreement - emphasizing the importance of the international process to maintaining national momentum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the Green Climate Fund (GCF) is widely commendable in several ways, access to the Fund has been very challenging for many African countries. Using GCF published statistics, we identify possible challenges likely to be responsible for this. First, we present an assessment of the GCF’s Readiness Support Programme with respect to how the programme’s performance may have affected achievement of African countries’ readiness outcomes. Second, a critical evaluation of the status of African GCF portfolio (pipeline and approved projects) provides a means by which to assess how well Africa’s current portfolio aligns with GCF strategic impact areas, results areas and investment priorities. We then discuss GCF access modalities and the implications of relying on International Accredited Entities (IAEs) to indirectly access the Fund. The readiness support assessment indicates that the distribution of support requests and funding approvals is nearly equal across the regions of Africa, Asia Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean. However, when the regions are considered individually, Africa demonstrates lower approvals with respect to requests and securing funding. Results from the GCF portfolio evaluation reveal that little or no attention has been devoted to GCF critical result areas such as forests and land use or transport, where great potentials for low-carbon development transitions exist. With respect to access modalities, the IAE financing mechanism currently provides access to the Fund for the majority of projects in both the global and African GCF portfolios. The implications of these findings are extensively discussed. Key policy insights For Africa, limited readiness support and a reliance on International Accredited Entities constrains capacity building, thereby reinforcing a lack of both readiness and direct access to the GCF. There are opportunities for Africa to diversify its GCF portfolios, adhere to international commitments, and address its adaptation and development needs by identifying and capitalizing on linkages between GCF funding priorities, mitigation, and adaptation. There are leverage points within existing climate finance and governance systems that could catalyse a shift in Africa’s engagement with the GCF and generate positive, cascading effects on institutional strengthening, direct access accreditation and securing funding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emission reductions improve the chances that dangerous anthropogenic climate change will be averted, but could also cause some firms financial distress. Corporate failures, especially if they are unnecessary, add to the social cost of abatement. Social value can be permanently destroyed by the dissolution of organizational capital, deadweight losses paid to liquidators, and unemployment. This article proposes using measures of corporate solvency as an objective tool for policy makers to calibrate the optimal stringency of climate change policies, so that they can deliver the least loss of corporate solvency for a given level of emission reductions. They could also be used to determine the generosity of any compensation to address losses to corporate solvency. We demonstrate this approach using a case study of the UK’s Carbon Price Support (a carbon tax). Key policy insights Solvency metrics could be used to empirically calibrate the optimal stringency of climate policies. An idealized solvency trajectory for firms affected by climate change policy would cause corporate solvency to initially decline - approaching but not exceeding ‘distressed’ levels - and then gradually improve to a new ‘steady state’ once the low-carbon transition had been achieved. In terms of the UK’s Carbon Price Support, corporate solvency of energy-intensive industries was found to be stable subsequent to its introduction. Therefore, the available evidence does not support its later weakening. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Geopolitical changes combined with the increasing urgency of ambitious climate action have re-opened debates about justice and international climate policy. Tensions about historical responsibility have been particularly difficult and could intensify with increased climate impacts and as developing countries face mounting pressure to take mitigation action. Climate change is not the only time humans have faced historically rooted, collective action challenges involving justice disputes. Practices and tools from transitional justice have been used in over 30 countries across a range of conflicts at the interface of historical responsibility and imperatives for collective futures. Central to this body of theory and experience is the need to reflect both backwards- and forwards-oriented elements in efforts to build social solidarity. Lessons from transitional justice theory and practice have not been systematically explored in the climate context. This article conceptually examines the potential of transitional justice practices to inform global climate governance by looking at the structural similarities and differences between the global climate regime and traditional transitional justice contexts. It then identifies a suite of common transitional justice practices and assesses their potential applicability in the climate context. POLICY RELEVANCE Justice disputes, including about historical responsibility and future climate actions, are long-standing in the climate context and could intensify with increased climate impacts and broadened mitigation pressures. Lessons from efforts to use transitional justice mechanisms could provide insight into strategies for balancing recognition of harms rooted in the past, while creating stronger future-oriented collective action. Several areas of transitional justice practice including: the combination of amnesties and litigation, truth commissions, reparations and institutional change could provide useful insights for the climate context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

State governments in the United States are well placed to identify opportunities for mitigation and the needs for adaptation to climate change. However, the cost of these efforts can have important implications for budgets that already face pressures from diverse areas such as unfunded pensions and growing health care costs. In this work, the current level of spending on climate-related activities at the state level are evaluated and policy recommendations are developed to improve financial management practices as they relate to climate risk. An examination of state budgets reveals that climate mitigation and adaptation activities represent less than 1% of spending in most states. The data collection highlights the obstacles to collecting accurate spending data and the lack of budgetary and accounting procedures in place. More importantly, the difficulty in benchmarking these activities poses challenges for the analysis of state-level policies as well as planning and modelling future climate-related spending. Other policy contexts, including public pensions and infrastructure, can provide guidance on budgetary and accounting tools that may help states prepare for and more efficiently manage climate-related expenditures. Key policy insights Climate change mitigation and adaptation will require substantial investments across many levels of government on a wide range of activities. Currently, US states are not clearly demarcating climate expenditures, hindering the identification of climate-related budgetary risks. In the absence of guidelines, these longer term fiscal outlays may remain chronically underfunded in favour of more near-term spending priorities. Establishing appropriate financial management and data collection practices is important for more sophisticated cost-effectiveness and policy analyses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A cumulative emissions approach is increasingly used to inform mitigation policy. However, there are different interpretations of what ‘2°C’ implies. Here it is argued that cost-optimization models, commonly used to inform policy, typically underplay the urgency of 2°C mitigation. The alignment within many scenarios of optimistic assumptions on negative emissions technologies (NETs), with implausibly early peak emission dates and incremental short-term mitigation, delivers outcomes commensurate with 2°C commitments. In contrast, considering equity and socio-technical barriers to change, suggests a more challenging short-term agenda. To understand these different interpretations, short-term CO2 trends of the largest CO2 emitters, are assessed in relation to a constrained CO2 budget, coupled with a ‘what if’ assumption that negative emissions technologies fail at scale. The outcomes raise profound questions around high-level framings of mitigation policy. The article concludes that applying even weak equity criteria, challenges the feasibility of maintaining a 50% chance of avoiding 2°C without urgent mitigation efforts in the short-term. This highlights a need for greater engagement with: (1) the equity dimension of the Paris Agreement, (2) the sensitivity of constrained carbon budgets to short-term trends