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This paper proposes a realistic appreciation of Greek communist perceptions of international realities and their impact on their domestic disposition and tactics in 1944–1949, during a particularly dense and rapidly changing international milieu. In a context whose volatility fuelled too many false perceptions, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) chose to internalise whatever it interpreted as positive signs and ignore those suggesting imponderables and adversities. The real difficulty for the Greek communists, however, was not the accuracy of their perceptions or lack thereof, but a lack of sufficient power to survive their inaccuracy. In addition, historiographically the paper seeks to redress the analytical balance in favour of national, regional and international politics as against the recent flood of local area studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to assess the sustainability of neutrality in the early Cold War. This issue is examined through the study of Switzerland's armament policy. The Swiss were able to maintain their status of a permanent neutral after the Second World War, and thus succeeded in upholding a centuries-long policy. Their armed neutrality, however, required modern weaponry. In search of this material Switzerland turned to the West, while refusing to purchase weapons from the East. The paper argues that Switzerland's self-imposed policy of armed neutrality increased Swiss dependence on western armaments, and thereby endangered its neutrality status and policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this article we will seek to analyse the development of international ties that enabled the channelling of international support to the Portuguese Socialist Party led by Mário Soares. The support directed to Portuguese socialists assumed particular relevance in the summer of 1975, during which the revolutionary dynamic questioned and challenged the democratic legitimacy. Coincidentally, during these months there were ongoing negotiations for the signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the situation in Portugal was presented by several actors as a test of the climate of détente. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Britain's participation in the process towards the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), between the Warsaw Pact's Budapest Appeal in 1969 and the opening of the CSCE in 1972, has been insufficiently studied. The British analysis of European security in the late 1960s and early 1970s informed Britain's response to calls for a conference and led them to believe that the CSCE was not the right forum for advancing their security goals. British and Western interests would also not be served by rejecting negotiations or participating in a conference held on Soviet terms. This prompted the British to contribute constructively to preparing a conference and to transforming Warsaw Pact appeals into the basis for genuine discussions. In the run up to the CSCE, British objectives settled on defending Western unity, securing the propaganda advantage, and achieving some small but meaningful steps to improve European security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]