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When human adults make decisions (e.g., wearing a seat belt), we often consider the negative consequences that would ensue if our actions were to fail, even if we have never experienced such a failure. Do the same considerations guide our understanding of other people's decisions? In this paper, we investigated whether adults, who have many years of experience making such decisions, and 6‐ and 7‐year‐old children, who have less experience and are demonstrably worse at judging the consequences of their own actions, conceive others' actions as motivated both by reward (how good reaching one's intended goal would be), and by what we call "danger" (how badly one's action could end). In two pre‐registered experiments, we tested whether adults and 6‐ and 7‐year‐old children tailor their predictions and explanations of an agent's action choices to the specific degree of danger and reward entailed by each action. Across four different tasks, we found that children and adults expected others to negatively appraise dangerous situations and minimize the danger of their actions. Children's and adults' judgments varied systematically in accord with both the degree of danger the agent faced and the value the agent placed on the goal state it aimed to achieve. However, children did not calibrate their inferences about how much an agent valued the goal state of a successful action in accord with the degree of danger the action entailed, and adults calibrated these inferences more weakly than inferences concerning the agent's future action choices. These results suggest that from childhood, people use a degree of danger and reward to make quantitative, fine‐grained explanations and predictions about other people's behavior, consistent with computational models on theory of mind that contain continuous representations of other agents' action plans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although current exemplar models of category learning are flexible and can capture how different features are emphasized for different categories, they still lack the flexibility to adapt to local changes in category learning, such as the effect of different sequences of study. In this paper, we introduce a new model of category learning, the Sequential Attention Theory Model (SAT-M), in which the encoding of each presented item is influenced not only by its category assignment (global context) as in other exemplar models, but also by how its properties relate to the properties of temporally neighboring items (local context). By fitting SAT-M to data from experiments comparing category learning with different sequences of trials (interleaved vs. blocked), we demonstrate that SAT-M captures the effect of local context and predicts when interleaved or blocked training will result in better testing performance across three different studies. Comparatively, ALCOVE, SUSTAIN, and a version of SAT-M without locally adaptive encoding provided poor fits to the results. Moreover, we evaluated the direct prediction of the model that different sequences of training change what learners encode and determined that the best-fit encoding parameter values match learners' looking times during training. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In two recent papers, Rose and Nichols present evidence in favor of the view that humans represent category essences in terms of a telos, such as honey‐making, and not in terms of scientific essences, such as bee DNA. Here, I challenge their interpretation of the evidence and show that it is directly predicted by the main theory they seek to undermine. I argue that their results can be explained as instances of diagnostic reasoning about scientific essences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Khemlani et al. (2018) mischaracterize logic in the course of seeking to show that mental model theory (MMT) can accommodate a form of inference (I, let us label it) they find in a high percentage of their subjects. We reveal their mischaracterization and, in so doing, lay a landscape for future modeling by cognitive scientists who may wonder whether human reasoning is consistent with, or perhaps even capturable by, reasoning in a logic or family thereof. Along the way, we note that the properties touted by Khemlani et al. as innovative aspects of MMT-based modeling (e.g., nonmonotonicity) have for decades been, in logic, acknowledged and rigorously specified by families of (implemented) logics. Khemlani et al. (2018) further declare that I is "invalid in any modal logic." We demonstrate this to be false by our introduction (Appendix A) of a new propositional modal logic (within a family of such logics) in which I is provably valid, and by the implementation of this logic. A second appendix, B, partially answers the two-part question, "What is a formal logic, and what is it for one to capture empirical phenomena?". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]