and (3) the climate risks for society posed by an almost ubiquitous inclusion of NETs within 2°C scenarios. POLICY RELEVANCE Since the Paris meeting, there is increased awareness that most policy ‘solutions’ commensurate with 2°C include widespread deployment of negative emissions technologies (NETs). Yet much less is understood about that option’s feasibility, compared with near-term efforts to curb energy demand. Moreover, the many different ways in which key information is synthesized for policy makers, clouds the ability of policy makers to make informed decisions. This article presents an alternative approach to consider what the Paris Agreement implies, if NETs are unable to deliver more carbon sinks than sources. It illustrates the scale of the climate challenge for policy makers, particularly if the Agreement’s aim to address ‘equity’ is accounted for. Here it is argued that much more attention needs to be paid to what CO2 reductions can be achieved in the short-term, rather than taking a risk that could render the Paris Agreement’s policy goals unachievable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate engineering has received increasing attention, but its discussion has remained on the sidelines of mainstream climate policy. The policy relevance of this previously exotic option is poised to rise because of the gap between the temperature goals of the Paris Agreement and slow global mitigation efforts. It is therefore crucial to understand the risks and benefits of the proposed schemes, and the social implications of policy choices. Assessment of the risks and benefits of solar geoengineering strongly depends on scenarios, but previous scenarios have not reflected the full range of social choices. In light of concerns over risks, a newer set of scenarios is desirable, which represents both uncertainties and social choices more fully. Borrowing and extending lessons from recent literature on the new community climate scenario process, we envision a possible scenario-building process that combines interdisciplinary scholarship with the involvement of stakeholders and citizens. The resultant scenarios would better characterize uncertainties of, and policy choices for, solar geoengineering, and foster critical appraisal of its risks and benefits. Such societal choices might include not only total ban and large-scale deployment, but also limited deployment, which has received less attention in the scenario literature. The interaction between scenario and governance research would be able to highlight the central issues at stake, including ethical, social, and political dimensions. Key policy insights A more comprehensive assessment of solar geoengineering is necessary to evaluate its risks and benefits, necessitating new scenario research It is crucial to reflect the full span of policy choices and uncertainties with interdisciplinary collaboration in such scenarios Such societal choices might include not only total ban and large-scale deployment, but also limited deployment, which has received less attention in the scenario literature Participatory scenario research would enable incorporating the concerns and opinions of stakeholders and citizens in scenario creation [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing analysis suggests that individuals may reduce their concern for and belief in climate change as a result of macro-economic difficulties. Such conclusions are predominantly based on repeated cross-sectional and pooled data making it difficult to separate out the effects of economic conditions from other explanatory factors. Approaching this question through experimentally priming individuals to feel a certain way about the economy has also proven difficult due to economic perceptions being difficult to alter in a survey setting [Kachi, Bernauer, & Gampfer, 2015. Climate policy in hard times: Are the pessimists right? Ecological Economics, 114, 227-241]. This article thus investigates a related question on the effect of the salience of economic perceptions on climate change views using an online question-order experiment, whereby salience denotes the prominence of the issue in the mind of the respondent. Respondents were randomly assigned to receiving an economic prompting question before or after being asked about their climate change views. The results show no effect of the prompting on belief in anthropogenic climate change, but they do show an effect of prompting on prioritization of taking urgent action to address climate change. Those with a non-positive view of the economy were less likely to support urgent action in comparison to those who considered the economy to be performing well if they were asked first about their economic evaluations. The salience of economic evaluations and the direction of such evaluations would not be significant if economic evaluations themselves were not important, and thus the findings also reveal that economic evaluations do matter. Key policy insights Belief in anthropogenic climate change is not affected by the salience of economic perceptions. Support for taking urgent action to implement policies to address climate change is impacted by the salience of macro-economic perceptions, with respondents who have their non-positive economic perceptions brought to the forefront of their minds displaying reduced support for urgent action. Policies that aim to tackle climate change are more likely to have bottom-up support from the public during periods when the economy is perceived to be prosperous. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding under what conditions individuals are willing to support policies aimed at mitigating climate change has important consequences for the legitimacy, costs, effectiveness, and longevity of any policy alternative. Given the politicized nature of climate change, one factor that has been found to be important in explaining public support is partisan political communication. It has, for example, been shown how political communication has important effects on public beliefs and attitudes regarding climate change. A lack of country comparative studies, together with methodological limitations in previous research, has, however, led to a limited understanding of how these processes work, especially in a comparative perspective. In this paper, the effects of political communication on public support for climate mitigation, and the cross-country variations of these effects, is studied. Specifically, this paper investigates: (1) to what degree individual policy attitudes varies across party lines, (2) to what degree variations in policy attitudes can be explained by the effect of party cues, and (3) to what extent the effect of partisanship and political communication varies across political contexts. Using original data from a country comparative online public opinion survey covering Australia, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden political communication is found to significantly influence public policy attitudes in all contexts studied, albeit to different degrees. POLICY RELEVANCE How individuals perceive and respond to the introduction of public policy is of considerable importance for the chance of any policy being effective. Understanding of how individual policy attitudes are formed is therefore of great importance to the design and implementation of public policy, climate mitigation policy included. Understanding of cross-country variations of factors influencing public policy attitudes is furthermore important for possibilities to effectively import or export policy solutions across political contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2015 Paris Agreement represents a historic deal in the form of a strong international response to address climate change. This outcome came as a surprise for some, as several controversial issues had been postponed from previous conferences, and were expected to complicate the talks in Paris. One related to the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage (L&D), and potential legal remedies for L&D in the form of compensation payments. This issue had been particularly contentious with some developing countries advocating ideas for climate damage liability, which developed countries were unwilling to include in an agreement. Although the negotiations on L&D secured many positive outcomes, Decision 1/CP.21 adopting the Paris Agreement notes that there is no possibility of claiming liability and financial compensation for developing countries. This article, however, argues that, rather than triggering endless compensation claims disputes, a liability mechanism could actually serve as a commitment and reciprocity device, ultimately increasing global policy ambition. In this regard, this article reports the results of two experiments testing the effects of liability rules on the climate policy investment decisions of two players that differ in wealth and vulnerability. Results show that liability rules imposing a responsibility for precaution on both parties increase cooperation significantly, consequentially minimizing risk of L&D occurrence in the first place. Liability rules could thus not only help to address future losses, but also to drive global mitigation and adaptation ambition. POLICY RELEVANCE The research results presented in this paper suggest that