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This paper examines the influence of democratic institutions on environmental policy stringency and the degree to which it is affected by membership in the Arctic Council. We hypothesize that, relative to countries with no Arctic presence, countries present in the Arctic given their territorial, trade, and touristic interests are more pro-environmentally inclined as they experience the effects of global warming first-hand, and the quality of democratic institutions may reinforce this effect. Our empirical analysis based on global macroeconomic data suggests that countries with democratic institutional environments are associated with more response to Arctic status and more stringent environmental policies. Moreover, the presence of democratic governments in the Arctic increases the stringency of both market- and non-market-based environmental regulations. The suggestive estimated monetary value associated with the impact of democratic institutions in the Arctic is about 101,000 international dollars per capita. These findings underscore that the development of democratic institutions may lead to strong welfare improvements and can be used in the design of international environmental agreements for Arctic area protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some communities see fewer greenhouse gas emissions than others? This study examines the intervening role of environmental NGOs in Japanese urban emissions between 2005 and 2017. We draw from all 1741 Japanese municipalities, testing the effect of grassroots NGOs on emissions, and demonstrating different pathways to reducing emissions through the cases of three environmental organizations. While past studies have examined the role of social ties in environmental governance outcomes like emission reduction efforts, the direct roles of grassroots organizations have not yet been explored in a mixed methods design. We find that cities with more local grassroots organizations and multi-level organizations tend to see fewer emissions over time, a compelling endorsement of civil society efforts to avert climate change. This study aims to build a theory on what kinds of environmental NGOs promote climate change mitigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The shift away from ecology towards climatology in Norwegian environmental policy in the late 1980s and 1990s was not accidental. A main mover was the Labor Party politician Gro Harlem Brundtland who did not want to deal with unruly and highly vocal Deep Ecologists. Better then to start afresh with a different set of environmental scholars appealing to the technocratic tradition within the Labor Party. Instead of changing the ethical and social ways of dealing with environmental problems as the Deep Ecologists were advocating, she was looking for technological and economic solutions. And she mobilized an international regime of carbon capture storage (CCS), tradable carbon emissions quota (TEQs), and clean development mechanisms (CDMs), all of which eventually were approved in Kyoto in 1997. This move towards technocracy and cost-benefit economics reflects a post-Cold War turn towards utilitarian capitalism, but also a longing to showcase Norway as an environmental pioneer country to the world. The underlying question was how to reconcile the nation’s booming petroleum industry with reduction in climate gas emissions. Should the oil and gas stay underground and the country strive towards the ecologically informed zerogrowth society the Deep Ecologists were envisioning? Or could growth in the petroleum industry take place without harming the environment as the Labor Party environmentalists argued? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Proponents of climate change mitigation face difficult choices about which types of policy instrument(s) to pursue. The literature on the comparative evaluation of climate policy instruments has focused overwhelmingly on economic analyses of instruments aimed at restricting demand for greenhouse gas emissions (especially carbon taxes and cap-and-trade schemes) and, to some extent, on instruments that support the supply of or demand for substitutes for emissions-intensive goods, such as renewable energy. Evaluation of instruments aimed at restricting the upstream supply of commodities or products whose downstream consumption causes greenhouse gas emissions—such as fossil fuels—has largely been neglected in this literature. Moreover, analyses that compare policy instruments using both economic and political (e.g. political “feasibility” and “feedback”) criteria are rare. This article aims to help bridge both of these gaps. Specifically, the article demonstrates that restrictive supply-side policy instruments (targeting fossil fuels) have numerous characteristic economic and political advantages over otherwise similar restrictive demand-side instruments (targeting greenhouse gases). Economic advantages include low administrative and transaction costs, higher abatement certainty (due to the relative ease of monitoring, reporting and verification), comprehensive within-sector coverage, some advantageous price/efficiency effects, the mitigation of infrastructure “lock-in” risks, and mitigation of the “green paradox”. Political advantages include the superior potential to mobilise public support for supply-side policies, the conduciveness of supply-side policies to international policy cooperation, and the potential to bring different segments of the fossil fuel industry into a coalition supportive of such policies. In light of these attributes, restrictive supply-side policies squarely belong in the climate policy “toolkit”. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The achieved international consensus on the 1.5-2 °C target entails that most of current fossil fuel reserves must remain unburned. A major contribution has to come from coal as both the most abundant and the most emission-intensive fuel. Currently, a majority of climate policies aiming at reducing coal consumption are directed towards the demand side. In the absence of a global carbon-pricing regime, these policies are prone to carbon leakage and other adverse effects. Supply-side climate policies present an alternative and increasingly discussed approach to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels. In this article, I employ a numerical model of the international steam coal market to examine two supply-side policies that are currently discussed in academic literature and by policy-makers, alike: (1) a production subsidy reform introduced in major coal-producing countries and (2) a globally implemented moratorium on new coal mines. The model simulates global patterns of coal supply, demand, and international trade, with endogenous investment in coal production and transportation capacities. I find that mere production subsidy removal, while associated with a small positive total welfare effect, leads to a minor reduction of global emissions. By contrast, a mine moratorium induces a much more pronounced reduction in global coal consumption by effectively limiting coal availability and strongly increasing prices. Depending on the specification of reserves, the moratorium can induce a coal consumption path consistent with the 1.5-2 °C target. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The shift away from coal is at the heart of the global low-carbon transition. Can governments of coal-producing countries help facilitate this transition and benefit from it? This paper analyses the case for coal taxes as supply-side climate policy implemented by large coal exporting countries. Coal taxes can reduce global carbon dioxide emissions and benefit coal-rich countries through improved terms-of-trade and tax revenue. We employ a multi-period equilibrium model of the international steam coal market to study a tax on steam coal levied by Australia alone, by a coalition of major exporting countries, by all exporters, and by all producers. A unilateral export tax has little impact on global emissions and global coal prices as other countries compensate for reduced export volumes from the taxing country. By contrast, a tax jointly levied by a coalition of major coal exporters would significantly reduce global emissions from steam coal and leave them with a net sector level welfare gain, approximated by the sum of producer surplus, consumer surplus, and tax revenue. Production taxes consistently yield higher tax revenues and have greater effects on global coal consumption with smaller rates of carbon leakages. Questions remain whether coal taxes by major suppliers would be politically feasible, even if they could yield economic benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite successful examples of multilevel government leadership on climate change policy, many local officials still face a variety of barriers, including low public support, low resources, and political division. But perhaps most significant is lack of public discussion about climate change. We propose deliberative framing as a strategy to open the silence, bridge political division, identify common and divergent interests and values, and thereby devise collective responses to climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay discusses the concept of usefulness of research for climate change adaptation. Based on prior research and stakeholder interactions with policymakers and practitioners in the Nordic countries, we contend that critical issues related to the usefulness of adaptation research seem less associated with content (i.e. research outputs), but rather centre around the efforts made to design and communicate research, that is, to put research at the service of society and make the case for adaptation on the political agenda. This, we argue, to some extent mirrors the situation and political context in the Nordic countries, where adaptation in many locations still is an issue in its infancy, not firmly established on the political agendas, and where working procedures are not yet institutionally settled. In this context, science is considered and sometimes used as a discursive tool to make the case for adaptation. Based on the calls for research that inspires, raises hope and helps to raise the issue of adaptation on the political agendas, we elaborate the role of honest issue advocates for researchers in the field of adaptation science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, a model for the distribution of the Global Carbon Budget between the countries of the world is presented. The model is based on the criteria of equity while also taking into account the different historical responsibilities. The Global Carbon Budget corresponds to the quantity of carbon dioxide emissions that can still be released into the atmosphere while maintaining the increase in the average earth surface temperature below 2 °C, and it is therefore compatible with the long-term objective defined in the Paris Agreement. The results of applying the model are shown both for the 15 emitters that currently top the ranking for world emissions as well as for the other countries, which are grouped together in three main groups: Other African, Other Latin American and Caribbean, and the Rest of the World. Mitigation curves compatible with the carbon budget allocated to the different countries are presented. When comparing each emitter’s historical emissions for the period 1971-2010 with the proposed distribution for the period 2011-2050 obtained using the model, it can be seen that developed countries must face the future with a greatly reduced carbon budget, whereas developing countries can make use of a carbon budget that is higher than their cumulative historical emissions. Finally, there is a discussion about how a model with these characteristics could be useful when implementing the Paris Agreement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The agri-food sector must adapt to changes in climate variability, while also helping to mitigate climate change. Measures termed ‘triple-win’ mitigate and adapt to climate change, while also improving soil health, thereby increasing yields. These measures might appear to be the easiest to implement, but in practice, barriers prevent full realisation. This study aims to move beyond previous research efforts that identify and categorise barriers by (i) revealing hidden barriers, (ii) understanding the interactions between barriers and (iii) exploring ways to address barriers. A case study focusing on crop rotation as a triple-win strategy in Ukraine demonstrates how a participant-driven iterative research approach can achieve these objectives. During semi-structured interviews with farmers and stakeholders, crop rotation emerged as an area of considerable dissensus with stakeholders commonly citing the greedy behaviour of producers as the problem. Further discussion indicated that the political economy of Ukraine caused financial constraints for producers and Q methodology allowed for additional clarity on the opposing views of crop rotation. Three factors emerged: producer insecurity, national insecurity and business insecurity. These three perspectives reveal contrasting priorities with producer insecurity and business insecurity concerned with the conditions under which producers must operate, while national insecurity has a focus on improving agricultural production to benefit the nation. Consensus statements across all factors could provide first steps to addressing barriers and an opportunity to open discussions amongst stakeholders. Finally, barriers arising from political processes demonstrate that climate policy needs to be integrated with other sector-specific policy decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Effective communication of risks involved in the climate change discussion is crucial and despite ambitious protection policies, the possibility of irreversible consequences actually occurring can only be diminished but never ruled out completely. We present a laboratory experiment that studies how residual risk of failure of climate change policies affects willingness to contribute to such policies. Despite prevailing views on people’s risk aversion, we found that contributions were higher at least in the final part of treatments including a residual risk. We interpret this as the product of a psychological process where residual risk puts participants into an ”alarm mode,” keeping their contributions high. We discuss the broad practical implications this might have on the real-world communication of climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cities in the USA engage in action on climate change, even as the federal government remains resistant to comprehensive climate policy. While experts generally agree that local level adaptation and mitigation policies are critical to avoiding the worst climate impacts, the degree to which cities communicate climate change issues to their constituents has yet to be fully explored. In this article, we evaluate how US cities communicate climate change-related issues, problems, and policies. We use a computer-assisted approach to evaluate climate change efforts by cities by examining the full text of press releases of 82 large cities in the USA. We first identify who discusses climate change, finding that many large cities in the USA address climate change in their public communication. Second, we examine the content of these discussions. Many cities discuss weather-related concerns in conjunction with broad collaborative efforts to address global warming, while city-based policy discussions focus more on energy and transportation efforts. Third, we evaluate the local factors associated with these discussions. We find that the city’s climate vulnerability is particularly influential in shaping the level and timing of climatic communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper distinguishes between bridging and bonding social capital to assess their roles for individual farmers’ adaptation strategies taken through technology adoption. Based on primary data collected in Langcang River (LCR) basin area in southwestern China, the paper finds: (1) adaptation measures have been widely taken by surveyed households, but non-infrastructure-based measures are more prevalent than infrastructure-based measures and (2) surveyed households have strong social capital while having weak bridging social capital. Their bonding social capital has significantly positive relationship with their adaptation decisions, but bridging