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The effectiveness of carbon price in emissions trading schemes (ETS) is an important issue in China in the context of its ambitious climate change goals. This paper adopts a staggered difference-in-differences model to estimate whether China's ETS reduced CO2 emissions while maintaining economic growth even under low carbon prices. The results indicate that despite the low carbon prices, the ETS effectively reduced CO2 emissions without undermining the economy. Specifically, an increase of $1 in the carbon price reduced CO2 emissions by 1.69% and increased the per capita GDP by $286. The carbon price primarily achieved emission reduction and promoted economic development through channels, such as technological innovation, foreign direct investment, energy mix, and industrial structure. Carbon leakage to neighboring regions was not evident. Heterogeneity analysis showed that the environmental effects of the carbon price were more pronounced in regions with higher levels of economic development and CO2 emissions. Conversely, the economic effects of the carbon price were more pronounced in regions with lower levels of economic development and CO2 emissions. The carbon price achieved significant economic effects in regions that solely adopted the free allocation mode of emission allowances, while regions that used a combination of free allocation and auctioning experienced substantial emission reduction effects. Despite low carbon prices, China's ETS effectively reduced CO2 emissions without compromising economic growth. This finding provides new empirical evidence for the effectiveness of carbon price as well as decision support for the future promotion of ETS. Technological innovation, FDI, energy mix, and industrial structure are crucial channels through which the carbon price achieves emission reduction and promotes economic development. The absence of carbon leakage to neighboring regions suggests that ETS is an internally effective mechanism for emission control. Heterogeneity analysis showed that regional characteristics and allowance allocation modes can influence the effectiveness of carbon price, thus emphasizing the importance of targeted policy design and appropriate allocation methods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to most climate mitigation scenario assessments, limiting global warming to 1.5–2°C in the long run will not be possible without the extensive deployment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) from the atmosphere. CDR is required for drawing down and achieving net-zero CO2 emissions by mid-century. Thereafter, CO2 removals will likely need to exceed residual CO2 emissions, resulting in net negative emissions. A policy framework based on 'carbon removal obligations' (CROs) has been proposed to respond to concerns about the financial and fiscal viability, the lack of incentives for CDR uptake, as well as the physical and technological risks associated with any climate mitigation scenario that relies on large scale CDR. Here we propose an updated and improved CRO policy framework, consisting of two core elements: the 'principal CRO mechanism' obliges emitters of a tonne of CO2 to remove a tonne of CO2 at the time of maturity of the CRO. On top of this obligation, CRO holders need to pay a fee for the temporary storage of CO2 in the atmosphere. This 'CRO pricing instrument' is used by regulators to steer the carbon emissions and removals pathways independently. Our update suggests that markets for CDR under the CRO framework should operate independently from markets for emission reductions. We propose a blueprint for legal implementation where CROs are integrated akin to private financial borrowing and debt mechanisms. By aligning CROs with established financial systems, we leverage familiar institutional roles, seamlessly integrating climate mitigation into the core economy. The proposal applies the polluter pays principle to the costs of carbon removal from the atmosphere, whilst providing legal guarantees that the removals will materialize. By placing climate change mitigation pricing levers in the hands of the traditional managers of financial stability, that is, central banks, better account is taken of the externality of carbon emissions as part of core economic and financial management, with the corollary that climate change mitigation response management is better integrated into the economic mainstream. Establishing a standard for the creation of removal units by CDR projects facilitates a more efficient market by reducing transaction costs and enhancing price discovery. Early action by government to put in place legislative measures indicating the direction of policy, and a timetable for introducing CROs, would enhance private sector confidence and engagement in the CDR project sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whether the carbon market can promote green technology innovation is a controversial topic because of an incomplete understanding of the mechanism and inconsistent datasets. This study first comprehensively explores the theoretical mechanism of the carbon market on green technology innovation from four aspects: the compensation effect, cost control motivation, crowding-out effect, and spillover effect. A sample of 209 cities in China is employed to empirically test the impact of China's pilot carbon market on green technology innovation and its regional and industry heterogeneity using quasi-natural experiments. We found that China's pilot carbon market has significantly promoted green technology innovation at the city level, especially in provincial capital cities, achieving a maximum effect two years after the shock. However, there is no significant spillover effect on the surrounding non-pilot cities, and Chongqing has realized the suppression of green technology innovation under the domination of the crowding-out effect. At the industry level, the pilot carbon market significantly promotes green technology innovation in the transportation, construction, chemical, and power industries but exhibits