policymakers would be well advised to further intensify negotiations on a climate-related compensation mechanism beyond that already committed to in the Paris Agreement. Our findings show that a compensation mechanism that implements a rather simple negligence rule makes climate cooperation more attractive and rewarding, potentially leading rich and poor nations to boost their investments in mitigation and adaptation for climate protection. Thus, far from opening up a Pandora’s box of endless compensation claims towards industrialized countries, a liability mechanism could make global climate cooperation more effective, and in the longer run also less costly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2015 Paris Agreement was adopted at the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 21) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In the run-up to COP 21, most UNFCCC Parties put forward intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs), containing mitigation pledges. These INDCs are now being confirmed as nationally determined contributions (NDCs), as governments formally ratify the Paris Agreement. NDCs are supposed to provide transparent, quantifiable, comparable, and verifiable mitigation objectives. However, there is neither methodological nor data consistency in the way Parties have prepared their NDCs. This article showcases recent collaboration among research, government, and private institutions that contributed to the Colombian NDC. While documenting the novel research, data, and rich web of collaboration that helped the Colombian government prepare the country’s NDC, this article links this specific case with the challenges of policy-oriented and interactive models of research. Our experience confirms previous research on the importance of stakeholder interaction, transparency and openness of processes, and willingness to break disciplinary and institutional barriers. In addition, the experience points to the importance of having appropriate available resources and a local institution acting as champion for the project. POLICY RELEVANCE The lack of methodological and data consistency in the way parties have prepared their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) can significantly slow down the progress toward limiting global warming below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels. In the meantime, calls for scientists to provide ‘usable’ information are increasing and the importance of close collaboration between scientists, end-users, and stakeholders is also increasingly acknowledged. In this article we make explicit the process and research challenges faced during what was, in the authors’ opinion, the successful collaboration among scientists, governmental, and private institutions that led to the formulation of an essential component of the Colombian NDC. As policy makers move forward with the implementation of their plans and as scientists become increasingly engaged with government planning, it is essential that they are aware of the needs and demands in terms of collaborations, data, resources, and type of results necessary to produce analyses that can be made fully public and can withstand international scrutiny. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The use of shale gas is commonly considered as a low-cost option for meeting ambitious climate policy targets. This article explores global and country-specific effects of increasing global shale gas exploitation on the energy markets, on greenhouse gas emissions, and on mitigation costs. The global techno-economic partial equilibrium model POLES (Prospective Outlook on Long-term Energy Systems) is employed to compare policies which limit global warming to 2°C and baseline scenarios when the availability of shale gas is either high or low. According to the simulation results, a high availability of shale gas has rather small effects on the costs of meeting climate targets in the medium and long term. In the long term, a higher availability of shale gas increases baseline emissions of greenhouse gases for most countries and for the world, and leads to higher compliance costs for most, but not all, countries. Allowing for global trading of emission certificates does not alter these general results. In sum, these findings cast doubt on shale gas’s potential as a low-cost option for meeting ambitious global climate targets. POLICY RELEVANCE Many countries with a large shale gas resource base consider the expansion of local shale gas extraction as an option to reduce their GHG emissions. The findings in this article imply that a higher availability of shale gas in these countries might actually increase emissions and mitigation costs for these countries and also for the world. An increase in shale gas extraction may spur a switch from coal to gas electricity generation, thus lowering emissions. At the global level and for many countries, though, this effect is more than offset by a crowding out of renewable and nuclear energy carriers, and by lower energy prices, leading to higher emissions and higher mitigation costs in turn. These findings would warrant a re-evaluation of the climate strategy in most countries relying on the exploitation of shale gas to meet their climate targets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main purpose of this article is to evaluate the extent to which the Cohesion Policy of the EU contributes to its climate change mitigation effort. While climate change mitigation and the EU Cohesion Policy have been both thoroughly studied theoretically, the novelty of the present article lies in an analysis of their mutual relationship. Also, a unique feature of this research is an analysis of the contribution of the Cohesion Policy to climate change mitigation over a period of 20 years, including a comparison of the three last programming periods (2000–2006, 2007–2013 and 2014–2020). The results of this research suggest that, while the beginning of the new millennium saw the Cohesion Policy neglecting the issue of climate change mitigation, the current programming period (2014–2020) placed it among its key priorities. This conclusion is supported by a comprehensive set of data on five selected indicators. This article also displays the results against the perspective of the overall climate change mitigation objectives of the EU. POLICY RELEVANCE The present article shows how a policy, which used to be considered rather distant from climate change, progressively adopted climate change mitigation as one of its principal objectives. As such, it provides a practical guidance on the integration of climate change mitigation in other policy areas, which may be applied not only in a supranational organisation but also on a national, regional or local level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most central and novel features of the new climate governance architecture emerging from the 2015 Paris Agreement is the transparency framework committing countries to provide,inter alia, regular progress reports on national pledges to address climate change. Many countries will rely on public policies to turn their pledges into action. This article focuses on the EU’s experience with monitoring national climate policies in order to understand the challenges that are likely to arise as the Paris Agreement is implemented around the world. To do so, the research employs – for the first time – comparative empirical data submitted by states to the EU’s monitoring system. Our findings reveal how the EU’s predominantly technical interpretation of four international reporting quality criteria – an approach borrowed from reporting on GHG fluxes – has constrained knowledge production and stymied debate on the performance of individual climate policies. Key obstacles to more in-depth reporting include not only political concerns over reporting burdens and costs, but also struggles over who determines the nature of climate policy monitoring, the perceived usefulness of reporting information, and the political control that policy knowledge inevitably generates. Given the post-Paris drive to achieve greater transparency, the EU’s experience offers a sobering reminder of the political and technical challenges associated with climate policy monitoring, challenges that are likely to bedevil the Paris Agreement for decades to come. Policy relevance The 2009 Copenhagen summit ushered in a more bottom-up system of international climate governance. Such systems typically depend on strong monitoring approaches to assess past performance and estimate future national contributions over time. This article shows why decision makers at multiple governance levels should pay serious attention to empirical data on the experiences and challenges that have emerged around monitoring in the EU, a self-proclaimed climate leader. The analysis highlights key political and administrative challenges that policy makers will likely encounter in implementing climate policy monitoring and ensuring transparency in the spirit of the Paris Agreement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change is increasingly challenging the ability of millions of people to sustain livelihoods as the places where they live become uninhabitable. The relocation of populations as individuals, households, and communities within countries and