social capital does not have such statistically significant relationship. It recommends that the governments contemplate carefully how to help the poor to get a good combination of bonding and bridging social capital when designing policies to help the rural poor to improve their long-term adaptive capacity and achieve sustainable rural development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Misperceptions of the scientific consensus on climate change are an important problem in environmental policy. These misperceptions stem from a combination of ideological polarization and statements from prominent politicians who endorse information contradicting or misrepresenting the scientific consensus on climate change. Our study tests a source credibility theory of correction using different partisan sources of information in a survey experiment. We find that corrections from Republicans speaking against their partisan interest are most likely to persuade respondents to acknowledge and agree with the scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change. The extent of these effects vary by the partisanship of the recipient. Our results suggest that the partisan gap on climate change can be reduced by highlighting the views of elite Republicans who acknowledge the scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is limited knowledge on institutional factors constraining and enabling climate change adaptation in Arctic regions, or the overall readiness of governing bodies and communities to develop, implement, and promote adaptation. This paper examines the preparedness of different levels of government to adapt in the Canadian Arctic territory of Nunavut, drawing upon semi-structured interviews with government personnel and organizations involved in adaptation. In the Government of Nunavut, there have been notable developments around adaptation planning and examples of adaptation champions, but readiness for adaptation is challenged by a number of factors including the existence of pressing socio-economic problems, and institutional and governmental barriers. Federally, there is evidence of high-level leadership on adaptation, the creation of adaptation programs, and allocation of funds for adaptation, although the focus has been mostly on researching adaptation options as opposed to supporting actual actions or policy change. The 2016 Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change, and increasing emphasis on climate change federally and in the Government of Nunavut, offer opportunities for advancing adaptation, but concrete steps are needed to ensure readiness is enhanced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To what extent citizens are willing not only to support ambitious climate policy but also willing to pay for such policy remains subject to debate. Our analysis addresses three issues in this regard: whether, as is widely assumed but not empirically established, willingness to support (WTS) is higher than willingness to pay (WTP); whether the determinants of the two are similar; and what accounts for within-subject similarity between WTS and WTP. We address these issues based on data from an original nationally representative survey ( N = 2500) on forest conservation in Brazil, arguably the key climate policy issue in the country. The findings reveal that WTP is much lower than WTS. The determinants differ to some extent as well, regarding the effects of age, gender, and trust in government. The analysis also provides insights into factors influencing how much WTS and WTP line up within individuals, with respect to age, education, political ideology, salience of the deforestation issue, and trust in government. Our findings provide a more nuanced picture of how strong public support for climate change policy is and a starting point for more targeted climate policy communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Banking and borrowing emission allowances provide temporal flexibility in cap-and-trade systems, which can enhance the economic efficiency of environmental policy while adhering to the same cumulative emission budget. This paper investigates the role of temporal ('when') flexibility from emission banking provisions under an economy-wide cap-and-trade policy in the USA. The current literature on meeting deep decarbonization targets almost exclusively assumes unlimited banking, which may bias policy recommendations and have important consequences for R&D prioritization and model development. Numerical experiments using the energy-economic model US Regional Energy, GHG, and Economy (US-REGEN) indicate that assumptions about banking materially impact cost and emission pathways in meeting long-term targets like 80% reductions by 2050 relative to 2005 levels. Given the stringency of long-run targets and convexity of marginal abatement costs, the cost-minimizing time path for mitigation with banking suggests that 2025 abatement should exceed the pledged level under the Paris Agreement (42% instead of 26-28%) to reduce future costs. Total policy costs are approximately 30% higher when banking is excluded; however, political economy barriers and uncertainty may limit the use of banking provisions despite their appeal on economic efficiency grounds. Banking on policy implementation with unlimited temporal flexibility may distort insights about the pace, extent, and economic impacts of future energy transitions associated with long-term abatement targets, especially for more stringent climate policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change presents a challenge to land management agencies tasked with managing landscapes to protect natural resources and provide key goods and services in the face of ecological change, complexity, and uncertainty. Land management agencies, like the U.S. Forest Service, have developed multi-faceted strategies that utilize concepts like resilience and ecological integrity to guide adaptation. To address an extant research need, we conducted a qualitative case study, consisting of interviews with Forest Service staff in the Rocky Mountain Region, to explore how local federal land managers approach adaptation. Our goals were to understand what impacts managers are finding salient, perceptions of current agency strategies, and aspects of policy and practice that support effective adaptation planning. Interview participants anticipate impacts to disturbance regimes, wildlife species, and human uses. Participants intend to draw on agency policies, like its climate change scorecard and its land management planning regulations. However, the participants note that ambiguous concepts, uncertainty, and institutional variables make adaptation planning challenging in practice. A major theme apparent in the interviews was the use of partnerships with a range of other entities to address climate change. Ambiguity associated with concepts like resilience and ecological integrity allow them to function as boundary concepts; however, this ambiguity makes it challenging for managers to operationalize these concepts. These findings revealed that climate change adaptation is leading to and revealing the need for broader governance change. Moving forward, it will be crucial to adjust current governance structures to support long-term partnerships adept at translating scientific knowledge into actions and implementing complex boundary concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the failure of integrated, top-down bargaining strategies, analysts and diplomats have now turned to bottom-up methods such as 'building blocks' and 'climate clubs' to coordinate national climate change policies and to avoid persistent diplomatic deadlock. We agree that decomposition of the grand problem of climate change into smaller units is a crucial first step towards effective cooperation. But we argue that given the great uncertainty of the feasibility and costs of potential solutions, this bottom-up approach will only work if it is supported by institutions that promote joint exploration of possibilities by public and private actors along with the scaling up of successes. As politics precludes creating many of these institutions under the consensus-oriented decision rules of the UN system, engaged outsiders-including especially clubs or