crowding-out effects in the steel industry. Finally, we propose policy implications for maintaining reasonable and stable carbon prices to stimulate compensation effects, scientifically determining the order of industry inclusion to avoid crowding-out effects, and accelerating inter-regional supply chains and technological cooperation to release spillover effects. It is recommended to scientifically determine a reasonable carbon price range and introduce institutions, individuals, and other trading entities to improve the liquidity of the carbon market and the effectiveness of carbon prices. Considering the high cost triggered by the complex processes of the steel industry in developing countries, its inclusion may inhibit green technology innovation; thus, it is necessary to be cautious about including the steel industry in the carbon market. To build a carbon market in developing countries, the order of industry inclusion must be determined based on scientific calculations of the costs of green technology innovation in the industry. Avoid using self-declaration for carbon quota allocation and focus on improving national basic innovation capabilities to ensure the supply of green technology innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emissions trading schemes (ETS) area is a leading climate policy instrument worldwide and have been widely discussed and researched. However, few studies to date focus on the nexus of ETS and income inequality, an important socioeconomic phenomenon. To fill this gap, taking China as an example, this paper discusses the influence of ETS on income inequality and its dynamic changes using a time-varying differences-in-difference model combined with a propensity score matching approach. The results demonstrate that China's pilot ETS has contributed to reducing income inequality. Various robustness tests support this conclusion. Moreover, the strength of ETS's contribution to reduction in income inequality gradually increases over time. We further analyze the mediating effects of carbon intensity, energy consumption, industrial structure, and technological innovation. ETS reduces income inequality by reducing coal consumption. The regional heterogeneity analysis shows that, unlike in other regions, ETS has a positive impact on income inequality (i.e. it increases it) in the eastern region in China due to its optimized energy structure and relatively complete, open, and flexible economy system. The paper discusses the above findings and their policy implications. It is also designed to promote research on ETS and to diversify research perspectives of income inequality from both theoretical and practical aspects. Evidence from China's pilot experience with ETS shows that it contributes significantly to balancing income distribution and alleviating the increasingly acute social conflicts caused by income inequality. This provides new theoretical and decision support for the promotion of ETS in the future. The energy revolution driven by ETS promotes income redistribution, which is conducive to income equality. Governments should enforce the constraints of ETS on power generation companies; guide capital to invest more in the non-thermal power industry, especially the renewable energy power sectors; and guide and regulate the income distribution in new power sectors. Governments' revenue from ETS can and should be used to further redistribution of income and to reduce income inequality. A higher number of free quotas and a lower carbon price could be imposed on low-profit or labor-intensive industries to reduce their emission costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To facilitate and balance regional economic development and to reduce carbon emissions, China has implemented a series of policies to promote the redistribution of industries and economic activities across regions since 2000. This paper employs a logarithmic mean Divisia index (LMDI) to analyse the dynamic net effect on carbon emissions of Chinese policies promoting economic redistribution across sub-national regions, using a panel data of five sectors in 30 provinces during 1995–2017. The results of our analysis show that the redistribution of industry in particular, but also business and construction activities, leads to an increase in CO2 emissions, while the relocation of agriculture and transportation activities reduces emissions. We also find that the emission increase effect of the transfer of carbon intensive industries to new (host) regions is higher than the emission reduction effect induced by the agglomeration of clean industries in the original (home) regions. However, from 2014–2017, alongside the gradual industrial redistribution, China has also reduced aggregate CO2 emissions by 58.6 MT. In addition, the results show that population migration, which is due to redistribution of industry and other economic activity, has caused higher emission increases than emission reductions due to redistribution policies. We further calculate the marginal effect of industrial redistribution on CO2 emissions and draw out relevant policy implications. Key policy insights Industrial (and other economic activity) redistribution within a county can be not only an economic policy, but also an important policy instrument to mitigate CO2 emissions. This is the case in China. In the process of regional industrial redistribution, policymakers should aim to reduce the emission increase effect of transfer of carbon-intensive industries to host regions and to raise the emission reduction effect induced by an agglomeration of clean industries in home regions. Industrial redistribution is usually a long-term strategy for regional development within a county, and any reduction effects on CO2 emissions are likely to need time to appear. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Integrating peatland restoration measures with climate policy is critical for meeting climate targets, but the current policies often fall short of utilizing the large potential that exists. Despite growing private sector interest, few regional voluntary carbon markets for peatlands have emerged worldwide. In this study, we explore three pioneering examples from Europe. From the perspective of social innovation, we aim to provide clarity on how these innovations emerged and developed, which actors drove the innovation process by assuming which roles, and which factors fostered or hindered the development. We do so by mapping the innovation process using Process Net-Map. The results show that all three cases have followed remarkably similar patterns in their innovation processes. Four phases, i.e. preparation, definition, refinement, and up-scaling were identified, as were actors' roles as innovators, promoters, intermediaries, implementers, and knowledge providers. However, the case studies are very different with regard to which actor constellation drove the innovation process: MoorFutures is driven by public and scientific actors, Valuta vor Veen is promoted by civil society actors in consultation with practitioners, and Hiilipörssi shifted from civil society to private actors. The governance modes, that is, actor constellation and their goals, have led to differences in concept, robustness of methodology, mitigation measure, and possibly potential for up-scaling. Our study indicates that the timing of interventions when actors with certain roles stepped in can accelerate the innovation process. Important political, economic, technical, and social factors influencing the innovation process, especially knowledge and trust accumulated between some key actors, are outlined. Private funding for regional voluntary carbon markets (VCMs) can tap the climate mitigation potential from peatlands, which is not currently adequately addressed by governments. Actor constellation drove the innovation process, leading to different concepts, methodologies, and mitigation measures. The timing of interventions by actors, notably providing seed funding, network, expertise and visibility, was critical for success. Building trust for regional VCMs requires not only a robust methodology to calculate emission reductions but also partnership and endorsement. The future development of climate policy on peatlands could be a decisive factor in regional VCMs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses options to increase mitigation ambition in crediting mechanisms that serve the Paris Agreement (PA), such as the Article 6.4 mechanism. Under the Clean Development Mechanism and other crediting mechanisms, baselines have been specified in the form of greenhouse gas (GHG) intensity factors and linked to business-as-usual developments. This means that with increasing production of goods and services through carbon market activities, absolute emissions may increase or fall only slowly. At a global level, such an approach widens the 'emissions gap'. To enable continued use of emissions intensity baselines in crediting mechanisms while being in line with the PA's goal to pursue efforts to limit temperature rise to 1.5°C, we propose to apply an 'ambition coefficient' to emissions intensities of technologies when establishing the baseline. This coefficient would decrease to reflect increasing ambition over time, and reach zero when a country needs to reach net zero emissions. Due to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, the coefficient would fall more quickly for developed than for developing countries. The latter would be able to generate emission reduction credits well beyond 2050, while for the former, crediting would stop around 2035 or before. An ambition coefficient approach would generate certainty for carbon market investors and preserve trust in international carbon markets that operate in line with the agreed, long-term ambition of the international climate regime. An ambition coefficient can help to align carbon market activities with net zero GHG emission pathways at country level, and ensure that carbon markets will not lead to a lock-in of emissions in participating countries. The ambition coefficient approach can serve as a 'bridging proposal' for the operationalization of PA carbon markets. It may resolve negotiation gridlock between those who want to increase stringency in carbon market instruments and those who think mitigation ambition should be generated through more stringent NDCs, facilitated by cost savings and increased financial resources generated by international carbon markets. The use of an ambition coefficient can enable the alignment of existing methodologies with necessary ambition levels to implement the PA, while also keeping transaction costs low. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I investigate whether and how banks align green words, in terms of their commitments to tackle climate change, with deeds in terms of credit allocation across carbon-intensive industries in France. I use data on bank credit exposures to large versus small firms across 49 industries for the main banking groups operating in France, which I merge with information on industries' greenhouse gas emission intensities and a score for banks' self-reported climate-related commitments over 2010–2017. I find evidence that higher levels of self-reported climate commitments by banks are associated with a slower growth of lending to large firms in the five most carbon-intensive industries. However, lending to small and medium-sized enterprises across more or less carbon-intensive industries remains unrelated to banks' commitments to green their business. These findings suggest that devising an appropriate carbon reporting framework for small firms is likely to enhance the decarbonization of bank lending. Key policy insights Over 2010–2017, in France, banking groups that self-report to CDP as being more committed to climate change adaptation and mitigation tend to cut their lending relatively faster to domestic firms in the five most carbon-intensive industries. This pattern is entirely driven by the dynamics of banks' credit to large corporations, which in France are legally bound to regular carbon reporting. In contrast, banks' climate commitments do not seem to affect their lending to domestic