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This paper analyses 556 model scenarios assessed by IPCC's Working Group-III for the 6th Assessment Report, which have an underlying 10-region classification and correspond to restricting warming levels to 1.5 ℃ and 2 ℃. We show that across all scenarios, the current global inequalities in incomes, energy use, and emissions, are projected to continue even in 2050. Scenarios also project higher per capita fossil fuel use and lower carbon dioxide removal in developed countries in 2050 compared to developing countries. Our results demonstrate the scale and scope of unequal outcomes in these scenarios, that have been anticipated by theoretical critiques of the underlying models. The paper explores the potential reasons for the unequal outcomes of the scenarios focusing on the two key issues of scenario design and modelling framework. Our analysis also suggests that instead of summary assessments focusing on singular median values or percentile ranges, as undertaken in the IPCC report, more could be learned from focusing on differences between models or considering outliers that could present new and innovative solutions to the determination of equitable and efficient future mitigation pathways. Our analysis underlines the need for new frameworks for emissions modelling and scenario building, for constructing possible futures that can also foreground equity and climate justice. Key Policy Insights: Scenarios assessed by IPCC project continuing global inequality in 2050. Inequality is pervasive across all variables – energy, fuel use, GDP, and emissions. Higher CO2 reduction and CDR are projected for some developing regions. IPCC must comprehensively review scenario assessment and reporting processes to ensure the transparent representation of all scenarios in the literature. There is a need for new scenario and modelling frameworks that consider and include climate equity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how monetary policy can be calibrated to promote a greening of finance. The paper reviews existing literature and notes a tendency to either focus narrowly on one policy instrument or provide a menu of options, without much depth or discrimination. This Perspective paper undertakes a theory-based analysis of green monetary policy options using an institutional approach to monetary economics. In so doing, it identifies a policy mix that would reorient finance by structurally modifying the relative incentives of financing green vs dirty assets. More specifically, the proposed green central banking strategy consists in the combined adoption of several, recalibrated monetary policy instruments. The two main ones are core elements of central banks' collateral policies: making (more) green assets eligible in credit operations with central banks and using so-called 'haircuts' to give green assets preferential treatment over dirty assets in those credit operations. Combined, the adoption of the proposed, recalibrated instruments promises to reorder the collateral asset hierarchies that are the backbone of modern financial systems, providing strong financial incentives for enhanced financing of investment in green assets and divestment from dirty assets. Monetary policy can help speed up a greening of the financial sector. Enhanced financing of green assets, as well as divestment from dirty assets, can be incentivized through a range of monetary policy tools. Among the most potent green monetary policy tools is differentiated treatment of green and dirty assets in credit operations, known as collateral policy. Several green monetary policy options can be pursued without compromising other monetary policy objectives (such as price stability). While most central banks currently remain reluctant to engage proactively with such policy tools, the increasing manifestation of climate change is likely to erode such resistance in coming years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The last two decades have seen an increase in climate financing channelled to the Global South from multiple sources, putting a spotlight on climate finance coordination challenges in recipient countries. However, the climate finance coordination debate has largely been centred at climate finance provision at the global level. Emerging literature has called on recipient countries to establish effective climate finance coordination mechanisms. Yet, the calls have not clarified what accounts for an effective coordination mechanism. This paper addresses the gap by analyzing stakeholder perceptions of effective climate finance coordination in Kenya. Kenya has instituted a legal and institutional framework to guide climate finance coordination, but challenges of coordination persist. Using the political economy framework, the paper analyzes political economy factors influencing stakeholder perceptions and climate change policy implementation to identify political contestations that need to be reconciled. Data is drawn from relevant literature, 29 key informant interviews and 4 focus group discussions at the national level in Nairobi and at the sub-national level in Turkana County. Deductive thematic analysis is adopted for coding and analyzing data. Results indicate that different ideologies, interests, incentives, politics, power relations and contestation over resources largely influence stakeholder perceptions of an effective climate finance coordination mechanism and climate policy implementation. The operationalization of the National Climate Change Council and the National Climate Change Fund are the most contested. The paper calls on policy actors to reconcile political issues of contention for recipient countries to institute coordination mechanisms that gain ownership and widespread legitimacy from stakeholders. Underlying political economy factors including different ideologies, interests, politics, incentives, power relations and contestation over resources largely influence stakeholder perceptions of effective climate finance coordination as well as climate change policy implementation. The consequential political contestations need to be reconciled; otherwise, the established coordination mechanism is less likely to gain ownership and widespread legitimacy from climate change stakeholders. This calls for meaningful and extensive stakeholder engagements and consensus building to minimize contention, particularly over the operationalization of the National Climate Change Council and the National Climate Change Fund in Kenya. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Citizens' assemblies on climate change are increasingly popular to support democratic decision-making. Such Climate Assemblies (CAs) convene representative groups of citizens formulating policy proposals after hearing experts and deliberating intensely. CAs may help addressing climate policy issues more effectively partly because their members need not worry about re-election. CAs' effectiveness depends on their design such as the issues chosen (or not chosen) for deliberation. Agenda-setters exert substantial power by selecting certain issues and by choosing framings that benefit some solutions over others. In this paper I ask: What characterizes agendas that are suitable and legitimate for deliberation in CAs? The aim is to support practitioners in making informed agenda choices for CAs by providing a list of ten widely accepted guiding principles based on expert interviews, policy documents, and information gathered from the Knowledge Network on Climate Assemblies (KNOCA). The paper systematically discusses trade-offs of various agenda choices in the light of different CA rationales. Results show that those with system-supporting rationales tend to favour narrower agendas tailored to political demands aiming to increase immediate policy impact; those with system-disrupting rationales prefer more open agendas allowing citizens to challenge existing political practices and worldviews. Results support earlier arguments that distinctions of entire deliberative processes in either top-down or bottom-up are too simplistic and that a tool-box approach is more useful. Insights appear relevant for debates of deliberative minipublics more generally. Future research should investigate whom to involve in setting CA agendas and with how much power. Effective agenda design hinges on rationales on how to achieve assembly objectives which depend on authorities' ambition for climate action. Given high ambition, system-supportive rationales aiming for policy impact favour narrower agendas tailored to demands of the policy process but risk low transformativeness. Given low ambition, system-disruptive rationales aiming to challenge established practices and worldviews favour more open agendas but risk low impact if assemblies are not politically embedded or able to mobilize opposition groups. Assembly designs are seldom purely supportive or disruptive but often hybrid. Agenda-setting has many dimensions allowing for productive combinations of disruptive and supportive elements tailored to contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Transitioning to a low-carbon economy while promoting sustainable development requires behavioural changes and mobilization of significant investments. Key instruments being used for that include carbon pricing initiatives, such as carbon taxes and cap-and-trade policies, and, more recently, green bonds. Although the literature has provided some evidence on emission reduction associated with carbon pricing initiatives, there is a lack of investigations on the environmental performance of green bonds; and only theoretical models describe the potential benefits of combining both. Aiming to fill this gap, this study uses regression analysis and annual data for 150 countries between 1990 and 2019 to assess how carbon pricing initiatives and green bonds relate to carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. This paper makes two main contributions. First, it examines how two climate instruments, carbon pricing and green bonds, relate to CO2 emissions. Previous research has focused only on individual instrument assessments and mainly on carbon pricing. Second, this paper empirically analyses whether there are interaction effects of the two instruments, an assessment not previously undertaken. The results suggest that the implementation of nationwide carbon pricing initiatives is associated with an 11% reduction in CO2 emissions on average. By comparison, green bond issuances are associated with an average 14% reduction in CO2 emissions. Further, no statistically significant interaction effects between carbon pricing initiatives and green bonds were observed. The results must be cautiously interpreted and cannot be attributed solely to the instruments studied since heterogeneous effects, biases from distinct sources, and the existence of complementary policies might influence the results. Carbon pricing initiatives, such as carbon taxes and cap-and-trade schemes, and green bonds are being used to promote the transition to a low-carbon economy. Investigation into green bonds and their impact on emissions is scarce and to date, only theoretical models analysed potential interaction effects of their combination with carbon pricing. The results show an average of 11% reduction in CO2 emissions associated with carbon pricing initiatives and of 14% reduction in CO2 emissions associated with green bonds issuances. While the results show promise in the emission reduction performance of these two instruments, caution in interpreting these results is advised as complementary policies, biases from distinct sources, and evidence of heterogeneous effects make it challenging to disentangle the effect of individual policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Institutional investors, who control as much as $154 trillion globally, may play an important role in shaping the energy transition as major stakeholders in fossil fuel producing, distributing and consuming companies. Research on investors and fossil fuels has focused largely on the divestment movement or on shareholder engagement. However, given their limited success to date, additional strategies to influence the fossil fuel sector are merited. This review paper expands the scope of attention to investors, asking: what strategies for influencing the fossil fuel industry are available to institutional investors and what are the implications of these for achieving an inclusive fossil fuel phase-out? Through a systematic review of 153 papers, we identify seven strategies for influencing the fossil fuel phase-out: divestment, shareholder engagement, hiring practices, engaging the financial sector, engaging indirect financial actors, litigation, and green investment. These strategies represent ways for investors to increase the impact of their engagements, as well as areas deserving greater attention from academics, policymakers, and activists. Across these strategies, we note trade-offs in favour of financial returns at the expense of social, ecological, and equity outcomes. We argue that future research should focus on: (a) the role of under-studied actors in aligning finance with climate goals; (b) the implications of investor action for an inclusive energy transition; and (c) policy solutions capable of overcoming investors' short-term profit motives to instead incentivise long-term investor engagement with climate issues. Legal mandates and uncertainties in how to apply fiduciary responsibility with respect to climate change result in investors and asset managers prioritizing short-term profits at the expense of climate goals. Voluntary investor efforts focus predominantly on transparency and disclosure and are insufficient to meet climate goals. Legally binding decarbonization strategies are needed to align finance with the Paris Agreement. Influence over investment strategies is increasingly concentrated in a small number of powerful actors. Policymakers should consider not only asset owners, but also asset managers, index providers, and proxy advisory firms. Investors can increase their climate action by incorporating policies on climate into their