building blocks that can learn in the face of uncertainty-working in parallel with the UN diplomatic process will have to provide them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inadequate policy surveillance has undermined the effectiveness of multilateral climate agreements. To illustrate an alternative approach to transparency, I evaluate policy surveillance under the 2009 G-20 fossil fuel subsidies agreement. The Leaders of the Group of 20 nations tasked their energy and finance ministers to identify and phase-out fossil fuel subsidies. The G-20 leaders agreed to submit their subsidy reform strategies to peer review and to independent expert review conducted by international organizations. This process of developed and developing countries pledging to pursue the same policy objective, designing and publicizing implementation plans, and subjecting plans and performance to review by international organizations differs considerably from the historic approach under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. This paper draws lessons from the fossil fuel subsidies agreement for climate policy surveillance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change is the consequence of a market failure, with private actors' incentives misaligned on a global scale and across multiple generations. Government policies to address climate change remain inadequate and the near term prospects are suspect. Analysts have turned their attention to finding alternative approaches to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Green clubs offer a potential institutional mechanism for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, but to be effective they must be designed to fit their circumstances. An effective green club solves a market or quasi-market failure among firms and their stakeholders. Focusing on the market and nonmarket strategic imperatives for green clubs identifies several important considerations for improving the effectiveness of green clubs. Green clubs addressing climate change are more likely to be effective if they provide potential participants with a private benefit they are unable to achieve through other means and when the private benefits participants receive are tightly linked to the environmental benefits the club produces. Analyzing green clubs through this lens suggests that environmental certification club goods are more promising candidates than environmental technology club goods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we make two points about bottom-up approaches to climate policy. First, we argue that it is more productive to work with a small group of countries to establish the basis of a global climate regime than tackling the issue with all countries, as in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Secondly, we argue that negotiators should also work explicitly to encourage the development and deployment of clean technologies as a way to reduce future emissions, and suggest how this might be achieved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Paris Agreement cemented a new framework for global climate policy based on the voluntary and non-legally binding emission reduction actions by both developed and developing countries. The building blocks strategy for climate action discussed in this Special Issue is well adapted to and strongly complements this new structure. Building blocks focus on multiple transnational mechanisms for mobilizing a wide range of both public and private actors to take actions that reduce emissions by capturing incentives other than climate mitigation as such. The initial commitments by countries under the Paris Agreement are insufficient to meet the level of action required to stabilize the global climate system at a safe level. As such, new voluntary action by public and private actors will be required. The building blocks strategy, and the examples presented in this Special Issue, offers answers to the question of how to generate and design smaller-scale initiatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change is one of the most compelling challenges for science communication today. Societal reforms are necessary to reduce the risks posed by a changing climate, yet many people fail to recognize climate change as a serious issue. Unfortunately, the accumulation of scientific data, in itself, has failed to compel the general public on the urgent need for pro-environmental policy action. We argue that certain metaphors for the human-environment relationship can lead people to adopt a more nuanced and responsible conception of their place in the natural world. In two studies, we tested properties of multiple metaphors with the general public (study 1) and experts on climate change (study 2). The metaphor 'the earth is our home' resonated with climate experts as well as diverse subpopulations of the general public, including conservatives and climate-change deniers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While there has been considerable focus on understanding barriers to climate information use associated with the character of climate knowledge, individuals' negative perception of its usability and constraints of decision-contexts, less attention has been paid to understanding how different scales of decision-making influence information use. In this study, we explore how water and resource managers' scales of decision-making and scope of decision responsibilities influence climate information use in two Great Lakes watersheds. We find that despite availability of tailored climate information, actual use of information remains low. Reasons include (a) lack of willingness to place climate on agendas because local managers perceive climate change as politically risky, (b) lack of formal mandate or authority at the city and county scale to translate climate information into on-the-ground action, (c) problems with the information itself, and (d) perceived lack of demand for climate information by those managers who have the mandate and authority to use (or help others use) climate information. Our findings suggest that (1) scientists and information brokers should produce information that meets a range of decision needs and reserve intensive tailoring efforts for decision makers who have willingness and authority to use climate information; (2) without support from higher levels of decision-making (e.g., state), it is unlikely that climate information use will accelerate significantly; and (3) the trend towards characterizing climate specific actions within a broader concept of sustainability practices, or 'adaptation by stealth,' should be supported as a component of the climate adaptation repertoire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Least developed countries often lack the requisite capacity to implement climate change adaptation projects. The Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) is a scheme where industrialized countries have (as of early 2016) disbursed $934.5 million in voluntary contributions, raised more than four times that amount in co-financing, and supported 213 adaptation projects across 51 least developed countries. But what sorts of challenges have arisen during implementation? Based on extensive field research in five least developed countries-Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, the Maldives, and Vanuatu-and original data collected from almost 150 research interviews, this article qualitatively explores both the benefits and challenges of LDCF projects in the Asia-Pacific. It finds that while LDCF projects do contribute to enhancing multiple types of infrastructural, institutional, and community-based adaptive capacity, they also suffer from uncertainty, a convoluted management structure, and an inability to fully respond to climate risks. Based on these findings, the study concludes that adaptation must be pursued as a multidimensional process; and that LDCF activities have tended to promote marginal rather than more radical or systematic transformations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The winter of 2013/2014 saw a series of severe storms hit the UK, leading to widespread flooding, a major emergency response and extensive media exposure. Previous research indicates that experiencing extreme