across international borders demonstrates the complexity of climate change impacts. Looking at the literature, some researchers argue that relocation caused by climate change can be an effective strategy to adapt to localized changes, whereas others argue that the movement away from ones' homeland is more neatly captured in the climate change lexicon as ‘loss and damage’. We argue here that the relocation of people as a result of the impacts of climate change can be both adaptation and loss and damage. Drawing on examples from Alaska and Kiribati, we show that dividing this issue between the two concepts is unhelpful in resolving key issues around the types of appropriate support for these transitions to sustain and protect livelihoods and to open up possibilities for self-determined futures. Policy Relevance Climate-induced relocation poses a significant challenge for the populations affected as well as the government agencies tasked with providing technical assistance and funding. At present, policies and institutional frameworks have not yet been developed to accommodate these challenges, despite the urgent need to do so. When the relocation of populations can be planned, participatory, and people centred, then it can be an adaptation strategy that will protect people from the permanent loss of land and livelihoods. If these movements are decided, driven, managed, and undertaken by those affected, then there is the potential for the relocation to also be a transformative opportunity for people to respond to the impacts of climate change, and sustain their livelihoods and possibly even improve certain livelihood outcomes. However, these relocations also cause significant loss and damage. The extent of the loss and damage will partly depend on the ability to have these relocations planned and ensure that human rights protections are embedded in institutional frameworks. The article shares a series of lessons and learnings that are of policy relevance at a variety of scales. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The way that the media reports and comments on key events in the fragmented global climate governance landscape is one important route to strengthening public accountability of such governance. Editorials and other opinion pieces provide key contributions to the public sphere, but have been almost entirely neglected in media research on climate change. Another understudied aspect in such research is the reporting on the fragmentation of global climate governance across numerous forums. This article provides an exploratory approach to address these two research gaps. It presents a quantitative analysis of how often leading newspapers in seven countries (Finland, India, Laos, Norway, South Africa, UK and USA) wrote about 18 meetings in six different global climate governance forums between 2004–2009 and whether they provided commentaries about them. The study shows that media coverage (articles and opinion pieces) is limited or absent for many meetings that are not attended by heads of state, are the launch of a new process or do not have the convening power of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The pattern of coverage differs significantly among individual newspapers and there is no clear distinction between developed and developing country newspapers. The article concludes that overall news coverage, and editorial commentary in particular, of global climate meetings in the selected newspapers is too low and too patchy to significantly support domestic publics to hold their own (and indirectly other) governments accountable with regard to fragmented global climate governance. Policy relevance This study is instructive for the media and civil society, who should both act as accountholders of governments with regard to how they act in global climate governance and its implementation. Reporting and commentaries need to reflect the overarching process, not only sporadic coverage of high-level meetings, but also critical analysis of what is achieved. They should also take a broader scope in terms of the kinds of meetings and processes in global governance that they cover. Civil society should encourage the media to increase coverage along these lines, e.g. by adequate monitoring of government actions (or lack thereof) and share this with the media. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Paris Agreement takes a significant step forward in strengthening the adaptation pillar of global climate policy. By widening the normative framing around adaptation, calling for stronger adaptation commitments from states, being explicit about the multilevel nature of adaptation governance, and outlining stronger transparency mechanisms for assessing adaptation progress, the Agreement is a milestone in ongoing efforts to make adaptation an equal priority with mitigation. Significant work remains to be done, however, to clarify how the long-term goal for adaptation set out in Article 7 will be meaningfully realized. The challenge for Parties in implementing the Paris Agreement will be to establish credible commitments from state and non-state actors with regard to adaptation planning, implementation, and financing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Technology Executive Committee (TEC) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) recently convened a workshop seeking to understand how strengthening national systems of innovation (NSIs) might help to foster the transfer of climate technologies to developing countries. This article reviews insights from the literatures on Innovation Studies and Socio-Technical Transitions to demonstrate why this focus on fostering innovation systems has potential to be more transformative as an international policy mechanism for climate technology transfer than anything the UNFCCC has considered to date. Based on insights from empirical research, the article also articulates how the existing architecture of the UNFCCC Technology Mechanism could be usefully extended by supporting the establishment of CRIBs (climate relevant innovation-system builders) in developing countries – key institutions focused on nurturing the climate-relevant innovation systems and building technological capabilities that form the bedrock of transformative, climate-compatible technological change and development. Policy relevance This article makes a direct contribution to current work by the TEC of the UNFCCC on enhancing enabling environments for and addressing barriers to technology development and transfer (specifically, it will contribute to Activity 4.3 of the TEC's 2014–15 rolling workplan ‘Further work on enablers and barriers, taking into account the outcomes of the workshop on NSIs’). The article articulates both the conceptual basis that justifies a focus on NSIs in relation to climate technology transfer and makes concrete recommendations as to how this can be implemented under the Convention as a Party-driven extension to the existing architecture of the Technology Mechanism. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The lack of broad public support prevents the implementation of effective climate policies. This article aims to examine why citizens support or reject climate policies. For this purpose, we provide a cross-disciplinary overview of empirical and experimental research on public attitudes and preferences that has emerged in the last few years. The various factors influencing policy support are divided into three general categories: (1) social-psychological factors and climate change perception, such as the positive influences of left-wing political orientation, egalitarian worldviews, environmental and self-transcendent values, climate change knowledge, risk perception, or emotions like interest and hope; (2) the perception of climate policy and its design, which includes, among others, the preference of pull over push measures, the positive role of perceived policy effectiveness, the level of policy costs, as well as the positive effect of perceived policy fairness and the recycling of potential policy revenues; (3) contextual factors, such as the positive influence of social trust, norms and participation, wider economic, political and geographical aspects, or the different effects of specific media events and communications. Finally, we discuss the findings and provide suggestions for future research. Policy relevance Public opinion is a significant determinant of policy change in democratic countries. Policy makers may be reluctant to implement climate policies if they expect public opposition. This article seeks to provide a better understanding of the various factors influencing public responses to climate policy proposals. Most of the studied factors include perceptions about climate change, policy and its attributes, all of which are amenable to intervention. The acquired insights can thus assist in improving policy design and communication with the overarching objective to garner more public support for effective climate policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Along with the large middle-income countries Brazil, China, and South Africa, India has been put under increasing pressure to shoulder parts of the mitigation burden and commit to national emission reduction targets. India, however, refers to its limited capacity and widespread