mandates for asset managers and engaging with fossil fuel financiers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Governments and international organizations are increasingly using public funds to mobilize and leverage private finance for climate projects in the Global South. An important international organization in the effort to mobilize the private sector for financing climate mitigation and adaptation in the Global South is the Green Climate Fund (GCF). The GCF was established under the UNFCCC in 2010 and is the world's largest dedicated multilateral climate fund. The GCF differs from other intergovernmental institutions through its fund-wide inclusion of the private sector, ranging from project design and financing to project implementation. In this paper, we investigate private sector involvement in the GCF through a qualitative exploratory research approach. We ask two main questions: Do private sector projects deliver on their ambitious goals? What are the tensions, if any, between private sector engagement and other principles of the GCF (most importantly the principles of country ownership, mitigation/adaptation balance, transparency, and civil society participation)? This paper argues that private sector involvement does not provide an easy way out of the financial constraints of public climate financing. We show that the GCF fails to deliver on its ambitious goals in private sector engagement for a number of reasons. First, private sector interest in GCF projects is thus far underwhelming. Second, there are strong tradeoffs between private sector projects and the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) principles of country ownership, transparency, and civil society participation. Third, private sector involvement is creating a mitigation bias within the GCF portfolio. Fourth, while the private sector portfolio is good at channeling funds to particularly vulnerable countries, it does so mostly through large multi-country projects with weak country ownership. Fifth, there is a danger that private climate financing based on loans and equity might add to the debt burden of developing countries, destabilize financial markets, and further increase dependency on the Global North. The main problem of GCF private sector engagement is lack of interest from the private sector. For now, the GCF will strongly rely on public funds for its mission; thus establishing a strong track record of high impact climate projects should take priority over the promises of mobilizing private financial resources. Given the strong mitigation bias of private sector projects, public sector financing needs to be even more focused on climate adaptation. The GCF needs to ensure that the private sector's short-term interests in profitability do not undermine its own long-term goal of transformational change and development. The GCF needs to make sure that private sector projects are compatible with Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) principles and its own rules on country ownership, transparency, and civil society participation. The GCF needs to pay more attention to building a sound institutional framework to ensure that climate finance does not add to the already existing debt burden, economic dependency, and financial instability of partner countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A mid-century net zero target creates a challenge for reducing the emissions of emissions-intensive, trade-exposed sectors with high cost mitigation options. These sectors include aluminium, cement, chemicals, iron and steel, lime, pulp and paper and petroleum refining. Available studies agree that decarbonization of these sectors is possible by mid-century if more ambitious policies are implemented soon. Existing carbon pricing policies have had limited impact on the emissions of these sectors because their marginal abatement costs almost always exceed the tax rate or allowance price. But emissions trading systems with free allowance allocations to emissions-intensive, trade-exposed sectors have minimized the adverse economic impacts and associated leakage. Internationally coordinated policies are unlikely, so implementing more ambitious policies creates a risk of leakage. This paper presents policy packages a country can implement to accelerate emission reduction by these sectors with minimal risk of leakage. To comply with international trade law the policy packages differ for producers whose goods compete with imports in the domestic market and producers whose goods are exported. Carbon pricing is a critical component of each package due its ability to minimize the risk of adverse economic impacts on domestic industry, support innovation and generate revenue. The revenue can be used to assist groups adversely impacted by the domestic price and production changes due to carbon pricing and to build public support for the policies. A country with a mid-century net zero GHG emission target likely will need to implement more ambitious mitigation policies soon for emission-intensive sectors such as aluminium, cement, chemicals, iron and steel, lime, pulp and paper and petroleum refining. More ambitious mitigation policies are likely to vary by country and be implemented at different times, creating a risk of leakage due to industrial production shifts to other jurisdictions. More ambitious mitigation policy packages, compatible with international trade law, that a country can implement to reduce emissions from these sectors with minimal risk of leakage are available but differ for producers whose goods compete with imports in the domestic market and those whose goods are exported. Carbon pricing is a critical component of each package due its ability to minimize the risk of adverse economic impacts on domestic producers, support innovation and generate revenue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the UNFCCC, the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) plays a central role as a policy framework for adaptation. While significant efforts, including research, have been made on the NAP scheme (which includes NAP formulation as one component), a critical evaluation of the entire NAP scheme is lacking. This includes an analysis of the relationship between the NAP process and the NAPs, their nature and intended functions, the interlinkages and implications of various COP agreements and guidelines on the NAPs, and alignment with the concept of the adaptation planning process. This paper analyzes COP Decisions, relevant documents from constituted bodies, and efforts by relevant international organizations to better understand how the NAP scheme is constructed and operated in order to clarify its strengths and weaknesses. To get an idea of how countries understand the COP Decisions and other relevant guidance for formulating their NAPs, we also reviewed the NAPs of nine countries in the Asia-Pacific region (Bangladesh, Cambodia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nepal, PNG, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, and Tonga). As a result, we find critical issues in the