weather events has the potential to heighten engagement with climate change, however the process by which this occurs remains largely unknown, and establishing a clear causal relationship from experience to perceptions is methodologically challenging. The UK winter flooding offered a natural experiment to examine this question in detail. We compare individuals personally affected by flooding ( n = 162) to a nationally representative sample ( n = 975). We show that direct experience of flooding leads to an overall increased salience of climate change, pronounced emotional responses and greater perceived personal vulnerability and risk perceptions. We also present the first evidence that direct flooding experience can give rise to behavioural intentions beyond individual sustainability actions, including support for mitigation policies, and personal climate adaptation in matters unrelated to the direct experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The landmark agreement recently negotiated in Paris represents an ambitious plan to combat climate change. Nevertheless, countries' current climate pledges are insufficient to achieve the agreement's goal of keeping global mean temperature rise 'well below' 2 C. It is apparent that climate negotiators need to be equipped with additional strategies for fostering cooperation if a climate catastrophe is to be averted. We review the results arising from an emerging literature in which the problem of avoiding dangerous climate change has been simulated using cooperation experiments in which individuals play a game requiring collective action to avert a catastrophe. This literature has uncovered five key variables that influence the likelihood of avoiding disaster: (1) the perceived risk of collective failure, (2) inequalities in historical responsibility, wealth, and risk exposure, (3) uncertainty surrounding the threshold for catastrophe, (4) intergenerational discounting, and (5) the prospect of reward or punishment based on reputation. Along with the results of a recent experimental assessment of the key instruments of the Paris Agreement, we consider how knowledge of the effects of these variables might be harnessed by climate negotiators to improve the prospects of reaching a solution to global climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Adverse climatic conditions may differentially drive human migration patterns between rural and urban areas, with implications for changes in population composition and density, access to infrastructure and resources, and the delivery of essential goods and services. However, there is little empirical evidence to support this notion. In this study, we investigate the relationship between climate shocks and migration between rural and urban areas within Mexico. We combine individual records from the 2000 and 2010 Mexican censuses ( n = 683,518) with high-resolution climate data from Terra Populus that are linked to census data at the municipality level ( n = 2321). We measure climate shocks as monthly deviation from a 30-year (1961-1990) long-term climate normal period, and uncover important nonlinearities using quadratic and cubic specifications. Satellite-based measures of urban extents allow us to classify migrant-sending and migrant-receiving municipalities as rural or urban to examine four internal migration patterns: rural-urban, rural-rural, urban-urban, and urban-rural. Among our key findings, results from multilevel models reveal that each additional drought month increases the odds of rural-urban migration by 3.6%. In contrast, the relationship between heat months and rural-urban migration is nonlinear. After a threshold of ~34 heat months is surpassed, the relationship between heat months and rural-urban migration becomes positive and progressively increases in strength. Policy and programmatic interventions may therefore reduce climate induced rural-urban migration in Mexico through rural climate change adaptation initiatives, while also assisting rural migrants in finding employment and housing in urban areas to offset population impacts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anthropogenic climate change will influence winter chill accumulation, with future declines likely in temperate locations. However, these declines only translate as impacts when cultivar winter chilling requirements are not satisfied. This study presents a methodology to evaluate future impacts of declining winter chill through a cultivarspecific approach which is useful for growers, industry and policy-makers to develop adaptation strategies. A risk based system was applied to represent the likelihood of meeting cultivar chilling requirements using low, medium, medium-high and high risk ratings based on percentiles. This was combined with climate projection uncertainty graphically at 16 Australian growing districts historically (1981-2010) and for 2030, 2050 and 2090. The results demonstrated that impacts and likely adaptation options differed between cultivars, some recording limited risk at all sites out to 2090 ('Nonpareil' almond) whilst others recorded greater risk both historically and into the future ('Chandler' walnut). Notably, risk differed across sites and with the future time period. These results highlight which cultivars are susceptible to low winter chill conditions, where this risk does and does not manifest and the different time horizons at which the risk will materialise across Australia's main growing districts. Using this approach, changes in winter chill conditions are presented in a useable form which allows for appropriate climate adaptation strategies to be developed, securing the industries into the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates policy actors' positions on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) expressed in Indonesian media, and shows how these policy debates have evolved between 2007 and 2012. Results indicate media debates have moved beyond early, buoyant consensus on REDD+ as a win-win solution for economic growth and environmental conservation, to clearly acknowledge the need for institutional and governance reform. Several shifts in the frequency and nature of REDD+ discourse around 2010 - including from an international to a national level focus and an increase in the level of optimism - suggests the 2010 Letter of Intent between Indonesia and Norway has the potential to be a significant driver of change. Results also indicate that translating political will into measurable performance at a local or jurisdictional level is likely to require a broader appreciation of the complex interests, expectations and implications associated with the necessary reforms, and stronger engagement with key actor groups whose vested interests go beyond REDD+ itself. We observe an apparent desire on the part of Indonesian national authorities to have their cake and eat it too; that is, to keep their forest and clear it too. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mitigating climate change will require innovation in energy technologies. Policy makers are faced with the question of how to promote this innovation, and whether to focus on a few technologies or to spread their bets. We present results on the extent to which public R&D might shape the future cost of energy technologies by 2030. We bring together three major expert elicitation efforts carried out by researchers at UMass Amherst, Harvard, and FEEM, covering nuclear, solar, Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), bioelectricity, and biofuels. The results show experts believe that there will be cost reductions resulting from R&D and report median cost reductions around 20 % for most of the technologies at the R&D budgets considered. Although the improvements associated to solar and CCS R&D show some promise, the lack of consensus across studies, and the larger magnitude of the R&D investment involved in these technologies, calls for caution when defining what technologies would benefit the most from additional public R&D. In order to make R&D funding decisions to meet particular goals, such as mitigating climate change or improving energy security, or to estimate the social returns to R&D, policy makers need to combine the information provided in this study on cost reduction