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China has established three rounds of low-carbon pilot city initiatives. However, a gap exists between policy making and successful implementation, and the effects on greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction were found to be different among pilots. This paper considers the question of how low-carbon policies in cities can be implemented effectively and how policy combinations are adopted for GHG emissions reduction. It uses a mixed research approach, including Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and field investigation in Pilot Y (situated in the southwest China). The results show that, first, financial support and monitoring systems are necessary conditions, while political leadership is a sufficient condition. This means that the absence of financial support or monitoring systems could lead to increased GHG emissions, while the presence of political leadership always promotes the reduction of GHG emissions but may not be sufficient on its own to achieve them. Second, the target responsibility system (TRS) – a system used by higher government levels to assess the policy implementation of lower government levels – and human resource mechanisms cannot effectively lead to the promotion of GHG emissions reduction. Finally, in the absence of TRS and human resource mechanisms, environmental information disclosure (EID) was found to effectively promote low-carbon urban development by encouraging public participation. This paper reveals the complexity of the implementation of low-carbon policies in cities, identifies the link between city-level and national action, and enriches the theoretical explanation of governance and low-carbon policy implementation gaps in China. Key policy insights China's low-carbon pilot city project is critical for reducing GHG emissions, however, the effects of the low-carbon pilot city programmes varied greatly. Financial support and monitoring systems are necessary conditions, while political leadership is a sufficient condition to achieve cities' GHG emissions reduction goals. Local low-carbon development is limited and not put into practice at the city level in China, in part because of the absence of financial support and limited political attention. This study highlights the key conditions of organizational behaviour at the meso-level, and enriches the theoretical explanation of environmental policy implementation gaps in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thailand's Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) aims to reduce 20 to 25% of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions with respect to the projected reference level of NDC in 2030, respectively, in its unconditional and conditional scenarios. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states that limiting global temperature rise to 1.5°C would require net zero carbon dioxide emissions globally by around 2050. Thailand's current energy system is highly fossil fuel dependent and requires enormous transformations to achieve more stringent GHG emission reduction targets beyond its NDC. This paper seeks to estimate the level and the intensities of Thailand's energy system and their economy-wide effects post-2030 under the business as usual and 16 GHG emission reduction scenarios ranging from 30 to 100% by 2050. A computable general equilibrium analysis using the AIM/Hub model is employed to estimate the macroeconomic impacts of meeting the unconditional and conditional emission reductions of Thailand's NDC in 2030 along with varying GHG emission reductions in 2050. Results show that renewables – constituting solar, wind, biomass and hydro and carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies account for more than 95% in the power generation mix by 2050, if 100% GHG emission reduction from the 2010 level is to be achieved. Electricity generation based on biomass both with and without CCS will occupy a major share in the investments by 2050 in all the conditional and unconditional NDC scenarios. A rapid increase in carbon sequestration occurs from 2040 onwards through the deployment of CCS and bioenergy with CCS (BECCS) technologies in all the conditional and unconditional NDC scenarios. Carbon prices lie in the range of 3.4–266.2 US$/tCO2eq during 2025–2050 to achieve 100% GHG emission reductions in 2050. Imposition of early stringent mitigation target lowers the carbon prices in the conditional scenarios towards 2050 when compared to the unconditional scenarios. The rapid uptake of CCS, energy efficiency improvements and electrification of the end-use technologies are identified to be the key measures to transform the energy system of Thailand. By 2050, the Thai economy would face a higher fall in both the GDP and household consumption in the unconditional scenarios than those in the conditional scenarios at all levels of GHG emission reduction. Results indicate that early mitigation efforts can be less costly than the delayed ones in the long-term. The cumulative investment needed to achieve decarbonization in Thailand is estimated to exceed 355 billion US$2005 over the period 2010–2050 in the 100% GHG reduction scenarios. The transmission and distribution investments in the power sector need to increase by 30–35% to attain 100% GHG emission reductions during 2010–2050. The trade deficit improves by up to 23–29% in the various GHG mitigation scenarios in 2050. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global climate change governance has changed substantially in the last decade, with a shift in focus from negotiating globally agreed greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction targets to nationally determined contributions, as enshrined in the 2015 Paris Agreement. This paper analyses trends in adoption of national climate legislation and strategies, GHG targets, and renewable and energy efficiency targets in almost all UNFCCC Parties, focusing on the period from 2007 to 2017. The uniqueness and added value of this paper reside in its broad sweep of countries, the more than decade-long coverage and the use of objective metrics rather than normative judgements. Key results show that national climate legislation and strategies witnessed a strong increase in the first half of the assessed decade, likely due to the political lead up to the Copenhagen Climate Conference in 2009, but have somewhat stagnated in recent years, currently covering 70% of global GHG emissions (almost 50% of countries). In comparison, the coverage of GHG targets increased considerably in the run up to adoption of the Paris Agreement and 89% of global GHG emissions are currently covered by such targets. Renewable energy targets saw a steady spread, with 79% of the global GHG emissions covered in 2017 compared to 45% in 2007, with a steep increase in developing countries. Key policy insights The number of countries that have national legislation and strategies in place increased strongly up to 2012, but the increase has levelled off in recent years, now covering 70% of global emissions by 2017 (48% of countries and 76% of global population). Economy-wide GHG reduction targets witnessed a strong increase in the build up to 2015 and are adopted by countries covering 89% of global GHG emissions (76% not counting USA) and 90% of global population (86% not counting USA) in 2017. Renewable energy targets saw a steady increase throughout the last decade with coverage of countries in 2017 comparable to that of GHG targets. Key shifts in national measures coincide with landmark international events - an increase in legislation and strategy in the build-up to the Copenhagen Climate Conference and an increase in targets around the Paris Agreement - emphasizing the importance of the international process to maintaining national momentum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a detailed analysis of the Tokyo Metropolitan Emissions Trading Scheme (Tokyo ETS), Japan’s first emissions trading scheme with mandatory cap initiated by the government of Tokyo. Unlike trading schemes in other countries, the Tokyo ETS covers indirect emissions from the commercial sector. It is well known that a variety of market barriers impede full realization of energy efficiency opportunities, especially in the commercial sector. Experiences with the Tokyo ETS should therefore provide important lessons for the design of climate change mitigation policies, especially when targeting the commercial sector. The emissions from covered entities have been drastically reduced from those at the scheme’s outset, with an average 14% reduction as of the end of the first commitment period of five years (2010-2014) compared with 2009 levels. This paper shows that the Tokyo ETS alone did not cause these reductions; there were other drivers. Among them, the energy savings triggered by the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 were crucial. The contribution of credit trading, in contrast, was limited since most of the covered entities reduced emissions by themselves. Through an investigation of official reports, an assessment of the emissions data from the covered entities compared to those of uncovered entities and in-depth interviews with firms covered by the scheme, this paper confirms that the main drivers of emissions reductions by covered entities were separate from the ETS. In fact, the advisory aspect of the scheme seems to be much more important in encouraging energy-saving actions. Key policy insights Most of the observed emission reductions were not caused by the Tokyo ETS alone. An advisory instrument was crucial to the effectiveness of the Tokyo ETS. The experience of the Tokyo ETS suggests that making full use of the advantages of emissions trading is difficult in the case of the commercial sector. Price signals have not provided a stimulus to climate change mitigation actions, which implies that establishing a cap to yield effective carbon prices poses a challenge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most policy instruments to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have focused on producers, and on the energy efficiency of buildings, vehicles and other products. Behavioural changes related to climate change also impact 'in-use' emissions, and potentially, emissions both 'upstream' (including from imported goods) and 'downstream' (eg disposal). Consumption-oriented policies may provide avenues to additional and cost-effective emission reductions, but are less prevalent, in part because of political sensitivities around government efforts to shape individual-level mitigation behaviour. In this paper, we explore policy instruments for encouraging low carbon behaviour in the EU context. Drawing on a literature survey and interviews, as part of the EU Carbon-CAP project, we develop a list of 33 potential instruments, present a systematic methodology for assessing their potential impact and feasibility, and apply this to rank instruments of most interest. Most instruments involve a clear trade-off between their potential impact and feasibility; about half feature in the top three scoring categories, many being voluntary approaches, which may be easier to implement, but with limited or highly uncertain impact. However, we identify a handful of top-scoring instruments that deserve far more policy attention. The complexity of consumer and corporate motivations and behaviours suggests that instruments should be trialled and monitored (e.g. in regions / individual States) before widespread introduction. Most would also be most effective when nested within wider policy packages, to address the varied behavioural motivations and stages of supply chains. Key policy insights Influencing consumer behaviour has been little used in climate policy and is politically sensitive and complex, but can address emissions that have largely escaped influence to date. A few instruments stand out as particularly promising, including: technology lists; supply chain procurement by leading retail companies; a carbon-intensive materials consumption charge; and key infrastructure improvements. A common trade-off between potential impact and likely feasibility points to the importance of government-business collaboration to secure support and impact. More ambitious transformation would require a mix of production and consumption-oriented policy instruments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]