poverty. Is India hiding behind its poor? While others examine the distribution of emissions within the country to answer this question, we study domestic policy making for energy subsidies and access to clean energy. Empirical evidence suggests that domestic policy making is at least partially consistent with the pro-poor arguments advanced at the international level. Given their large number and the country's democratic system, the poor do have some weight in Indian politics. However, pro-poor policies end where they do not translate into greater vote shares. Moreover, India's international position ignores the existing complementarities between climate-friendly and pro-poor activities. Policy relevance Despite India's recent growth spurt, its concern to fight energy poverty at home before engaging in any commitments on climate policy at the international level should be taken seriously within the international negotiations. Policy making in India is driven by democratic incentives, which, in this case, work to the benefit of the poor. Pro-poor policies may not go as far as one would wish from a developmental perspective, but the impact of the masses of the poor on domestic policy making is politically significant and cannot be ignored. This also provides some broader lessons for mitigation and adaptation policies in developing countries: politicians respond to incentives and support will only reach the needy if the appropriate incentives are in place. While we observe some significant commitment and implementation problems even in a democratic country like India, such problems must be expected to be even more serious elsewhere. This should not be overlooked when designing institutions for the allocation of climate finance, such as the Green Climate Fund. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The language of transformational change is increasingly applied to climate policy, and particularly in climate finance. Transformational change in this context is used with respect to low-carbon development futures, with the emphasis on mitigation and GHG metrics. But, for many developing countries, climate policy is embedded in a larger context of sustainable development objectives, defined through a national process. Viewed thus, there is a potential tension between mitigation-focused transformation and nationally driven sustainable development. We explore this tension in the context of operationalizing the Green Climate Fund (GCF), which has to deal with the fundamental tension between country ownership and transformational change. In relation to climate finance, acceptance of diverse interpretations of transformation are essential conditions for avoiding risk of transformational change becoming a conditionality on development. We further draw lessons from climate governance and the development aid literature. The article examines how in the case of both the Clean Development Mechanism and Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions, there has been limited success in achieving both development objectives and ‘nationally appropriate’ mitigation. The development aid literature points to process-based approaches as a possible alternative, but there are limitations to this approach. Policy relevance The concept of transformational change has gained prominence in climate finance. The conundrum facing the GCF is that it seeks to support transformational change in the climate realm, in a context where countries may have competing priorities. Balancing or even transcending this tension is a fundamental design challenge for the GCF. A primary focus on mitigation, particularly if metrics of performance are tied exclusively to GHG reduction, raise concerns about diluting ownership by recipient countries and evokes concerns of conditionality or worse. The literature on development assistance has explored options notably conditions on process and adequate capacity, and suggests that there are no short cuts to building domestic ownership. Actors on climate change need to avoid the risk that transformational change is perceived as, and becomes, an imposed condition. The risk that transformation change, operationalized in the context of unequal power relations, becomes an imposition on development, needs to be avoided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article illustrates the main difficulties encountered in the preparation of GHG emission projections and climate change mitigation policies and measures (P&M) for Kazakhstan. Difficulties in representing the system with an economic model have been overcome by representing the energy system with a technical-economic growth model (MARKAL-TIMES) based on the stock of existing plants, transformation processes, and end-use devices. GHG emission scenarios depend mainly on the pace of transition in Kazakhstan from a planned economy to a market economy. Three scenarios are portrayed: an incomplete transition, a fast and successful one, and even more advanced participation in global climate change mitigation, including participation in some emission trading schemes. If the transition to a market economy is completed by 2020, P&M already adopted may reduce emissions of CO2from combustion by about 85 MtCO2by 2030 – 17% of the emissions in the baseline (WOM) scenario. One-third of these reductions are likely to be obtained from the demand sectors, and two-thirds from the supply sectors. If every tonne of CO2not emitted is valued up to US$10 in 2020 and $20 in 2030, additional P&M may further reduce emissions by 110 MtCO2by 2030. This article analyses Kazakhstan's climate change and energy efficiency policies by making use of a modelling platform that provides a consistent framework for testing dynamic hypotheses. The effects of different P&M have been evaluated as the differences between two scenarios according to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) reporting guidelines. It concludes that domestic climate mitigation objectives are synergistic with energy efficiency goals, and the set of policies adopted to achieve both objectives should be planned, implemented, and enforced jointly. It also quantifies the GHG emissions reduction if the transition to a market economy proceeds quickly and successfully (∼ −100 MtCO2e in 2030), and if a mitigation-specific policy is implemented (∼ −200 MtCO2e in 2030) compared to a baseline projection, and it highlights the need to prepare more robust and detailed energy balances and inventory of emissions in order to develop and monitor the progress of the policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The last ten years have seen the growth of linkages between many of the world's cap-and-trade systems for GHGs, both directly between systems, and indirectly via connections to credit systems such as the Clean Development Mechanism. If nations have tried to act in their own self-interest, this proliferation of linkages implies that for many nations, the expected benefits of linkage outweighed expected costs. In this article, we draw on the past decade of experience with carbon markets to examine why systems have demonstrated this revealed preference for linking. Linkage is a multi-faceted policy decision that can be used by political jurisdictions to achieve a variety of objectives, and we find qualitative evidence that many economic, political, and strategic factors – ranging from geographic proximity to integrity of emissions reductions – influence the decision to link. We also identify some potentially important effects of linkage, such as loss of control over domestic carbon policies, which do not appear to have deterred real-world decisions to link. Policy relevance These findings have implications for the future role that decentralized linkages may play in international climate policy architecture. The Kyoto Protocol has entered what is probably its final commitment period, covering only a small fraction of global GHG emissions. Under the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, negotiators may now gravitate toward a hybrid system, combining top-down elements for establishing targets with bottom-up elements of pledge-and-review tied to national policies and actions. The incentives for linking these national policies are likely to continue to produce direct connections among regional, national, and sub-national cap-and-trade systems. The growing network of decentralized, direct linkages among these systems may turn out to be a key part of a future hybrid climate policy architecture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Narrowing research and policy, while challenging, is especially important in climate change adaptation work (CCA) due to the high uncertainties involved in planning for climate change. This article aims to seek stakeholders’ opinions regarding how research and policy development can be bridged within the Cambodian water resources and agriculture sectors. The study used institutional ethnography methods with informants from government organizations, local academia, and development partners (DPs). This article identifies a number of challenges, and barriers for narrowing research–policy development gaps, including: limited effectiveness of governmental policies and planning; lack of relevant information required to promote evidence-based planning and policy development; and communication