potentials with an analysis of the macroeconomic implications of these technological changes. We conclude with recommendations for future directions on energy expert elicitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is likely that climate change communications and media coverage will increasingly stress the importance of adaptation, yet little is known about whether or how this may affect attitudes towards mitigation. Despite concerns that communicating adaptation could undermine public support for mitigation, previous research has found it can have the opposite effect by increasing risk salience. It is also unclear whether people respond differently to information about mitigation and adaptation depending on whether action is framed as an individual or government responsibility. Using an experimental design, this study sought to examine how public attitudes towards mitigation are influenced by varying climate change messages, and how this might interact with prior attitudes to climate change. UK-based participants ( N = 800) read one of four texts in a 2 × 2 design comparing adaptation versus mitigation information and personal versus governmental action. No main effect was found for adaptation versus mitigation framing, nor for individual action versus government policy, but we did observe a series of interaction effects with prior attitudes to climate change. Mitigation and adaptation information affected participants' responses differently depending on their pre-existing levels of concern about climate change, suggesting that mitigation framings may be more engaging for those with high levels of concern, whereas adaptation framings may be more engaging for low-concern individuals. Government mitigation action appears to engender particularly polarised attitudes according to prior concern. Implications for climate change communications are considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An effective climate agreement is urgently required, yet conflict between parties prevails over cooperation. Thanks to advances in science it is now possible to quantify the global carbon budget, the amount of available cumulative CO emissions before crossing the 2 C threshold (Meinshausen et al. Nature 458(7242):1158-1162, ). Countries carbon claims, however, exceed this. Historically such situations have been tackled with bankruptcy division rules. We argue that framing climate negotiations as a classical conflicting claims problem (O'Neill Math Soc Sci 2(4):345-371, ) may provide for an effective climate policy. We analyze the allocation of the global carbon budget among parties claiming the maximum emissions rights possible. Based on the selection of some desirable principles, we propose an efficient and sustainable allocation of the available carbon budget for the period 2000 to 2050 taking into account different risk scenarios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper updates the SCVI (Socio-Climatic Vulnerability Index) maps developed by Torres et al. () for Brazil, by using the new Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) projections and more recent 2010 social indicators data. The updated maps differ significantly from their earlier versions in two main ways. First, they show that heavily populated metropolitan areas - namely Belo Horizonte, Brasília, Salvador, Manaus, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo - and a large swath of land across the states of São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Bahia now have the highest SCVI values, that is, their populations are the most vulnerable to climate change in the country. Second, SCVI values for Northeast Brazil are considerably lower compared to the previous index version. An analysis of the causes of such difference reveals that changes in climate projections between CMIP3 and CMIP5 are responsible for most of the change between the different SCVI values and spatial distribution, while changes in social indicators have less influence, despite recent countrywide improvements in social indicators as a result of aggressive anti-poverty programs. These results raise the hypothesis that social reform alone may not be enough to decrease people's vulnerability to future climatic changes. Whereas the coarse spatial resolution and relatively simplistic formulation of the SCVI may limit how useful these maps are at informing decision-making at the local level, they can provide a valuable input for large-scale policies on climate change adaptation such as those of the Brazilian National Policy on Climate Change Adaptation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In climate policy, substitutions metrics are used to determine exchange ratios for different greenhouse gases as part of a multi-gas strategy. The suitability of the metric depends on the policy goals and considerations regarding its practical use. Here, we present a multi-model comparison study to look at the impact of different metrics on the mitigation strategies and global climate policy costs. The study looks into different Global Warming Potentials (GWP) and the Global Temperature change Potential (GTP). The study shows that for all the models, varying between GWPs - from different IPCC reports, with different integration periods: 20 or 100 years - has a relatively small influence on policy costs (< 2.2 % spread across scenarios with a 2.8 W/m target) and climate outcomes. Metrics with a constant low substitution value for methane (effectively reducing its abatement), in contrast, lead to higher-cost mitigation pathways (with an average cost increase of 32.8 % in a 2.8 W/m scenario). If implemented efficiently, a time-varying GTP leads to a limited cost reduction compared to GWP. However, under imperfect foresight in combination with inertia of CH abatement options, or if implemented sub-optimally, time-varying GTP can result in higher costs than a 100-year GWP. At the same time, given a long-term radiative forcing target, a time-varying GTP results in slightly higher maximum global temperature change rates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A growing body of work aims to understand the impacts of climate change on agriculture as well as farmer's perceptions of climate change and their likeliness to adopt adapting and mitigating behaviors. Despite this, little work has considered how intention to adopt differs from actual adoption of climate change practices in agriculture. Applying the Theory of Planned Behavior we aim to assess whether different factors affect intended versus actual adoption of climate behaviors among farmers in New Zealand. Data were collected through mixed methods (37 interviews and a telephone survey of 490 farmers) in two regions of New Zealand 2010-2012. Through multiple regression models we test hypotheses related to the Theory of Planned Behavior around the role of attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived capacity in affecting intended and actual adoption. Results suggest that there are different drivers of intended and actual adoption of climate change practices. Climate change attitudes and belief is only associated with intended not actual adoption. We find no evidence that subjective norms (climate change policy support) significantly influence either intention or actual adoption. Only perceived capacity and self-efficacy were important predictors of both intended and actual adoption. These results suggest a disconnect between intended and actual behavior change and that using data about intention as a guiding factor for program and policy design may not be prudent. Furthermore, fostering perceived capacity and self-efficacy for individuals may be crucial for encouraging both intended and actual adoption of climate adapting and mitigating behaviors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the implications for the US National Climate Assessment (NCA) of diversifying information needs to support climate change risk management. It describes how the Third US National Climate Assessment (NCA3) evolved to begin to narrow the gap between information from climate and impact scientists and 'intermediaries' (individuals who have expertise in climate science, communication, and decision-support processes)-who are sometimes collectively described as 'producers' in