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Research on perception and cognition suggests that whereas East Asians view the world holistically, attending to the entire field and relations among objects, Westerners view the world analytically, focusing on the attributes of salient objects. These propositions were examined in the change-blindness paradigm. Research in that paradigm finds American participants to be more sensitive to changes in focal objects than to changes in the periphery or context. We anticipated that this would be less true for East Asians and that they would be more sensitive to context changes than would Americans. We presented participants with still photos and with animated vignettes having changes in focal object information and contextual information. Compared to Americans, East Asians were more sensitive to contextual changes than to focal object changes. These results suggest that there can be cultural variation in what may seem to be basic perceptual processes.

The authors examined cultural preferences for formal versus intuitive reasoning among East Asian (Chinese and Korean), Asian American, and European American university students. We investigated categorization (Studies 1 and 2), conceptual structure (Study 3), and deductive reasoning (Studies 3 and 4). In each study a cognitive conflict was activated between formal and intuitive strategies of reasoning. European Americans, more than Chinese and Koreans, set aside intuition in favor of formal reasoning. Conversely, Chinese and Koreans relied on intuitive strategies more than European Americans. Asian Americans’ reasoning was either identical to that of European Americans, or intermediate. Differences emerged against a background of similar reasoning tendencies across cultures in the absence of conflict between formal and intuitive strategies.

analogy, and connectionist models-maintain that abstract rules ore not involved in human reasoning, or at best ploy a minor role. Other views hold that the use of abstract rules is o core aspect of human reason- ing. We propose eight criteria for determining whether or not people use abstract rules in reasoning, ond examine evidence relevant to each criterion for several rule systems. We argue thot there is substantial evidence that several different inferential rules, including modus ponens, contractual rules, cousai rules, and the law of large numbers, ore used in solving everyday problems. We discuss the implications for various theoretical positions ond consider hybrid mechanisms that combine aspects of instance and rule models.