international agreements and actions on the NAPs that may become obstacles to global, and eventually national, adaptation efforts and make specific policy recommendations to address these challenges. Key policy insights Neither the NAP process nor the NAPs themselves have been well defined by the COP. As a result, formulated NAPs have no more in common than a 'plan on adaptation developed by the national government.' It is vital for the COP to define the NAP process and the NAPs more clearly, including their roles and relations, and to ensure consistent support for developing countries' adaptation efforts through the NAP scheme. The COP should define the NAP process as the adaptation planning process (AP process) and find the roles of the NAPs as the 'grand design of the AP process' to enhance the consistency and effectiveness of global efforts on adaptation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Corporate carbon neutrality pledges have been criticized for their lack of integrity, especially when they are primarily based on the simple purchase of carbon offsets without making any significant emission reductions. Neutrality pledges that are consistent with the goal of the ISO corporate net zero guidelines should be based on the reduction of all but the so-called unavoidable or residual emissions. The residual emissions should be neutralized not through reduction offsets but by actually removing the equivalent amount of emissions from the atmosphere. In this paper, I analyze whether climate pledges of 115 large companies, which cover all eleven Global Industry Classification Standards' sectors, follow the aforementioned net zero definition. The assessed criteria are (i) the type of pledge made, (ii) the definition of residual emissions employed and (iii) whether the company commits to neutralize its emissions exclusively with removals. Secondly, the assessment involves evaluating the companies' commitment to their net zero pledges by examining the residual emission level provided and determining if their climate goal extends to absolute scope 3 emissions. From the companies that had a net zero target (69) only 22% aimed to reduce emissions to a residual level and compensate with removals. The residual emission levels in the target year is specified by 29 companies and ranges between 0 and 80% (mean = 19.3%, median = 10%, n = 29). More than half of the residual emissions that exceed the median of 10% are claimed by sectors that are not classified as hard-to-abate such as information technology or communication companies. Key policy insights: Corporate net-zero goals appear more ambitious than the reduction and compensation commitments that companies are making Residual emission levels that determine the reduction obligations under a net-zero pledge should not be determined by corporates or technical experts alone Involvement of governments and civil society actors in participatory processes at national and international level is needed to determine residual emissions 'Fair contributions' and thus residual emissions should be informed by companies' impact on fulfilling the needs of the most vulnerable [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The potential for renewable energy to encourage sustainable development raises high hopes for the future among countries in the Global South. However, there has been less research on how energy transitions are perceived outside of the Global North and democratic contexts. This paper explores attitudes towards the energy transition in Jordan, where expert interviews reveal that a strong renewable energy industry has emerged from top-down government efforts to reduce energy dependency and costs. We perform an in-person household survey with 320 respondents in areas with different transition risks and benefits, and then test a series of hypotheses using regression analysis. In the four communities surveyed, income stress and climate concern influence attitudes, as well as perceptions of community benefits. National-level concerns also matter, including energy dependency and energy costs for all Jordanians. Our results highlight the importance of context: findings from the North are not universal and understanding transitions in the Global South requires studying them in their own right. Policy insights Jordanian policymakers should reverse their policy of blocking renewables to avoid public backlash. Jordanian policymakers and funders should promote projects in communities with high economic dependence on the fossil fuel industry to ensure local support in areas facing transition risks. Policymakers should highlight collective, not just individual benefits of transitions, as perceptions of community and country benefits increase support. Policymakers in highly energy-dependent countries like Jordan should frame renewables as an answer to local and national challenges such as high energy prices. Actors wishing to promote clean energy support in different contexts should investigate local dynamics to build communication strategies that frame transitions appropriately. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global warming will lead to more frequent and intense heatwaves across all regions of the world in the coming decades. Adaptation at the individual level plays a key role in helping populations cope with these extreme events. This study undertakes a systematic review of the academic literature on the determinants of heat-adaptive behaviours (HABs) following the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines. A Boolean algorithm was used on two online databases (PubMed and Web of Science Core Collection) to retrieve 73 relevant, quantitative, peer-reviewed papers. All included studies focus on high-income economies (N = 48) or middle-income economies (MIEs, N = 25). A meta-analysis was performed on 34 studies using a random-effects model, with an emphasis on heat-related perceptions (perceived efficacy, risk and threat) and heat-related knowledge (HRK), as these variables are the most likely levers of behavioural change. Perceived efficacy, HRK, perceived threat and gender (i.e. being female) are positively associated with the adoption of HABs. A moderation analysis reveals heterogeneity in the effect of these variables by country income group, with low HRK and perceived threat constituting stronger barriers to HABs in MIEs. This study also highlights various gaps in the current literature, regarding the populations studied, the statistical methods used, and the lack of standardization of HABs and perception concepts. Key policy insights: Heat-adaptive behaviours (HABs) are influenced by both psychological and non-psychological factors. Information and communication campaigns may be designed to influence the determinants of psychological factors and use them as adaptation levers. Policymakers should implement information campaigns to underline the characteristics and adverse health effects of heatwaves, as well as reminding people of ways to cope with heatwaves, especially in middle-income economies (MIEs). Information and prevention campaigns in MIEs should