barriers. Evidence-based planning is valued by government officials most when there is actual and effective implementation of policies and plans. In practice, this often implies that governmental policies and plans need be scoped and scaled down to meet the available budget, and thus be achievable. In the long term, it also means building the capacity for policy-relevant research on climate change adaptation within Cambodia. Engaging policy stakeholders in research process for co-producing adaptation knowledge, and introducing knowledge intermediaries are suggested by informants as means to narrowing gaps between research and policy development. The presence of the Cambodia's Prime Minister in research–policy dialogues is recommended as important for attracting the attention of high-level policy makers. Policy relevance As a least developed and highly climate-vulnerable country, Cambodia has received climate change funding to implement a number of climate adaptation initiatives. Cambodia is likely to receive more climate change finance in the future. This article aims to assist evidence-based planning, in particular, through policy-relevant research on CCA, so that resources for adaptation in Cambodia are used effectively and efficiently. This research also directly benefits the sustainable development of the country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Which kind of reaction can a nation or group of nations expect when leading by example in climate policy? This synthesis article describes possible positive reaction mechanisms from different fields of economics, some of which have scarcely been linked to climate economics previously. One effect may be behavioural, a reaction motivated by fairness, reciprocity, or norms. Second, other nations may interpret the leader's action as a signal on his preference or the value of the objective and adjust their own policy based on the new information. Third, the leader may provide a service to other nations, which decreases their costs and risks. The followers could benefit by learning successful policies, adopting technologies, and obtaining information on the cost of environmental policy. All of these mechanisms have in common that the leader sets an example with the intention of motivating others to contribute to the public good. Policy relevance A large body of both theoretical and empirical evidence shows that leading by example in climate change mitigation by a small group of nations has important potential for motivating other nations to follow. Modern economics has identified a range of mechanisms to explain why simple free-riding is unlikely to dominate the reaction to leadership. One such mechanism is described by behavioural economics. Humans often behave as conditional cooperators, meaning that they are willing to do their bit once a leader has done his. A second mechanism is the transmission of a credible signal that the leader considers climate change mitigation to be important. Finally, the leader gains knowledge, which spills over to other countries and thus moves their cost–benefit ratio in favour of mitigation. This evidence implies that leadership provides a promising alternative to stimulate the global cooperation that will eventually be needed to stabilize the climate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The few systematic international comparisons of climate policy strength made so far have serious weaknesses, particularly those that assign arbitrary weightings to different policy instrument types in order to calculate an aggregate score for policy strength. This article avoids these problems by ranking the six biggest emitters by far – China, the US, the EU, India, Russia, and Japan – on a set of six key policy instruments that are individually potent and together representative of climate policy as a whole: carbon taxes, emissions trading, feed-in tariffs, renewable energy quotas, fossil fuel power plant bans, and vehicle emissions standards. The results cast strong doubt on any idea that there is a clear hierarchy on climate policy with Europe at the top: the EU does lead on a number of policies but so does Japan. China, the US, and India each lead on one area. Russia is inactive on all fronts. At the same time climate policy everywhere remains weak compared to what it could be. Policy relevance This study enables climate policy strength, defined as the extent to which the statutory provisions of climate policies are likely to restrict GHG emissions if implemented as intended, to be assessed and compared more realistically across space and time. As such its availability for the six biggest emitters, which together account for over 70% of global CO2emissions, should facilitate international negotiations (1) by giving participants a better idea of where major emitters stand relative to each other as far as climate policy stringency is concerned, and (2) by identifying areas of weakness that need action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change mitigation is a wicked problem that cuts horizontally across sectors and vertically across levels of government. To address it effectively, governments around the world, in particular in the EU, have developed several generations of multi-sectoral national mitigation strategies (NMS) since the early 1990s. Although NMS became the main effort to systematically coordinate mitigation policies, few works have studied them comparatively so far. The present article fills this gap by analysing how the EU-15 group of countries operationalized climate protection through NMS. First, we introduce the three roles policy strategies usually aim to fulfil: besides being policy documents they also represent governance processes (supposed to coordinate sectoral implementation), and capacity-building efforts. Empirically, we then explore the rationale, origins and prevalence of NMS. Subsequently, we characterize them as policy documents (with regards to their contents and structures) and as governance processes that address capacity building only implicitly. Based on existing assessments we finally review some performance indications of NMS. We find that in particular second- and third-generation NMS aimed to take their governance function seriously but resembled ‘lacklustre bookkeeping' of emissions, targets and mitigation options. Instead of approximating NMS towards their obviously overcharging governance function, we suggest to recalibrate them towards their communication and capacity-building function in a way that goes beyond bookkeeping. Policy relevance The present article shows that NMS fail to effectively govern climate change mitigation across a broad range of sectoral policy domains. Since most European countries have adopted not one but up to three generations of NMS since the 1990s, this finding is highly relevant for them – and for all others aiming to adopt similarly broad strategies. Instead of piling one strategy on top of another irrespective of their implementation, and instead of abolishing mitigation strategies altogether, we recommend recalibrating them towards what they can realistically accomplish: effective communication and capacity building so that NMS can advance from lacklustre bookkeeping to actively promoting a government-wide climate change mitigation vision. The article can help governments to realise that renewing integrated strategies such as NMS without overhauling them comes close to flogging a dead horse. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article assesses the relevance ofex posttransaction costs in the choice of climate policy instruments in the EU (focusing mainly on the example of Germany) and the US. It reviews all publicly available empiricalex posttransaction cost studies of climate policy instruments broken down by the main private and public sector cost factors and offers hypotheses on how these factors may scale depending on instrument design and other contextual factors. The key finding from the evaluated schemes is that it is possible to reject the hypothesis that asymmetries inex posttransaction costs across instruments are large and, thus, play a pivotal role in climate policy instrument choice. Both total and relativeex posttransaction costs can be considered low. This conjecture differs from the experience in other areas of environmental policy instruments where high total transaction costs are considered to be important factors in the overall assessment of optimal environmental policy choice. Against this background, the main claim of this article is that in climate policy instrument choice,ex posttransaction cost considerations play a minor role in large countries that feature similar institutional characteristics as the EU and the US. Rather, the focus should be on the efficiency properties of instruments for incentivizing abatement, as well as equity and political economy considerations (and other societally relevant objectives). In order to inform transaction cost considerations in climate policy instrument choice in countries that adopt new climate policies, more data would be desirable in order to enable more robust estimates of design- and context-specific transaction-cost scaling factors. Policy relevance The findings of this study can help inform policy makers who plan to set up novel climate policy instruments. The results indicate