small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs) in carbon-intensive industries. Overall, the results support recent calls for an extension of mandatory carbon disclosure regulations to SMEs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On the one hand, a large number of companies have committed to achieve net zero emissions and many of them foresee to offset some remaining emissions with carbon credits, suggesting a surge of future demand. Yet, the supply side of the voluntary carbon market is struggling to align its business model with the new legal architecture of the Paris Agreement. This article juxtaposes these two perspectives. It provides an overview of the plans of 482 major companies with some form of neutrality/net zero pledge and traces the struggle on the supply side of the voluntary carbon market to come up with a viable business model that ensures environmental integrity and contributes to achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Our analysis finds that if carbon credits are used to offset remaining emissions against neutrality objectives, these credits need to be accounted against the host countries' Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to ensure environmental integrity. Yet, operationalizing this approach is challenging and will require innovative solutions and political support. Key policy insights There is a growing mismatch between the faith placed in carbon credits by private sector companies and the continued quest for a common position of the main suppliers of the voluntary carbon market. The voluntary carbon market has not yet found a way to align itself with the new legal architecture of the Paris Agreement in a credible and legitimate way. Public policy support at the national and international level will be needed to operationalize a robust approach for the market's future activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The climate emergency calls for decisive actions to achieve CO2 emissions reductions globally and in China. Although China has made substantial progress in renewable energy deployment and has promised to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060, the increasing CO2 emissions reflect a paradox in China's energy revolution, suggesting that second-best choices are necessary. Large-scale deployment of carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) can avoid stranding assets in existing fossil energy industries and thus incur less resistance from incumbents. With an estimated storage capacity of 3120 GtCO2, China has great potential to deploy CCUS. The more quickly CCUS scales up, the less the cost of mitigation in the future. Although China has issued many policies to promote CCUS development and achieved significant progress through demonstration projects, barriers still exist for its large-scale deployment. Barriers include the lack of CCUS-specific legal and regulatory models, relatively high investment requirements, and low public perception and acceptance towards CCUS. To effectively promote this second-best choice, institutional reforms are critical, including enabling climate change legislation, carbon tax policy, risk avoidance and risk sharing measures, compensation, and strengthened public engagement. Key policy insights Large-scale deployment of Negative Emission Technologies will be needed in China and beyond to address the climate emergency. Market distortions impede renewable energy development in China, making large-scale deployment of CCUS an essential second-best choice. Detailed legal and regulatory rule changes can reduce market uncertainties and provide a legal foundation and mandate for CCUS development. Particularly when source control measures – such as renewable energy deployment, industrial restructuring and energy efficiency improvements – face bottlenecks, the scaling up of negative emission technologies is essential. International cooperation on CCUS technologies and deployment should be strengthened to share experience, technology, and deployment modes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS) presents an opportunity to compare the theory of linked emissions trading with practice. From 2009 until October 2012 New Zealand was linked to the market under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and there was no indication that this link would be broken. A series of events starting in late 2012 cast doubt on the future eligibility of Kyoto units in the NZ ETS, made the future of linking in New Zealand uncertain, and may have contributed to price divergence between offshore and domestic units. Delinking was officially confirmed by the New Zealand government in December 2013 to take effect from 31 May 2015. This raises the question of what the effect of delinking and announcements had on the carbon market. To study this effect, we used daily price data in a difference-in-differences model over the period 1 January 2011 to 1 January 2016. From this model, we found evidence that, even with differing pre- and post-time specifications, the government announcements in 2012 caused prices in the two markets – for New Zealand units (NZUs) and Kyoto units – to decouple and NZUs traded at a premium based on their projected scarcity. This is further backed up by the behaviour of the raw price data and the change in the types of units surrendered over this time period. The NZU price reaction to the government announcements (rather than delinking itself) shows strong evidence of a well-functioning market. Key policy insights The NZU price reaction to the delinking announcement shows strong evidence of the New Zealand carbon market reacting in the present to news about the future: a property of any well-functioning market. The long period of price divergence between the New Zealand and Kyoto markets has led to a large privately held bank that is a liability to the New Zealand Government and reduces the government's ability to auction NZUs. If the NZ ETS had delinked earlier from the Kyoto market it could have avoided a protracted period of arbitrage which significantly inflated the NZU bank. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many economists, businesses, and policymakers view carbon pricing as the single best policy approach to address climate change. Such optimism, however, tends to neglect the political conflicts surrounding climate policy and the necessity to accelerate the ongoing low-carbon energy transition. To unveil these conflicts, we analyze the responses of key actors to public consultations in 2015–16 concerning the EU emissions trading system (ETS) and the EU renewable energy directive. From this, we identify a prominent policy position contending that climate policy should focus on the ETS given its purported efficiency. Some actors who share this position use the ETS as a Trojan Horse – a strategy to divert attention from, and fend off, more ambitious climate action in the form of complementary renewable energy policies. Such political strategies do not just undermine carbon pricing but impede the energy transition at large. However, we also find energy industry incumbents that express support for a much stronger ETS and more effective climate policy. Therefore, it seems that the 'Trojan Horse strategy' may fail and the low-carbon transition might gain increasing support from a broad range of stakeholders. Even so, we argue that any singular climate policy approach risks political capture and that a mix of policies will be necessary to accelerate the ongoing transition. Key Policy Insights Major European industry actors tend to advocate the EU ETS as the primary climate policy instrument. Some European industry actors have used the EU ETS as a Trojan Horse – to fend off strict climate action and to slow down the low-carbon energy transition. Political conflicts surrounding individual climate policies reflect much larger struggles over the direction and pace of the energy transition. Climate policy should not rely too heavily on a single instrument but rather include a mix of measures that promote both low-carbon innovation and the decline of carbon-intensive industries, technologies and practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The production of basic materials accounts for around 25% of global greenhouse gas emissions. Existing measures to reduce emissions from industry are limited due to a combination of competitiveness concerns and a lack of technological options available to producers. In this paper, we assess the possibility of implementing a materials charge to reduce demand for basic industrial products and, hence, also reduce industrial emission levels. The modelling shows that a charge equivalent to around €80/tCO2 could reduce the EU's total (energy plus process) CO2 emissions by up to 10% by 2050, depending on the substitution options available. The materials charge could lead to small GDP increases and a minor reduction in overall employment levels. Key policy insights Full carbon price pass through along the materials value chain creates incentives for resource efficiency and substitution in the value chain of material use. Most macroeconomic models ignore mitigation opportunities in the value chain, as do carbon pricing mechanisms for industrial emitters, which largely mute incentives for mitigation opportunities with free allowance allocation. Including consumption at a benchmark level in emission trading systems reinstates a full carbon price incentive for all mitigation opportunities while avoiding competitive distortions and carbon leakage risks. Macroeconomic modelling shows that this allows for an additional 10% emission reduction accompanied by a slight GDP increase and employment reduction. Long-term clarity on carbon leakage protection furthermore strengthens low-carbon investment frameworks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several years of very low allowance prices in the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS) have motivated calls to introduce a price floor to correct potential underlying distortions and design flaws, including (i) the political nature of allowance supply and related credibility issues, (ii) potential myopia of market participants and firms, and (iii) waterbed and rebound effects resulting from policy interactions. In the wake of the recent EU ETS reform, allowance prices have sharply increased. This raises the question of whether the case for introducing a price floor in the EU ETS remains valid. We argue that such a price floor, also adopted in several other greenhouse gas cap-and-trade systems worldwide, remains an important improvement in the design of the system, as long as the above-mentioned distortions and design flaws persist. An EU ETS price floor can safeguard against these issues and provides more explicit guidance on the minimum allowance price policymakers consider acceptable. Either as a complement or substitute to the current Market Stability Reserve (MSR), a price floor would thus make the EU ETS less prone to future revision in case of unexpectedly low prices. We identify and confront four prominent arguments against the introduction of an EU ETS price floor. Key policy insights An EU ETS price floor would be an important institutional innovation enhancing political and economic stability, and predictability of the EUA price The recent Market Stability Reserve (MSR) reform has not removed the need for a carbon price floor. Introducing an element of price responsiveness into the so far purely quantitative design of the EU ETS would help to preserve its integrity In contrast to conventional wisdom, legal analysis reveals that an EU ETS price floor can be legally feasible Political support for a carbon price floor is gaining traction across Europe [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Paris Agreement requires mitigation contributions from all Parties. Therefore, the determination of additionality of activities under the market mechanisms of its Article 6 will need to be revisited. This paper provides recommendations on how to operationalize additionality under Article 6. We first review generic definitions of additionality and current approaches for testing of additionality before discussing