this article-and the decision-making needs of a wide range of 'users' (individuals involved in advising or making a wide range of policy and management decisions). One step in the evolution of the NCA3 included adding a chapter to assess decision-support tools and systems being used in climate-related decisions. Another involved efforts to improve characterization of the level of confidence of NCA3 authors in their findings to help decision-makers and their advisors differentiate well-established and more preliminary conclusions. This paper lays out an argument for increasing the role of the NCA in assessing decision-support systems in the Fourth Assessment (NCA4) and the Sustained Assessment. It also briefly reviews approaches and potential next steps related to characterizing uncertainty and communicating confidence intended to improve application of assessment findings by decision-makers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The leaders and authors of the Third US National Climate Assessment (NCA3) developed new modes of engaging academia, the private sector, government agencies and civil society to support their needs for usable, rigorous, and timely information and better connect science and decision-making. A strategic vision for assessment activities into the future was built during the NCA3 process, including recommendations on how to establish a sustained assessment process that would integrate evolving scientific understanding into decision making to manage the risks of climate change over time. This vision includes a collaborative assessment process that involves partnerships across a diverse and widely distributed set of non-governmental and governmental entities. The new approach to assessments would produce timely, scientifically sound climate information products and processes, rather than focusing on the production of single quadrennial synthesis reports. If properly implemented, a sustained assessment would be more efficient and cost-effective, avoiding the painful and time-consuming process of beginning the assessment process anew every 4 years. This ongoing assessment would also encourage scientific and social innovations and explore new insights and opportunities, building the capacity to advance the development and delivery of climate information to meet societal requirements and benefit from scientific opportunities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Well-targeted scientific assessments can support a range of decision-making processes, and contribute meaningfully to a variety of climate response strategies. This paper focuses on opportunities for climate assessments to be used more effectively to enhance adaptive capacity, particularly drawing from experiences with the third US National Climate Assessment (NCA3). We discuss the evolution of thinking about adaptation as a process and the importance of societal values, as well as the role of assessments in this evolution. We provide a rationale for prioritizing future assessment activities, with an expectation of moving beyond the concept of climate adaptation as an explicit and separable activity from 'normal' planning and implementation in the future. Starting with the values and resources that need to be protected or developed by communities rather than starting with an analysis of changes in climate drivers can provide opportunities for reframing climate issues in ways that are likely to result in more positive outcomes. A critical part of successful risk management is monitoring and evaluating the systems of interest to decision-makers and the effectiveness of interventions following integration of climate considerations into ongoing strategic planning activities and implementation. Increasingly this will require consideration of path dependency and coincident events. We argue that climate adaptation is a transitional process that bridges the gap between historically time-tested ways of doing business and the kinds of decision processes that may be required in the future, and that scientific assessments will be increasingly central to these transitions in decision processes over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Third US National Climate Assessment (NCA3) was produced by experts in response to the US Global Change Research Act of 1990. Based on lessons learned from previous domestic and international assessments, the NCA3 was designed to speak to a broad public and inform the concerns of policy- and decision-makers at different scales. The NCA3 was also intended to be the first step in an ongoing assessment process that would build the nation's capacity to respond to climate change. This concluding paper draws larger lessons from the insights gained throughout the assessment process that are of significance to future US and international assessment designers. We bring attention to process and products delivered, communication and engagement efforts, and how they contributed to the sustained assessment. Based on areas where expectations were exceeded or not fully met, we address four common tensions that all assessment designers must confront and manage: between (1) core assessment ingredients (knowledge base, institutional set-up, principled process, and the people involved), (2) national scope and subnational adaptive management information needs, (3) scope, complexity, and manageability, and (4) deliberate evaluation and ongoing learning approaches. Managing these tensions, amidst the social and political contexts in which assessments are conducted, is critical to ensure that assessments are feasible and productive, while its outcomes are perceived as credible, salient, and legitimate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the development of the Third U.S. National Climate Assessment, an indicators system was recommended as a foundational product to support a sustained assessment process (Buizer et al. ). The development of this system, which we call the National Climate Indicators System (NCIS), has been an important early product of a sustained assessment process. In this paper, we describe the scoping and development of recommendations and prototypes for the NCIS, with the expectation that the process and lessons learned will be useful to others developing suites of indicators. Key factors of initial success are detailed, as well as a robust vision and decision criteria for future development; we also provide suggestions for voluntary support of the broader scientific community, and for funding priorities, including a research team to coordinate and prototype the indicators, system, and process. Moving forward, sufficient coordination and scientific expertise to implement and maintain the NCIS, as well as creation of a structure for scientific input from the broader community, will be crucial to its success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Assessments that are designed to be credible and useful in the eyes of potential users must rigorously evaluate the state of knowledge but also address the practical considerations-politics, economics, institutions, and procedures-that affect real-world decision processes. The Third US National Climate Assessment (NCA3) authors integrated a vast array of sources of scientific information to understand what natural, physical and social systems are most at risk from climate change. They were challenged to explore some of the potentially substantial sources of risk that occur at the intersections of social, economic, biological, and physical systems. In addition, they worked to build bridges to other ways of knowing and other sources of knowledge, including intuitive, traditional, cultural, and spiritual knowledge. For the NCA3, inclusion of a broad array of people with on-the-ground experience in various communities, sectors and regions helped in identifying issues of practical importance. The NCA3 was more than a climate assessment; it was also an experiment in testing theories of coproduction of knowledge. A deliberate focus on the assessment process as well as the products yielded important outcomes. For example, encouraging partnerships and engagement with existing networks increased learning and made the idea of a sustained assessment more realistic. The commitment to building an assessment focused on