thatex posttransaction costs play a minor role for large countries that feature similar institutional characteristics as the EU and the US. For instrument design the focus should rather be on efficiency properties of instruments in incentivizing abatement, as well as equity and political economy considerations (and other societally relevant objectives). [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Relying on a recent survey of more than 3400 participants from China, Germany, and the US, this article empirically analyses citizens' perceptions of key guiding principles for sharing mitigation costs across countries, justification of climate policy and trust in climate policy. Our findings suggest that the ranking of the main principles for burden-sharing is identical in China, Germany, and the US: accountability followed by capability, egalitarianism, and sovereignty. Thus, on a general level, citizens across these countries seem to have a common (normative) understanding of fairness. We therefore find no evidence that citizens' (stated) fairness preferences are detrimental to future burden-sharing agreements. In all three countries a majority of citizens considers international climate policy to be justified, but citizens' perceptions differ across specific items and countries. Finally, a substantial portion of citizens in all countries exhibit a lack of trust in international climate agreements. Policy relevance Disagreement over the distribution of mitigation costs across countries is blocking current negotiations about a new international climate change agreement to be adopted in 2015. At the heart of this disagreement are different perceptions of distributive justice among those involved in climate policy making. Our findings show that there is no difference in the ranking of fairness principles across citizens in China, Germany, and the US, suggesting that the common ground for crafting a future agreement is larger than expected. In particular, the accountability principle should weigh heavily when deciding on the burden-sharing. In addition, our findings suggest that in order to gain support among citizens, international climate policy may need to take measures to improve trust. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the crash of carbon prices in phase II of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), many have argued that the low price mirrors structural failures requiring intervention. A wide range of reform options have been suggested, including delegating the governance of the carbon market to an independent authority. This article analyses the debate by reconstructing the various arguments for or against reform. Three possible drivers of the price decline are investigated: (1) exogenous shocks; (2) insufficient credibility; and (3) market imperfections. It is argued that the extent to which a low price is problematic and warrants reform depends on the specific objectives associated with the EU ETS and the perception on the functioning of the market. A two-dimensional EU ETS Reform Space, comprising the degree of price certainty within the EU ETS and the level of delegation, is devised. Within the Reform Space, EU ETS reform options currently discussed are mapped. This descriptive structure offers a framework to clarify whether delegation responds to various concerns with respect to the EU ETS. Delegation might enhance flexibility under unforeseen circumstances, decrease policy uncertainty, and increase the credibility of long-term policy commitments. However, higher degrees of delegation face challenges including democratic legitimacy and political feasibility. Policy relevance In January 2014, the European Commission proposed a structural reform of the EU ETS characterized by a quantity triggered Market Stability Reserve, increasing flexibility in allowance supply. However, intense debate has revealed considerable differences in opinion regarding the need for and objectives of any adjustment mechanism. Other proposals, including various degrees of delegation to a rule-based adjustment mechanism or an independent authority as well as degrees of price certainty, were also suggested. This article offers a new framework, the EU ETS Reform Space, to compare reform options more systematically. This work therefore contributes to structuring the policy debate by providing a tool to better understand the merits and demerits of various reform proposals [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Since 2009, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) regime has seen the emergence of several new political groups. This article analyses how the new political groups are positioning themselves in relation to the key UNFCCC principles (the North–South divide and ‘common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities’, CBDR/RC). Drawing on original data, including official statements and submissions, observations at COP 17, COP 18, COP 19, and interviews with delegates, the article analyses the BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF), the Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action (CD), the Durban Alliance (DA), the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC), and the Association of Independent Latin American and Caribbean States (AILAC). Modelled after Hendrik Wagenaar's approach to narrative policy analysis, the article draws a map of narrative positions based on the North–South and new CBDR/RC divisions. This framework reveals the embeddedness of narratives in practice as they unfold in the formation of new political groups. CVF, CD, DA and AILAC align on a narrative of ‘shared responsibility across the North–South divide’. This meta-narrative challenges the hitherto dominant notion of CBDR/RC, which BASIC and LMDC defend through a meta-narrative of ‘differentiated responsibility upholding the North–South divide’. Policy relevance As we approach the UNFCCC 2015 deadline, this article presents a study of the new political landscape for negotiations, specifically of six new political groups in relation to the core principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ (CBDR/RC). Prior to COP 15, groups primarily organized based on the categorization of their members as either an Annex I (developed country) or non-Annex I (developing country) Party. This created two opposing understandings of CBDR/RC, especially regarding who has the responsibility to act on climate change. This article finds that some of the new political groups are challenging this North–South divide, contributing to a more complex relationship between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties on the CBDR/RC issue. This article provides practitioners and analysts with up-to-date knowledge on the developments of new political groups, which will necessarily form the basis of any policy analysis of the UNFCCC leading up to the 2015 deadline. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This study focusing on the climate equity debate in the context of GHG mitigation explores design of a framework that is based on the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ principle of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Besides incorporating the widely recognized differences among countries such as current and historic GHG emissions and capabilities, the framework also accounts for their relative vulnerabilities to climate change. The study argues that since climate change impacts are akin to global public bad, compensation, especially for the poorer nations who are also the worst victims of the climate change impacts, could be conceived in the form of greater share in the GHG emission rights. This, it is argued, would provide the much needed space to grow for the poorer countries and facilitate enhancement of their adaptive capacity to face climate and other threats. It is also argued that the framework results accord with one of the welfare principles, the Weak Equity Axiom (WEA) (Sen, A. K. (1973).On economic inequality. Delhi: Oxford University Press), and yield an equitable distribution of burden. Policy relevance The present study attempts to inform the equity debate in the international climate negotiations. The multi-criteria framework of the study suggests a means to incorporate various national attributes which could result in an equitable sharing of the GHG mitigation burden among countries. The study results highlight that impacts due to climate change could provide an important and equitable basis for burden sharing in the present and in future. The study also highlights the significance of scientific literature on climate change impact assessments in informing the future policy dialogue in the climate negotiations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article describes a ‘tax and trade' emission regulations system that controls both emission costs and emission quantities. Emitters are taxed at a fixed price on carbon emissions and the government uses the tax revenue to buy carbon offsets on existing emissions markets. Unlike a traditional carbon tax, regulated firms may also produce carbon credits which may be sold to the government. Thus, the government bears the compliance cost risk rather than an individual firm and has control over the number of offsets purchased and the effective emission reduction. This unusual form of hybrid has potential political advantages of creating an economic incentive on corporate choices (at the margin) substantially greater than the actual trading price, and with lower financial transfers than in most schemes. Policy relevance The article presents a hybrid carbon emissions system that adds to the growing discussion of hybrid policy instruments which could be implemented by policy makers, particularly in nations without current cap and trade policies. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

All sectors face decarbonization for a 2 °C temperature increase to be avoided. Nevertheless, meaningful policy measures that address rising CO2from international aviation and shipping remain woefully inadequate. Treated with a similar approach within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), they are often debated as if facing comparable challenges, and even influence each others’ mitigation policies. Yet their strengths and weaknesses have important distinctions. This article sheds light on these differences so that they can be built upon to improve the quality of debate and ensuing policy development. The article quantifies ‘2 °C’ pathways for these sectors, highlighting the need for mitigation measures to be urgently accelerated. It reviews recent developments, drawing attention to one example where a change in aviation mitigation policy had a direct impact on measures to cut CO2from shipping. Finally, the article contrasts opportunities and barriers towards mitigation. The article concludes that there is a portfolio of opportunities for short- to medium-term decarbonization for shipping, but its complexity is its greatest barrier to change. In contrast, the more simply structured aviation sector is pinning too much hope on emissions trading to deliver CO2cuts in line with 2 °C. Instead, the solution remains controversial and unpopular – avoiding 2 °C requires demand management. Policy relevance The governance arrangements around the CO2produced by international aviation and shipping are different from other sectors because their emissions are released in international airspace and waters. Instead, through the Kyoto Protocol, the International Civil Aviation Authority (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) were charged with developing policies towards mitigating their emissions. Slow progress to date, coupled with strong connections with rapidly growing economies, has led to the CO2from international transport growing at a higher rate than the average rate from all other sectors. This article considers this rapid growth, and the potential for future CO2growth in the context of avoiding a 2 °C temperature rise above pre-industrial levels. It explores similarities and differences between these two sectors, highlighting that a reliance on global market-based measures to deliver required CO2cuts will likely leave both at odds with the overarching climate goal. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is so far the largest emissions trading system in the world. A rigorousex postempirical analysis of the scheme is presented. The effect of the scheme on firms' investment decisions in carbon-reducing technologies is analysed by using detailed firm-level data from Swedish industry. Based on difference-in-difference estimation as well as a before–after difference estimation, the results reveal that the EU ETS has not had a significant effect on firms’ decisions to invest in carbon-mitigating technologies. However, although the EU ETS appears to have no direct effect on investments, it is too early to dismiss the system. Consideration is given to how the EU ETS can realize its potential to become an effective tool in the EU climate and energy policy portfolio. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

A policy network analysis using a questionnaire survey was conducted to identify the main climate policy actors in South Korea and examine how they form alliances and come into conflict over four major issues. Generally, it was found that governmental organizations are the main actors in the South Korean climate policy arena and that they mediate between the business and civil sectors. In particular, key organizations in each sector play a leading role in the formation and maintenance of at least two distinct alliance networks: growth and environmental. In particular, the growth network has been stronger and more intense than the environmental network, with the exception of nuclear power policy. The crucial drivers of proactive policy discourse in South Korea have been scientific discourse and a consensus on the advent of anthropogenic climate change by the international scientific community, the international climate change negotiations and the pressure to commit to GHG emissions reduction, and low-carbon green growth strategy. Policy relevance The positions of South Korean governmental organizations (as well as other civil society organizations) on the four major issues of climate policy have not been aligned. The government has not acted as a unified body; instead it is an aggregated body composed of organizations with competing interests. If policy actors with different interests share the recognition of the state of the country within global society and understand international pressure as well as the urgency of combating climate change, then a common policy goal can be achieved. It is essential for the government to exert proactive leadership for climate policies in mediating the growth and environmental networks. It is important to boost environmental networks in order to overcome the alliance of growth networks. A more proactive response for combating climate change would establish open policy-making processes for environmental network actors and provide economic opportunities for climate actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Researchers and policy makers increasingly recognize the need to adapt to future changes in climate, given that past emissions of greenhouse gases have already committed the world to some level of climate change. However, the current understanding of the costs and benefits of adaptation measures is still fairly rudimentary, and far from comprehensive. An assessment is presented of the current state of knowledge on the magnitude of adaptation costs in the United States. While incomplete, the studies suggest that adaptation cost could be as high as tens or hundreds of billions of dollars per year by the middle of this century. Key studies are identified in each sector, and the cost estimates and approaches to cost estimation are surveyed. Methodological issues are highlighted in interpreting, comparing, and aggregating adaptation cost estimates. Policy recommendations are made along with appropriate steps to make future adaptation cost studies more comparable within and across sectors and more accessible and relevant to policy and decision makers. Policy relevance Designing and implementing climate change adaptation policy requires good information about the effectiveness and cost of available adaptive options. The current state of knowledge on adaptation costs in the United States is assessed and significant gaps in the literature are highlighted – particularly in terms of sectoral and geographic coverage – as well as inconsistencies in methodologies and assumptions that hamper comparison across studies. Critical steps are identified that can be taken to make adaptation cost studies more accessible and useful to decision makers. The findings and recommendations are relevant to adaptation cost studies globally, not just in the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Equity is a highly contentious but essential area of negotiation, if a stable and effective international climate agreement with broad participation is to be achieved. Three perspectives on the magnitude dimensions of equity are identified that need consideration in the process of formulating an agreement: agreement on a ‘safe’ temperature goal; agreement on the required global effort; and agreement on a fair division of contributions. The opportunities are explored for reconciling these perspectives in an operational framework for equity. Specifically, this means the importance of the adopted a global temperature goal of below 2°C temperature increase by the end of the century. In addition, an initial approach to quantifying adaption costs is suggested, while the importance of arriving at a global mitigation goal is emphasized. It is argued that finance and technology support commensurate with the required global mitigation and adaptation effort is an important element of equity. Policy relevance The centrality of equity, in terms of both form and magnitude, will be vital for the design and implementation of a 2015 Agreement that is capable of achieving the objectives of the Convention. Three central areas of debate within global negotiations are identified and discussed: an appropriate temperature goal; global goals for adaptation, mitigation, finance, and technological support; and the division of global effort. The opportunities for reconciling the areas of debate are explored specifically in the context of an Equity Reference Framework, along with suggestions for approaches to quantifying adaptation needs. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]