clearly highlight the frequency and severity of the health hazards associated with heatwaves in order to improve public awareness of these risks. Information campaigns based on simple infographics showing the most effective HABs and reminding people of the efficacy of HABs to reduce heatwave health risks may be especially impactful in high-income economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scenario-guided foresight processes are increasingly used to engage a broad range of stakeholders in sharing knowledge, reflecting, and setting priorities to respond to present and future climate change related dynamics. They are particularly useful to inform agricultural policies and planning in the face of a changing climate. Such participatory approaches are key to integrating multidisciplinary expertise, perspectives, and viewpoints, and ensuring that the multi-faceted vulnerabilities and the development needs of diverse groups are addressed in the design, planning, and implementation of climate adaptation policy. However, in practice, ensuring meaningful participation in the policy process is far from straightforward. In this paper, we examine the integration of gender and social inclusion considerations in 15 scenario-guided foresight use cases across Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia to determine the ways in which gender and social inclusion dynamics were considered and integrated at different stages of scenario-guided planning processes. To inform the analysis, we use qualitative data from key informant interviews, interviewing scenario coordinators and a gender and social inclusion expert who was engaged in one of the cases; we also review associated reports and outputs. The results suggest that few scenario-guided planning processes centred gender and social inclusion considerations from an early stage and consistently throughout the interventions, translating often into low diversity of stakeholders and insufficient depth reached in the content produced. A number of common challenges are reported including time, budget, and human resource constraints, as well as existing power and institutional dynamics. The latter includes, for instance, low women's representation in technical organizations or important hierarchical social norms structuring discussions. While the focus on the future can disrupt established modes of doing, the complexity of foresight methods can also undermine effective participation leading to important trade-offs. Innovations in the modes of engagement and parallel processes with diverse groups can be important leverage points for inclusion within policymaking processes. Key policy insights: Gender and social inclusion should be prioritized from the onset and integrated at different stages of scenario-guided planning processes, notably by allocating more time, human, and financial resources to ensure inclusiveness. Parallel consultations among diverse organizations and groups can provide effective spaces for often-sidelined or marginalized groups' interests and needs to be integrated into policy decision-making given the existing power structures that regulate access to many workshops and related discussions. Multi-scale engagements with different networks also help deepen understanding and reconcile gaps across scales of decision-making (e.g. from local level to national level). Practitioners should further their use of foresight processes and development of tools and methods for integrating gender and social inclusion in these as part of the policy process, as well as strengthen the capacities, expertise, and role of conveners. Promotion and dissemination of existing gender and social inclusion research and documentation as well as support for learning and reflection to refine identified leverage points can lead to improved success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the effects of the collateral-based monetary policy, implemented by the People's Bank of China, on green financing costs. Employing a Difference-in-Differences (DID) method to examine credit spreads of financial bond in primary and secondary markets from 2017 to 2019, our findings highlight a significant decrease of 26 basis points (bps) in the financing costs of green financial bonds in the primary market, with a 12-bps decline in the secondary market post-policy. Our study underscores the crucial role of implicit credit enhancement provided by the People's Bank of China's collateral endorsement. Interestingly, the liquidity provision mechanism, where investors pay premiums to secure liquidity support, does not find empirical backing in the specific context of China's bond market. These findings illuminate the effectiveness of collateral-based monetary policies in reducing green financing costs, offering valuable insights for using collateral strategies to green monetary policies. Collateral-based policies' success in reducing green financing costs suggests a strategic avenue for supporting green monetary policy goals. Implicit credit enhancement serves as a crucial mechanism driving this cost reduction. The People's Bank of China's experience exemplifies the robustness of such policies without requiring strict collateral scarcity, highlighting broad policy applicability. Collateral-based monetary policy could drive the 'green premium', broadening green bond appeal beyond just environmentally-focused investors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Local climate change impacts hit hard at smallholder farmers in developing countries due to their overreliance on rain-fed farming. Whilst ecosystem-based adaptation (EbA) to climate change holds an answer to smallholder farmers' adaptation needs, there are inadequate empirical results from the field to support formulation of effective adaptation strategies. Hence, this paper aimed at investigating EbA practices adopted by farmers, in North-Western Ghana to ameliorate local climate change impacts, with emphasis on benefits and associated challenges. The study methods were cross-sectional survey, mixed methods, and case study approach, with all data collected in the Wa West District of Ghana. Data were gathered using questionnaire, focus group discussion (FGD) and interviews. Data from the questionnaire were entered into SPSS version 20 to analyze associations between the variables using cross-tabulation. Descriptive statistics, in the form of percentages and frequencies, were then generated from the survey data and integrated with the qualitative information in the presentation of results. Also, statistical significance of the relationships was analyzed using chi-square test. Chi-squared tests were done to determine associations between socio-economic and environmental factors, and challenges and benefits associated with the adoption of EbA practices. This was necessary to give further insights to inform policy-related decisions aimed at addressing EbA adoption challenges. The results revealed that farmers use a combination of practices rather than single practice. Farmers integrated crops and trees and keep local breed of farm animals. Benefits