under which conditions additionality testing of specific activities or policies is still necessary under the new context of the Paris Agreement, that is, in order to prevent increases of global emissions. We argue that the possibility of 'hot air' generation under nationally-determined contributions (NDCs) requires an independent check of the NDC's ambition. If the NDC of the transferring country does contain 'hot air', or if the transferred emission reductions are not covered by the NDC, a dedicated additionality test should be required. While additionality tests of projects and programmes could continue to be done through investment analysis, for policy instruments new approaches are required. They should be differentiated according to type of policy instrument. For regulation, we suggest calculating the resulting pay-back period for technology users. If the regulation generates investments exceeding a payback period threshold, it could be deemed additional. Similarly, carbon pricing policies that generate a carbon price exceeding a threshold could qualify; for trading schemes an absence of over-allocation needs to be shown. The threshold should be differentiated according to country categories and rise over time. Key policy insights Without additionality testing, market mechanisms under the Paris Agreements might lead to an international diffusion of 'hot air'. To avoid this, an independent assessment of NDC ambition is in order. Otherwise, activities under the mechanisms need to undergo specific additionality tests. Additionality testing of projects and programmes should build on the experience developed under the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms. Bold approaches are needed for assessing additionality of policies. To avoid cumbersome assessment of all activities triggered by such policies, highly aggregated approaches are suggested, ranging from payback period thresholds for technologies mandated by regulation to minimum price levels triggered by carbon pricing policies. Over time, the stringency of threshold values should increase. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Carbon pricing, including carbon taxes and emissions trading, has been adopted by different kinds of polities worldwide. Yet, beyond the increasing adoption over time, little is known about what polities – countries as well as sub- and supranational entities – adopt carbon pricing and why. This paper explores patterns of adoption (both implemented policies and those scheduled to be) through cluster analysis, with the purpose of investigating factors that could explain polities' decisions to adopt carbon pricing. The study contributes empirically by studying carbon taxes and emissions trading together and by ordering the polities adopting carbon pricing into clusters. It also contributes theoretically, by exploring constellations of variables that drive the adoption of carbon pricing within individual clusters. We investigated 66 adopted policies of carbon pricing, which were divided into five clusters: early adopters, North-American subnational entities, Chinese pilot provinces, second-wave developed polities, and second-wave developing polities. The analysis indicates that the reasons for adopting carbon pricing have shifted over time. While international factors (climate commitments or influences from polities within the same region) are increasingly salient, domestic factors (including crises and income levels) were more important for the early adopters. Key policy insights Carbon pricing has become a global mainstream policy instrument. Economic and fiscal crises provide windows of opportunity for promoting carbon pricing. The international climate regime can support the adoption of carbon pricing through mitigation commitments and international financial and technical assistance. Learning between polities from the same region is a useful tool for promoting carbon pricing. Carbon intensive economies tend to prefer emissions trading over carbon taxes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Current country-level commitments under the Paris Agreement fall short of putting the world on a required trajectory to stay below a 2°C temperature increase compared to pre-industrial levels by the end of the century. Therefore, the timing of increased ambition is hugely important and as such this paper analyses the impact of both the short and long-term goals of the Paris Agreement on global emissions and economic growth. Using the hybrid TIAM-UCL-MSA model we consider the achievement of a 2°C target against a baseline of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) while also considering the timing of increased ambition of the NDCs by 2030 and the impacts of cost reductions of key low-carbon technologies. We find that the rate of emissions reduction ambition required between 2030 and 2050 is almost double when the NDCs are achieved but not ratcheted up until 2030, and leads to lower levels of economic growth throughout the rest of the century. However, if action is taken immediately and is accompanied by increasingly rapid low-carbon technology cost reductions, then there is almost no difference in GDP compared to the path suggested by the current NDC commitments. Key policy insights Delaying the additional action needed to achieve the 2°C target until 2030 is shown to require twice the rate of emissions reductions between 2030 and 2050. Total cumulative GDP over the century is lower when additional action is delayed to 2030 and therefore has an overall negative impact on the economy, even without including climate change damages. Increased ratcheting of the NDC commitments should therefore be undertaken sooner rather than later, starting in conjunction with the 2023 Global Stocktake. Early action combined with cost reductions in key renewable energy technologies can reduce GDP losses to minimal levels (<1%). A 2°C future with technological advancements is clearly possible for a similar cost as a 3.3°C world without these advances, but with lower damages and losses from climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]