mutual learning, transparency, and engagement contributed to the credibility and legitimacy of the product, and the saliency of its contents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The National Climate Assessment's ability to support decision-making partly relies on engaging stakeholders throughout the assessment process. The guiding vision for the Third National Climate Assessment (NCA3) was for an inclusive, broad-based, and sustained process attentive to both the conduct of assessments and communication of findings. Such a process promotes dialogue between scientific experts, stakeholders, and decision-makers about what is important in a particular region or sector, the potential impacts of climate change, and possible responses. We sought to create actionable research and assessment products widely perceived as credible, salient, and legitimate. The process also sought to build capacity to conduct sustained assessments and use climate change information in decision-making processes. Here we describe how we pursued this stakeholder engagement vision during the planning, development, and release of NCA3. Through repeated opportunities for stakeholder. input, we ensured process transparency and inclusiveness in the framing of assessment and built human capital. We also increased connectivity among stakeholder organizations. By cultivating a network of collaborators who connected the NCA to other networks, the NCA3 engagement process laid the groundwork for a sustained assessment - which is envisaged to transition the traditional quadrennial assessment approach into a more dynamic and adaptive assessment process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the 2015 summit on global climate change in Paris, political action will (or will not) be taken to tackle the threats of the global climate crisis. Both social scientists as well as conservationists have come to the conclusion that human activity is one of the main reasons for climate change and nature degradation, and the main target of justice related mitigation and adaptation responses. This article puts human (in)activity into focus, and introduces a social identity perspective on environmental justice. Specifically, it shows how conservation scientists can draw from the idea of a common human identity (CHI). It delineates how the representation of a 'common human ingroup' could inform beliefs about environmental justice, which in turn should motivate individuals and groups to act in favor of the natural environment. The review highlights that social identification with all humans may represent a potential path to global environmental justice, and combines recent insights from social identity research with conservation behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public discourse on climate change often refers to possible bias among climate scientists as a rationale for limited climate policy action by the United States. Part of this discussion is the association of scientists with environmental interest groups and whether such affiliations facilitate the perception that climate scientists lack objectivity. While surveys suggest that some climate scientists disapprove of affiliations with interest groups, recent research indicates that climate scientists are quite likely to be involved with environmental organizations. This paper compares the affiliations of scientists and the general public to discern whether scientists are uniquely likely to affiliate with interest groups or they simply share characteristics common to the public who also affiliate with these organizations. Our findings suggest that climate scientists are no more likely to donate money, but are less likely to sign a petition or attend a demonstration, when controlling for other factors. These results strengthen our understanding of the affiliations between scientists and interest groups and hold implications for the accuracy of popular perceptions of climate scientists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A significant number of countries classified as 'developing' during the negotiation of the UNFCCC in the early 1990s have experienced rapid economic growth and increase of greenhouse gas emissions since then. We assess whether governments of such countries are considering taking up responsibility for emissions mitigation in the context of the UNFCCC's principle of common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR). While an expansion of mitigation responsibility to Non-Annex I countries has been strongly opposed by overarching groups such as the G 77, we find countries such as South Africa and Indonesia that have clearly supported binding commitments. Other countries like China and Singapore oppose binding commitments but increasingly engage in domestic mitigation action. Moreover, China has pledged a significant amount of climate finance. Even in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which adamantly refuse mitigation commitments, some mitigation action seems to emerge. We thus foresee that countries will increasingly adopt differentiated positions regarding their responsibility for mitigation. This could provide new dynamics in international climate negotiations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Transformation as an adaptive response to climate change opens a range of novel policy options. Used to describe responses that produce non-linear changes in systems or their host social and ecological environments, transformation also raises distinct ethical and procedural questions for decision-makers. Expanding adaptation to include transformation foregrounds questions of power and preference that have so far been underdeveloped in adaptation theory and practice. We build on David Harvey's notion of activity space to derive a framework and research agenda for climate change adaptation seen as a political decision-point and as an opportunity for transformation, incremental adjustment or resistance to change in development pathway. Decision-making is unpacked through the notion of the activity space into seven coevolving sites: the individual, technology, livelihoods, discourse, behaviour, the environment and institutions. The framework is tested against practitioner priorities to define an agenda that can make coherent advances in research and practice on climate change adaptation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The IPCC's fifth assessment report of Working Group III has just come out. It pays special attention to the 2 °C temperature target and tells us that the window of opportunity to prevent such climate change is rapidly closing. Yet, the report also presents a portfolio of stabilization targets, reflecting a fundamental ambiguity: there is no unique 'dangerous' climate threshold. Here, we describe a framework for the evaluation of optimal climate policy given an uncertain formal climate threshold. We find that uncertainty leads to moving targets: even when the available information does not change, future regulators will tend to relax current climate plans. We develop a reduced form integrated assessment model to assess the quantitative significance of our findings. We calibrate preferences such that in 2000 a stabilization target of 450 ppmv maintains the optimal balance between climate risks and abatement costs. The naïve equilibrium ultimately reaches a peak of 570 ppmv, missing the 2000 stabilizations targets by a wide margin. Our results offer an explanation for the inertia in mitigation efforts over the past decades: policies often delay the majority of abatement efforts. Yet, believing that subsequent regulators will uphold the planned future efforts is self-defeating. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fossil fuel subsidy reform would not only decrease consumption, but also lower the world market price of traded fossil energy carriers, in particular oil. As a consequence, oil importers would lower their import bills by more than US$ 30 bn per year. Recycling at least a part of these savings to support low-carbon energy technologies in countries that reduce their subsidies could provide a mechanism to jointly incentivize transformation of the energy system and alter the political economy of subsidy reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]