of EbA included improvements in soil fertility leading to high crop yield and availability of food and income. Challenges of adopting EbA were the long timespan for benefits of most EbA practices to begin to accrue, lack of extension information and increasing cost of hired labour. It is recommended that tree integration should emphasis trees with multiple benefits and compatible with food crops. For the achievement of food security policy objectives, agroforestry promotion should focus on the integration of fruit tree crops and food crops to address hunger and increase farmers' incomes. Mobile extension technology should be exploited by government for the provision of EbA-specific information to farmers to bridge the extension services gap. Climate change policy of government should include the planting of non-fruit trees as windbreaks to provide multi-purpose benefits including provision of stakes for yam farmers, live-fencing and firewood for women. There is the need for government policy objectives to include EbA by farmers under the flagship 'planting for food and jobs' programme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A desire to shift from fossil fuels to non-carbon-emitting energy sources has become an imperative supported by national, state, and local policies. In the U.S., a diverse array of policies at multiple levels of government have helped the solar industry achieve exponential growth. These advancements, however, are mediated by local implementation processes, which might be expected to have a large impact in the context of U.S. federalism. This paper investigates the effects of two countervailing forces – policy incentives and implementation disincentives – on residential solar adoption in New Jersey. The New Jersey case study includes two complementary analyses designed to illuminate policy incentives and implementation disincentives, respectively. The first is an interrupted time-series analysis that evaluates the effects of federal and statewide renewable energy policies on residential photovoltaic (PV) growth. The second is a set of semi-structured in-depth interviews with solar industry experts, providing implementation insights from the solar industry and indirectly portraying residential customers' experiences. Results confirm that market-based instruments at the state-level play a crucial role in increasing the relative financial advantage of these systems and, thus, the attraction of residential solar PV to adopters. In addition, the behaviours of future adopters and the valuation of this technology as an investment in the housing market will impact the spread of residential PV systems in the future. Unfortunately, case study findings also confirm that an absence of standardized solar application procedures and outdated interconnection standards is a significant drag on the adoption rate. This highlights a need for policymakers to place greater emphasis on local implementation pathways in solar policy design. Options to achieve this include more robust ex-ante coordination among state and local levels of government and with industry to standardize implementation processes. While U.S. federalism may at times be constraining, our results suggest that even minimal levels of ex-ante coordination can lead to implementation gains that will have a large impact on solar diffusion outcomes. Federal and state-level financial incentives significantly impact the residential photovoltaic solar adoption rate. The absence of streamlined interconnection application procedures and outdated interconnection standards for the grid limit the residential PV adoption in New Jersey. Our findings underline the importance of paying equal attention to both policy design and to technical standards to underpin implementation processes, especially in the decentralized context of U.S. federalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Adaptation tracking is crucial for understanding progress in responding to climate change impacts across space and time. However, adaptation tracking is constrained by the lack of agreement on how to measure adaptation. While there has been significant focus on government plans and other documented adaptation as the basis for adaptation tracking, emerging literature also advocates for inclusive approaches that consider multiple experiences and priorities when designing and using adaptation tracking indicators. However, little literature empirically investigates the specifics of what this integrated approach is or what it could achieve. We address this gap using a thematic analysis of 48 focus group discussions and of government policies to compare the perspectives of livestock keepers and governments in Eastern Africa on climate risks and adaptation in livestock systems. The results show considerable similarities in how they perceive climatic hazards, impacts, adaptation strategies, goals, and adaptive capacities, highlighting elements that could be recognized as relevant by both sets of stakeholders. However, the differences underscore the value of an integrated approach as it supports the recognition of variations in climate risks and adaptation options across contexts as well as capturing diverse effects of adaptation across scales. Insights from this paper contribute to discussions on developing integrated adaptation tracking frameworks that take into account the contextual nature of climate hazards, impacts, adaptation strategies, adaptive capacities, and adaptation goals. Governments and livestock keepers perceive climate hazards, impacts, adaptation strategies, adaptive capacity, and adaptation goals in largely similar ways. Differences in governmental and livestock keeper perspectives provide the basis for integrating them in the development of adaptation tracking indicators. Drawing on multiple experiences, priorities, and knowledges could support more effective tracking of adaptation progress by considering the various scales and contexts within which adaptation occurs. Integration requires an adaptation tracking framework that utilizes core indicators that have broader relevance and additional ones that address the context-specificity of climate hazards, impacts, adaptive capacities, adaptation strategies, and adaptation goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change is a key socioeconomic and environmental concern in South Africa. The South African government introduced several climate change initiatives to address the impacts of climate change, resulting in the proliferation of climate adaptation policies across spheres of government. This paper studies different climate change adaptation policies and climate policy paradigms (CPP) to understand the adaptation landscape; it explains and compares the changes in CPP in South Africa over time. We mapped 40 policy documents from 2004 to 2022, which shows 12 national policies, 12 provincial (sub-national) policy documents and 14 metropolitan city policy documents. We then used 12 national policy documents to illustrate and understand the CPP. The research shows that different stakeholders have shaped climate change adaptation policy, both private and public firms advised on climate change policy and there are a number of different funding partners supporting the adaptation policy like GEF, C40 and GIZ. The changing policy environment has introduced new frameworks, objectives and processes. Therefore, more efforts will be needed going forward to guide adaptation policy across national, provincial and local governments. We find that several CPPs have emerged, that is different paradigms encompassing a range of policy goals, framings and instruments. The present National CC Adaptation Strategy (NCCAS) mandates adaptation across all levels of government and allows all important stakeholders to address climate change consequences. This NCCAS increases the number and ambition of adaptation policy, encourages integrated approaches, policy coherence and clear direction on how to handle climate risks and impacts in varied South Africa and its global commitment. Changes in policy paradigm enable the use of new policy instruments, including funding and budget mechanisms. Finally, climate adaptation policy has become more ambitious and stringent, requiring all levels of government to plan for climate change. The climate change policy landscape in South Africa has grown over the past 18 years, with policy development across different spheres of government (national, sectoral, provincial and metros), New CPPs have emerged, supported by new policy frames, goals and instruments. The NCCAS provides a clear policy goal, which also provides new policy instruments to implement climate actions and acts to enhance integrated approaches, The lack of domestic budget allocation remains a challenge for national government, but external partnerships have begun to provide support for policy development. Notably, a shift from a flexible to stringent approach to climate policy is needed to deliver effective climate action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The effectiveness of carbon price in emissions trading schemes (ETS) is an important issue in China in the context of its ambitious climate change goals. This paper adopts a staggered difference-in-differences model to estimate whether China's ETS reduced CO2 emissions while maintaining economic growth even under low carbon prices. The results indicate that despite the low carbon prices, the ETS effectively reduced CO2 emissions without undermining the economy. Specifically, an increase of $1 in the carbon price reduced CO2 emissions by 1.69% and increased the per capita GDP by $286. The carbon price primarily achieved emission reduction and promoted economic development through channels, such as technological innovation, foreign direct investment, energy mix, and industrial structure. Carbon leakage to neighboring regions was not evident. Heterogeneity analysis showed that the environmental effects of the carbon price were more pronounced in regions with higher levels of economic development and CO2 emissions. Conversely, the economic effects of the carbon price were more pronounced in regions with lower levels of economic development and CO2 emissions. The carbon price achieved significant economic effects in regions that solely adopted the free allocation mode of emission allowances, while regions that used a combination of free allocation and auctioning experienced substantial emission reduction effects. Despite low carbon prices, China's ETS effectively reduced CO2 emissions without compromising economic growth. This finding provides new empirical evidence for the effectiveness of carbon price as well as decision support for the future promotion of ETS. Technological innovation, FDI, energy mix, and industrial structure are crucial channels through which the carbon price achieves emission reduction and promotes economic development. The absence of carbon leakage to neighboring regions suggests that ETS is an internally effective mechanism for emission control. Heterogeneity analysis showed that regional characteristics and allowance allocation modes can influence the effectiveness of carbon price, thus emphasizing the importance of targeted policy design and appropriate allocation methods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Relying on the digital economy may help reconcile contradictions between the need to improve quality of life (QoL) and the need to reduce carbon emissions. Yet, previous research has not systematically explored the correlation between the digital economy, QoL, and carbon emissions. This paper explores the influence of the digital economy and of changes in QoL on carbon emissions, using a system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model. To do this we first use principal component analysis to calculate an objective QoL and a digital economy index using provincial panel data in China from 2006 to 2018. The results demonstrate that both the digital economy and QoL exhibit inverted U-shaped effects on carbon emissions. Our results also show that the growth of the digital economy improves QoL while mitigating the influence of QoL on carbon emissions. Thus, these findings illustrate that policymakers can rely upon the digital economy to help reconcile potential conflicts that arise between QoL and carbon emission reduction goals. Overall, these findings add a new dimension to carbon reduction policies. We propose that policymakers can improve QoL and reduce carbon emissions by coordinating the scale and efficiency-enhancing effects of developing the digital economy. In addition, regions that rely on energy industries should consider the efficiency-enhancing effect of the digital economy when formulating provincial and national emission reduction policies. China aims to improve the QoL of its citizens while achieving carbon peak and neutrality goals in the coming decades. This study demonstrates how the digital economy can both improve QoL and reduce carbon emissions. Given the non-linear impact of QoL on carbon emissions, policymakers should not be concerned that climate mitigation policies will deter or damage efforts to generate to QoL improvements. Countries should develop digital economies to improve QoL while simultaneously paying attention to its efficiency improvement effect, which can reduce carbon emissions. Policymakers should focus on the enhanced efficiency improvement effect of the digital economy on the allocation of resources, particularly in regions with energy-intensive industries as economic pillars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policymakers and governments increasingly frame climate protection in terms of green growth, arguing that continued economic growth and climate protection are complementary and mutually beneficial. With such framing, governments hope to overcome the global common goods problem associated with climate change and to enable higher ambition on climate action within and across states. Yet, no empirical evidence to date has been provided on how widespread the support for green growth is in international climate politics. This paper, therefore, investigates which countries employ green growth framings at UNFCCC negotiations, and whether this relates to domestic factors, in particular economic structure, level of development and climate impacts. We conduct panel-data analysis on green growth positions derived from hand-coding a unique dataset of High-level Segment statements at the Convention of the Parties (COPs) from 2010 to 2019 for 151 countries. The results reveal that, to date, green growth proponents are those countries with the most advanced national clean energy technology (CET) capacities – as measured by the Green Complexity Index. The findings highlight that green growth is not promoted by all countries at international climate negotiations. In international climate negotiations, climate protection is increasingly framed as a green growth opportunity to motivate global ambition. Clean Energy Technology (CET) leading countries are more likely to use green growth framings than other less-technologically advanced peers and those with high exposure to climate risks. Mechanisms to support green growth pathways for all countries should be scaled up, including technology transfer and finance to foster local capacities and human capital. Given that green growth framings are not universally endorsed, further emphasis should be placed on additional co-benefits of climate action beyond economic growth, such as food and energy security, adaptation and resilience-building. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As an instrument supporting the realization of EU climate neutrality targets by 2050 and encouraging decarbonization outside its borders, the current proposed Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is facing opposition from some countries. Focusing on Brazil, this paper evaluates the impacts of the CBAM on the Brazilian economy through a comprehensive analysis of various scenarios based on the potential EU implementation of the CBAM and Brazil's climate scenarios. Results obtained in this research alleviate concerns of detrimental and competitiveness losses from Brazilian industries. Rather, the implementation of the EU CBAM improves the trade balance of Brazil's Energy-Intensive Industries (EII). The relatively low CO2 contents of Brazilian EII are elemental to this result, while contributions of carbon-free technologies in electricity generation are also critical factors in maximizing this trade surplus. Other consequential factors affecting these results are the contributions of CO2 removal from Brazil's forestry of land used, and homogeneity of CBAM-imposed products. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of digital technologies poses opportunities and challenges for transparency and accountability in climate governance. This paper examines their impact on information flows and accountability in the context of climate outcomes, analyzing three case examples (World Bank Climate Warehouse, Climate TRACE, and OpenClimate) to assess the potential of digital solutions to improve data availability and reliability, particularly for non-state actors (NSAs). Using Ostrom's 'rules in use' framework, we explore how digital technologies shape transparency outcomes, highlighting challenges and unintended consequences. We analyze how these initiatives frame, design, and implement their rules for digital approaches to define their participants' data collection, purpose, and access rules, all of which are crucial aspects impacting transparency and accountability for the Paris Agreement. Our findings reveal uncertainties in the rules' operationalization for these digital technologies that undermine their potential to enhance transparency. Three key issues emerge: (1) establishing appropriate rules to govern data quality for accuracy and credibility; (2) addressing power imbalances to foster inclusive and equitable transparency; and (3) aligning rules in use across digitally-enabled solutions to promote coordination and facilitate polycentrism in the post-Paris climate regime. These insights shed light on the role of digital approaches in bridging transparency and accountability gaps, emphasizing the need for careful rule design and coordination for effective implementation in global climate governance. Digital technologies have the potential to generate new modes of transparency within the Paris climate governance system, particularly at the level of non-state and subnational actors. By comparing three case examples employing digital technologies to improve climate data, we evaluate various formal and informal 'rules in use' for generating data and facilitating sharing across actors and initiatives to enhance transparency and accountability. To leverage the potential of digital technologies in advancing transparency and accountability in climate governance, policymakers should prioritize the alignment of rules in use, address power imbalances, and ensure the creation of appropriate rules governing data quality and structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change policies are prepared in a power-loaded environment, where different policy actors interact to meet their personal or collective interests. This paper argues that the 'power interplay' between actors plays a significant role in shaping and re-shaping climate change policies. We present examples from South Asia (Nepal, India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan) to show how actors' power interplay at the local, sub-national, national and transboundary levels influences climate change policy-making. We show that negative effects of power interplay are prominent in the climate policy domain of South Asia, including short-termism of local adaptation plans, exclusion of certain policy actors in the policy-making processes, lack of transboundary-level adaptation, and lack of coordination between actors. Nuances also exist, such as the state's authority in prioritizing technical solutions, exclusionary design and implementation of climate policies, and an agenda of securitization; these can further marginalize the actors involved in climate change policy processes. The negative effects of power interplay in South Asia can limit the success of on-the-ground implementation of adaptation and mitigation strategies, limit adaptive capacity among communities, and possibly counter the development of a strong climate change solutions space. Lastly, we argue that there are no silver bullet solutions to power asymmetries and appeal to policy actors – in South Asia and elsewhere – to design context-specific and power-sensitive policy-making approaches. Negative effects of power interplay have led to the exclusion of certain policy actors (especially communities at risk) in policy-making processes and a lack of transboundary-level adaptation in South Asia. Hard infrastructure-based adaptation measures tend to exacerbate the vulnerability of the communities at risk in South Asia. Policy actors must design context-specific and power-sensitive policy-making climate adaptation and mitigation approaches to reduce the negative impacts of power interplay. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]